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Federal Republic of Germany 
ABSTRACT 
The focus of this thesis is on an aspect ofjudicial accountability that has not hitherto attracted 
much attention in South African law: the civil liability of the judiciary for wrongs committed 
in the course of judicial proceedings. More particularly, the thesis examines to what extent a 
South African judicial officer may be held liable in delict for infringing the proprietary or 
personality rights of another - almost invariably a litigant appearing before the judicial officer. 
The wrongful conduct in question is usually the giving of a judgement without a proper legal 
foundation (wrong judgement), but it may take a variety of other forms, for example 
defamation, insult or, less commonly, physical assault. 
Since judicial liability is not an invention of the modem constitutional state, but has deep and 
ancient roots, the investigation is inevitably and essentially an historical one. The thesis traces 
the development of such liability in Roman law, in early medieval law, in the ius commune 
(i.e., the Italian school of the Glossators and the Commentators), in Roman-Dutch law, in 
English law, and finally, in the South African usus hodiernus. The assessment of the modem 
South African law is a critical one. The question is asked whether the narrow scope of judicial 
liability that is presently recognised is an adequate safeguard against abuse of the judicial 
office, and whether it is compatible with the new constitutional order in South Africa. 
The topicality and controversial nature of the subject is evident from the submissions made by 
the judiciary to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in October 1997. It is apparent that 
the judges are suspicious of attempts to make them more accountable for their actions, 
regarding these as encroachments on their traditional independence. Significantly, it also 
appears that the threat of civil liability is not one that is taken seriously. The approach adopted 
in this thesis is that a proper balance needs to be struck between judicial independence and 
judicial accountability; and that, as history teaches us, civil liability is an essential component 
of such accountability. 
The modus operandi adopted in this thesis is to examine the state of development of judicial 
liability in each successive historical epoch that may be considered an antecedent of the 
modem South African system. Each chapter begins by sketching the historical context, the 
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position and status of the judges in the relevant period, and the background developments in 
the general law of delict. Thereafter judicial liability is examined under three headings: 
liability for WTongjudgements; liability for infringements of personality rights; and procedural 
aspects and their practical implications. 
Liability for WTong judgements involves claims for patrimonial loss, usually under the actio 
legis Aquiliae, and has proved controversial throughout the course of its development. As we 
shall see, the scope of such liability has been gradually restricted: from strict liability in earlier 
Roman law to liability only for a deliberately incorrect judgement given with an improper 
motive in modem South African law. 
The reasons for this gradual restriction of liability may be traced to changes in the surrounding 
legal-political environment. In Republican Rome extensive judicial liability served an 
essential compensatory purpose: in the absence of the possibility of upsetting a judgement on 
appeal or review, it afforded the only means of redress for a WTonged litigant. With the advent 
of appeal procedures in later Roman law, this compensatory function of judicial liability 
tended to be overshadowed by a new aspect: the desire of the emperors to keep their judges in 
check. This use of judicial liability as an instrument of control continued for centuries, but 
with the Age of Enlightenment came new ideas about the separation of powers in a modern 
state, and the need for judicial independence from the executive arm of government. 
Certainly, in the Netherlands of the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, it had come to be 
accepted by most writers that a judge ought not to be held liable for mere negligence; partly 
because of the availability of an appeal, but also because of the very real difficulties 
experienced by a largely uneducated lower judiciary in applying the newly received and 
complex Roman law. In modem South African law, influenced as it has been by English law, 
the overriding importance attached to judicial independence has resulted in a de facto 
immunity for the judges. 
Judicial liability for infringements of personality rights usually involve claims for defamation, 
assault or for WTongful imprisonment. Since such claims are brought under the actio 
iniuriarum, which has always required deliberate wrongdoing, liability is inherently restricted 
and has proved far less controversial than liability for WTongjudgements. 
As regards procedural enforcement of judicial liability, South African law is unIque III 
recognising and retaining a particular privilege that dates back to Batavian times: a person 
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who wishes to institute an action against a judge must first petition the court for leave to sue. 
This procedural requirement presents yet another obstacle to a successful claim for damages 
against ajudge. Whether it is constitutional is an interesting question that remains to be tested. 
The research on which this thesis is based involved an investigation of both primary and 
secondary sources of information. As regards judicial liability in Roman law, in early 
medieval law, in the ius commune and in English law, much work has already been done by 
others, and I have drawn extensively upon the products of their labours. Comparatively little, 
on the other hand, has been written on judicial liability in Roman-Dutch and in modern South 
African law, so that in these systems I have perforce had to rely chiefly on primary sources. In 
the case of the Roman-Dutch law I have been fortunate to have access to the wealth of 
materials contained in the splendid Brand van Zyl Collection of the Law Faculty of the 
University of Cape Town. These comprise, inter alia, the standard works (most of which have 
been translated) of the best known Roman-Dutch writers; a large number of less familiar 
works by the same authors; and an impressive array of works by other contemporary writers of 
lesser renown. 
In the case of the modern South African law of judicial liability, given the lack of any 
monograph or treatise on the subject, I have based my analysis on the rather meagre case law, 
seen against the background of the general principles of delictual liability and of the new 
constitution. Though the cases on the substantive law of judicial liability are few and far 
between, they represent a veritable treasure chest by comparison with the virtually non­
existent cases on the procedural aspects of such liability. My research on those aspects 
entailed an investigation of the holdings in the National Archives, in the South African 
Library, and in the Library of the Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division of the High Court 
of South Africa. 
I INTRODUCTION 

In the Groninge Musemn in the Flemish town of Bruges there hangs a gruesome but 
breathtaking painting by Gerard David, a famous fifteenth century Flemish artist. The 
painting, Judgment of Cambyses, was commissioned by the city magistrates of Bruges for 
display in their beautiful and impressive town hall, which in those days reflected the 
enormous wealth and prestige of Bruges and which still today attracts multitudes of admiring 
visitors. 
The painting vividly portrays the famous story of how the Persian King Cambyses punished 
one of his judges, Sisamnes, for accepting a bribe to give an unjust judgement.! The 
punishment was death: Sisamnes' skin was to be peeled off and cut into strips to make a cover 
for the seat on which Sisamnes had sat when delivering his judgement. Thereafter Cambyses 
appointed Sisamne's son Otanes to be judge in place of his father, with the admonition to 
remember always on what seat he was sitting. 
David used two panels to portray the story. In the background of the left panel we see 
Sisamnes taking his bribe, and in the foreground his subsequent arrest by the king. In the right 
panel, we see Otanes sitting on the judgement seat around which is wrapped his father's skin; 
but our attention is inexorably drawn to the front scene where, under the watchful eye of 
Cambyses a grimacing Sisamnes is being flayed by three grim-faced executioners, one of 
whom has a knife clenched between his teeth. 
Although David's Judgment of Cambyses is a particularly chilling example, the practice of 
displaying such examplars of justice in town halls and courts was a common one in the 
Netherlands in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries.2 According to Yan der Yelden, such 
exemplars 
I The right panel of the painting is diplayed above at page iv. The oldest source of this story appears to be Herodotus, 
Historiae,26-27. 
2 See for a detailed discussion Van der Velden , Simiolus 23 (1995), I and II. Also Van Miegroet, Simiolus 18 (1990). I am 
indebted to my mother, Mrs. Gita Maria v. Hlilsen , for the patience with which she gave me her professional support in 
regard to the historical research in Dutch and Belgian libraries as well as for her valuable comments. 
2 
"... served as graphic illustrations of the impartial dispensation of justice for everyone who entered 
the buildings of the civic authorities. They were therefore designed for people from all walks of 
life, ranging from the administrators and judges who were responsible for enforcing the laws, to the 
ordinary to\\<11Speople who were bound to respect them.,,3 
Of the very many judgement scenes depicted in these exampla justitiae, that of Cambyses is 
amongst the most common.4 The conclusion is inescapable that the city fathers felt the need 
not only to emphasise that impartial justice was administered in their courts, but also to 
remind judges that harsh consequences were in store for those who abused their high office. 
The problems associated with abuse ofjudicial office - how to safeguard against it, and how 
to deal with the judge who commits the abuse - are, of course, not limited to the late medieval 
age of Ger:~ard David, but are almost as old as the law itself. As this thesis will demonstrate, 
they are problems that have occupied the minds of jurists, monarchs and politicians 
throughout the centuries. Even to this day, Juvenal's famous question: "Quis custodiet ipsos 
custodes" retains its relevance.5 In modern democratic societies it is not only expected, but 
almost taken for granted, that judges will base their decisions on a proper application of the 
relevant laws and legal principles, putting aside their personal whims, fancies and 
predilections. Not without reason is justice symbolised by a blindfolded Justitia holding aloft 
her scales before the courts.6 Unfortunately, however, today no less than in the past, the ideal 
is not always realised in practice. 
In more recent times, and especially in South Africa, the issue of judicial accountability has 
tended to be overshadowed by that of judicial independence. The need to secure the 
independence of the jUdiciary from interference or control by the other branches of 
government is undoubtedly of the utmost importance in the modern state; indeed, it has been 
described as an 'axiom of democratic political philosophy,.7 Judicial independence must 
3 Van der Velden, Simiolus 23 (\ 995) 1, 52. 
4 Other biblical themes include the Last Judgement (Apocalypse 6,10); and the Judgement of Salomo (Book of Kings I 
3,16-28); the story of Esther and Ahasuerus (or Ahaschwerosch or Artaxerxes = Xerxes I (486-465 B.C.) in Book Esther 
7,1-10); Susanna and Daniel (Book Daniel 13, I -64) or the more secular histories of the legends of Trajan or Herkinbald 
and Zaleucus. See also Van der Velden, Simiolus 23 (1995) I, 6-7; Van Miegroet, Simiolus 18 (1995), 117 for further 
references. With regard to the Judgement of Salomo see Schild, Urteil des Konigs Salomo, 281 et seqq and for the Last 
Judgement Scheffczyk, Gericht. Jiingstes, 1327. 
5 Satira, vol.VI 347. 
6 With regard to Just itia ' s image in the allegory see inler alia Windisch, 1m Zeichen der Waage, 1069-1087 and Kobler, 
Bilder, 139 
7 Bamford , SAU 73 (1956), 380. See also Andrews, South Africa, 286-313 ; Motala, ClLSA 24 (1991 ), 285-3 J 4. 
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however be balanced with judicial accountability, as many South African commentators are 
belatedly appreciating when contemplating the role played by their judiciary in propping up 
the system of apartheid. 
The need for judicial accountability is all the more evident when one considers the impressive 
power wielded by the judiciary. Viewed from the perspective of the individual in society, the 
conduct of a judge can have very severe consequences for his or her rights to liberty, property, 
personality and - in some systems, including South Africa's until very recently - even to life. 
Provided the judge adheres to the law in exercising this considerable power, there can be little 
or no cause for complaint; but when the law is disregarded, and the individual's rights are 
trampled upon, the need for some fonn of control is clear. 
What fonn that control might take depends to a large degree on the values and nonns of the 
society or legal system in question. In a fascinating article Professor Max Rheinstein has 
identified the various mechanisms that exist to secure observance of the law by the judiciary, 
and has classified them as either internal (idealistic) or external (institutional).8 Internal fonns 
of control centre upon the religious beliefs and ethical nonns of a particular community, 
which can exert a very strong influence on the behaviour of judges in that community. They 
might also include the training of judges in such a way that the making of a judicial decision 
becomes almost a conditioned reflex : shades of the so-called Begriffsjurisprudenz of the 
nineteenth century Gennan historical schoo19, and its successor, the pandectists. 1o Such a 
quasi-mechanical application of the substantive lawll holds little attraction today, however, 
B To his credit, Professor Max Rheinstein in his fascinating article Who Watches the Watchmen' was one of the first legal 

authors to scrutinise these various mechanisms that exist to secure observance of the law by the judiciary. It has to be 

acknowledged that this thesis was widely inspired by Rheinstein ' s essay. But there have been other contributions, too. 

South African contributions are for instance Labuschagne, 1993 De Jure, 347-362; Corder, SA Public Law 7 (1992), 181-193. 

Further Cameron, SAJOHR 6 (1990), 251-265 and Judicial Accountability, 181-199 or Rautenbach and Malherbe, 

Constitutional Law, 234-236. 

9 Chief representatives of these schools of thought were inter alia von Savigny, Puchta and Windscheid. 

10 With respect to the development of the historical school see De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 114-123; Van Zyl , Geskiedenis, 

250-254 and further 257-260; Wesenberg and Wesener, Privatrechtsgeschichte , 170-180 and 182-188 together with 

excellent bibliographical annotations. Note also Kelly, Western Legal Theory, 320-328 with regard to the historical school 

and 358-365 for details as to the free law movement and sociological jurisprudence. For the relevant development in the 

USA see especially the work by Reimann , Historische Schule und Common Law, 250-270 . 

I I Compare in this regard the programmatic title of Regina Ogorek ' s work: Richterkbnig oder Subsumtionsautomat7 See 

Ogorek, Rich/erkonig for details. 

and is increasingly viewed as quite unrealistic in view of the creative role necessarily played 
by judges in developing the law. Conceptual jurisprudence has to a large extent been 
supplanted by Interessenjurisprudenz and by American realism. 
External or institutional mechanisms of control may take many forms. These include inter alia 
the requirement of publicity (of judicial proceedings, of judicial decisions and of the law 
itself); the possibility of taking the decision of a judge on review or on appeal (apart from 
correcting initially wrong decisions, frequent reversals may be damaging to a judge's pride, 
reputation or prospects of promotion); an overriding power on the part of the executive or 
head of state to grant clemency; various types of sanctions (eg., disciplinary measures such as 
impeachment and removal or suspension from office; and even criminal liability in suitable 
cases, eg., bribery) and finally, the possibility of civil liability.12 
The latter is the concern of this thesis. Professor Rheinstein has described the civil liability of 
the judiciary as 
U •• • one of the most effective institutional devices ever applied to establish the judicial duty of strict 
law observance as a principle of government. Its importance in the historical development of a rule 
of law has been little investigated, but can hardly be overestimated.,,13 
One of the main aims of this thesis, at least to some extent, is to make good that deficiency by 
tracing the civil liability of a judge for wrongs committed in the course of judicial proceedings 
back to the days of the early Roman republic. There are indications, however, that such 
liability dates back to much earlier times, and was amongst the very earliest means of judicial 
control: the historical sources indicate that as early as 3700 years ago the Babylonian king 
Hammurabis enacted regulations by which judges could be held civilly liable. 14 
A survey of modern legal systems reveals various possible approaches to the issue of civil 
judicial liability. Some systems recognise direct state liability for the wrongs of judges: since 
judges exercise a public function in adjudicating as an organ of the state, and receive 
remuneration from the state, it is felt by some that the responsibility to pay damages to the 
12 More specifically on the aspect ofjudicial liability as a means of judicial accountability see inter alia Cappelletti , AJCL 31 
(1983), 1-62 and Labuschagne, THR-HR 59 (1996), 479-485. 
13 Rheinstein, Who Watches the Watchmen, 7. 
14 In § 5 of Hammurabis's famous law book one can read that a judge who disregarded Hammurabis's decisions had to be 




















party injured by judicial misconduct should rest directly on the state itself. Alternatively, the 
state might be held vicariously liable for the wrongs of its judges, in systems where the judge 
is considered to be an employee of the state. A third and more sophisticated option, employed 
for example in Germany, is to impose vicarious liability on the state but with a right of 
recourse against the judge. 15 The benefit of such a system is that it combines a sure right to 
compensation (as some sort of socialisation of risk) with both judicial accountability and 
freedom from harassing legal actions. Finally, there is the possibility of holding a judge 
personally liable in delict to compensate the party for the harm caused by the wrong. 
As we shall see in a subsequent chapter, the model chosen by South African law is the latter 
one: direct, personal liability of the judge. In principle, though rarely in practice, ajudge might 
be sued under either of the two main delictual actions: under the actio iniuriarum for 
defaming a party or for invading his or her personality rights in some other way (eg., insult, 
deprivation of liberty); and under the actio legis Aquiliae for patrimonial loss wrongfully and 
culpably caused (eg., for economic losses flowing from a misjudgement or, less likely but not 
impossible, as an American case shows, from a physical attack upon the party).16 As we shall 
see, in order to protect the judiciary against such claims, the circumstances in which a claim 
will be allowed have been very narrowly defined - too narrowly, in my respectful submission 
- with the result that the prospect of liability exists more in theory than in practice. Indeed, 
since there is not a single reported case since 1652 of a superior court judge being held liable 
in delict, the jUdiciary appears to enjoy a de facto, albeit not a de jure, immunity from such 
claims, quite unlike the position in earlier times. 
This thesis sets out to trace the historical development of civil judicial liability in delict in 
South African law and to critically examine the present state of the law in this regard. The 
historical investigation begins with Roman law and then proceeds to each succeeding epoch 
that may be considered an antecedent of the mix that is modern South African law: early 
medieval law, medieval Italian law as depicted by the Glossators and Commentators, Roman­
Dutch law, and English law. The development of judicial liability in English law overlaps in 
time with many of the other developments, and is included not merely for purposes of 
IS According to § 839 11 Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) together with Art 34 Grundgesetz (GG). For a detailed comparative 
analysis of various models ofjudicial liability reference should be again to Cappelletti, AJCL 31 (1983), 1 and Barth, CWLR 27 
(1976-77), 727. 
16 Gregory vThompson J 500 F. 2d 59 (1974). 
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companson, but because it has exercised such a marked influence on the modem South 
African law. 
s 
Each chapter begins with an introductory part which outlines the position and status ofjudges 
in the epoch under consideration. This is followed by a brief assessment of the relevant 
developments in the law of delict. Attention is then focused on the various aspects of judicial 
liability that merit consideration: liability for defamation, for wrongful imprisonment, and for 
wrongful misjudgement; and procedural questions relating to the assertion and enforcement of 
judicial liability. Where it seems to be necessary, the introductory part is preceded by a 






"The judge rules over the souls with his souL". 
(Plato 1) 
II ROMAN LAW 
1 	 THE POSITION AND STATUS OF JUDGES WITHIN THE ROMAN 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
1 1 	 Early development 
The system of Roman civil judicial liability was inextricably interwoven with or, rather, was 
determined by two aspects: first the development of the Roman system of proceedings and 
secondly the selection, training, functions and authority of the Roman judiciary. While the 
first aspect will be given priority in the main part of this chapter, the second should have our 
attention first. Undoubtedly, the Roman judiciary was subject to dramatic changes throughout 
its history. It is no exaggeration to state that at the beginning of the Roman empire the Roman 
judiciary had nothing in common with the Byzantine judiciary of the sixth century A.D. 
However, when one remembers that Roman legal history covers more than I 200 years, this 
statement loses some of its force. 
The earliest manifestations of judicial office in Roman law are obscure and have been the 
subject of intense debate.2 What is clear is that by the time of the famous XII Tables (449 
B.C.), court proceedings had generally become bipartite.3 This form of proceedings formed the 
1 My translation of Der Staat , 123. 
2 For an overview see most recently Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 27-34 . For the purposes of this thesis we will follow the 
accepted (although not uncontested) division of Roman history into the Regal period (753 S.c. - 507 S.c.), the Republic 
(508 S.c. - 23 B.C), the Principate (24 S.c. - 284 A.D.) and the Dominate (285 A.D. - 476 A.D. [west] and 565 A.D. 
[east)). Not completely congruent with this classification is the classification into the so-called post-classical period that 
will be contrasted with the pre- and high-classical period of Roman law which lasted from mid-Republican days to about 
the year 200 A.D. 
3 This derives from the fact that the XII Tables already provided for a certain form of procedure before an elected judge 
who was distinct from the magistrate, namely the legis actio per iudicis arbilerve potulationem for various actions. Further, 
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basis of developments in the following 600 years. In the preliminary stage, a party was 
required not to seek judgement from a judge, but to approach a member of the Roman 
superior magistracy, initially probably one of the consules, in order that this officer could 
decide whether or not there had been an actionable wrong (proceedings in iure). Only at the 
second stage did the parties come before a judge whom the parties were free to select for 
determination of the outcome of the lawsuit (proceedings apud iudicem).4 
It has been debated whether the bipartite system formed the base of the initial form of (civil) 
proceedings at Rome or whether this was itself the result of a process of refinement. Those 
who argue in favour of the former say that the foundations of bipartition have to be seen in 
originally private arbitration agreements entered into by litigants independent of any state 
control. Using the authority of public magistrates to reinforce the forms, i.e., the procedures as 
well as the results which had already been determined by purely private agreement, was a 
further development.s Hence, so it is argued, private arbitration came under the control of the 
state only in the formative period of the pre-Republican state, and rested on an essentially 
contractual foundation .6 
On the other hand, the view is held that already during the reign of the kings, that is prior to 
507 B.c., when a revolt drove the last Etruscian king out ofRome, all jurisdiction was, without 
exception, combined in the hands of the king. Only under the penultimate king, Servius 
Tullius, or so goes the tradition7, was the bipartite system introduced into the early monarchy 
and, later, into the Roman Republic. 8 Again, much ink has been spilled in trying to explain the 
reasons for this step. One attempt at interpretation sees the emergence of the Roman bipartite 
system as an antiquarian forerunner of Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers, 
there was reference to dare iudicern or arbifrum (Tab. IX.3 and XI!'3). See Liebs, RR, 30; Kaser, TR 32 (1964) 348 and 

357; Broggini , Judex Arbilerve, 9-10,16-17, 59 fn23, 83 fn94 and 85 fnlOl. 

4 For a more detailed account of this system of proceedings see below at 22. 

5 Dawson, Lay Judges , 23. 

6 Steinwenter, Judex, 2464-2471 and Zum ArtikelJudex, 350-356; Wlassak, Romischer Provinzialprozej3, 12 ef seqq as well 

his Judikationsbefehl, 247 et seq; DOll, ZSS (RA) 54 (1934), 98 ef seqq and ZSS (RA) 55 (1935),9 el seqq. 





8 Van Wannelo, Principles of Roman Civil Law, 272; Jolowicz, Roman Law, J79-180; Liebs, RR, 17; Wenger, 

Jnsti/utlonen, 21 ; Kaser and Hackl , ZPR, 33 fn50; Kaser, TR 32 (1964), 336-338; Humbert, Judex, 632; Broggini, Judex 

Arbiterve, 24 et seq and 54 et seq. 
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and takes this democratic ideal as the underlying force. 9 The elected judges in a sense 
represented the people of Rome and, thus, were able to make a decision independent of state 
authority.lo A second opinion sees the reason for bipartite · development in an attempt to 
relieve the monarch of excessive administrative work resulting from the inevitable increase in 
litigation with the growth of the state. In consequence the kings separated the most time­
consuming parts of the proceedings, especially the hearing of evidence and preparing of the 
judgement, and delegated these to other judges. I I Finally, it has been suggested that the 
introduction of the bipartite system was based upon the idea of guaranteeing the parties a fair 
trial. By leaving it up to the parties to decide on the person who was to conduct the lawsuit, 
blaming the judge for an unjust decision was avoided. 12 Undoubtedly, this was an effective 
means of ensuring peace in the community in Rome, which at that stage of development was 
still a small town and easily surveyed. 
In any case, there will always be considerable uncertainty as to the true foundations of the 
early Roman judiciary and the introduction of the bipartite system. 13 Development from the 
middle of the fourth century B.C. onwards offers far safer ground. 
1 2 The praetor 
As indicated above, a party to a dispute had first to turn to a magistrate in order to initiate a 
legal action. The magistrates were the highest officials in the res publica. They were elected 
and granted imperium, general authority to command, for one year. From the early fourth 
century B.C., the superior magistrates were referred to as consules. 14 Subordinate to the 
consules were another group of officers (minor col/ega consulum). It is known for certain that 
from the year 367 B.C. the consules lost to the so-called praetor their judicial office 
9 With regard to Wenger's view see Dawson, Lay Judges, 24-25, further Kaser's commentary in TR 32 (1964), 331 ; 

1010wicz, Roman Law, 180 fu4. 

10 Kaser, TR 32 (1964), 332 fu4 with further references. 

II This view was favoured by Kaser in Ursprung, 115-116. 
12 Kaser, TR 32 (1964), 344; Kobler, Bilder, 22. 
13 Dawson, Lay Judges, 26 
14 With the introduction of the so-called consular constitution under the leges Liciniae Sextiae 367 S.c. 
10 
(iurisdictio), which up to that time appears to have been part of their general imperium. 15 
Other minor members of the magistracy did not hold imperium but potestas (for instance the 
so-called quaestores or the aediles), which was a more restricted kind of official authority that 
related exclusively to the specific office held. 16 
The office of the Republican praetor was, in fact, merely a stepping stone to the highest 
political and administrative office, the consulate. 17 Prior to the year 337 B.C, only patricians 
were eligible for the office ofpraetor. 18 Thus, it was not competence that was decisive in the 
selection of the praetor, but descent, prestige and being well-connected. It appears then that 
although the praetores might have been political professionals, they were certainly not legal 
professionals; in other words they were laymen. 19 It is little wonder, thus, that they secured for 
themselves legal advisers. From the day of the XII Tables, the praetor was advised and 
assisted by a consilium which was staffed by the priesthood (sacerdotes publici) of the so­
called pontijices, who were also exclusively of patrician descent. 20 Only at a later period were 
these advisers ousted by secular professional jurists.21 
1 
15 It appears that initially the consules were called praetores (prae-rire = to go ahead, which had the original meaning of 
commander-in-chief or strategist (characteristically in Greek: strategos) or even iudex which indicates that the general 
imperium contained all these military, administrative and legal competencies. Later, the title praetor was revived under the 
leges Liciniae Sextiae as the title of the magistrate occupied with the administration of justice. See 1010wicz, Roman Law, 
43-48; Van Warmelo, Principles a/Roman Civil Law, 5; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 15-19 and 365; Kaser and Hackl, 
ZPR, 37-39; Hattenhauer, ERG, 63-65; Ogilvie, Frii.hes Rom, 91-92; Mommsen, RG, 75; Liebs, RR, 18 and 24-25. A 
comprehensive study has been provided recently by Kunkel and Wittmann, Staatsordnung, 21-28. 
16 See Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 172-174; Van Zyl , Roman Private Law, 19-21; Hattenhauer, ERG, 65. 
17 Dawson, Oracles, 105. 
18 Derived from patres = Fathers. These were members of the early Roman nobility who constituted the senate. Only in 
c<>nsequence of the struggle of the lower orders, were non-patrician families granted seats in the Senate and eligibility for 
the magistracy. See 1010wicz, Roman Law, 7-10; Borkowski, Textbook, 4-5; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 5-6; Kunkel , 
RG, 29-31 for details. 
19 Liebs, RR, 31; Dawson, Oracles, 105. 
20 See generally Schulz, Romische Rechtswissenscha[r, 7-1/6; Kunkel, Juridical Review 66 (1954), 155-157 and RG, 24, 
33-34 and 90-92; Dawson, Oracles, 107-108; Van Zyl , Roman Private Law, 35-36; furthermore Kaser, TR 32 (1964),353­
354; Liebs, RR, 26-31. 
21 Kunkel, RG, 92. 
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The term pontifices derives from Jacere, to make, and pons, bridge. In other words, these 
priests were builders of bridges22 in the sense of persons who showed the way and who 
consequently were in charge of various kinds of 'traffic', i.e., sacral communication with the 
Gods (ius sacrum) which inter alia, entailed setting the calendar that regulated the dies Jasti 
(court days), as well as legal communications.23 Success in both religious and legal matters 
depended on the appropriate use of words and formal rites. It was exclusively the priests that 
were called upon for the appropriate forms of procedure, the method of framing valid legal 
transactions or the rules of legal interpretation. The pontifices developed generally applicable 
formulae in accordance with Roman custom and early Roman legislation, i.e., the famous XII 
tables, for the successful performance of these sacra-legal acts.24 These acts came to be known 
as legis actio.25 The original form of the Roman civil law of procedure became thus the legis 
actio forms of procedure. 
The court of the praetor was held in the open air on certain days and certain hours, as fixed by 
the pontifices. Initially, the court was situated in the comitium in front of the curia at the 
northern end of the Jorum Romanum across from the Basilica Julia. 26 It was only from about 
80 B.C. that the court was relocated to the south-eastern end, directly between the regia and 
the temples of Vesta and Castor. The praetor was seated on his sella curilis on a wooden 
paladium which was about 1m high and large enough to accommodate his advisory staff 
(consilium) . The parties to the action appeared before the praetor on the ground level; beyond 
them was the gallery for interested spectators. No walls, doors or railings separated the court 
22 The pontifices were in charge of the bridge over the River Tiber in the course of the via salaria which was of importance 
for the expansion of Rome's sphere of influence throughout Italy. See Liebs, RR, 27. Contra Bretone, Geschichte des 
romischen Rechts, 82 . 
23 Schiavone, Der Jurist, 102; Bretone, Geschichte des romischen Rechts, 82 and 83: "Die Pontifices kUmmerten sich aber 
nicht nur dort, wo in irgendeiner Weise das Handeln der Menschen die gottliche Sphere beriihrte, sondern sie grifJen auch 
als Deuter und Ratgeber in aile Gebiete und Winkel des juristischen Lebens ein." Further Dawson, Oracles, 107. 
2.4 Schiavone, Der Jurist , 102-103. 
25 One possible etymological interpretation of lex is rite. See Schmiedlin, TR 38 (1970), 367-387 and Bretone, Geschichte 
des romischen Rechts, 395. See also Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 34-37 and Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 368. Schiavone, Der 
Jurist , 101 makes the point that the profound association of magic, religion and ius in early Roman law undoubtedly led to 
the development of the first spiritual and physical 'public sphere' in Roman history. However, Roman priests were not 
fancy oracles like the Delphi oracle, but more like sacral and legal experts or technicians. See Bretone, Geschichte des 
romischen Rechts, 82. 
26 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 43 fn46 and 47. for details, with further references and a helpful map, see also frier, Roman 
Jurists, 57-63; and Kunkel, ZSS (RAJ 85 (1968), 320-329; Wesel, Geschichte des Rechts, 175 . See also Neumeister, Das 





from the life on the forum. It was truly a public hearing. The parties made their statements of 
facts on oath before the praetor. In so doing, they were obliged to follow slavishly the 
prescribed formulae that applied to the particular cause of action. The slightest deviation from 
the formula caused the party to lose his case irnrnediately.27 This formal hearing determined 
the issue. In the next phase, the issue thus determined was delegated to a judge who, after 
hearing evidence, gave the final judgement. 
In keeping with this sacral-mystical transfiguration of the legal sphere, the pontifices 
concealed the whole set of formulae well until the early third century B.C. Hence it was neither 
the praetor nor, as we will see, the iudices, but the pontifices who for centuries were the 
wardens of the grail of legal knowledge.28 However, from about the third century, the 
extremely formal legis actio forms of procedure were slowly replaced by more flexible and 
informal procedures, while the pontifices were deprived of their autocracy and the door 
gradually opened to a demystified, secularised and independent legal science.29 This modified 
form was the so-called formulary process. It was no longer based on the reproduction of fixed 
formulae but, generally, on an informal hearing of the parties. It was now that the praetor 
gained a crucial position since it was up to him (by means of new formulae) to extend the 
protection of the law to cases where a legis actio was not available to a party. Hence, the 
praetores began to modify the 'old' law (so-called ius civile) by a ius honorarium. 
In due course, on the day of their assumption of office each year, the praetores published in 
the edicta perpetua the formulae that were to have validity during their terms of office. With 
the lex lulia iudiciorum privatorum (17 B.c.), it was mainly the strict formulae of the legis 
actio that fell into disuse. However, bearing in mind that the praetorship always remained a 
political office staffed by laymen, it is obvious that this creative momentum of the ius 
27 See particularly Jolowicz, Roman Law, 181-182. 
28 Schiavone, Der Jurist, 104 refers to the overlapping of magic-religious activities and legal activities in the days of the 
early Republic, which led to the stabilisation of both functions. See also Dawson, Oracles, 107; Bretone, Geschichte des 
rbmischen Rechts, 82. 
29 Two essential reasons for this development were the publication of the pontijices' secret list of formulae in the famous 
ius Flavianum (304 B.C.) and the fact that in consequence of the lex Ogulnia (about 300 B.C.) plebeians became eligible 
for the office of pontifex, which opened up the closed ranks of this priesthood. By the last century B.C. , jurists of 
aristocratic descent were replaced by members of other classes of Roman society. See Van Warmelo, Principles of Roman 






















honorarium was hardly the result solely of praetorian creativity. Rather, it was indicative of 
the influence of the consilium, which continued to advise the praetores in all legal matters. 30 
13 The iudex 
We turn now to the judges as the second branch of the legal proceedings during the Republic. 
Roman law encompassed the single lay judge, commonly referred to as iudex or iudex 
privatus or iudex unus3 !, who tried exclusively civil litigation, as well as benches of lay 
judges, the so-called recuperatores (in civil matters, 3-5 judges) and the questiones (in 
criminal matters, several dozen judges). This superstructure applied in Rome as well as in the 
provinces. Since we do not have detailed knowledge of civil liability of members of these 
multi-member courts, in what follows the focus will be on the single iudex.32 Here the sources 
are richer and, in any case, most civil cases were brought before the single iudex. 33 
All judges, those sitting alone as well as those from the benches, were drawn from a list of 
judges, the so-called album iudicum selectorum.34 At Rome, the iudices of the album, like the 
praetor, initially were exclusively members of the Senate. Thus, in the early Republic it was 
essentially the patricians who controlled the administration of justice: praetor, pontifices and 
iudices were all drawn from the exclusive group of Roman aristocrats.35 From the days of the 
Gracchi, however, the album became the source of discord between the Senate and the rising 
knights (equites) . From the day of the radical lex Sempronia (122 B.c.), only knights became 
30 Van Warmelo, Principles ofRoman Civil Law, 14; Broggini, 1962 NJW, 1651 . 

31 For more details on the terminology see Kelly, Civil Judicature, 112-117; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 48 fn21 , further 192­
20 I; Thiir and Pieler, Gerichtsbarkeit, 369-37 J. 

32 Above that it may be questionable in what wayan unsatisfied litigant was supposed to sue a full bench of recuperatores 

or even less likely the judges of the questiones. Similarly today there applies no liability to the members of a jury, ego in the 

United States for a wrong judgement. 

33 Thiir and Pieler, Gerichtsbarkeit, 370: " . .nahm das Verfahren vor dem Einzelrichter im Formularprozess die Stelle des 

ordentlichen Rechtsweges ein." See also Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 192. 

34 Thiir and Pieler, Gerichtsbarkeit, 373-376; Dawson, Lay Judges , 15-20. 

35 Borkowski, Textbook, 60; Frier, Roman Jurists, 199; Dawson, Oracles, 107-108; Kaser, RPL, 405 ; Van Zyl, Roman 

Private Law, 366 fn I 0; 1010wicz, Roman Law, 181 fn I; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 49; Kaser , TR 32 (1964), 355; Broggini, 

1962 NJW, 1651. Or as De Zulueta, Institutes, 225 puts it: "For us the notable point is that the album iudicum, from which 
the iudices ... were chosen, was at all times confined to the well-to-do." 
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eligible for judicial office. 36 Thus, for 41 years, until Sulla's compromise lex Cornelia 
iudiciaria (81 B.C.), members of senatorial families were excluded from the album. 
However, the Senate's re-established privileges lasted for a mere eleven years. In 70 B.c., the 
praetor L. Aurelius Cotta proposed an act which came to be known as the lex Aurelia. 
According to this act three groups composed the late Republican album, namely senators, 
knights and tribuni aerarii. Later, Caesar removed the latter and replaced them by a greater 
number of knights. The lex Aurelia tells us that the album iudicum selectorum listed an 
impressive 900 iudices selectae, 300 senators, equites and tribuni aerarii, respectively.37 
These 900 iudices were divided into three decuriae, each 300 members strong. Probably these 
decuriae were mixed units where senators, knights and tribuni aerarii, and later senators and 
knights were represented on an equal basis. Pompey reports that Caesar modified the selection 
criteria in the sense that only the richest of the qualified were included in the album. This is 
indicative of what we know from other sources, namely that qualification for judicial office 
indeed depended inter alia on property. Tribuni aerarii had to have a property rating of 
300,000 sesterzes, and equites one of 400,000 to be eligible for office.38 
From the time of the Principate, senators appear increasingly to have been relieved of their 
judicial duties. Thus, it became exclusively the knights who sat as judges. The praetor drew 
lots annually from the general list and assigned iudices to the special lists for civil and 
criminal proceedings. 39 Practically every three years a full decuria was freed from the judicial 
service. From the time of the Principate, the album ceased to be prepared annually. Moreover, 
the emperors themselves came to be involved in the selection.4o 
36 Frier, Roman Jurists, 200; Broggini, 1962 NJW, 1651 ; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 50-51 are sceptical about the full relevance 
of these late Republican legislative measures to the civil proceedings, but see also Kaser, TR 32 (1964), 354-355. Kelly, 
Roman Litigation, 102 states: "The figure of the iudex privatus in the Roman system of judicature was a respectable one, if 
for no other reason than that the lists ofjudges were composed of members of the upper strata of Roman society; originally 
only senators could be judges, then, in the late Republic, equites were admitted to the honour." See also Dawson, Oracles, 
106: "The praetors, like the iudices, ordinarily came from the upper ranks of Roman society." 

37 Borkowski, Textbook, 63; Frier, Roman Jurists, 199-201; Lengle, ZSS (RA) 53 (1933), 275-283; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 

193-194; Broggini, 1962 NJW, 1652. For further details see Birks, CU 47 (1988),54. 

38 For a detailed overview see Birks, CU 47 (1988), 52-56; Jones, Criminal Courts , 86-90. The album applied to civil and 

criminal courts. See Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 193-196, and TR 32 (1964), 357 fn84. Under Augustus, senatorial rank was 

granted to persons who owned at least one million sesterzes. See Wells, Romisches Reich, 16. 

39 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 51. 

40 Ibid. at 193; Kelly, Princeps Iudex, 81. 
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An important feature of the Republican single iudex was that he was chosen by the parties. It 
is appropriate, therefore, to describe the Roman iudex as a jurOr.41 However, they not only 
decided matters of fact, as do modem jurors, but heard and gave judgement on the whole suit 
before them.42 Initially, the parties to a lawsuit appear to have been free to decide on any man 
above a minimum age and, later, even on a foreigner (peregrinus) as their judge. The praetor 
accepted any suitable suggestion as to the choice of judge and assigned the case formally to 
the person chosen as judge.43 Only women (Jeminae) , minors (impuberes), those mentally 
disturbed (Juriosi), and the deaf (surdi) were excluded from the office.44 
Where the parties were not able to present an acceptable iudex to the praetor, a two-stage 
procedure was applied. Historians have advanced alternative views as to the precise course of 
events. It is suggested that the parties first took turns in rejecting. Each rejected a decuria 
until, when only one decuria remained, each rejected, in turn again, one of the judges listed in 
that decuria. The defendant had the last rejection. This interpretation is based on the so-called 
lex lrnitana, found near Sevilla, Spain in 1981.45 Prior to this important discovery, another 
view of the procedure for selection of judges was favoured. According to this view, the 
praetor read names from the annually prepared album in order to assist the parties (Jerre 
iudicem or procari iudicem = to demand a judge) in their choosing. If there was no agreement, 
41 For an overview on the various descriptions in the literature see Sigillito, SLLJ 33 (1989),484-485. Further Kaser and 
Hackl, ZPR, 48. 
42 Dawson, Oracles, 101 . 
43 For details on the selection process see most recently Metzger, New Outline, 61-76; further Birks, CLJ 47 (1988), 39-40 
and 50-51; Simshauser, ZSS (RAJ 109 (1990), 184; Kaser and Hackl , ZPR, 195; Rodger, JRS 81 (1991), 87-89; La Rosa, 
IURA, 40 (1989), 63-74; Galsterer, JRS 78 (1988), 78-90; Paricio, Sicurezza Giuridica, 192 and Administracion de la 
Justicia, 34 - all these with specific regard to the new information provided for by the recently discovered lex Imitana. 
Partly outdated, therefore, Dawson, Oracles, 101-103 and Lay Judges , 27-29; Borkowski, Textbook, 63 and 67; Kaser, 
RPL,405 and 408; Van Warme\o, Principles ofRoman Civil Law, 278; Thomas, Textbook, 85-86; Jolowicz, Roman Law, 
181 ; Wieacker, Recht und Gesellschafl, 69; Kunkel, RG, 82-84 ; Steinwenter, fudex, 2467; Mazeaud, Nomination du Judex, 
117-120; Simshauser, furidici , 13-14 and Lokin, Prota, 59. 
44 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 195; Kaser, RPL, 405; Berger, ludicare, 518. 
'5 See the authorities referred to above in fn43. Generally with regard to the lex fmitana see Gonzalez, JRS 76 (1986), 147­
150; Simshauser, ZSS (RAJ (1990), 163-164. See also Johnston , JRS 77 (1987), 62-76. The text of the lex Imitana can be 
found in JRS 76 (1986), 153-181 , a translation by M H Crawford is provided for at 182-199, followed by a commentary by 
J A Gonzalez at 200-238. 
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the praetor assigned a judge from the album by drawing lots (sortiri iudicem).46 The essential 
question with respect to the procedure of appointment of judges is to what extent one can 
draw conclusions about Roman procedure at large from the lex Jrnitana since this was only a 
provincial statute. However, the prevailing opinion answers this question in the affirmative.47 
The task of the iudex was to decide on questions of law (iudicare). Judicare, however, was 
similar to but not identical with ius dicere. The differences have been described as follows: 
"Jus dicere has the same etymological sense as iudicare. But while the latter word was applied to 
the settlement of a legal dispute by means of judgement, the Romans used ius dicere and its 
derivatives to describe the activities of the jurisdictional magistrate, who did not himself pronounce 
the final judgement but merely had a presidential or introductory function in the case. ,,48 
In Republican Rome, the iudices, like the praetores, initially held their public court (pro 
tribunali) in the comitium and on the forum; later, according to Kaser, only in the comitium. 
For this purpose a platform had to be erected on which the iudex and his advisors took their 
seat The two parties appeared before (or rather below) him and argued the case.49 
From what has been said above, it is evident that the Republican iudex was as much a layman 
as the praetor and as such he relied on the advice of the pontifices and, later, on his cons ilium 
of jurists.5o The judicial office was an honorary duty, a munus publicum.51 To shy away from 
46 Dawson, Oracles, 101-103 and Lay Judges, 27-29; Borkowski, Textbook, 63 and 67; Kaser, RPL, 405 and 408; Van 
Wannelo, Principles ofRoman Civil Law, 278; Thomas, Textbook, 85-86; Jolowicz, Roman Law, 181; Buckland, Textbook, 
608; Wieacker, Recht und Gesellschaft, 69; Kunkel, RG, 82-84; Steinwenter, Iudex, 2467; Wesel, Geschichte des Rechts, 
175; Mazeaud, Nomination du Judex, 117-120; Simshauser, Iuridici, 13-14. 
47 For details see Birks, CU 47 (1988),49-50, further Metzger, New Outline, 61-63; Johnston, JRS 77 (1987),62,66 and 
77. Now also Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 195 and Simshauser ZSS (RA) 109 (1990), 167-168 and 185-188. Nonetheless La 
Rosa, IURA 40 (1989), 68-74, suggests that Roman practice would not have allowed the parties to elect a judge who was 
not listed on the album, and Galsterer, JRS 78 (1988), 83 shares the view that at Imi the election procedure was likely to 
have been simplified in contrast to the method used at Rome. 
4S Kunkel and Kelly, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History, 2ed Oxford (1973), 85 as quoted at Ellis, 
1987 Obiter, 18. See also Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 41; Berger, Iudicare, 519; Schulz, Classical Roman Law, 13. 
49 Jolowicz, Roman Law, 186 fn3; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 51 and 202-203 with further references in fn3, 9 and 10. Kunkel, 
ZSS (RA) 85 (1968), 320 fn 153, however, states that civil law suits before the iudex privatus did not have to be performed 
in public and on a platform. He argues that it is unlikely that a iudex assembled a platform for the one case to which he was 
appointed. (Tribunalia for public use seem not to have existed in Republican days). Therefore, Kunkel concludes that the 
iudices stood at the forum while hearing and deciding simple law suits (probably near those areas where the court of the 
praetor was held, for which see fn26). There might also have existed the practice of hearing a case in the judge's home. 
so Dawson, Lay Judges, 27-29 and Oracles, 101; Frier, Roman Jurists, 199; Jolowicz, Roman Law, 187; Kelly, Western 
Legal Theory, 42; Kaser, OZOR 19 (1969), 381-391; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 197; Broggini, 1962 NJW, 1652; Schulz, 




this task without good reason was generally considered bad form. 52 That Roman iudices, 
particularly in the days of the late Republic, were drawn from the legally untrained members 
of the superior classes rather than from the ranks of the professional jurists or counsellors, is 
evident, for instance, from the fact that a mere 74 jurors appear to have been identified by 
name in MCAlexander's survey of39l trials from 149 B.c. to 50 B.c.53 Of these, the majority 
were criminal trials and thus involved a large number of jurors (questiones). For our purposes 
hovJever, what is more interesting is how many single judges (mostly in civil suits) 
Alexander's survey identified by name. If my counting is correct, there were merely five civil 
cases and two cases where the claim was based on the actio iniuriarum where single judges 
known by name gave a judgement. In only two of these cases a well-known jurist, namely P. 
Mucius Scaevola, sat as judge.54 Thus the survey confirms that generally the legal ability or 
the fame of the judge was usually insignificant by comparison with that of the advocates or 
jurists arguing before him.55 It was purely by chance that a trained jurist was elected praetor 
or was chosen as ajudge in a case.56 
The lay knowledge of the Republican judges is stressed by some scholars. Lay iudices are 
frequently described as victims of the brilliant rhetoric and eloquence of the Roman oratores 
who argued before them in court by means of the genus iudiciale, the procedural speech or 
make a serious decision should take counsel of competent and impartial persons ...There is clear evidence that in Cicero'S 

day iudices normally took jurists into their consilia; the magistrates did the same, at least on occasion ...". And Kunkel, ZSS 

(RA) 85 (1968), 325-326 contains a useful description of the actual involvement of the consilium in the judicial decision, 

where it is said that the judges regularly turned to their advisors while in court and openly discussed with them the legal 

aspects of the pending case as well as the final judgement. 





52 Horace in his Epistles vol.I.l6 at 40 asks: "Who is a good man?", and answers that a good man's attributes are, among 

others, serving as a witness, acting as a guarantor, and being a judge. Quoted at Borkowski, Textbook, 58. For exceptions 

see Gimenez-Candela, Cuasidelilos, 10-11. Further Steinwenter, Judex, 2466; Dawson, Oracles, 103 and Lay Judges, 28; 

Lokin, Prota, 59. 

53 Trials, 228-229. 

54 Ibid. cases 22, 73,76, 126,352,353 and 366. P. Mucius Scaevola adjudicated in cases 22 and 352. 

55 Note for instance case 121 in Alexander's survey, a civil suit for missio in possessionem. Apparently all details of the 

persons involved are known, i.e., the names of the defendant (P. Quinctius), his advocate (M. lunius Brutus), the procurator 

(Sex. Alfenus), the plaintiff (Sex. Naevius) and the praetor (probably P. Burrenus). The only person who remained 

unnamed was the judge. See Alexander, Trials, 63. Further note Broggini's comments in 1962 NJW, 1651 fn2. 





oration.57 And finally without some continuity of tenure there was little chance to develop 
anything like legal expertise.58 In any event, the modest legal knowledge of the iudices was 
evident to all. 
At the time of Augustus, the three decuriae were enlarged by a fourth, and a fifth was finally 
added by Caligula.59 Generally, the Republican system of selecting and appointing judges was 
continued in the early Principate. However, changes were in the offing. Even though the 
formulary system and consequently bipartition between praetor and iudex was retained within 
the traditional (ordinary) form of procedure, an extraordinary system of proceedings, the so­
called extraordinaria cognitio or cognitio extra ordinem (cognitio = an investigation) came to 
the fore with Augustus. It sowed the seed of destruction of bipartition. It is important to note 
that the transition from ordinary to extraordinary jurisdiction was a gradual process, and both 
systems of proceedings operated side by side for quite some time. It took about three hundred 
years, from Augustus to about the reign ofDioc1etian (284-305 A.D.), before the cognitio extra 
ordinem effectively replaced the ordinary system of formulary proceedings. 6o By the year 342 
A.D., the latter was formally abolished.61 Considering the reluctance of the early emperors to 
overthrow in too overt a manner the Republican order and to break with the mores maiores, it 
is evident that modifications were made only in new fields oflaw. 
57 See the book review of B W Frier's The Rise of the Roman Jurists by Birks, OJLS 7 (1987), 448; also Broggini, 1962 
NJW, 1652 who tells us of none other than the great Cicero describing the role of the oratores as follows: "I want the 
oratori to cause the following experiences. If one hears that he is about to address the court, one rushes in to take a seat. 
The court is full...there are plenty of spectators and the iudices are all attentive. The orator rises from his seat and the 
audience is asked to be silent; but later the applause is ample: if the oratori asks for laughter, there is laughter; if he ask for 
tears, there are tears such that if someone who would only listen, not knowing what in fact is going on, must think that there 
is a great artist on the stage." Further Neumeister, Das Antike Rom, 75-81. See also Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 360 fn50 and 53 
with useful references. 
58 Dawson, Oracles, 103 . 
59 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 193; Dawson, Oracles, 102; Birks, eLf 47 (1988), 37 and 53. For more details on the division of 
the various epochs of Roman (legal) history followed in this thesis see fn2. 

60 Generally see Borkowski, Textbook, 73; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 384 fn77; Van Warmelo, PrinCiples of Roman 

Civil L.aw, 280-281; Kaser, RPL, 396-397 and 426; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 436; Kunkel, RG, 130; Hattenhauer, ERG, 78­
80. J 'N ICZ, Roman Law, 400 states: "Republican institutions were not abolished, but new imperial institutions grew up by 

their side, with the result that they became atrophied and finally perished. This process however was not complete until the 

Principate had given way to the donunate." 
















Three fields have been identified as the roots of the cognitio proceedings. 62 At first there was 
the so-called cognitio extra ordinem in a narrow sense.63 These were new actions on questions 
that were beyond even the praetor's power to enact a new fonnula. However, it was the 
emperors who accepted the need for a modification and assumed jurisdiction for these actions. 
Consequently, imperial delegates were authorised as judges and ordered to decide the 
matter. 64 
The second field, the carving out of the emperors' own appellate jurisdiction, is of 
considerable importance to the subject of this thesis. Rarely did Roman emperors act as a 
court of first instance and, apart from the cognitio extra ordinem, this originally took place 
only outside of Rome on the base of special petition.65 However, from the end of the first 
century, the principes began to assume true appellate jurisdiction. Initially, the only 
judgements subject to appeal were those of the cognitio extra ordinem in a narrow sense. 
Decreta of the courts of ordinary jurisdiction remained sacrosanct for a long time. Later, 
however, the emperors ceased to refrain from far-reaching interference on appeal. The first 
domino to fall among the ordinary fonns of proceedings was the proceedings in iure before 
the praetor. As a first step (from about the reign of Claudius (41-54 A.D.), the emperors began 
to set aside and refer back either formulae or decreta to the praetor or the iudex. The second 
step, which appears to correspond with the beginnings of post-classical law (at about the third 
century A.D.), were the so-called refonnative appeals with which the principes began to 
replace the final judgements of the iudices. 66 
The third major field of importance to the proceedings extra ordinaria cognitio was the 
proceedings at the courts in the Roman provinces. There were two distinct groups of 
provinces, one of which had never known the two-fold system of fonnulary proceedings.67 
62 Generally on this process see Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 438-443; Jolowicz, Roman Law, 400-404; Prichard, RPL, 450-451 ; 

Kaser, RPL, 396-397 and 426-427; Kelly, Princeps Judex, 80-84 and 91-99; Wieacker, Recht und Gesellschaft, 70-72; 

Simshauser, JuridiCi, 4; Steinwenter, Judex, 2469-2471. 

63 See particularly Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 451-460. 

64 Jbid. at 438 . 

65 Wieacker, Recht und Gesellschaft, 70; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 439,445-451 and particularly 501-510. 

66 Contra Kelly, Princeps Judex, 97-98 who accepts full reformative appeals already from the age of Nero (54-68 A.D.). 

Against him Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 503 fn 15 and 504 fn 18. Also Litewski, RlDA II (1964), 348-365 . 

67 Some of the provinces were administered directly by the principes , so-called imperial provinces. It was proposed that in 

those provinces which were under governorship of knights (praeJecti, Pontius Pilatus for instance belonged to the order of 






From an early stage, cases were heard in accordance with the extraordinary system of cognitio 
proceedings. In provinces of the other kind, justice was administered by means of the 
formulary system ofproceedings.68 However, from the beginning of the Dominate,69 owing to 
a shortage of suitable iudices in the ranks of the local honoraries, it often happened that the 
Roman governors chose ajudge from the ranks of eminent Romans, and few litigants dared to 
question this.7o From the time of the Dominate, it also became obvious that this tendency to 
interfere in the form of proceedings was increasingly extended to other aspects of procedural 
law. Thus, to some degree, the accompanying degeneration of the formulary proceedings in 
Rome emanated from the conditions in the Roman provinces.7l 
The ordinary courts continued to be staffed by lay iudices drawn from the album, whereas the 
extraordinary courts were staffed exclusively by imperial servants who conducted all of the 
various stages of the lawsuit (principium, medium litis, dejinitiva sententia) and held 
imperium merum et mixtum.72 Initially, these courts were staffed by consules and, later, by 
specially appointed praetores, who did not have much more in common with the old 
Republican jurisdictional magistrates than the name, in itself evidence of the cautiousness 
with which the early emperors initiated modifications.73 Since the principes were the holders 
of the general imperium, which again included iurisdictio, the judicial officers active at the 
extraordinary courts had only delegated jurisdiction (iurisdictio mandata). While hearing 
appeals, the emperors were advised by a consilium ofjurists (consilium principes). 74 Towards 
the end of the use of formulary proceedings, it became obvious that even before the ordinary 
courts parties no longer had the right to agree on a judge, and that the judges were appointed 
practice in legatorial provinces (administered by the legali Augusti pro praelore) since the governor lacked the magisterial 

imperium and therefore the ius edicendi. See Jolowicz, Roman Law, 408 fn2; Kunkel , RG, 58; Wells, Romisches Reich, 13­
J5, 154, 157 and 164; Kaser, RPL, 396; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 439-440; Dawson, Lay Judges, 31-33. 

68 These provinces were the so-called senatorial provinces which remained under the administration of the senate, which 

elected the governor annually. See Wells, Romisches Reich, 154. For instructive examples from the province Baetica 

(Southern Spain) during the reign of the Flavian emperors (second half first century A.D.) see Birks, CLJ 47 (1988), 36-48. 

69 From about Cornmodus and the Severine Emperors (180 A.D.). This development might be related to the general crisis in 

the empire up to about 260 A.D. See also Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 441 . 

70 Unrestricted agreement of the parties as to choice of the iudex in some provinces is reported until the reign of Trajan (98­
117 A.D.). See Simshauser, Juridici, 14 with further references at fn38. For the preceding period of the Flavian principes, 

this is generally confirmed by Birks, CLJ 47 (1988), 36-48. See also Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 468-470. 

71 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 441; Kaser, RPL, 426; Jolowicz, Roman Law, 403-404; Simshauser, Juridici , 9-21. 

72 Thiir and Pieler, Gerichtsbarkeil, 392. 




























by the praetor. These appointed judges were named iudici dati.75 And, since this procedure 
had been the practice in some of the provinces, it once again confirms the degenerative 
influence that emerged from outside the capita1.76 
With the reign of Dioc1etian, the Dominate reached its climax. 77 The administration of the 
empire was reformed and the provinces divided into smaller unitS.78 This had immediate 
consequences for the administration of justice, which now came to be shaped in a form much 
closer to our modem legal systems. The empire became a tetrarchy and was divided into 4 
realms, 12 dioceses and 112 provinces. The provinces were administered by either (so-called) 
proconsuies, consuies, corectores or praesides; the dioceses by a vicarius and the realms by a 
praefectus praetorio. In keeping with this division, a triad of courts emerged, toO.79 The 
lowest (local) judges (iudices minores) were the duoviri or magistrati municipaies, who were 
commonly advised by the town councillors, the curiae.80 In-between these were the iudices 
medii, the provincial governors of the variously ranked provinces who adjudicated at the 
provincial COurtS.81 The highest judges (iudices maiores) sat on the benches of the courts of 
the vicarii, the praefecti praetorio as well as the court of the principes at Rome, the emperor's 
council (consistorium principes or, in legal matters the auditorium principes). This court was 
staffed by, among others, the heads of the imperial cabinets (officia) and a number of 
councillors (comites consistoriani).82 All iudices maiores were iudices sacra or vice sacra, in 
other words holy or imperial judges who adjudicated in place of the emperor. 
74 Kunkel, RG, 104; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 441 and the text below at fn82. 

75 Wieacker, Recht und Gesellschaji, 70; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 461 fn7 and 462. 

76 See the text above at fn71 and Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 519-520. 

77 The emperor as master and God (dominus et deus). See Kunkel, RG, 127; Van Warmelo, Principles ofRoman Civil Law, 

19-21; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 7; Kaser, RPL, 5; Liebs, RR, 80; Kobler, Bilder, 30; Hattenhauer, ERG, 83-84. 

78 For more details see particularly the work by Kuhoff, Senatorische Laujbahn. Furthermore Kelly, Western Legal Theory, 

79-81; Kunkel, RG, 128; Simshauser, luridici, 4-5; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 517; Hattenhauer, ERG, 85. 

79 For the following see above all Wieacker, Recht und Gesellschaji, 70-73 and also Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, who provide an 

overview at 529-532, whereas a detailed account appears at 532-550. Further Kaser, RPL, 430; Thomas, Textbook, 121; 

Demougeot, L'Empire Romain, 230-232; Steinwenter, ludex, 2470-2472; Kunkel, RG, 129-130; Simshauser, lundid, 14­
15; Ferguson, ILR 46 (1960-61), 734. 

80 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 545-547. 

81 Kuhoff, Senatorische Laufbahn, 50-110; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 530, 532-533. 

82 The four heads of the officia were the magister ofJiciorum who was chief of the imperial chancery, the quaestor sacri 

palatii, a kind of minister of justice, the comes sacrarum largitionum and the comes rerum privatarum. See Kuhoff, 

SenaLOrische Laufbahn, 112-148 (vicar ii), 194-228 (notarii and magistri scriniorum); Jones, Later Roman Empire, 506­
507; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 448; Kunkel, RG, 128. Further Spruit, Enchiridium, 120-121. It is interesting to note that some 

The hierarchical nature of the imperial system of administration of justice is further apparent 
from the formal ranking to which judges were subject. Accordingly, sacri judges were 
classified either as illustres (praefecti praetorio and urbi) or spectabiles (vicarii). Judices 
medii were ranked as clarissimi (provincial governors). The superior judges as well as the 
intermediate judges were entitled to delegate cases to subaltern judges, the so-called iudices 
pedanei. 83 The iudices dati were ad hoc commissars especially appointed by the emperors.84 
In Rome, the old magisterial praetors finally lost their ordinary jurisdiction to the praefectus 
urbi, who became the head of the city court of first instance.85 The same applied III 
Constantinople. These praefecti urbi were also entitled to delegate to iudices pedanei. 
It is absolutely essential to appreciate that these officers performed both judicial and purely 
administrative functions. 86 The iudices of the post-classical period therefore were civil 
servants fully incorporated into the various ranks of the imperial administrative machinery. 
They were appointed to their respective offices for a term of one to three years. 87 It is, 
therefore, not surprising that in imperial terminology the term iudex was no longer restricted 
to the officers of the judiciary, but applied generally to all leading members of the 
administration.88 Ironically, therefore, the term iudex came to cover also those Republican 
magisterial offices which traditionally were strictly separated from the office of the old lay 
iudex. We will have to return to this aspect in due course. 
of the most illustrious jurists during the Principate and Dominate sat on this council. For instance Iavolenus Priscus, L. 

Neratius Priscus, P. Iuventius Celsus, Salvius Iulianus, Q. Cervidius Scaevola, Aemilius Papinianus, Iulius Paulus and 

Domitius Ulpianus. The emperors, like the Republican praelores and iudices, initially held court in public at the forum. 

From the time of Severus the emperors' court sat in the imperial palace. 

S3 From cum pedes = at feet, in other words judges who sat parterre and not elevated on the higher tribunal. See also Kaser 

and Hackl, ZPR, 547-551 and 548 fn la and 2; Ferguson, lLR 46 (1960-61), 734. 

84 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 448 fn15. 

8S Ibid. at 539. 

86 Dawson, Lay Judges , 33. 

87 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 527; Thiir and Pieler, Gerichtsbarkeil, 394. 

88 A complete list of all iudices of the Byzantine days is included under C 3.1.14.1. See further Jones, Laler Roman Empire, 

500 and 502; Steinwenter, ludex, 2471; Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 15 ; Hiibner, lURA 5 (1954), 208; 

Weitzel , ludex, 793-794 refers to a EntdifJerenzierung (lack of differentiation) that became typical of the classification of 






Diocletian's structure continued to exist, with a number of politically necessary modifications, 
well into the Byzantine age. 89 After Justinian's expulsion of the Vandals from Africa (534­
535 A.D.) and the Ostrogoths from Italy (535-553 A.D.), the final structure until the late 
seventh century A.D. appears to have been the following: iudices maiores remained the judges 
at the emperor's court, as well as at the courts of the two remaining praefecti praetorio per 
Occidentem and per Orientem and at the courts of the two praefecti urbi. 90 Iudices medii 
became the judges at the courts of the lower ranked governors, while iudices minores 
remained the municipal magistrates, the duoviri (or duumviri), complemented by the 
defensores civitatis, a kind of neighbourhood judiciary.91 Most of these post-classical Roman 
judges remained laymen.92 Although some of the provincial governors were chosen from the 
ranks of the advocates, the majority of the officers were selected for their noble birth. 
From the time of the late Principate, it appears that imperial iudices engaged in the 
administration of justice employed so-called adsessores, legally trained assessors, to 
compensate for their own inadequacy.93 These assessors were trained jurists and came to be 
engaged as civil servants, without, however, any independent jurisdiction. They advised the 
iudices and were quite influential. The adsessores complemented the consilium, which 
remained in operation throughout the post-classical period. 
Thus, the Roman judicial office was characterised by the change from a lay judge, an elected 
juror, an ordinary citizen to an authorised administrative imperial officer who, even though 
89 These changes resulted especially from the gradual decay of the Western Empire prior to its ultimate demise in 476 A.D. 

In Africa, Spain, Gaul, general Roman jurisdiction ceased to exist and after 476 A.D. Visigothic and Burgundian kings 

delegated jurisdiction over the Roman population of their now sovereign kingdoms to fonner Roman civil officers. See also 

below at chapter III I. 

90 The city of Rome and the surrounding provinces remained under Byzantine sovereignty for another 130 years as the so­

called Ducat of Rome and the Exarchat of Ravenna. These were later to become the backbone of the Pontifical State. See 

Wesenberg and Wesener, Privatrechtsgeschichte, 23 and chapter III ) fu 18. 

91 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 544-547. The duumviri were nominated by their predecessors. Selection was from the ranks of the 

local town council (decuriones). Appointment generally lay to the council (curia). The term of office was one year. See 

inter alia D 47.10.13.5; C 3.1.18; C 10.32.45. See ibid. 545 fun3 and 4 for further details and references. 

92 Jones, Later Roman Empire, 502: "In the later Roman empire legal training was ... not expected ofajudge." Also Dawson, 

Lay Judges, 33. 





not a professional jurist, was a trained public servant.94 With regard to the subject of this 
thesis, two aspects of this development need to be emphasised: first, the judge the parties 
faced from the days of the late Principate onwards regularly was the official representative of 
an increasingly authoritative political system. As representatives of the emperors, judges were 
invested with far-reaching powers to ensure legal obedience. This stood in dramatic contrast 
to the status the judges enjoyed under the formulary system where the authority of the judge, 
at least to some extent, was dependent on the consent of the parties. Secondly, by means of 
incorporation of the judge into the state bureaucracy, the judiciary for the first time became 
subject to imperial control and discipline. 95 
JUDICIAL LIABILITY FOR WRONG JUDGEMENTS 
For a lucid presentation of the liability of judges in Roman law, it is helpful to subdivide the 
relevant period of about a millennium into three sections: namely liability prior to the 
formulary form of procedure, under formulary proceedings and, finally, under the system of 
the extraordinary cognitio proceedings. The latter two sections will be further divided into 
three parts: first a more detailed outline of the form of proceedings as far as they bear 
relevance to our subject; next, a discussion of the development of the state of mind required 
for liability; and, finally, consideration of the question of the kind of wrongs for which Roman 
judges were made liable. 
2 1 Judicial liability in the XII Tables and during the early Republic 
The earliest indications of the liability ofjudges are lost in the mist that surrounds the dawn of 
Roman law.96 What we do know is that according to the xn Tables the acceptance of a bribe 
94 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR 519. Ferguson, ILR 46 (1960-61), 734 correctly observed that: "The judices were thus Imperial 
officials rather than the private citizens of earlier times. Similarly, the independent office of the praetor... had been 
extinguished and blended with the functions of the judex Uudge) in the imperial prefect." 
95 This theme is also stressed by Ferguson, fLR 46 (1960-61), 734-735. 


























made the iudex subject to capital punishment.97 In addition, it is probable that the early 
Republican ius civile under the legis actio system of procedure provided for a civil remedy 
against a judge, who acted litem suam Jacere; in other words, who made the case before him 
his own. 
Writers have advanced this view on the basis of several argwnents. To some, the term litem 
suam facere indicates more a consequence than an element of an offence. In this sense, it is a 
typically archaic way of describing a specific type of liability: " ... [t]he iudex takes over, as a 
result of his own wrongdoing, a liability which would otherwise have fallen on one of the 
parties to the action.,,98 Technically this was possible if the injured party were permitted to 
consider the judge as a iudicatus, someone against whom judgement was given and against 
whom personal execution, the so-called legis actio per manus iniectionem lay.99 In this form, 
the liability of the judge qui litem suamfecit may have been part of sections of the XII Tables 
that were not preserved. IOO It has been suggested, further, that liability of the iudex was an 
appendix to a form of criminal punishment that was developed shortly after the enactment of 
the xn Tables. lol 
Other writers accept the view that the judge's liability litem suam facere was developed prior 
to praetorian intervention as a type of liability sui generis. This solution gains some degree of 
plausibility in analogy with a second legal concept, where a case was awarded to one party 
when the other failed to appear (litem addicere). Similarly, a judge, could be liable where he 
failed to be present in COurt. 102 In fact, from a later period, the second century B .C. to be 
97 MacCormack, Liability ofthe Judge, 3-5; Kelly, Roman Litigation, 102; Schmidt-Speicher, Rechtsbeugung, 15. 

98 Stein, RIDA 5 (1958), 564. 

99 Hubner, IURA 5 (1954), 207; MacCormack, Liability ofthe Judge, 5; Karlowa, Rechtsgeschichte, 1349. Generally on the 

legis actio per manus iniectionem see Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 370; Van Warmelo, Principles of Roman Civil Law, 





100 Pernice, Labeo, 168-169; Stojcevic, IURA 8 (1957), 69: " ...un institut ancien .. Ie quasi-delit si iudex etait connu des la 

Loi des XII tables ..."; Hubner, IURA 5 (1954),205: "Dass die Regelung der Richterhaftung in die Zeit einer formalen 

Typisierung zuruckreicht und nicht erst als actio in factum dem ius honorarium entwachsen ist, ist kaum zu bezweifoln ."; 

Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 14. 

101 Levy, Privatstrafe, 48-49. Against this notion Hubner, IURA 5 (1954), 202 with further references: ..... [AJls Indiz gegen 

den Strafcharakter der Hajiung [wird) die von Ulpian bekiimpjie Meinung Julians zu werten sein, der die Hajiung aufden 

Erben des iudex erstrecken will. War die Klage gegen den Erben moglich. .. so konnte sie keine Deliktsbusse sein .. . ". 

102 Karlowa, Rechtsgeschichte, 1349; MacConnack, Liability of the Judge , 5-6 and see the references there at fn6 . With 

regard to to litem addicere see Kaser, TR 32 (1964), 351-352 with further references. 

26 
precise, we know that a judge was held liable litem suam facere if he failed to deliver his 
judgement or did not appear in court. 103 It is not inconceivable that this kind of omission may 
have attracted liability already in the days of the early RepUblic. About other instances of 
liability imposed on judges in pre-edictal law, we have not much knowledge. 104 
2 2 Judicial liability from the late Republic to the beginning of the post-classical 
period (300 B.C. - 200 A.D.) 
The considerable degree of uncertainty that surrounds developments during the first centuries 
of Roman law gives way to more clarity from the time of the late Republic. The phase of 
development that followed coincides with the emergence of the ius honorarium and the 
heyday of the so-called system of formulary proceedings. lOS 
Sometime between the second century and the early decades of the first century B.C., a praetor 
must have decided to include into one ofhis annual edicts (edictaperpetua) an actio infactum 
against an iudex and made this available to anyone who had suffered from a judicial wrong. 
Henceforth, the judge was not a substitute for the defendant within the original suit but was 
subject to an autonomous edictal action by an injured party. This development was born from 
a desire for more flexibility, as well as the practical need to provide the parties with some kind 
of redress which took proper account of the peculiarities of the formulary system of 
procedure. However, some more detail is needed on the practical conditions of this system of 
proceedings to provide a better background to the development ofthe liability of the iudex. 106 
103 Macrobius, Saturnalia, 3.16.15 . For details see below at fn136. In drawing on those omissions enclosed in Macrobius' 
Saturnalia, Cremades and Paricio, AHDE 53 (1984), 188-189 and also D'Ors, SDHl48 (1982), 380 share the opinion 
adduced inter alia by Hubner, MacCormack and Karlowa 
104 See also Usteri, Verantwortlichkeit des rbmischen Richters , 10 who proposes that at a transitional stage between the old 
actions on grounds of the XII Tables and the edictal actio in factum a judge could have been liable under the actio 
iniuriarum or the actio legis Aquiliae. 
105 In principle, all writers agree on this general proposition. See inter alia Hochstein, Obligationes QuaSi ex Delicto, 15; 
Hubner, lURA 5 (1954) 200-201; MacCormick, Acta Juridica 20 (1977), 149-151 , 157; Stein, RlDA 5 (1958), 563; 
Stojcevic, IURA 8 (1957), 63; MacConnack, Liability of the Judge , 9 and 20; Birks, TR 52 (1984), 373; Pugsley, 1969 fJ, 
351-355. For the division of the various epochs of Roman (legal) history followed in this thesis see again fn2 . 
106 A useful overview on the consequences of the formulary proceedings in the light of the liability of the iudex is provided 
by MacCormick, Acta Juridica 20 (1977),149-151; further see MacCormack, Liability of the Judge, 20; Hubner, JURA 5 
(1954),201 and 206; Borkowski, Textbook 355; Van Warmelo, Principles ofRoman Civil Law, 222. More generally Kaser 
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As indicated above, the system of fonnulary proceedings was characterised chiefly by the 
bipartite proceedings before the praetor and before the iudex. The proceedings before the 
praetor (in iure) were concluded with the fonnal act of the litis contestatio. It extinguished the 
plaintiffs initial claim against the defendant. From this point, legal effectiveness lay 
exclusively in the remedy defined by the praetor in the formula. This formula was granted by 
the praetor by virtue of his imperium (iurisdictio) as a magistrate. 107 
There followed the trial phase before the selected judge (apud iudicem).108 Irregularities and 
mistakes during this phase could lead to liability of the judge. After the proceedings in iure 
had been completed with the declaration of litis contestatio and after the judge had been 
selectedl09, the proceedings were led over to the trial phase apud iudicem by means of a 
magisterial announcement of the first trial day (intertium dare).l1o According to Gai.4.l5, the 
parties generally agreed to appear before the iudex on the third day after the hearing in iure. At 
the time of the fonnulary fonns of proceedings, however, the scheduled trial day was no 
longer referred to as comperendinus (tertius) dies, but as intertium or in tertium. I I I The party 
at whose petition the praetor had scheduled the trial day had to serve notice on the other party 
and the judge three days in advance of the effective trial day (denuntiare). Under specific 
circumstances, i.e., severe or chronic illness of a party or the judge, the trial had to be 
and Hackl, ZPR, 220-382 and Kaser, RPL, 401-411 and 417-423; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 372-380; Prichard, RPL, 
443-450; Thomas, Textbook, 83-110; Van Warmelo, Principles ofRoman Civil Law, 275-279; Borkowski, Textbook, 66­
73; Ellis, 1987 Obiter, 16-27; Kunkel, RG, 80-90; Liebs, RR, 37-41; Ferguson, fLR 46 (1960-61), 733-734. 
107 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 288. The formula consisted of the nominatio (nomination of the judge), intentio (exposition of 
the claim), condemnatio (instruction to condemn or to absolve). For details Thomas, Textbook, 95-102; Van Zyl, Roman 
Private Law, 373-377; Borkowski, Textbook, 67 and Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 310-322 and 350. 
108 For details on to the proceedings apud iudicem see particularly Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 350-375. For a detailed analysis 
in the light of the lex frnitana see the work by Metzger, New Outline. The work contains references to most of the recent 
contributions in this field. The crucial question with regard to the lex frnitana is to what degree one may draw from it 
conclusions about Roman procedure in general. 
\09 With regard to the appointment of judges see the text above at fn45 et seqq. 
110 At this stage it might be appropriate to draw attention to a modified view which has been adduced only recently by 
Metzger, New Outline, 91. To him the lex frnitana ensured a divided hearing in iure. After the settling of legal questions, 
but prior to the fixed appointment of the judge who heard the trial, a break permitted a prospective judge to learn ahead of 
time of his selection. A hearing after the break allowed him to advance grounds to excuse himself from office. Only 
thereafter did the magistrate fix the trial day and appoint a judge. 
III With regard to the various possibilities of spelling (and hence understanding) intertium see Metzger, New Outline, 29­
30. Most scholars agree that intertium was the successor to comperendinus dies. Note Metzger, New Outline 77-88. 
, 
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adjourned (diffisio or diem diffindere).112 Unless adjoununent was effectively granted, the trial 
Itwould be held on the exact day that had been fixed by the magistrate and both judge and 
parties were required to appear. 
Only a few sources allow us to draw proper conclusions on the details of the trial phase before 
the iudex. A substantial part of the judge's task was to hear evidence in regard to the assigned 
formula. It nonetheless would be grossly incorrect to believe that points of law were merely 
raised at the proceedings in iure. On the contrary, wherever the formula granted to the judge 
the right to exercise discretion, the iudex was called upon to settle questions of law. For these 
purposes, the iudex was assisted by his cons ilium (referred to above), the need for whom 
would otherwise be difficult to explain. On the principle ofcuria novit iura, whether or not he 
acted on advice of his cons ilium, the iudex conducted the trial and granted or revoked the 
parties' or witnesses' right to speech. In addition, common principles of procedure, such as 
audi alteram partem or orality, were accepted and had to be observed. The trial was supposed 
to begin, be carried out and completed with judgement given on one and the same day, in any 
event before sunset.!13 In principle, however, adjournment during the trial phase apud iudicem 
by a judge was permitted by granting a divided or fictional day (diem diffindere) so that the 
condition of one trial day was met over a series of days. 114 
Once evidence had been heard, the judge was obliged to give judgement (sententia). Only by 
swearing rem sibi non liquere, i.e., that the case had not become clear to him, could he evade 
this obligation, which corresponded to his munus publicum. I IS Judgements usually lacked any 
opinions upon which the judge had based his decision. 116 
112 Most detailed, again, is the presentation of Metzger, New Outline, 91-152. See further Kaser and Hackl , ZPR, 356 and 
Gimenez-Candela, Cuaside/itos, 29-40. It has not been undisputed whether it was the praetor/magistrate or the judge 
himself who decided on the grant of adjournment. The fonner view is held, among others, by Gimenez-Candela, 
Cuasidelitos, 35; the latter is favoured by Lamberti, Labeo 36 (1990), 191-193. 
113 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 357-359; Metzger, New Outline, 101 fu2 with vast references. 
114 See especially the comments by Metzger, New Outline, 101-103; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 358; Gimenez-Candela, 
Cuasidelitos, 14-15; Simshauser, ZSS (RA) 109 (1990),202-203. 
115 There might be such a case in Alexander, Trials, 38 (case 73) where it is stated that the judge refused to adjudicate. The 
possibility of the iudex to escape liability by swearing rem sibi non liquere generally invites the question as to the 
relationship between this clear confession of the judge not having grasped the underlying questions of fact or law of the 
case before him and the well-known maxim error iuris nocet, that is that generally mistake (error) or ignorance 
(ignorantia) of law where not regarded as excusable (even though there applied numerous exceptions to that rule). For an 



















It must be understood that the sententia the judge gave at the end of the proceedings apud 
iudicem was final and binding. I 17 There was no possibility of appeal and there was equally no 
point in going back to the praetor for a new formula. ll8 The claim in itself was consumed 
once the formula had been granted. Only in rare circumstances could the praetor grant a 
restitutio in integrum, which most likely would be countered by the opposing party by means 
of an exceptio rei judicatae vel in iudicium deductae. 119 What is also important to note is that 
it was absolutely immaterial to the extinction of the initial claim whether the final decision of 
the iudex was correct or not. The decision was final and binding. 12o This was the formulary 
system's harsh but effective solution to the problem of achieving res iudicata, i.e., legal 
certainty. 
At least in theory, thus, any conceivable mistake in the application of substantive or 
procedural law, which provoked either a wrong judgement or no judgement at all, was strictly 
speaking impossible for the prejudiced party to overcome. The following three examples will 
demonstrate these severe consequences of formulary proceedings. 
Consider first a judge who failed to adjourn the trial properly. In consequence of the strict 
application of the one-day rule, the formula was consumed and it became impossible for the 
prejudiced party to resume the case. A second instance is that of the consequences of a wrong 
jUdgement. With the sententia in hand, the winning party was able to proceed immediately 
with the execution of the jUdgement, which, with the survival of the principle of personal 
Rechtsirrtum, 302 and see below at chapter IV 3 1 fnn 163 et seqq. The lack of detailed comments by the Roman authorities 
during pre- and high-classical Roman law indicate that apparently this problem (as regards the liability of the iudex) was 
not identified as such. There is only one very brief passage at D 24.3.17.2 that deals with a mistake due to ignorantia of a 
iudex. However, there is no indication as to the judge's liability, rather the plaintiff was advised to make us of the exceptio 
doli. See also below at 2 2 1 at the end. 
116 Visky, BIDR III ser. 18 (1971), 739-745; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 371 fnl7 b. 
117 Dawson, Oracles, 102. 
liS Litewski, RlDA II (J968), 356 fn48 and 50. 
119 Thomas, Textbook, 104; Kaser, RPL, 407. 
120 MacCormick, Acta Juridica 20 (1977), 153; Kaser, RPL, 420; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 379. Kaser and Hackl, 
ZPR, 375 state: "Mit dem Urteil wird der Rechtsstreit... endgiiltig entschieden. Es kann weder vom Richter selbst 
zunickgenommen noch vom einsetzenden Magistral.. ..aufgehoben werden. Erst unter dem Prinzipat entwickelt sich ... eine 
Berufung an den Kaiser." 
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execution in those early days, could lead to the debtor's being killed or enslaved. 121 Thirdly, 
dangers to the parties derived not only from the decision itself but also from the conduct of the 
lawsuit by the judge. The duration of the proceedings apud iudicem was statutorily restricted. 
Litigation was not open ended. 122 So-called lawsuits iudicia legitima had to be finished within 
eighteen months, while so-called lawsuits iudicia imperio continentia had to be end with the 
ending of the praetor's term of office, which was one year. 123 If the plaintiff instituted his 
claim near the end of the praetor's term of office and if the iudex delayed judgement beyond 
these time limits, the plaintiff likewise enjoyed no legal protection. 124 
Taking these harsh consequences into account, there was obviously only one possibility for 
providing a litigant who suffered from a judicial wrong with adequate redress under the 
system of formulary proceedings: an actio in factum against the judge under the edict Si iudex 
litem suam jecerit. 125 This was the praetorial solution to an inherent problem in the system of 
formulary proceedings, namely to reconcile the aim of res iudicata with some control on 
judicial irregularities other than by appeal, which, as a more refined concept of administration 
of justice, was not yet available to parties during the late RepUblic. With this in mind, two 
questions emerge: Was there a certain state of mind required before a iudex could be held 
liable under the edict; and secondly, for what kind ofwrongs was the iudex held liable? 
Distinguishing those two questions is absolutely essential in order not to lose one's bearings · 
\ 
in an area of Roman law that has attracted much contoversy with numerous renowned 
academics entering the ring to advance or to defend their suggestions and interpretations. 
121 See Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 383-401; Kaser, RPL, 421-423; Thomas, Textbook, 109; Van Warmelo, Principles ofRoman 
Civil Law, 279; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 379-380; Borkowski, Textbook, 70-71. However, under the formulary 
system of procedure personal execution was increasingly pushed into the background by execution against property (missio 
in bona). 
122 Tab. XII. 1.7-9. See Kaser, TR 32 (1964), 352. 
123 D 2.12.1.2 and D 2.12.3 pr. Further Hubner, IURA 5 (1954),201; Thomas, Textbook, 93 ; Lokin, Prota , 58. 
124 See particularly Simshauser, ZSS (RA) 109 (1990), 176. 
125 Van Warmelo's view is exactly on this point when he observes in his Principles ofRoman Civil Law at 222 that " ... if a 
judge were to deliver a wrong judgement, there was either no possibility of appeal or a limited possibility only. The judge 
was therefore, held personally liable for a wrong judgement and could be sued by a victim for the damage he had suffered." 
Note also Paricio who states in his Sicurezza Giuridica at 193 that: "La decision del juez (siempre y cuando, como veremos, 
fuese dada dentro de los limites de los formula) era wilida, y el condenado venia obligado a acatarla y cumpirla. Esto es 
tanto como decir que la sentencia era ya ejucutable." And he concludes: "EI unico camino del que eventualmente disponia 
el vencido era oponerse cuando se intentara contra til la actio iudicati ..". See also Cremades and Paricio, AHDE 54 
(1984), 190-191. 
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221 State of mind 
Until high-classical law (about 100-200 A.D.) , liability was strict, i.e., not dependent on the 
state of mind of the judge.126 In other words, the liability of the judge was established simply 
by proof that he had given a false judgement; it was not necessary for the plaintiff to lead 
126 Of those views advanced, the one accepted here appears to be the prevailing opinion. The general scope of this thesis 

does not allow to deal with these questions in the greatest possible detail. Therefore, the following two footnotes will try to 

provide an overview (not concluding) of the vast literature on the subject of the required state of mind for the liability of the 

iudex together with references to the controversial opinions. 

(The I 990s): The most recent contribution appears to be 0 F Robinson's article 'The 'iudex qui litem suam fecerit ' 

explained ' in ZSS (RAJ 118 (1999) forthcoming; Metzger, New Outline, 104, 134-141, 152-153; Schrage, Legal History 17 

(1996), IO 1-129 states that " .. .it seems logical not to take mere subjective culpability into account. "; Lamberti, Labeo 36 

(1990),265 : "£Cco perchi si potrebbe anche essere d'accordo con quegJi auton' che addirittura ritengono la menzione 

dell 'imprudentia come non aJlusiva a fattispecie colpose, bensi carica di un signijicatio 'piu forte', espressione di un 





(The 1980s): Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 17-18 points out that "[ c ]Iassical lawyers .. . generally emphasising more 

objective criteria of liability, did not have any difficulty in taking these situations [typical examples of quasi-delictual 

liability] for what they really were: namely cases of strict liability." D'Ors, SDHI 48 (1982), 393 accepts that the "... 

categoria cuasi-delictual es precisamente 10 que se ha considerado como 'responsabi/idad objectiva '... En el caso del 

iudex, la causa de la accion es, como hemos visto, la omision de senlencia, es decir, el incumpJimiento de un munus, 

independientemente de toda consideracion de dolo 0 culpa." However, one must bear in mind that D'Ors restricted judicial 

liability to very few instances. For details see below text at fu 162. D'Ors' view of the relevant state of mind in pre- and 

high-classical law was generally accepted as sound by Cremades and Paricio, AHDE 54 (1984), 179 et seqq. See also 





(The 1970s): Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 15-16, 23-24: "Nach dem kann mit erheblicher Sicherheit davon 

ausgegangen werden, dajJ es sich bei den quasi-deliktischen Tatbestanden zunachst um FaJle einer obje/div qualijizierten 

Hafiung handelte ... ". 

(The 1960s): Gordon, Temis 21 (1967), 304: "It seems simpler to accept the evidence that liability was in fact objective." 

And Pugsley, 1969 lJ, 353 ful2 agrees when he states "... the common factor. .. is strict liability." Nicholas, Introduction, 

225: "In the classical law, however, it seems that his liability was indeed strict...". 
(The 1950s): Seidl, SDHI 18 (1952), 343: "Es bestdtigt die Lehre ... dass im klassischen Recht der iudex non ex maleficio, 
sondern aus der Gefahrenbeherrschung alJein haftete: er beherrschte die Gefahr ... ohne dass man ihm ein DeJi/d vorwerfen 
miisste,ja auch ohne dass man ihm auch nur Fahrlassigkeil vorzuwerfen brauchte."; Stein, RJDA 5 (1958), 569 states that 
" ... it was unnecessary to shew further that he [the judge] was either fraudulent or negligent. "; Jonas, BLR 6 (1954), 431 
concludes: "Although the [classical] interpreters of the Lex Aquilia, came to insist on the presence offault as a condition of 
liability, there remained areas in the Roman law which provided for liability regardless of fault. These fields are found in 
the quasi-delicts." Hiibner, IURA 5 (1954),204: " ...die Richterhaftung basierte dann nicht auf der Ahndung schuldhafter 
Pjlichtverlelzung, sondern aufobjekJive qualijizierler Schadensverteilung aus Gefahrtragung." 
(Prior to the 19405): See inter alia Pernice, Labeo, 248-249; Lenel , £dictum Perpetuum, 167-168. 
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evidence to show dolus or culpa on the part of the judge. 127 For obvious reasons, this had 
arisen from the fonnulary system of proceedings under which the parties were largely subject 
to the authority of the iudex without a chance of appeal. 128 One of the crucial questions in this 
respect is how to interpret the various texts that refer to the liability of the iudex, qui litem 
suam fecit. Some of these texts contain no reference at all to the iudex's state of mind l29; 
others seem to refer to imprudentia l30 (as a particular fonn of culpa) and one even to dolus 
malus. 131 How can these passages be reconciled with the notion of strict liability? 
127 Other opinions which have been raised with respect to the state of mind required for the iudex's liability include most 
recently Kaser and Hack], ZPR, 196 fn38. They share the view that, as early as classical law, liability of the judge was for 
so-called typical culpa. See further Birks, eLP 22 (1969), 173. Buckland, Textbook, 599 and Manual, 331-332 suggested 
that the concept of judicial liability was based upon vicarious liability in the sense that even though the judge is liable for 
his own wrongdoing he takes over a foreign liability which, normally, would have fallen on one of the parties to the case. 
Similarly Sandars, Institutes, 424. Others, namely Kelly, Roman Litigation, 102-117 and Stojcevic, IURA 8 (1957), 71 
advance the view that, from the late Republic already, the liability of the judge was not based on strict liability but upon 
some kind of CUlpability on the part of the iudex, that was either dolus or culpa. Broggini, 1962 NJW, 1652 restricts the 
iudex's liability from the days of Cicero to arglistige Handlungen which are acts dolo malo. Tomulescu, IURA 24 (1973), 
87 generally accepts the view that liability is for dolus in cases of illegal sentences, whereas for procedural mistakes it is for 
dolus and culpa. Pauw, THR-HR 42 (1979), 242 appears to favour Kaser's view, that already in classical law liability was 
for typical culpa: "Dit lyk dus asof die grondslag van aanspreeklikheid nie dolus is nie maar imprudentia ... Sy gedrag kom 
dan na aan Kaser se 'typisierter culpa '." However, note also Professor Birks's more recent contribution in TR 52 (1984), 
384 fn34 where he expresses his dissatisfaction with his earlier view that liability was for actual or typical dolus and, 
instead, favours liability for culpa (in its narrow sense). In his eyes strict liability is not necessary to explain the scope of 
judicial liability by the time of high-classical law. Dolus, on the other hand, is not exclusively relevant because nowhere is 
it said by the sources that liability was for dolus alone. Moreover, Birks argues that as a category of dolus liability is rarely 
of practical importance (at 384) because it is nearly impossible to prove dolus on the part of the judge (a thought which was 
also advanced by the Dutch jurist Voet as early as the seventeenth century. For details see below chapter V 4 I 5). More 
recently, Borkowski in his Textbook at 335 introduced the idea that liability of the iudex (as in the case of all the other 
quasi-delicts) was based neither upon strict liability, nor on vicarious liability, but on the fact that a judge is entrusted with 
conduct of the case. However, this comes very near to Hiibner's view. See the authors discussed below at fn 143 to complete 
this overview of the abundant literature on the issue of the state of mind required for judicial liability under the formulary 
system of proceedings. 
128 Hiibner, IURA 5 (1954), 201 : " ... seiner Macht weitgehend ausgeliefert ." Contra Stojcevic, IURA 8 (1957), 71 " ... c 'est 
dans celie mesure que Hubner n 'a pas raison lorsqu'il avance que Ie juge romain avait une position plus diJJicile que Ie 
juge d'aujourd'hui." 
129 Macrobius, Saturnalia, 3.16.15; Antinoopolis Papyrus 1. 22; Gai 4.52; lex Irnitana Chapter 91.Tab. X. A 51 and B 15. 
For a discussion see the text below at fnnI32-139. 
130 Inst4.5 pr which is very similar to D 44.7.5.4 and D 50.13.6. For details see the text directly below. 
131 D 5.1.15.1. Since this text is from Ulpian, notably an (early) post-classical Roman jurist, a discussion appears more 
appropriate in the following section. See below at 2 3 I. 
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D 50.13.6, which is thought to have been extracted from the third book of Gaius's res 
cottidianae, as well as the almost identical D 44.7.5.4 and Inst 4.5 pr, refer to judicial wrongs 
committed through imprudentia. 132 At first glance, therefore, these passages contain a clear 
indication of the judge's state of mind. 
"Si iudex litem suam fecerit [,non proprie ex maleficio obligatus videtur. Sed quia neque ex 
contractu obligatus est, et utique pecasse aliquid intellegitur licet per imprudentiam: ideo videtur 
quasi ex maleficio teneri in factum actione, et) in quantum de ea re aequum religioni iudicantis 
visumfuerit poenam sustinebit.,,133 
The key to proper understanding of this section is that the text fromfecerit to in quantum was 
interpolated some centuries later at the time of Justinian when the texts of the classical jurists 
were edited for inclusion in Justinian's Corpus Iuris Civilis. Therefore, the implication as to 
the iudex's state of mind is not genuinely classical. 134 
If one accepts this view, the lack of indication of subjective culpability in high-classical law 
corresponds neatly with another set of texts which have not been SUbjected to the compilers' 
interpolations and which, therefore, are considered genuinely pre-classical or high-classical. 135 
In one of these texts, we are told of a group of men occupied with mistresses while engaged in 
drinking and gambling games, somewhere in Rome. This in itself surely was not a rare sight 
in Roman days. However, what makes this text a valuable contribution is the following. At 
least one of the men appears to have been selected as iudex and is supposed to hear some 
cases later that day. In order to enjoy a high old time until the latest possible hour, they send a 
servant to report on what is happening at the forum, what acts have been passed or turned 
down. Finally, they decide to leave for the forum to avoid any liability litem suam facere 
which their friend undoubtedly would have faced had he not heard the cases the praetor had 
assigned to him on the basis of his imperium. However, on their way they waste no 
opportunity to have some more drinks and reach the forum in a rather peevish mood. The 
132 Gaius Jived and wrote during the second century A.D. and is considered a high-classical jurist. See Honore, Gaius, 68-
69. 
133 D 44.7.5.4 ends at teneri and has no et before utique and Inst 4.5 pr is distinct from D 50.13.6 in that it lacks in factum 
actione and videbitur replaces visum fuerit. 
134 See Lenel, £dictum Perpetuum, 169. Even Kelly, Roman Litigation, III agrees with Lenel on this point: " ... Lenel 
regards everything in the Gaius passage ... as interpolated, so that the imprudentia concept is got out of the way, at any rate 
so far as the classical period is concerned. The latter suggestion seems acceptable ... ". See further Stein, RlDA 5 (1958), 
567-568. Other writers hold the view that Gaius never tried to specify the behaviour (state of mind) that constitutes a 
wrong. See MacCormack, Liability of the Judge, 19-20 or Hubner, IURA 5 (J 958),203. 
135 MacCormick, Acta luridica 20 (1977), 152 with regard to Gai 4.52. 
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hearing of the case commences, witnesses are heard, but the judge absents himself for a while. 
On his return, he declares that he has followed the testimony and asks for the documents, but 
with all the wine he has consumed he is hardly able to open his eyes: 
"Ubi horae decem sunt, iubent puerum vocari ut comitium eat percontatum qUid inforo gestum sit, 
qui suaserint, qui dissuaserint, quot tribus iusserint, quot vetuerint. Inde ad comitium vadunt, ne 
litem suam faciant. Dum eunt, nulla est in angiporto amphora quam non impleant, quippe qui 
vesicam plenam vini habeant. Veniunt in comitium, tristes iubent dicere. Quorum negotium est 
narrant, iudex testes poscit, ipsus it minctum. Ubi redit, ait se omnia audvisse, tabulas poscit, 
litteras inspicit: vix prae vino sustinet palpebras. 
Later, when he retires to prepare the judgement, he whispers to his boon companions that he 
does not care about these dull people (the parties) and that he would rather have another bottle 
of wine and something decent to eat. 
Eunt in cons ilium. Ibi haec oratio 'quid mihi negotii est cum istis nugatoribus, quin potius 
potamus mulsum mixtum vino Graeco, edimus turdum pinguem bonum que piscem, lupum 
germanum, qui inter duos pontes captusfuit?,,136 
In this context, it is interesting that such forms of judicial misbehaviour apparently did not 
result in immediate liability. This confinns the view taken above that mainly liability lay for 
those wrongs that effectively resulted in loss of the action, as would have been the case had 
the judge not appeared at the Forum to hear the case. The following part of the Antinoopolis 
papyrus 22, which dates back from the fourth century A.D., and which was discovered in the 
winter of 1913-14 in Sheikh Abada, has been considered equally predicative. 
"Item Pomp[oniusj scr[ibitJ. Si falso t[utorej a[uctorej male foerit diffis(s)us dies, ed[ictumj 
q[uijd[emj cessare, et iudicem, q[uija neq[uej diffidit neq[uej s[ententiJam dixit, litem suam 
fe[cisse videri .. .j.,,137 
If a judge ordered an invalid adjournment (male fuerit diffisus dies), he was supposed to have 
acted litem suam facere since he had neither adjourned properly nor given sufficient sententia 
for or against a party. Under the formulary system of proceedings, this implied that the case 
was not resumed. A choice text is Gai4.52: 
"Debet autem iudex attendere, ut cum certae pecuniae condemnatio posita sit, neque maioris 
neque minoris summa posita condemnet; alioquin litem suam faciat." 
136 This text from Macrobius's Saturnalia, 3.16.14-17 reproduces a speech by C Titius on the pre-classical lex Fannia from 
about 161 B.C. The pre-classical origins of this passage are also stressed by Cremades and Paricio, AHDE 54 (1984), 187. 
137 See Antinoopolis Papyri, 47; Seidl, SDHl18 (1952), 343; Hubner, IURA 5 (1954), 203-204 and more recently Gimenez-
Candela, Revision, 557-562. 
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Here Gaius makes the point that a judge had to be careful not to condemn a party contrary to 
the condemnation clause of the formula; otherwise, he would make the case his own since the 
party would have lost any opportunity to resume the case. 
It is evident that none of the three instances of judicial wrongdoing postulated earlier indicate 
anything with regard to the state of mind of the iudex involved. Alternatively, there is no 
doubt as to the serious threat the iudex faced, namely being held liable once he failed to obey 
certain essential requirements. This apparent lack of any indication of culpability in pre-
classical and high-classical texts also derives from a passage from the lex Irnitana. In this lex, 
it is indicated that a judge would be held liable, uti lis iudici arbitrove damni sit, where he did 
not return a verdict in time or where he forgot to extend the period of his appointment in time, 
regardless of any form of culpability: 138 
" .. . si neque dies diffis<s>us neque iudicatum juerit, uti lis iudici arbitroue damni sit ... " and " ... si 
neque diffi[sJsum e lege neque iudicatum sit per quos dies quoque loco ex h(ac) l(ege) iudicari 
licebit oportebit ... " . 139 
This is strikingly similar to the regulation in the Antinoopolis papyrus which has just been 
quoted. 140 The same principle (no indication of culpability) also applies to judges who 
adjudicated in cases which were not yet up for adjudication: " ... rem in iudicio non esse 
" 141 oporteret .... 
The impression given by the examples above is strict liability of the iudex during the period 
from about 300 B.C. to 200 A.D., which was predominantly under the influence of the system 
of formulary proceedings. 142 Its purpose was to protect the parties from the harsh 
138 D'Ors, SDHl48 (1982), 374-377 says: "Baste observar .. . cOmo este capitulo cuya transcripcion nos hemos permitido 
adelantar, trata del intertium, de la diffissio y del juez que, por no hacer bien la difJissio ni dar sentencia, asume en 
proprio perjuicio fa causa, que deja de estae en juico. Es el temor de esta caducidad de la accion, por omision del iudex, 
10 que provoca que ef juez asuma las consecuencias de la accion por iii Jrustrada." See also Gimenez-Candela, 
Cuasidelitos, 37-40 and Mayer-Maly's review of Gimenez-Candela's work in TR 60 (1992), 194-196 for further details. 
139 Chapter 9I.Tab.X. 51-53 and B 15-16. 
140 Metzger, New Outline, 104; D'Ors, SDHI 48 (1982), 376; Gimenez-Candela, Cuasidelitos, 41 ; Lamberti , Labeo 36 
(1990),253 . 
141 Chapter 9l.Tab. X. B 7-8. 
142 At this point it should be remembered that not all the writers who deal with the lex lrnitana would agree on the 
proposition that the sequence of the passages shows that judicial liability initially was strict. See Birks, TR 52 (1984), 384 
and Simshauser, ZSS (RAJ 109 (1990),1 77. 
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consequences of judicial wrong. 143 Strict liability and, in consequence, the avoidance of the 
difficult burden of establishing the judge's state of mind was adequate compensation for the 
inherent disadvantages of the system. 
Aside from the texts and the difficult question of interpolation, another two arguments can be 
raised in favour of the view that in Republican and earlier classical law judicial liability was 
strict. 
In the first place, the development of the Roman law of legal liability makes it evident that in 
early Roman law, as in so many other early legal systems, the required state of mind was 
based upon the notion that whoever committed the deed, the externally visible event, had to 
bear the consequences regardless of any subjective factors. l44 At a further stage of 
143 This appears to be the appropriate place to refer to a number of scholars who favour a more restricted liability of the 
iudex only for (proved) culpable acts from as early as the time of the late Republic. In their eyes, practical reasons, above all 
others, negate the feasibility of strict liability. ludices were either chosen by the parties or drawn by a lot, they were 
generally unpaid and non professional. In this regard, Kelly, Roman Litigation, 112, makes the point that " ... it seems hardly 
likely that a judge in the period of formulary procedure would have consented to hear any case if he knew that any 
carelessness on his part would raise a presumption of litem suamfacere." Stojcevic, IURA 8 (1957), 71 refers to policy 
considerations, for instance pacification and the protection of the authority of the magistrate: "Toutefois, les juges n 'etaient 
pas juges de profession et ne devaient pas posseder de connaissances juridiques. C 'est pourquoi if pouvait facilement leur 
arriver de mejuger. La securite juridique et I 'autorite de la magistrature auraient ete serieusement ebranlees si les parties 
avaient pu mettre en cause Ie juge pour imprudentia ... le jugement ne pouvait etre attaque que si Ie juge avait prononce sa 
sentence defecteuse par dol." Note, however, that MacConnick, Acta Juridica 20 (1977), 156 very aptly argues that 
" ... since the parties had agreed to Maevius [fictive person] being judge, if either of them [the litigants] said that Maevius 
were biased for or against him, or corrupted ... such a complainer might fairly have been told he should have chosen better." 
To return to the critics, it is further argued that Roman litigation in a sense was not too different from today's. There was 
always and will always be one party which comes out dissatisfied with the judge's decision. But " ... [t]hat's life ... " 
according to MacConnick, Acta Juridica 20 (1977), 151 " .. . and that's litigation - an institution which systematically 
dissatisfies half its customers." Without any prospect of appeal it is evident that disgruntled litigants would tum and sue the 
iudex personally where they felt the judge had judged wrongly. Kelly, Roman Litigation, 113 makes the additional point 
that a wide standard of liability would have made the "judicial machinery unworkable." In the affirmative, Simshauser, ZSS 
(RA) 109 (1990), 177. However, the best argument against Kelly's initial argument is, probably, that if the judge could not 
reach a decision because either the legal or the factual situation was not properly understood by him he could swear rem 
sibi non liquere (that the case is not clear to him). Consequently, another judge would be appointed and the iudex would 
evade any liability. With regard to the latter aspect see Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 354 and fn37, 370 fn3 and Kaser, RPL, 419. 
144 Kaser, RPL, 186; Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 20-21; Jars/Kunkel/Wenger Ramisches Recht, 229-230 
state: "Am Anfang dieser Entwickiung pjlegt ein Rechtszustand zu stehen, der schon die objektive Tatsache des kausalen 
Zusammenhangs geniigen laj3t urn eine Haftung des Verursachenden zu begriinden (reine Erfolgshaftung) ." Note, however, 
Kaser's view that in reality ancient strict liability (at least in some instances) was already a typified liability for fault or 
rather dolus/dolus sciens (which other scholars accept only at a later stage). In his view someone who committed an act 
37 
development, liability arose in respect of an act which, typically, resulted in a conSCIOUS 
infringement of another person's rights, without, as yet however, the specifying of fault (culpa 
in a wide sense) as such. Such conscious infringements of other people's rights were 
considered an iniuria. And iniuria, inter alia, became the early base of the lex Aquilia. Thus 
the criterion of damnum iniuria datum initially implied damnum culpa datum. 145 It was only 
in classical law that lawyers were prepared to consider, cautiously, the individual fault of the 
CUlprit alone. Only now did damnum culpa datum come to the fore. 146 
In classical law, the distinction between legally responsible and irresponsible behaviour was 
generally derived from considering typical instances of liability and distinguishing these 
within the field of 'causation'. Generally, it was only by a direct act that liability could arise. 
Indirect acts or even omissions came to be included only after the emergence of culpa in the 
sense of negligence and the consequent development of broader (and more flexible) 
standards of care. 'Causation' and fault therefore were not yet properly separated. Fault was 
still determined with reference to a number of external and objective aspects. 147 Thus, one 
can say with JorslKunkellWenger that in classical law: "The state of mind remained 
concrete-casuistic. Generalised and abstract concepts were foreign to Roman lawyers.,,148 For 
this reason the prevailing doctrine has termed this intermediate stage of the development of 
typically resulting in a loss generally intended to cause this result. See for Kaser's opinion his RPR I, 503 as well as RPL, 
186 and particularly his article in BIDR 65 (1962), 79-104. Kaser's view has not gone undisputed. See inter alia 
Wittmann, Korperverletzung, 16 et seqq. Wittmann holds the view that any discussion about the tenn dolus, whether 
'typical' dolus or not, implies a subjective and not merely an objective concept of liability. Beyond this, Wittmann believes 
that as early as the XII Tables both dolus and culpa were identified . Molnar in BIDR III ser. 28 (1986), 465 el seqq. on the 
other hand posits - except in cases of killing - a puristic objective standard of liability, that is Erfolgshaftung for early 
Roman law. 
145 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 1004; lorslKunkellWenger Romisches Recht, 231 . 
146 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 1006: " ... damnum iniuria datum was replaced, for all practical purposes, by damnum 
culpa datum." 
147 Kaser, RPL, 186 states: "Indirect causation, as well as the causation through omission, was not included in the Aquilian 
culpa in which causation and fault were still intertwined. It was only the high-classical and late classical period which 
relaxed the requirement of causation and extended these situations by granting analogous actions." 
148 "Der Verschuldensbegriff blieb konla-et-kosuistisch. Abstrakt-allgemeine BegrifJe waren den Romern fremd." My 
translation from lorslKunkellWenger Romisches Recht, 231. See also Kaser, RPR I, 503. Further Zimmermann, Law of 
Obligations, 988 who states: "The analysis of delict in terms of objective and subjective requirements, of factual and 
normative elements and, more generally of abstract conceptual thinking is thoroughly un-Roman." And at 1008 
Zimmermann observes ..... Roman lawyers approached the question of culpa in a casuistic manner. They did not try to 
subsume the facts of the individual case under a standardised test or fonnula." 
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the concept of fault as 'typical culpa' .149 Only in the twilight between high-classical and 
post-classical law did fault emerge as a truly subjective concept based upon the 
reproachability of the behaviour of the individual in question. 150 
It is against this general background that it is argued that judicial liability in early and late 
Republican law, as well as in earlier classical law, was based upon objective criteria and not 
as yet on culpability. In other words, the standard of judicial liability initially had to be strict 
liability. Even though classical law recognised the concept of typical culpa, the few genuinely 
classical passages available do not indicate unequivocally that, as a matter of course, typical 
culpa applied to judicial liability. Any indications of fault or culpa in its true SUbjective sense, 
which can, anyway, be derived only from Gaius, must have been introduced into the concept 
of judicial liability at a later stage, most likely in post-classical law under Justinian. The 
general development of culpability in Roman legal history lends considerable strength to this 
argument. It is even more conclusive if we recollect that the liability of the iudex, qui litem 
suam fecit was probably not an innovation by the praetor but has roots somewhere in the 
earliest days of Roman law, where strict liability was the case beyond any doubt. 151 
In the second place, the fact that under the system of formulary proceedings the lay iudex was 
not prevented from swearing rem sibi non liquere indicates that apparently the maxim error or 
ignorantia iuris nocet did not (yet) apply. This can be taken as another argument in favour the 
view that for this period the question of state of mind was irrelevant. As a matter of fact the 
doctrine of error is hopelessly keyed to the question of whether or not the actor's conduct was 
wilful since, to use a pictorial expression, acting under the influence of error relates to wilful 
conduct like a mirror image. In this sense the non-application of the doctrine of error in any 
event implies more of an objective or strict liability approach. 
149 Kaser, RPR I, 503 makes the point: "Auch in der klassischen Zeit neigt man ferner irnmer noch dazu, das Verschulden 
nach typischen Verhaltenslagen zu beurteilen, die jedoch, der kasuistischen Denkweise gerniijJ, stark difJerenziert werden." 
See also Kaser, RPR II, 349; Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 24. 
150 JorslKunkellWenger Rornisches Recht, 232 state: "UnzweiJelhajt hat die Entwicklung von einern objelaiv-typischen 
Verschulden zurn subjektiven Verschulden gefiihrt, doch liijJt sich nach Lage der Quellen nicht sicher entscheiden ob diese 
Entwicklung in der Klassik oder erst in der Nachklassik zurn AbschlujJ gelangt ist." 
151 See Hochstein, Obligationes QuaSi ex Delicto, 24-25. Contra Hochstein Macheiner in ZSS (RA) 90 (1973), 516-517. 
That objective criteria are likely to have played a decisive role is also affirmed by Zimmerman, Law of ObligatiOns, 17-18 
who makes the point that c\assica\\awyers generally still emphasised more objective criteria of liability, as was (later) the 
case at the time of Justinian . Thus he says that " ... the liability of the judge in classical law was not dependent either on 
whether he had negligently (or possibly even intentionally) given the wrong judgement." 
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222 Causes of liability 
If strict liability is accepted, the question of what sort of wrongs the Roman iudex was to be 
held liable for becomes considerably more important. It appears from the texts that judicial 
liability under the formulary system arose essentially from procedural ~rrors . 152 The sources 
indicate that judicial liability could arise from the following wrongs, all of which, as will be 
seen, were of a procedural nature: adjudication regardless of intertium 153 , failure to perform 
difjisio, i.e. , to adjourn the case properlyl54, failure to hear and to decide the case within the 
required period, i.e., within the magistrate's period of office or the eighteen month rule (mars 
litis)155, failure to appear on the forum on the day or at the time fixed for the tria1 156, rendering 
judgement in a case which was not yet pending157, and, finally, to refer once more to Gaius's 
example, departing from the binding requirements (ultra vires) of the formula. All these 
examples reflect not so much mistakes on points of fact or law but procedural errors, breaches 
152 MacCormick, Acta Juridica 20 (1977), 152 refers to patent errors; Pugsley, 1969 IJ, 352 indicates excess of jurisdiction 
or acts ultra vires as the decisive criterion; Birks, TR 52 (1984), 383 accepts that " ... liability was imposed for 
mismanagement of the proceedings apud iudicem. "; MacCormack, Liability 0/ the Judge, 19 and 26 stresses the " ... failure 
by the judge to perform one of the basic procedural requirements of his office ... ". Note also Frier's comment in Casebook, 
237: "The original nature of this liability is very obscure, and the few texts concerning it are believed to have been heavily 
altered by the Digest' s compilers. But it may be that the original liability was much more narrowly conceived: the iudex 
became liable to the plaintiff if he failed to hear the case at the appointed time, or if he failed to render judgement...By the 
second century A.D., the iudex was liable also for judgements that did not correspond to the formula .. . ". D'Ors, SDHI48 
(1982), 368-394 particularly favours a narrow, exclusively procedural , cause of liability. Further, Metzger, New Outline, 
153; Simshauser, ZSS (RAJ \09 (1990),176-177; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 196 fn38; Lenel, Edictum Perpetuum, 169, who 
refers to constantly recurring minor illegalities; see also Kiibler, ZSS (RAJ 39 (1918), 216. The majority of the authors 
referred to above share the view that liability in post-classical law in addition came to be based on errors of substantive law. 
For developments in the Principate see below at 232 for more details. From HUbner's contribution, IURA 5 (1954),203 
fn 16 it is not entirely clear for what period of the development he considers Rechtsunwissenheit, that is lack of legal 
knowledge (= substantial mistakes) as a determinant of judicial liability. 
153 Lex Irnitana chapter 91.Tab.X R: "Quo iure in tertium denuntietur, dies difJindatur diffisusue sit, res iudicetur, lis iudici 
damni sit ... ". 
154 See lex Irnitana chapter 91.Tab.X. 51 and B 15; Antinoopolis Papyrus 1.22. Further Metzger's summary in New Outline, 
146-147 and 152-153; Gimenez-Candela, Cuasidelitos, 39-42. 
155 No 'direct indication of liability for failure to hear the case before mors litis. However, the lex Irnitana refers to that rule 
in chapter 9I.Tab.X. 53 - B 2. See also HUbner, IURA 5 (1954), 201; more recently Sirnshauser, ZSS (RAJ 109 (1990), 176; 
Johnston, JRS 77 (1987), 75 fn69 (who appears to favour an even shorter period than that of mors litis) ; Gimenez-Candela, 
Cuasidelitos, 39. Apparently, however, the judge always had the opportunity to swear rem sibi non liquere in a case where 
he felt unsafe to decide the suit. In a sense, therefore, Roman law - quite distinct from later periods - did not deal with the 
problem of denial of justice due to ignorance of the judge, except perhaps for the passage in D 24.3.17.2. 
156 Macrobius, Saturnalia 3.16. J 5. 
157 See lex Irnitana chapter 9I.Tab.X.B 7-8: " ... rem in iudicio non esse oporteret ... " . 
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of judicial duties. lss In fact, except for the last case, all these examples are evidence of failure 
to give any judgement at all. 
That procedural errors were the main source of liability litem suam facere during the period 
presently assessed also appears from another more recent discovery, namely the tabula 
Contrebiensis, an inscription on bronze from 87 B.C., unearthed near Saragossa only in 
1979. 159 The first century B.C. was undoubtedly a period when the system of formulary 
proceedings was at its height. The inscription is a record of a case heard before a court in 
Contrebia in Spain. How the judges were appointed by the praetor Gaius Valerius Flaccus and 
what formula was granted to the plaintiff prior to litis contestatio is neatly set out. From there 
the record moves directly on to the decision of the court, as well as the names of the iudices 
and counsel involved and, finally, the place and date of the trial. 
What is of considerable importance to the scope of judicial liability under the system of 
formulary proceedings is that the judgements were not discursive. All that was stated was the 
final sententia, the final judgement. There was no indication, whatsoever, as to the underlying 
reasoning or application of law. 160 Consequently, it is argued by scholars that there hardly 
existed a point of departure for a dissatisfied party to sue the judge for anything other than 
matters external to the court's mental processes. 161 It is for this reason, apparently, that 
liability was imposed only for procedural errors or, in the words of Metzger, for errors that 
were " .. .'intrinsic' to the trial and capable of proof without resort to matters outside of the 
events at trial.,,162 This view, which is also accepted here, may be termed a 'narrow view' of 
litem suamfacere. 163 
158 MacCormick, Acta Juridica 20 (1977), 154; MacConnack, Liability of the Judge, 18. 
159 See Birks, TR 52 (1984), 375-383; Schrage, Legal History 17 (1996), 103. More generally on the tabula see Richardson, 
JRS 73 (1983), 33-41 and Birks et ai, JRS 74 (1984),45-73 . 
160 Dawson, Oracles, 103; Wesel, Geschichte des Rechts, 175. 
161 This opinion was ventured initially by D'Ors in SDHl48 (1982), 377-378. Birks in TR 52 (1984), 374 et seq. accepted 
D'Ors view as sound but added strength to it with the conclusions he drew from the tabula Contrebiensis. For a detailed 
discussion see ibid. at 378-383. An author neither Birks nor D'Ors point to is K Visky who stressed as early as 1971 in his 
contribution in RlDA III ser. 18 (1971), 739-745 that under the formulary fonn of proceedings judgements included no 
motivation by the deciding judge on the basis of which a party might have been able to conclude on to the judge's 
conclusions as to fact or law. Visky's view has been accepted (for this period) by Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 370 fn 17b. 
162 D'Ors's and Birks's 'narrow view' (see the title of Birks 's contribution in TR 52 (1984): 'A new argument for a narrow 
view of litem suamfacere') has been accepted by a number of other authors, namely Robinson 'The 'iudex qui litem suam 
fecerit' explained' in ZSS (RA) 118 (1999) forthcoming; Metzger, New Outline, 53; Simshauser, ZSS (RA) 109 (1990), 177; 
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However, actionable judicial wrongs were restricted to those procedural mistakes that 
effectively resulted in the loss of the suit. In other words, even serious examples of 
miscarriage of justice, such as breach of the principles of audi alteram partem, orality or the 
actual failure to assess the evidence (as in the case of the drunken judge in Macrobius's 
Saturnalia) did not lead to judicial liability as long as the case was not lost as a result of these 
procedural mistakes. 164 
2 3 Judicial liability in post-classical law (about 200 - 550 A.D.) 
Just as knowledge of the ordinary system of formulary proceedings is crucial for a proper 
understanding of the underlying reasons for a judge's liability well into the high-classical 
period, so too the implications of the so-called extraordinary cognitio proceedings provide the 
background for the further development of judicial liability up to Justinian's Corpus Iuris 
Civilis. 165 
The following characteristics of the proceedings extraordinaria cognitio, all significant 
deviations from the formulary system, should be noted at the outset. First and foremost, the 
bipartition of the proceedings into the parts in iure and apud iudicem fell away. One and the 
same judge conducted the whole case. 166 Consequently, the formula became totally irrelevant. 
In fact, by the middle of the fourth century the sons of Emperor Constantine, fearing 
'hairsplitting' to the disadvantage of the litigants, explicitly abolished the further use of any 
formulae. Actions were now initiated by a letter to the judge. If the judge approved the actio, 
Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 196; Gimenez-Candela, Cuasidelitos, 39; Paricio, Sicurezza Giuridica, 194; Cremades and Paricio, 
AHDE 54 (1984),181-186. 
163 Taken from Metzger, New Outline, 153 . 
164 Dawson, Oracles, 102-103 states: "If his actions conformed to the formula which conferred his powers, the iudex in 
perfonnihg his judicial duties was almost wholly unhampered by procedural rules ... ". 
165 The term Corpus Juris Civilis was only introduced by the Glossators, however, for the sake of clarity in this thesis, the 
work will be referred to under this title in the Roman period. Generally for the cognitio extra ordinem see Van Zyl, Roman 
Private Law, 385-387; Van Warmelo, Principles of Roman Civil Law, 280-281 ; Thomas, Textbook, 119-121; Ellis, 1987 
Obiter, 24; Kaser, RPL, 396-397 and 426-433; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 471-501 , 560-613 ; Simshauser, Juridici, 5-9; Jones, 
Roman Government, 81-84; Kelly, Princeps Judex, 84-90. 
166 Dawson, Lay Judges, 32-33: "The trial judge acquired continuous control over the proceedings before, during and after 
the trial. " 
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the statement of claim (libellus) was delivered by public citation. 167 The defending party 
responded with a counter statement (libellus contradictorius). Summons was by official 
messenger. At the trial stage, the hearing before the iudex was put on record. Judgement was 
given orally and drawn up in due course. Execution was performed by an officer for which 
service the parties had to pay high charges. Furthermore, cases were no longer heard out of 
doors in the forum. 168 Instead, the hearings in Rome and Constantinople were moved to the 
inaccessible tribunal at the apsis of the covered basilicas. The apsis was shut off by railings 
(cancel/ae) and curtains (vela). In the provinces court was held at the praetorium, the 
governor's office. From the fourth century, proceedings were no longer open to the public. 169 
Another development of considerable importance was the availability of an appeal against a 
decision of the iudex. On the basis of the eternal underlying iurisdictio of the post-classical 
principes, a comprehensive system of appeal was developed to perfection. The judgements of 
the iudices pedanei or dati could be appealed against at the court of the judge who had 
delegated the case to them. Likewise, the judgements of the municipal iudices minores could 
be appealed at the provincial courts, and the judgements of the municipal courts of the urban 
district (within 100 miles) of Rome and Constantinople at the court of the praefecti urbi. 
Judgements of first instance of the provincial iudices medii could be rectified either by the 
vicarii or the praefecti praetorio. Decisions of the vicarii could be challenged at the emperor' s 
court. However, decisions of the praefecti urbi were seldom subject to the further intervention 
of the emperor; and decisions of the praefecti praetorio were generally considered non-
167 For the following see Borkowski , Textbook, 74; Jolowicz, Roman Law, 404-406; Ferguson, ILR 46 (1960-61), 738-740; 
Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 385-387; Van Warmelo, Principles of Roman Civil Law, 280; Thomas, Textbook, 119-121 ; 
Prichard, RPL, 451 ; Kaser, RPL, 430-433; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 570-617; Wieacker, Recht und GesellschaJt, 74-80 ; 
Kunkel, RG, 130-131. 
168 See the authorities above at fn49 . 
169 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 554-555 ; Kunkel in ZSS (RA) 85 (1968), 320 argues on the basis of Cassius Dio's account that 
already in Dio's lifetime (from 150-235 A.D.) law suits had been removed from the publicity of the Forum to the seclusion 
of a court room. For developments from the days of AUgustus onwards see generally Kunkel'5 account at 319-325. 
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appealable. 17o Judging had become a full-time job, administered by the state as one of the 
essential features of autocratic government. l7l 
With regard to judicial liability, the three most important aspects of the gradual emergence of 
the extra ordinem cognitio form of proceedings are the following: by the post-classical period, 
appeal proceedings had become the ordinary legal remedy available to a dissatisfied litigant. 
Therefore, for the first time the essential impact of the availability of appeal proceedings on 
the concept of judicial liability is noticeable. Secondly, the typical relationship between a 
citizen as party to a case and a citizen as judge ceased to exist. By the time of the late 
Principate, it was replaced by the relationship between the citizen as subordinate and an 
increasingly autocratic public authority represented by a judiciary staffed by imperial servants. 
Therefore, thirdly, the peculiarities of the formulary system of proceedings with its implied 
disadvantages for the parties had withered away. The main underlying reasons for the liability 
ofthe iudex, qui litem suamfecit of pre-classical and high-classical law no longer existed. 
Nevertheless, it appears from the sources that the liability of the judge was retained; although 
it was adjusted in some respects to suit the new conditions. This tendency manifested itself 
not so much in the Western Empire, where from the fourth century the law was subject to 
increasing vulgarisation, but rather in Byzantium; and was of course triggered mainly by 
adoption of the liability of the iudex, qui litem suamfecit in Justinian's Corpus Iuris Civilis. 
Two proposals have been advanced as to why Justinian retained the concept of judicial 
liability. On the one hand, it has been suggested that the possibility of appeal gave post-
classical litigants far greater opportunity for a remedy than litigants in earlier epochs. 172 It is 
conceivable that the liability of the iudex continued to be available to a party to enable him to 
170 The course of development, however, is too complex to be covered fully in this work. For a detailed survey see 
especially the work Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 504-506 for the Principate, and 533-536 and 617-623 for the Dominate; also 
Wieacker, Recht und Gesellschaft, 72-73. Further reference may be to Borkowski, Textbook, 75; Dawson, Lay Judges, 33; 
Van Warmelo, Principles of Roman Civil Law, 281; Thomas, Textbook, 121-122; Prichard, RPL , 452; Kaser, RPL, 433; 
Kunkel , RG, 129-130. 
171 Dawson, Lay Judges, 33 . 
172 MacCormack, The Liability of Judges , 22-23; Stojcevic, IURA 8 (1957), 74. Contra, however, MacCormick, Acta 
Juridica 20 (1977), 157 and Kelly, Roman Litigation, 116-117 who argue that by the post-classical period the liability of 
the judge must have fallen into complete disuse and become a dead letter since there are remarkably few references to litem 
suam facere . The passages contained in the Corpus furis Civilis appear to be mostly high-classical. See also Dawson, 
Oracles , 102. 
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recover the additional costs of appeal (sportulae), which are reported to have been tremendous 
in those days.173 The sportulae were to the benefit of the iudex involved since the judicial 
salaries were decreased. Thus, the cost of maintaining the administration of justice was 
increasingly shifted on to the shoulders of the parties. Another aspect worth noting is that 
litigants faced a considerable degree of uncertainty when going on appeal since appeals from 
the most remote parts of the empire were handled in Rome, in Constantinople or other major 
provincial towns by judges and advocates (advocati) who never saw or heard the parties 
involved. Finally, since justice was very slow, an appellant might be faced, for example, with 
the death or insolvency of the party that won the initial case and against whom appeal of the 
decision was sought. 174 Bearing these uncertainties in mind, judicial liability must have 
remained an attractive alternative for litigants. 175 
In addition reference must be made to policy considerations. Even though the Roman empire 
mutated to an autocratic state under the leadership of omnipotent emperors, the principes 
increasingly struggled to maintain the morale of their servants, the effectiveness of the 
imperial executive or judiciary and the authority of their autocratic government. Corruption, 
lethargy, decadence and inability became typical of the chronic decay of the late imperial and 
also the Byzantine administration. 176 The liability of the iudices, at least indirectly through the 
threat of a possible action against a iudex by an injured party, was probably one of the few 
means remaining to the emperors to control their officers. 
173 Jones, Later Roman Empire, 517 states: "There was one law for the rich and another for the poor ... Too much scope was 
given to dilatory tactics, and the fees - not to speak of bribes - were excessive, but an injured party could, if he were 
prepared to spend the necessary time and money, normally get his remedy." Further Borkowski, Textbook, 75; Kunkel, RG, 
131; Kaser, RPL, 430; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 520 and 557-558. 
174 See Jones, Later Roman Empire, 516-517. 
175 The suggestion that judicial liability was in fact an alternative also derives from Jones, Later Roman Empire, 504, even 
though he does not draw that final conclusion. With regard to the restricted availability of appeal proceedings he says: 
"This remedy [appeal procedures] was evidently extensively used by those who could afford it...but for the poor man, who 
could not meet the heavy expenses involved in an action before a higher court, it cannot have been practicable." What 
remained practicable, however, was to sue the judge if there was some indication of wilful misjudgement. 
176 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 520 mention the apparent efforts of the emperors to fight the arbitrariness of the predominantly 
incompetent and corrupt administration and to restrict their authority by a vast number of regulations; further 526-528; 
Jones, Later Roman Empire, 502 states: "Honesty and fearless independence were highly esteemed, but they were ideals 
rather than nonnal requirements. Judicial corruption was an endemic evil which the emperors were powerless to overcome." 
Also Dawson, Lay Judges, 33; Kunkel, RG, 130-131. 
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That this was their motive may be inferred from a number of legislative measures that were 
introduced in order to ensure civil liability of judges for specific procedural omissions. 
Justinian, for instance, decreed in C 3.1.13.6 that the party that lost the case was to be 
sentenced to payment of costs quantum pro solitis expensis litium iuraverit (at the amount 
confinned by oath). If a judge failed to sentence the losing party for costs, he himself had to 
pay the amount in question to the winning party.l77 The same applied in instances of default. 
Where a party appeared belatedly, it had to be sentenced to paying the other party all expenses 
suffered in consequence of the default. Again, the judge's failure to do so made him liable for 
the amount in question. 178 
It is evident that judicial liability came increasingly to operate repressively.179 Thus, in post-
classical law there emerged a second important aspect of judicial liability, which will be 
encountered throughout subsequent legal historical development: the function of judicial 
liability not so much as a (necessary) remedy but as a control device, as a means of ensuring 
judicial accountability. With the appearance of the authoritative state and a judiciary that was 
staffed not by citizen lay judges selected by the parties, but by imperial judicial officers, the 
need to control the judiciary became abundantly clear. It was realised that an ineffective and 
biased judiciary posed a serious threat to the proper operation of any polity. 
2 3 1 State of mind 
As indicated above, the general development of legal liability initially made it unlikely that 
judicial liability would be detennined by fault. Except for the (nearly similar) passages by 
Gaius in Inst 4.5 pr, D 44.7.5.4 and D 50.13.6, there was no indication in pre-classical and 
high-classical law that any particular state of mind or fault on the part of the judge was 
required. 180 
177 C 3.1.13.6. 
178 C 3. 1.1 5, see also Kaser and Hackl, ZP R, 532 fn61 and 632. 
179 Hiibner, IURA 5 (1954), 208; Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 15 ; Steinwenter, Iudex, 2471; Kaser and Hackl, 
ZPR, 532. In the affinnative also Lamberti, Labeo 36 (1990),264-265 . 
180 Inst 4.5 pr is part ofGaius' introductory textbook Institutiones . Gaius belongs to the group of classical jurists who wrote 
in the second century A.D. It should be remembered that the passage in Inst 4.5 which refers to imprudentia is thought to 
have been interpolated. See above at fnn 133-135. 
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However, a controversial passage in D 5.1.15.1 was adopted from the early post-classical 
jurist Ulpian (about 170 - 222 A.D.), where reference is made to a judge who adjudicates dolo 
malo. 181 Can this mean that by the third century A.D. fault came to be considered essential for 
the detennination of judicial liability? The passage states: 
"Judex tunc litem suam facere intellegitur, cum dolo malo in fraudem legis sententiam dixerit 
(dolo malo autem videtur hoc facere, si evidens arguatur eius vel gratia vel inimicitia vel etiam 
sordes), ut veram aestimationem litis praestare cogatur." 
The view of Lenel, who considered everything from the word dixeri! onwards to be 
interpolated by Justinian's compilers and consequently not authentic in Ulpian's day, has 
received strong support. 182 The reference to dolo malo which appears before the parentheses 
was interpreted as coming from a particular statute on suretyship, which prevents any kind of 
generalisation. As in the case ofthe interpolated parts of Ins! 4.5 pr, D 44.7.5.4 and D 50.13.6, 
any reference to dolus malus, in other words to a generalised standard of culpability, derives 
from the (later) period of Justinian where " ... the harmonising approach of late post-classical 
law recognised the classical legacy of legal liability and developed a ... coherent...doctrine of 
lSI Domitius Ulpianus was one of the leading early post-classical jurists together with Aemilius Papinianus and lulius 
Paulus. See Kunkel, RG, 114-115. About one third of all titles of the Digest was drawn from Ulpian. For more details see 
Honore, Ulpian, 1-46; Jors, Domitius, 1435-1509; KnUtel, Ulpianus, 625-626. 
182 Lenel, £dictum Perpetuum, 168. See inter alia Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 14; Seidl, SDHI 18 (1952) 
578; HUbner, IURA 5 (1954),207 fn32; Stein, RIDA 5 (1958) 569 states: "D 5.1.15.1 is really the only text that supports 
the proposition that there was at first liability only for fraud, and, already, Lenel describes the phrase containing the words 
dolo malo as undoubtedly interpolated." The same view is shared by D'Ors, SDHI 48 (1982), 373-374 and Gimenez-
Candela, Cuasidelitos, 48. This interpretation, however, has been modified in various degrees by other writers. For instance 
by Cremades and Paricio, AHDE 54 (1984),203-205 who would not go as far here as D'Ors. MacCormack, Liability of the 
Judge, 21-23, pays especial attention to the specific meaning of fraus legis in D 5.1.15.1; and MacCormick, Acta Juridica 
20 (1977), 156 generally accepts dolus as of relevance to the proceedings extraordinem cognitio (and consequently 
considers D 5.1.15.1 genuine). Birks, TR 52 (1984), 385-387 does not consider D 5.1.15 .1 as interpolated and Kelly, 
Roman Litigation, 110 suggests that in late Republican law judicial liability was already based upon fault, more particularly 
(for practical reasons) on dolus (see also above at fnI27). From D 5.1.15 .1 Kelly draws the conclusion that a false 
judgement given dolo malo, whether in breach of a statute (fraus legis) or not, was a case of litem suam facere. Kelly 
resolves the apparent contradiction that D 5.1.15.1 is only post-classical and therefore inconclusive for the earlier 
development by arguing that the earlier texts, which lack any indication of the judge's state of mind, provide for a 
presumption of dolus. Where a iudex ordered an invalid adjournment, failed to give judgement, departed from the 
prescribed formula or failed to hear a case, he was presumed to be partial and therefore to have acted deliberately, that is 
with dolo malo. In the late post-classical (Justinian) period , however, Kelly accepts liability for dolus and imprudentia (at 
114). Further see Mayer-Maly, TR 60 (1992), 196. 
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However, a controversial passage in D 5.1.15.1 was adopted from the early post-classical 
jurist Ulpian (about 170 - 222 A.D.), where reference is made to a judge who adjudicates dolo 
malo. 181 Can this mean that by the third century A.D. fault came to be considered essential for 
the detennination of judicial liability? The passage states: 
"Judex tunc litem suam facere intellegitur, cum dolo malo in fraudem legis sententiam dixerit 
(dolo malo autem videtur hoc facere, si evidens arguatur eius vel gratia vel inimicitia vel etiam 
sordes), ut veram aestimationem litis praestare cogatur." 
The view of Lenel, who considered everything from the word dixerit onwards to be 
interpolated by Justinian's compilers and consequently not authentic in Ulpian's day, has 
received strong support. 182 The reference to dolo malo which appears before the parentheses 
was interpreted as coming from a particular statute on suretyship, which prevents any kind of 
generalisation. As in the case of the interpolated parts of Inst 4.5 pr, D 44.7.5.4 and D 50.13.6, 
any reference to dolus malus, in other words to a generalised standard of culpability, derives 
from the (later) period of Justinian where " ... the harmonising approach of late post-classical 
law recognised the classical legacy of legal liability and developed a ... coherent...doctrine of 
181 Domitius Ulpianus was one of the leading early post-classical jurists together with Aemilius Papinianus and lulius 
Paulus. See Kunkel, RG, 114-115. About one third of all titles of the Digest was drawn from Ulpian. For more details see 
Honore, Ulpian, 1-46; Jors, Domitius, 1435-1509; Knutel, Ulpianus, 625-626. 
182 Lenel , Ediclum Perpetuum, 168. See inter alia Hochstein, Obligaliones Quasi ex Delicto, 14; Seidl, SDHI 18 (1952) 
578; Hubner, IURA 5 (1954), 207 fn32; Stein, RIDA 5 (1958) 569 states: "D 5 .1.15.1 is really the only text that supports 
the proposition that there was at first liability only for fraud, and, already, Lenel describes the phrase containing the words 
dolo malo as undoubtedly interpolated." The same view is shared by D'Ors, SDHl48 (1982), 373-374 and Gimenez-
Candela, Cuasidelitos, 48. This interpretation, however, has been modified in various degrees by other writers. For instance 
by Cremades and Paricio, AHDE 54 (1984), 203-205 who would not go as far here as D'Ors. MacCormack, Liability of the 
Judge, 21-23, pays especial attention to the specific meaning of fraus legis in D 5. 1.15. I; and MacCormick, Acta Juridica 
20 (1977), 156 generally accepts dolus as of relevance to the proceedings extraordinem cognitio (and consequently 
considers D 5.1.15.1 genuine). Birks, TR 52 (1984), 385-387 does not consider D 5.1.15.1 as interpolated and Kelly, 
Roman Litigation, 110 suggests that in late Republican law judicial liability was already based upon fault, more particularly 
(for practical reasons) on dolus (see also above at fn 127). From D 5.1.15.1 Kelly draws the conclusion that a false 
judgement given dolo malo, whether in breach of a statute (fraus legis) or not, was a case of litem suam facere. Kelly 
resolves the apparent contradiction that D 5.1.1 5.1 is only post-classical and therefore inconclusive for the earlier 
development by arguing that the earlier texts, which lack any indication of the judge's state of mind, provide for a 
presumption of dolus. Where a iudex ordered an invalid adjournment, failed to give judgement, departed from the 
prescribed formula or failed to hear a case, he was presumed to be partial and therefore to have acted deliberately, that is 
with dolo malo. In the late post-classical (Justinian) period, however, Kelly accepts liability for dolus and imprudentia (at 
114). Further see Mayer-Maly, TR 60 (1992), 196. 
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standards of liability based upon fault.,,183 It was only then that dolus and culpa were fully 
identified as cornerstones in the detennination of legal liability. 
The underlying development of legal liability may be outlined by three main features: Firstly, 
the element of moral culpability came to the fore. Influenced by Christianity and Greek 
philosophy, post-classical jurists stressed the individual's subjective and ethical 
responsibility.184 Secondly, as this development no longer pennitted selective typification, 
generally applicable tenninology and definitions had to be developed. On this basis, thirdly, 
dolus and culpa emerged in the law of obligations as essential components of a general 
concept based on fault. In light of this, it is little wonder that, to sixth century Byzantine 
jurists occupied with compilation of the texts of the classical jurists, any form of strict legal 
liability - including the liability of the judge - must have appeared highly suspect. Passages 
like utique peccasse aliquid intellegitur licet per imprudentiam (lnst.4.5 pr) or, as here, dolo 
malo autem videtur hoc jacere, si evidens arguatur eius vel gratia vel inimicitia vel etiam 
sordes (D 5.1.15.1) are, thus, most likely, post-classical alterations made in order to reconcile 
the iudices' strict liability of earlier classical and Republican law with the culpa requirements 
of Justinian law. 18S They stressed the aspect of moral blame, i.e., the judge's reprehensible 
attitude or his negligent and careless handling of the lawsuit as the source of his CUlpability. 
Scholars agree on the general position of the Justinian age that legal liability was generally 
based upon fault, but there have been different proposals as to the specific effects of this 
development on judicial liability. This divergence in late post-classical law is better 
appreciated if it is understood that in the Corpus luris Civilis judicial liability was not only 
183 My translation from JorslKunkelfWenger Romisches Recht, 238: "Erst die harmonisierende Arbeit der Spatzeit /iejJ die 
im kiassischen Recht vorhandenen Ansatze zur Vereinheitlichung des Haftungsrechts viel starker hervortreten und 
entwickelte ein. .. in seiner geistigen Struktur ... vollig geschlossenes ... System des haftungsbegrUndenden Verschuldens. See 
further Kaser, RPR II, 348: "Das Bestreben, die allgemeinen HaftungsmajJstabe ... auf Verschulden zu grUnden, setzt ... eine 
schon in spatkiassischer Zeit erreichte Entwicklungfort." 
184 For the influence of Greek philosophy on post-classical Roman law generally see Kelly, Western Legal Theory, 45-57. 
185 See Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 22-25 with further reference to Kunke.1 and Albertario; Habner, IURA 5 
(1954),208; Stein, RJDA 5 (1957), 570 ascertains: "In the final stage, the Byzantines were faced with a category whose 
basis they did not understand. By that time the liability of the iudex had been changed - probably it was first restricted to 
deliberately false judgements and then extended to cover false judgements given per imprudentiam. Thus various Byzantine 
scholars - who in any case would not have approved of liability without fault - added the references to the culpa of the 
defender. .. ". 
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based upon an independent specific honorarian actio in factum but, together with three other 
actions, came to be classified as a so-called quasi-delict. 186 
2311 Judicial liability as a form of quasi-delictual liability 
One of the most important legacies of classical Roman law, which still prevails today, is the 
systematic classification of the law of obligations into various components. Already in the 
second century A.D., Gaius in his Institutes referred to a twofold classification of obligations, 
namely into obligationes ex contractu and obligationes ex delicto. 187 In a later classification, 
also ascribed to Gaius, a threefold system emerged, where the so-called obligationes ex varUs 
causarum jiguris were added. 188 In Justinian's Digest, contracts l89, delicts l90, quasi-
contracts l91 and quasi-delicts l92 are discussed directly after reference is made to this threefold 
scheme of obligations. Thus, it is safe to conclude that quasi-contracts and quasi-delicts were 
a subdivision of the variae causarumjigurae. 193 The category of quasi-delicts covered various 
types of liability which for one reason or another did not fit into the category of (true) delicts. 
Either causation in such instances was indirect rather than direct as required at this stage of 
development of Aquilian liability, or the pre-Justinian sources which were to be included in 
the Corpus Iuris did not require fault for liability. In any case, it is as difficult for modern 
Romanists as it was for Justinian's compilers to find a truly satisfactory explanation or a 
common link for the lumping together of these diverse actions. Not surprisingly, a wealth of 
different proposals has been advanced in the literature. Particularly problematic has been the 
reconciliation of the action against the iudex, qui litem suam fecit with the other three quasi-
delictual actions. 
186 The other actions belonging to the group of obligationes quasi ex delicto were the actio de deiectis vel ejJusis (Inst 4.5.1 
and D 44.7.5.5), the actio de posito vel suspenso (Inst 4.5. J -2 and D 44.7.5.5) and the actio de damno aut furto adversus 
nautas, caupones, stabularios (Inst4.5.3 and D 44.7.5.6) . 
187 See Gai.3.88. 
188 Gai D 44.7.J.pr. 
189 D44.7.1.1 et seqq. 
19D D 44.7.4. 
191 D44.7.5.J-3. 
192 D 44.7.5.4-6. 
193 Generally see Zimmennann, Law of Obligations, \ 0-15 with further references and his Effusum vel Deiectum, 311-3 J 2; 
Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 250-251; Kaser, RPL, 24-25. 
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To answer to the question of how Justinian rationalised these varying actions in the Corpus 
Iuris Civilis,194 some writers argue that initially the common denominator was the high-
classical notion of 'typical culpa'. Typical culpa being their point of departure, these authors 
are certain that sixth century Byzantine jurists simply superimposed a generalised fault 
criterion on the liability of the judge and the other quasi-delicts. More precisely, this was a 
concept of negligence or culpa in the narrow sense. 195 In the eyes of these scholars, culpa 
(negligence) became the essential characteristic of all quasi-delicts. Owing to the apparent 
desire of Justinian to (re-)systematise the law in its entirety along the lines of developed 
classical law, dolus became indicative of the 'true' delicts, whereas culpa became indicative 
of the quasi-delicts. Thus, in the light of this new system a judge was held quasi-delictually 
liable for wrong judgements due to imprudentia (Inst 4.5.pr, D 44.7.5.4, D 50.13.6), which 
was equated with culpa or negligence, and delictually liable for wrongs due to dolus (D 
5.1.15.1). 
Reluctance to accept such a clear cut distinction in Justinian law between delicts exclusively 
committed dolo malo and quasi-delicts (including the liability of the judge) committed only by 
culpa appears in another approach to the subj ect. 196 The most striking argument in favour of 
this alternative view is that in Justinian law dolus and culpa remained the basis of delictual 
liability under the lex Aquilia. Why then did the compilers retain a group of quasi-delicts 
where liability was exclusively for culpa? Or, to put it differently: In the light of Justinian's 
efforts to (re-)systematise Roman law, how is it that Aquilian liability in particular formed the 
most prominent exception to this supposedly systematic scheme? 
194 However, some proposals do not specifically deal with this question of appearance of quasi-delictual liability in 
Justinian law (which is probably considered by these writers to be based on fault anyway) but concentrate on the classical 
foundations of the various actions that may have influenced Justinian's compilers in identifying them as quasi-delicts. 
Reference could be inter alia t~ Buckland, Manual, 331-332 and Textbook, 599 who considered vicarious liability as the 
common link. This also appears to be Lee's position in his Elements at 401 when he states that the law creates in all quasi-
delicts (apparently including the judge who makes the case his own) a liability ..... though the defendant may in fact not be 
to blame." Others, for instance Borkowski in his Textbook, 335 choose a different approach to explain the common link of 
the quasi-delicts. Borkowski argues in favour of the view that quasi-delicts covered situations where the defendant was 
entrusted with the 'safety' of a thing. For instance to make an apartment safe against anything falling on the street, or to 
bring the lawsuit before him to a safe end. Again, others like Thomas in Textbook, 377 and Institutes, 281 have pointed out 
that reasons of public policy linked the four actions together since they operated as a kind of insurance for the victim. A 
somewhat despondent view is the denial of any common denominator. See Wolodkiewicz, RlSG 14 (1970), 194-197. 
195 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 196 fn38 and Mayer-Maly recently again in TR 60 (1992), 194; Kelly, Roman Litigation, 114. 
Any reference to culpa in the following section is intended to equate with negligence. 
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Another opinion is that the compilers of the Corpus Juris Civilis remained aware of some kind 
of peculiarity in the liability of the iudex and the other quasi-delicts. Accordingly, the quasi-
delicts were not forms of Aquilian liability. Consequently, they refrained from classifying the 
quasi-delicts under an 'extended' actio legis Aquiliae as delicts committed with culpa. 
However, under the overwhelming influence of culpability in the law of obligations, they were 
unable to value these instances for what they really were: examples of strict liability. Hence, 
so the argument goes, the compilers chose a via media. By somewhat technical devices, 
namely by including formulations of culpa or of irrefutable presumptions of fault, the liability 
of the iudex, qui litem suam fecit, and the other instances of quasi-delictual liability were, 
regardless of their initial outward appearance, adjusted to the prevailing system of liability for 
fault. 197 Thus the formulations of culpa that appeared were those interpolations identified in 
the passages on judicial liability discussed above. And in the other cases of quasi-delicts, 
particularly the liability of shippers, stablekeepers and innkeepers, the defendants were 
presumed to have been negligent in the choice or supervision of their employees (culpa in 
eligendo) or in their occupation of the premises (culpa enim penes eum est. Nec adicitur 
culpae mentio).198 
On one point all contributors agree, however: From the enactment of the Corpus Juris Civilis, 
culpa in one way or another became the basis of the obligationes quasi ex delicto, including of 
course the liability of the judge. Since it was particularly the Corpus Juris Civilis through 
which Roman law was received in high medieval Italy and later in large parts of Europe, 
judicial liability, therefore, came to be determined by fault and not by strict liability. 199 
196 Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 24-26; Stein, RlDA 5 (1957), 570; Hubner, JURA 5 (1954),203. 
197 Apart from the authorities quoted above, this opinion has been recently affirmed by Lamberti, Labeo 36 (1990), 265-
266. Zimmermann, Effusum vel Deiectum, 313 observes a similar tendency with regard to another quasi-delict, i.e., the 
actio de eJJusis vel deiectis: " .. .im justinianischen Recht .. . ste/len wir zwei bemerkenswerte Neuerungen fest. Auf der einen 
Seile wird ein dem klassischen Klagerechtfremdes Verschuldensmoment unter die HaJtungsvoraussetzungen geschmuggelt. 
Diese Tendenz zur Subjelaivierung klassischer Hafiungsformen ist typischfur Justinian .. . ". 
198 D9 .3.1.4. 
199 See also Zimmermann, EJJusum vel Deiectum, 313: "Die Erkenntnis dieser Zusammenhdnge [that quasi-delictual 
liability initially was strict] wird a/lerdings dadurch erheblich verdunkell, daft die Kompilatoren nicht nur bei der actio de 
efusis vel deieclis, sondern auch bei den anderen drei Quasideliklen das Zurechnungskriterium der culpa ins Spiel 
gebracht haben: unbekiimmert sowohl um die Logik der Abgrenzung zwischen Quasidelikten und echten Delikten." 
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23 1 2 Culpa and dolus 
Two further aspects deserve attention. What exactly did culpa and dolus imply as degrees of 
1· b'l' ?200 la 1 Ity. 
If one studies the relevant sources, including the interpolated ones, the reference is not to 
culpa, but on the contrary to imprudentia. Imprudentia in the context of the relevant sources 
has been translated inter alia as imprudence (Borkowski), lack of foresight (Frier), ignorance 
(Sandars) or error (Thomas). The most apt translation appears generally to be carelessness. 
Closely related to imprudentia is imperitia, appropriately translated as inexperience or lack of 
expertise. Roman law covered a number of instances where liability arose from imperitia. For 
instance, a doctor was liable when he operated unskilfully or caused the death of a patient by 
wrong use of a drug. Whereas in classical law some of these examples were considered as a 
special form of liability for custodia, it is evident that by the time of Justinian imperitia came 
to be equated with culpa: imperitia culpae adnumeratur.201 It is interesting that, except for the 
passage which relates to the liability of the iudex, the term imprudentia was not used as 
indication of a certain state of mind anywhere in the Corpus Iuris Civilis. Beyond doubt, 
however, the principle of equation applied to the liability also of the iudex; in other words, 
imprudentia culpae adnumeratur. Thus, in practice, liability of the iudex arose for 
1· 202 neg Igence. 
At the other side of the spectrum, apparently, was intention. It must be said that in lay terms 
dolus originally meant trickery and deception. In legal terminology, however, we are faced 
with a more refined concept of dolus, namely dolus malus and dolus bonus. Only by means of 
200 Kaser, RPR I, 505 and 511 points out the ambiguity of the tenn dolus. The Gennan pandectist Sintenis, Civilrecht, § 
22.2 fn9 once wrote: "Dolus has such a variety of meanings and legal consequences ... that it becomes quite obvious: a 
general treatment of the tenn is practically impossible ... ". My translation. 
201 Inst 4.3.7. Other instances included the case of a muleteer who, from inexperience, could not control his herd 
sufficiently to prevent their running over someone's slave; or the sirrtilar case of a horse rider whose horse bolted 
(Inst.4.3 .8); or, under the locatio conducto. the case of a locator who offered to perfonn a service without being competent 
for it (eels.fUlp. D 19.2.9.5; Ulp. D 19.2.13.5 or Ulp. D 9.2.27.29). Generally see Scott, Imperitia Culpae Adnumeratur, 
130-133; Zimmennann, Law of Obligations, 386,397-398 and 1009 with further references; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 
305 fn211 and 341 fn347; Kaser, RPR 1,509 fnn46 and 47, RPR !l352 fn41; Jors/Kunkel/Wenger Romisches Recht, 237. 
202 It has also been interpreted as culpa levis in abstracto (Van Wannelo). 
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the attributed malus did the act committed dolo become a legally culpable act. 203 It is the legal 
meaning of dolus that is of interest here. By the time of early post-classical law, dolus malus 
had gained a threefold meaning, even though as Fritz Schultz has pointed out, to some degree 
" ... the boundaries of the conception remained fluid ... ,,.204 
In the context of the bonae fidei iudicia, dolus malus was the antonym of bona fides. Hence, a 
debtor was liable for an intentional breach of good faith. Originally, this probably meant 
liability for fraud or deceit, but it became apparent later that the bona fides granted a much 
wider discretion. Thus dolus malus (as the antonym) went beyond its original meaning and 
could entail any behaviour outside the limits of decency and the ethical demands made of a 
Roman citizen; in other words: infidelity.205 
Dolus was also referred to as an essential requirement of the actio de dolo: 206 in the first 
century B.C., dolus was introduced by the praetor as a specific delict, a so-called praetorian 
delict. By means of this subsidiary and penal action, a person was enabled to claim 
compensation for the damage suffered because of another's fraud. Here, dolus malus initially 
had the meaning of false pretences, of trickery and, in particular, simulated behaviour.207 
Later, however, the meaning of dolus was extended to include instances where a person was 
203 For instance, a stratagem was regarded as dolus bonus. See Naf-Hofrnann, Actio de Dolo, 1-2; Zimmermann, Law of 
Obligations , 669 fnnI36-139. Further Schultz, Classical Roman Law, 606; and Van Warmelo, Principles of Roman Civil 
Law, 278, who rightly observes: "The main point is that everyone knows what fraud is, but to describe it precisely is 
extremely difficult." 
204 Schulz, Classical Roman Law, 606, This appears also from Kaser, RPR I, 628; Kaser, RPL, 60 (actio doli) , 188 (bona 
fidei iudicia), 249 (delictual obligations); Jars/Kunkel/Wenger Ramisch€s Recht, 237; Siber, Ramisches Recht, 234; Naf-
Hofmann, Actio de Dolo, 2; Demburg, Pandekten, § 86 I; Sintenis, Civilrecht, § 22.2 fu9. 
205 Kaser, RPR 1,509: "Der VerstofJ gegen die bona fides wird als dolus malus gekennzeichnet. Der Sinn dieses Ausdrucks 
geht hier uber die Ausgangsbedeutung 'Arg/ist, Betrug ' weit hinaus und schliefJt jed.e Unlauterkeit ein ... ", Kaser, RPL, 
188-189; Jars/Kunkel/Wenger Ramisch€s Recht, 235; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 263 fu5l. Note however, that for 
juristic acts within the law of contract (and quasi-contract) that were based upon the strictum ius (as opposed to the bona 
fidei iudicia) a debtor was liable merely for the wilful non- or mal-performance of an obligation without extension of this to 
the hann or loss to the creditor. See Kaser, RPR I, 506 and 51 I. 
206 According to Schulz, Classical Roman Law, 605 the classical name of the action was actio de dolo and not actio doli. 
207 C. Aquilius Gallus (the promoter of the actio de dolo) defined dolus malus as cum esset aliud simulatum, aliud actum 
(Cicero, De Officiis 3.14.60) and Servius Sulpicius understood dolus malus as machinationem quandam alterius decipiendi 
causa, cum aliud simulatur et aliud agitur (Ulp. D 4.3.1.2). Thus, the essential aspect was pretending to do one thing and 
doing (or intending) another, which amounts to simulation. See also Zimmermann, Law of ObligatiOns, 665; Schulz, 
Classical Roman Law, 605-607; Van Warmelo, Principles of Roman Civil Law, 228; Thomas, Textbook, 374; Borkowski, 
Textbook, 330-332; Naf-Hofmann, Actio de Dolo, 4-7. 
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openly deceived.208 Thus, under the actio de dolo, dolus malus was a delict in its own right 
and had the meaning of fraud, bedrog or ArglistlEetrug, although in specific circumstances it 
came close to the meaning of dolus within the bonafidei iudicia, namely to infidelity.209 
Thirdly and finally reference was to dolus within delictual liability (actio legis Aquiliae, actio 
iniuriarum, actio furti): from early post-classical law dolus malus appeared increasingly as the 
counterpoint to culpa (negligence). Thus, dolus malus (and culpa) emerged as standards of 
liability. This meaning of dolus malus to some limited extent is comparable with our modem 
notion of intention, opset or Vorsatz, and, it is worth noting, applied regardless of any open or 
simulated fonn of deceit.2lO 
At the time of the compilation of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the various components of this 
threefold scheme had certainly been modified. Thus, the course of development, which we 
have discussed in detail with regard to judicial liability, may now be seen in broader 
perspective: Except for the specialised and more restricted actio de dolo, the tenns dolus 
malus/culpa were used to assign to the various contractual, quasi-contractual, delictual and 
quasi-delictual obligations a coherent system of legal liability. In consequence of a better 
208 D 4.3.1.2: "Labeo autem posse et sine simulatione id agi, ut quis circumveniatur: posse et sine dolo malo aliud agi, 
aliud simulari, sicutfaciunt, qui per eiusmodi dissimulationem deserviant et tuentur vel sua vel aliena: itaque ipse sic 
dejiniit dolum malum esse omnem callid.atem /allaciam machinationem ad circumveniendum /allendum decipiendum 
alterum adhibitam." According to Labeo's definition, a person can be deceived without simulation, that is without being 
misled by a pretence, but by means of any conceivable cunning, tricky or contrived behaviour, i.e., openly. See 
Zimmennann, Law o/Obligations, 665; Schulz, Classical Roman Law, 606; Naf-Hofmann, Actio de Dolo, 3, 18-20 and 45-
47. 
209 Zimmermann, Law o/Obligations, 668: "A person charged with dolus had not necessarily employed deceit and trickery, 
but had infringed one of the standard principles by which to conduct an honest life: fidelity."; Kaser, RPR 1,511 and 628; 
Jars/KunkellWenger Ramisches Recht, 232-233, 236; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 350; Niif-Hofmann, Actio de Dolo, 2-
4. In this sense dolus malus had a very wide range of applicability. Rightly, therefore, Frier, Casebook, 332 makes the point 
that the actio de dolo's subsidiary position was badly needed in order to restrict its application. The actual instances of 
application had to be kept low since it was a too wide open a 'door' to liability at the outset. This view is confirmed by 
Zimmennann, Law o/Obligations, 664. 
210 Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 333; Kaser, RPR I, 505 and 511: " ... dolus malus (hat] im Deliktsbereich 
die ... Bedeutung ... des deliktischen Vorsatzes als des Willens, den anderen durch die Tat zu schiidigen ... "; 
Jars/Kunkel/Wenger Ramisches Recht, 231-232: "Culpa bedeutete zundchst Verschulden schlechthin, um/afJte Vorsatz und 
Fahrldssigkeit, wurde jedoch spdter zunehmend in Gegensatz zu dolus gesetzt und bezeichnete jetzt das nicht dolose 
Verhalten." See also Kaser, RPL, 249; Siber, Romisches Recht, 234; Van Warmelo, Principles 0/ Roman Civil Law, 216 
and Prichard, RPL, 420 who observes that: "Dolus as a distinct delict must not be confused with dolus as a ground of 
liability in certain delicts, where it means wilful intent...". 
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worked out concept of legal responsibility (fault at large), as well as the emergence of moral 
culpability as the decisive criterion, dolus malus appeared as the intentional conunitting of a 
wrong. Thus, at the final stage of Roman law we are left with a twofold meaning of dolus 
malus: the more general one of a required state of mind and a specific one under the actio de 
dolo?ll It will be apparent in due course that this twofold meaning of dolus malus in the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis, was to cause a considerable amount of confusion, particularly in the 
Roman Dutch law of judicial liability. 
If, finally, we are to take this process of modification into account and apply this twofold 
meaning of dolus malus to the liability of the iudex, it may be argued that dolus malus now 
had the meaning of a state of mind. Thus a judicial wrong conunitted dolo malo was a 
deliberate infliction of damage on a party due to a wrong judgement without the more narrow 
characteristics that applied under the actio de dolo. This view is based upon two arguments. 
First, it was generally accepted that the actio de dolo was subsidiary to the actio legis Aquiliae 
(actio subsidiaria)?l2 Secondly, it may be argued that with regard to judicial liability dolus 
operated in contrast to imprudentia as a particular state of mind and not as a delict in its own 
right. Dolus therefore was not used in its more narrow sense of fraud or deceit.2l3 
In conclusion, it may be said that in post-classical Roman law judicial wrongs conunitted with 
imprudentia (quasi-delicts) were actionable under an actio in factum, whereas deliberate 
judicial wrongs (delicts) were actionable under the actio legis Aquiliae and not under the actio 
de dolo. 
21 1 Naf-Hofmann, Actio de Dolo, 2 and at 47 she makes the point that: "Fur die Klassik zeigt sich folgendes Bild: enger, 
begrenzter dolus-Begriff innerhalb der actio de dolo, und langsame Ausweitung des dolus-BegfrifJs aujJerhalb der Klage ." 
2 12 Kaser, RPR I, 627 and RPR II, 91; Schulz, Classical Roman Law, 607; Naf-Hofmann, Actio de Dolo, 8-9; Van 
Warmelo, Principles of Roman Civil Law, 227; Prichard, RPL, 420; Borkowski, Textbook, 331. 
213 Kaser, RPR 1, 628 states: "Bei den iibrigen MajJstdbenfur die vertragliche (und quasivertragliche) Hajiung bedeutet der 
dolus, wie in den erwdhnten Strafgesetzen, den 'Vorsatz ', das Wissen und Wollen ... , hdujig gegenuber der culpa als 
(qualijizierter) Fahrlassigkeit. Darauf, ob die bewujJte und gewollte Schadigung offen oder auf listigen Umwegen erreicht 
wird, kommt es dabei nicht an." 
55 
232 Causes of liability 
Having ascertained that judicial liability by the time of the Corpus Iuris Civilis was indeed 
based on fault, the question that remains is: For what sort of judicial wrongs could a late 
imperial iudex could be held liable? Was liability again confined to cases where the iudex had 
neglected a basic requirement of procedure? Or, was the scope of the liability of the judge 
extended to errors of substantive law? The most radical view has been advocated by D'Ors, 
who argues that throughout Roman law judicial liability was for procedural errors only?14 
Kelly also appears to restrict the scope of liability, albeit to a lesser degree than D'Ors. In his 
eyes: 
" ... [I]t is inconceivable that, even in the sixth century A.D., when judges had for probably three 
centuries been paid magistrates organised in a bureaucratic pyramid, there could possibly have 
been an action ... intended to apply to every wrong judgement, in other words that each judge was 
more or less an insurer of the parties appearing before him against any mistake whalsoever.,,215 
Again, for practical purposes, Kelly would limit the iudex's liability to instances of wrong 
application of rules of law, not necessarily those of faulty exercise of discretion.216 
A different view is held by MacCormack. He argues that by the time ofpost-c1assicallaw, the 
scope of liability had been extended to errors of substantive law. He derives his argument 
from an analysis of the passage in D 5.1.15.1 which refers to ajudgement in fraudem legis?17 
Unlike the prevailing opinion, he regards the notion of fraus legis in D 5.1.15.1 to have 
universal application. Broadly defined, fraus legis means a violation of a lex.218 Clearly, this 
no longer has anything in common with procedural errors. On the other hand, it remains a 
214 D'Ors, SDHI 48 (1982), 377-378, also Metzger; New Outline, 153; Pugsley, 1969 IJ, 354. 
215 Roman Litigation, 114 (my italics). However, the fault requirement alone would prevent this consequence. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Note, however, that MacCormack, Liability of the Judge, 21 fu60 does not agree with the prevailing opinion that this 
passage is interpolated. Thus in his eyes it is genuinely classical. Nonetheless, one may make use of his comments to 
describe the Justinian period, since he considers this to be the position of the law up to the sixth century (at 27). 
218 Which, according to MacCormack, ibid, included a senalUS consultum or imperial constitution. More precisely, one may 
define fraus legis as a direct (contravention of the letter) or indirect (contravention of the spirit) violation of a lex. 
MacCormack, ibid, 27, as well as at 23 and Gordon, Temis 21 (1967),305 argue that a judge would only be held liable 
where he was shown to be (dolo malo) objectively wrong and not merely wrong as a matter of opinion. Only a judgement 
that went against the spirit of the statute and also the letter of the law was objectively wrong. Decisions that were against 
the spirit but within the letter of the law had to be considered an opinion or, to put it differently, a matter of (tolerable and 
not actionable) interpretation by the judge. 
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rather narrowly defined " ... particularly grave piece of misconduct by a judge.,,219 From this 
starting point, MacCormack combines the requirement of a judgement in fraudem legis with 
the (typical) instances of judicial wrongdoing mentioned in D 5.1.15.1: Liability could arise 
only where a judge either violated the law or misjudged out of partiality, corruption or 
hostility. 
Other scholars have gone a step further. They accept liability for procedural errors as well as 
for errors of substantive law where clear 'extrinsic' proof could be offered as to a wilful and 
particularly reprehensible act, for instance in cases of bias or corruption, without paying 
special attention to fraus legis.22o Other writers agree but stress the point that, besides 
procedural errors, so-called Rechtsirrtf1mer, which are errors of law (supposedly due to lack of 
knowledge), were to be included in the liability of the iudex.221 
In my view, judicial liability was, most likely, extended to errors of substantive law under 
post-classical law. This was due, first, to the emergence of the extraordinary forms of 
proceedings and the possibility of appeal. For, it is difficult to see, technically, how an 
advanced system of appeal and review (as appeal procedures under the extraordinary cognitio 
proceedings doubtless were) could operate if judges a quo did not in some way or the other 
substantiate their judgements or indicate on what findings of fact or law the judgement was 
based on. Else, on what points could the appellant base his appeal?222 
219 MacCormack, Liability o/the Judge , 23. 
220 So does MacCormick, Acta Juridica 20 (1977), 155-157; Birks, TR 52 (1984), 385 accepts this view, stressing however 
the practical difficulties in proving wilful misjudgement: "But this proposition [judges are liable even for deliberately 
wrong applications of law or findings of facts] would be more theoretical than practical...because of the great difficulty in 
proving that a iudex had been guilty of bad faith ." Note further Schrage, Legal History 17 (1996), 103. 
221 Hubner, IURA 5 (1954),203 ful6 does not differentiate between pre-classical or high-classical law and the development 
of post-classical law. Therefore this criterion seem to apply to all periods. 
m The issue of Roman judges' motivation of their judgements has been debated. Overall, at least under the ordinary system 
of fonnulary proceedings, judges were not obliged to state the reasons for the judgement. However, they occasionally did 
so. Under the extraordinary cognitio proceedings and in post-classical Roman procedure, this rule prevailed, albeit to a 
lesser degree. See Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 371, 495 and 609. More recently, this view seems also to have been accepted by 
o F Robinson in her article 'The ' iudex qui litem suam fecerit' explained' in ZSS (RAJ 118 (1999) forthcoming, where she 
argues that since the cognitio extra ordinaria provided for a system of appeals (as distinguished from the situation under the 
system of fonnulary proceedings) judicial liability now could be based on allegations of incompetence, that is on 
substantially wrong judgement because now the (second) judge could hear and an appeal and investigate fully into the 
matter, including the judge's a quo reasons. 
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This is also to be concluded from an article by K Visky which deals with the question of 
whether or not judgements in Roman law were motivated by judges.223 Visky argues that, 
from the days of the extraordinary forms of procedure, a strong tendency (albeit not a written 
rule) prevailed to motivate judgements.224 He concluded, further, that there were additional 
means for an appeal court to evaluate the findings of fact and law by the court a quo. He 
identified two, namely a record (acta) on the basis of which the superior court could easily 
identify how the judge a quo found and assessed the relevant questions of fact and la~25; and 
secondly, the frequent consulting with renowned Roman jurists on points of law. The latter 
gave their answers in so-called responsa. In fact, once a jurist had received the honour of 
being patented by an emperor with the so-called ius respondendi, he spoke with the "leader's 
authority" (ex auctoritate principis)?26 Evidently, this made it almost obligatory for any judge 
to follow the opinion expressed in a responsa. The responsa, argues Visky, were included in 
the file of the case and the appellate court was thus able to follow the legal arguments the 
court a quo applied (or did not apply).227 Finally, it appears from Kaser and Hackl's 
Zivilprozessrecht that under the high-classical cognitio procedure appellants did not have to 
adduce the grounds for the appeal on petitioning for appeal. However, it is obvious that when 
the actual appeal was heard this had to take place at the latest. 228 
On balance, thus, the mam argument of D'Ors and especially Birks, i.e., the lack of 
knowledge of intrinsic errors on which an action against a judge could be based, may be void 
for the post-classical period. A second argument which may be raised in favour of a 'broad' 
view of judicial liability in post-classical law is based on the tendency of the emperors to use 
judicial liability as a (indirect) means of disciplining judges. Only a broad view of liability 
could support this objective. It appears that Visky is thinking along these lines when he cites a 
223 Visky, RlDA III seT. 18 (1971), 735 . 
224 Ibid. at 759: "Jedoch kann man konslatieren, daj3 der Richter - infolge der Entwicklung der Lebensverhiiltnisse und der 
ansteigenden Verwicklung des Geschd/isverkehrs - in vie/en Fiillen sich bewogen hat, sich mit der Entscheidung des 
Rechtsstreits nicht zu begniigen, sondern auj3erdem mindestens in groben Ziigen auch iiber die Tatsachen und iiber die 
angewandten Rechtsnormen einige Erkliirungen zu geben, die ihm zu seiner Urteils/iil/ung jiihrten." Tendency also 
affinned for the cognitio fonn of proceedings by Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 494 fn8a. 
m With regard to the acta see Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 482. 
226 Dawson, Oracles, 107-109. 
227 Visky, RlDA III ser. 18 (1971), 758-759. 
228 See Kaser and Hackl , ZPR, 507: "Das appel/are oder provocare ist in miindlicher oder schrifllicher Form 
moglich. .. Dagegen iSI die Angabe der 8erufungsgriinde nichl vorgeschrieben. Diese konnen die Parteien wdhrend des 
Prozesses wechseln ... ". See also Visky, RlDA III seT. 18 (1971), 754-755. 
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case where a judge's findings were not quite correct.229 According to Vi sky, this could 
occasion a lack of confidence in the late imperial judiciary and motivation of judgements 
would, consequently, be a useful means of judicial contro1.230 Visky obviously had appeal 
procedures only in mind, but this notion could also apply to an action for civil liability against 
a judge. 
24 Damages 
At the earliest stage of development, the Republican judge, if convicted, was liable to the 
party injured for the exact amount claimed by the party under the original action (quanti ea 
res).231 Quanti ea res foit, as it is better termed, was a purely objective standard. But a purely 
objective standard of assessment of damages does not necessarily satisfy a more sophisticated 
sense of justice?32 Thus, we see the encroachment of more SUbjective criteria on the objective 
standard of quanti ea res est. These subjective criteria came to be included under so-called 
condemnations in id quod interest. 
For instance, in an action under the lex Aquilia the value of an animal was now still assessed, 
but the loss suffered by the individual plaintiff was given more weight.233 Applied to the 
liability of the judge, from the time when the iudex became liable in terms of an independent 
actio infactum under the edict, damages were no longer confined to the objective value of the 
case a party had lost due to the judge's wrong decision but, instead, were calculated more in 
accordance with the actual damages suffered in consequence of the iudex's judgement. These 
damages could have been less or more extensive than the set amount of the initial action, and, 
further, may have involved loss of goodwill. However, id quod interest did not mean that a 
229 Vi sky, ibid. at 753-754, included a discussion of a late imperial (583) legal instrument from Syene that entailed the 
discussion of a decision of either a iudex pedaneus or a defensor civitatis (both inferior court judges, see the text above at 
fn91) named Markos. The judge gave his decision in a claim to an inheritance in favour the defendant even though the 
plaintiff produced evidence that the parties had agreed on an amicable agreement in favour the plaintiff. 
230 Jbid. at 759: "Jedoch Mite eine Motivierung im Kognitionsverfahren schon mehr erforderlich sein kdnnen. Die Parteien 
kdnnten namlich aUfihrem Richter, der ein Beamter war, eben infolgedessen weniger Vertrauen haben und - noch dazu -
die von solchen Richtern gefdllten Urteile manchmal nicht tadellos waren." 
231 Hubner, IURA 5 (1954),207; MacCormack, Liability of the Judge, 5 and the authorities referred to at fnn6 and 25. 
231 Erasmus, THR-HR 38 (1975), 107. 
233 Ibid, 107. 
59 
plaintiff in an action against a judge would recover his total loss or his full interesse (in 
today's sense of the word). This fonnulation indicated merely the freedom of the judge (in the 
action against the initial iudex) to exceed the objective value where this appeared to him to be 
necessary, that is where the objective value had to be considered inadequate in the light of the 
damages the party had effectively suffered.234 
Thus, generally id quod interest granted some discretion to the judge. However, this discretion 
was limited by the circumstances of the specific actio and its application to the case. 
Unrestricted discretion was granted to the judge only under the actions for condemnation in 
quantum iudici (bonum et) aequum videbetur. The latter applied to the liability of the iudex. 
The (second) judge was instructed by the fonnula to condemn in quantum de ea re aequum 
religioni iudicantis videbitur, poenam sustinebit.235 
In post-classical law, however, it appears that damages were measured differently, at least in 
part. In cases of liability for dolus, damages were assessed according to the fonnulation vera 
aestimatio litis, which at this (later) stage of the development of Roman law has to be 
interpreted in a wide sense. Liability here was for all damages direct and indirect, incurred 
through the judge's act, including the costs of appeal. In other words, the total interesse.236 
In instances of liability for culpa, damages continued to be assessed in accordance with the 
high-classical rule.237 
234 Ibid, 108; Medicus, Id Quod Interest , 234, 329-330. 
235 D 50.13.6; D 44.7 .5.4 and Inst 4.5 pro See further Kelly, Roman Litigation, 115 ; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 318-319 fn51 
with further references; MacCormack, Liability of the Judge , 23 and 26; Hubner, IURA 5 (1954), 207-208; Lenel, EdiClUm 
Perpetuum, 169; Wei/3, Institutionen , 464. 
236 D 5.1.15. 1. Further Hubner, IURA 5 (1954), 207; MacCormack, Liability of the Judge , 23. This was precisely the 
starting point of the Italian medieval jurists in the assessment of damages for dolo misjudgements. See Engelmann, 
Wiedergeburl,354. 
237 Hubner, lURA 5 (1954), 207. 
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3 JUDICIAL LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENTS OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS 
Turning now to the development of judicial liability for infringements of personality rights, 
historically, the delict of iniuria (contumelia) had its origins in the xn Tables.238 In this sense, 
iniuria became a delict in its own right, not be confused with the broader meaning of iniuria 
as indicative of wrongfulness, for instance under the actio legis Aquiliae where iniuria 
comprised wrongfulness and fault (damnum iniuria datum).239 Initially, the xn Tables made 
provision only for various forms of infringements of physical integrity. Thus, membrum 
ruptum (tab. vrn 2), the most severe form of early iniuria, which comprised severance, 
mutilation or permanent disablement of a limb, led to retaliation unless the parties had agreed 
to a pecuniary compensation (pactum). For os Jractum (tab. vrn 3), a less serious case of 
fracturing a bone, punishment was not retaliation but a fixed penalty payable by the CUlprit. 
Slight forms of physical harm appear to have been included under the concept of iniuria (tab 
vrn 4). Examples were slaps in the face, kicks, etc. In cases like these, the culprit had to pay a 
penalty of25 asses.240 
By the second century B.C., the rigid regulations of the xn Tables had been superseded by a 
number of edicts which made the delict of iniuria more flexible and extended its scope 
considerably.24I By means of the edict de iniuriis aestumandis, the praetor decided that for 
cases of iniuria a jury (recuperatores) had to estimate bonum et aequum the penalty (taxatio) 
in accordance with the bodily infringement complained of. Soon praetorian edicts covered 
238 The literature on the development of the Roman actio iniuriarum is vast. Only a selection of the works (predominantly 
those accessible in South Africa) is given here. The most recent work in this field is Walter, Actio Iniuriarum. See further 
Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 1050-1062; Burchell, Law of Defamation, 3-10; Midgley, Delict, 9-10; McQuoid-
Mason, Law of Privacy; Amerashinghe, Defamation; De ViI hers, Law of Injuries. Further, a number of dissertations can be 
referred to, namely Neethling, Die Reg op Privaatheid; Davidstz, Animus Iniuriandi; Pauw, Persoonlikheidskrenking; 
Ranchod, Foundations . Finally there are some of the standard works of Kaser, RPR I, 623-625, further RPR II, 439 and his 
RPL, 256-257; Liebs, RR, 285-293; Honsell, Romisches Recht, 152-153; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 343; Van 
Wannelo, Principles of Roman Civil Law, 220-222; Borkowski, Textbook, 322-328. 
239 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 1050; Walter, Actio Iniuriarum, 51 fn47; Midgley, Delict, 9; Honsell, Romisches 
Recht, 147. 
240 Walter, Actio Iniuriarum, 42-44; Burchell, Law of Defamation, 3-5; Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 1050-1053; 
Ranchod , Foundations, I; Pauw, Persoonlikheidskrenking, 1; Kaser, RPL, 256; Liebs, RR, 286-288; Honsel!, Romisches 
Recht, 152. 
241 By the time of the late Republic, the sum of 25 asses was hardly adequate to compensate a victim. The as had 
depreciated considerably and was only a small and worthless copper coin. See Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 1052; 
Liebs, RR, 289. 
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other forms of iniuria besides physical harm. Thus, in about 150 B.c., the so-called convicium 
(a certain form of defamation in public) came under the provision of the praetor's general 
edict, as did the edicts de ademptata pudicitia (with a view to protecting the good name of a 
woman or an adolescent), ne quid infamandi causa fiat (with a view to protecting one's 
reputation) and servum alienum verberare (with the purpose of protecting a slave owner's 
good name, which could have been damaged by the beating or torturing of the slave).242 By 
the time of classical law, the Romans had combined the various elements of the praetorian 
edicts under the generic term iniuria which covered both infringements of physical integrity as 
well as infringements of non-physical interests. The action available in these cases became 
known as the actio iniuriarum. 
Classical jurists managed to crystallise a number of general requirements, which had to be met 
before a claim could succeed. First of all there had to be an injury, also referred to as 
contumelia: " ... specialiter autem iniuria dicitur contumelia ... ".243 Contumelia in the widest 
possible sense indicated any " ... outrage or insult or wanton interference with rights, any act, in 
short, which showed contempt of the personality of the victim or was such as to lower him in 
the estimation of others.,,244 Secondly, there had to be an act against the boni mores; and 
furthermore, the CUlprit must have acted with animus iniuriandi.245 Finally, none of the 
recognised 'justification grounds' had to apply in the circumstances.246 However, like the 
development of the fault requirement with respect to the liability of the iudex, qui litem suam 
fecit in high-classical law, animus iniuriandi may not as yet be interpreted as intention or fault 
in its modem, exclusively subjective, sense.247 Rather, the high-classical notion of animus 
iniuriandi once again appears as a stepping stone in the development towards Justinian's 
242 Walter, Actio Iniuriarum, 44-50; Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 1052-1059; Burchell, Law of Defamation, 4-5; 
Ranchod, Foundations, 8; Pauw, Persoonlikheidskrenking, II; McQuoid-Mason, Law of Privacy, 19; Liebs, RR, 289-293 ; 
Kaser, RPL, 257. 
243 Walter, Actio Iniuriarum, 51. 
244 Buckland and Stein, Text-Book, 590. 
245 However, the term animus iniuriandi was hardly employed and was introduced by the Glossators and Commentators 
only some centuries later. Rather, the sources refer to animus iniuriae faciendae (Paul 0.47.10.26) or to iniuriae faciendae 
causa (lav. 0.4710.44). See Walter, Actio /niuriarum, 53 fn56. 
246 Walter, Actio /niuriarum , 50-57; Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 1059-1062; Burchell, Law of Defamation, 5-7; 
Ranchod, Foundations, II; Midgley, Delict, 9-10. 
247 Contra de Viltiers, LQR 34 (1918),412 fnn228 and 229. 
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(final) system of legal liability based on subjective criteria. This intermediate step resembled 
more the notion of 'typical culpa' or a casuistic approach.248 
It is under the rubric of justification grounds, however, that the possible liability of the iudex 
under the actio iniuriarum needs to be discussed. Imagine the case of a Roman iudex who 
defamed a litigant in court, fulfilling all the requirements for liability, including animus. 
Could this judge raise any of the Roman justification grounds in an action against him? 
High-classical Roman law accepted a number of grounds for denying an actio iniuriarum even 
though all other requirements were met. From a modem point of view, these grounds would 
relate either to defences against wrongfulness or defences against fault. What is material at 
this stage, however, is that classical Roman lawyers never drew this distinction.249 Even 
though wrongfulness (in the broadest possible sense of iniuria) initially contained the notion 
of culpa (fault), and thus never ceased to lurk in the background when culpa became the 
essential element in the determination of legal (delictual) liability in Roman law, it took 
almost another 2000 years before wrongfulness and fault emerged as distinct concepts m 
South African private law necessitating a distinction between defences.25o 
In high-classical Roman law, the actio iniuriarum did not lie against mentally disabled 
persons and minors; nor in cases of consent, truth or jest; nor in cases involving acts of 
authority (eg. chastising of pupils or children). The actio furthermore was not applicable in 
cases where a person acted in exercise of public office. This person, consequently, was 
presumed to have acted lawfully.25I Such privileged status appears principally from two 
sources: "Quae iure potestatis a magistratu jiunt, ad iniuriarum actionem non pertinent,,252, 
248 Zimmennann, Law of Obligations, 106 I makes the point: "Objective and subjective ingredients were inextricably 
interwoven within the concept of iniuria, and the relative weight attached to each depended, furthennore, on the type of 
injury in question." Ranchod, Foundations, 15, states that " .. . conduct which was classified as injuria usually did not occur 
without some fonn of dolus."; Pauw, Persoonlikheidskrenking, 26; Walter, Actio Iniuriarum, 52-54, are sceptical about 
Ranchod's emphasis on dolus (malus). With regard to 'typical culpa' see also the text above at fnI44 et seqq and the 
authorities quoted there. 
249 Ranchod, Foundations, 17; Walter, Actio Iniuriarum , 54. 
250 See below at chapter VII 2 I. 
251 Note, however, that Roman law did not operate with a concept of 'presumption of animus' or 'presumption of dolus', 
which, for reasons that cannot explained here, appeared only in the age from the Glossators and Commentators. For details 
see below at chapter IV 2. 
252 D47.IO.13.6. 
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and more generally, from the following: "]s, qui iure publico utitur, non videtur inuriae 
faciendae causa hoc facere ; iuris enim executio non habet iniuriam.,,253 What is referred to 
here is evidently the exemption of public officers, or more precisely, of the magistrate, from 
delictual liability. The essential argument is that a magistrate's exercise of a public right could 
not cause iniuria. 
In addition to the above-mentioned passages, we know of a number of other examples where 
Roman jurists engaged in discussion of the liability of magistrates for damage caused in the 
exercise of their official functions. 254 If reference was not to the actio iniuriarum, it was to the 
actio legis Aquiliae or to actiones in factum. 255 In each of these cases, the magistrate did not 
easily attract liability. On the other hand, this privilege did not go the full way, so to speak, as 
absolute privilege from liability. Already, the Roman jurists albeit not very successfully, were 
determined to fix the boundaries of the magistrates' authority. They offered no clear criteria 
for determining precisely when a judge would be held liable. And, as shall be shown, these 
uncertainties were not resolved by later generations of jurists. From the available sources it 
seems that liability arose only where the magistrate exceeded the confines of his authority, 
where he acted non iure, that is without a right or undutifu1.256 This principle apparently 
applied also to the actio iniuriarum as appears from the following passage: 
"Quod rei publicae venerandae causa secundum bonos mores fit, etiamsi ad countumeliam 
alicuius pertinet, quia tamen non ea mente magistratus facit, ut iniuriam faciat, sed ad vindictam 
maiestatis publicae respiciat, actione iniuriarum non tenetur.,,257 
However, it must be noted that this justification ground of public office, as it may be called, 
did not apply to Roman judges for the simple reason that the iudex under the formulary system 
exercised an honorary duty (munus publicum) but he did not hold a public office, nor did he 
exert any imperium.258 It was only in the person of the praetor, during the proceedings in iure, 
that the parties faced a member of the magistracy. The Roman lay iudices thus did not enjoy 
m D47. JO.l3 . 1. 
254 D 9.2.29.7; D 18.6.14; D 47.8.2.20; D 43 .24.7.4. 
255 Generally see Zimmennann, Law of Obligations, 1003; Borkowsky, Textbook, 106-107. See Kunkel and Wittmann, 
Staatsordnung, 259-260 with regard to procedural aspects of civil actions against magistrates. For details see below at 4. 
256 Julian D.18.6 .14. 
257 Paul D 47.10.33 . 
258 Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 359: "Bei alldem steht ihm [the iudex] als Privatmann keinerlei amtliche Befehls- oder 
Sirafgewall zu." See also KUbler, ZSS (RAJ 39 (1918), 213. With respect to the iudices' munus publicum see again above at 
fn5!. 
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the privileged status of members of the magistracy with regard to liability for infringement of 
personality rights under the actio iniuriarum. 
With the introduction of the proceedings extra ordinem cognitio, however, judges came to 
operate as full members of the imperial bureaucracy.259 Only from this stage of the 
development did the rules relevant to the Republican or early classical magistrates apply to all 
Roman iudices: they were exempt from an action as long as they had not acted non iure. 
In Justinian Roman law generally, iniuria was incorporated in the Corpus Iuris Civilis without 
any substantial modifications of its classical form. 260 The title of the Digest (D 47.10 de 
iniuriis et famosis libellis) relied extensively on Ulpian's commentary on the edict, and the 
relevant title of the Institutiones (Inst. 4.4 de iniuriis) was based upon Gaius's textbook.261 A 
number of interests were emphasised and came under the wings of the actio iniuriarum, 
namely corpus, dignitas andfama. In line with what has been said above in discussion of the 
scope of the liability of the iudex at the time of Justinian, fault (animus iniuriandi) also 
became the essence of the Justinian actio iniuriarum.262 No indication whatsoever appears 
from the sources that under Justinian regulations other than that stated above applied to the 
question of judicial liability under the actio iniuriarum. 
With regard to the assessment of the damages a late Roman iudex had to pay, the general 
standards of the actio may be taken as a basis. Hence, the actio iniuriarum was directed at 
payment of a sum of money which had to be specified by the plaintiff. The court then granted 
a certain sum according to equitable discretion (quantam pecuniam ... bonum aequum 
259 As pointed out earlier, due to a reversal of terminology, it was now the term iudex that covered any official endowed 
with jurisdictional as well as administrative authority (including the successors of the 'old' magistracy). See Kaser and 
Hackl, ZPR, 519-520. At 529 they state: "Die allgemeine Gattungsbezeichnung fur aile Arten von Richtern ist iudex ... Da 
die hauptamtlichen Richter auch verwaltende Aufgaben erfullen. heij3en sie ferner administrantes. 
administratores ... bisweilen nach wievor magistratus. Die Amtstdtigkeit wird bald mit mit iurisdictio. iudicium bezeichnet. 
bald mit administratio." See also the text above at fu 88. 
l60 Burchell, Law of Defamation, 8; Walter, Actio lniuriarum, 59; McQuoid-Mason, Law of Privacy, 26; Kaser, RPR f1, 
439. 
261 Walter, Actio lniuriarum, 59. 
262 Ranchod, Foundations, 21; Burchell, Law of Defamation, 8. 
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videbitur). Furthermore, condemnation rendered the judge infamis, which was tantamount to 
his removal from office.263 
4 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS AND THEIR PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Finally, there arises the question of particular procedural restrictions or regulations for actions 
against Roman iudices. 
First, with regard to the relevant action, it has been indicated elsewhere that under the edict it 
was an actio infactum under which a judge had to be sued. For post-c1assicallaw, it may be 
assumed that, in cases of dolus, the actio legis Aquiliae was the proper action, and an actio in 
factum was appropriate in instances of imprudentia misjudgements which had caused loss to a 
party. In cases of iniuria by a judge, the actio iniuriarum applied. Generally, under the 
formulary form of procedure all alike were subject to summons to court. Even at later periods, 
there was, at least in theory, some justification for the claim that the law was the same for all. 
In practice, however, there were certain important exceptions to this general rule?64 
In the Digest at 2.4 under the title de in ius vocando (of summons), we are infonned of two of 
these:265 certain persons were not to be summoned into court at all; others could be summoned 
only with the pennission of the praetor. Magistrates, who held imperium (at the time of the 
Republic for one year266) could not be summoned into court. This rule obviously included the 
praetor. Reference must also be made to the iudex in this respect. While ajudge was occupied 
263 Kaser, ZSS (RAJ 73 (1956),262 and 264. 
264 Jones, Later Roman Empire, 518. 
265 Even though we have infonnation only on the following aspects from the jurists of the high-classical and early post-
classical period, it has been suggested that this was based upon old traditions. See generally Weinrib, Phoenix 22 (\968), 
32-56; Kunkel and Wittmann, Staatsordnung, 259-260 and 265-267 for civil actions against magistrates. 
266 Weinrib, Phoenix 22 (\ 968), 33 observes: "The immunity from magistrates with imperium from the accusations of 
private citizens was deeply rooted in the structure of Roman political life. As long as the supreme magistrates exercised in 
their own persons all the judicial functions in the state, i.e., until the institution of the praetorship in 367 B.C., there was 
simply no possible procedure for a citizen to follow in prosecuting a holder of imperium ... This immunity from liability in 
private suits was not regulated by any rules of its own but solely by the powers inherent in each given office. Thus consuls 
and praetors were immune because of their imperium ... ". And further at 34. 
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with the hearing of a case as well as preparing and giving a judgement, he could not be called 
upon to appear in an action against himself. 267 
Undoubtedly, this concept operated as a procedural privilege. It appears to have been based on 
practical considerations rather than to protect the judges from personal harassment or from 
loss of status. It is evident that one objective behind such privilege was to enable the 
defendant to perform (or rather to conclude) his occupation or vocation. A magistrate was to 
be sued only after the ending of his term, a pontifex at the end of his office (dum sacra facit). 
Similarly, a person who was riding on a state horse while on some public mission, a couple 
who were about to get married or anyone who was involved in a lawsuit before the praetor or 
before another court could not be cited while occupied with these activities. The same 
(practical) principle applied to the iudex. Thus, only after a judge had given judgement in a 
pending case and his official duty had been terminated, could he be sued in an action. In light 
of the requirements of the formulary system of procedure, this regulation was perfectly sound; 
comp.lete procedural privilege, if it had existed, would have rendered illusory the (sole) 
remedy granted by means of an action against the iudex, qui litem suam fecit. 
The impression gained from D 2.4 is confirmed by a passage in D 47 .10.32, which was 
touched upon earlier in discussion of the liability of judges/magistrates under the actio 
iniuriarum. This section states that a plaintiff had to wait until the end of the magistrate's term 
in order to sue him in court. This rule applied to actions committed either in an official or in a 
private capacity. The only exception was with regard to minor magistrates, who did not hold 
imperium or potestas. These officials could be sued immediately, while still in office?68 E 
contrario it appears that during the Republic and for most of the Principate they include 
iudices, who due to their lack of general imperium were comparable to minor magistrates. 
To the second group of persons referred to above, who could not be summoned without leave 
from the praetor there belonged, for instance, the plaintiffs forbears and the patron (and his 
ancestors or descendants) of a freedman. In such cases, the prospective plaintiff had to petition 
267 D 2.4.2: "Praeterea in ius vocari non debet qui uxorem ducat aut eam quae nubat: nec iudicem dum de re cognoscat ... ". 
268 "Si quid igitur per iniuriam fecerit magistratus vel quasi privatus vel jiducia magistratus, iniuriarum pot est conveniri. 
Sed utrum posito magistratu an vera et quamdiu est in magistratu? Sed verius est, si is magistratus est, qui sine frau de in 
ius vocari non potest, exspectandum esse, quoad magistratu abead. Quod et si ex minoribus magistratibus erit, id est qui 
sine imperio aut potestate sunt magistratus, et in ipso magistratu posse eos conveniri." 
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for a so-called venia agendi.269 This second category reveals an added reason for procedural 
privilege, which applies also to the sununoning of magistrates: It was felt that, like the 
sununoning of parents or patrons before the praetor, the summoning of magistrates amounted 
to a serious derogation of their (public) authority.27o 
Consequently, it appears that in classical law judges generally could be summoned without 
greater procedural obstacles. Whether or not the same principles applied at the time of the 
Principate or the Dominate is not easy to answer. The relevant passages are included in 
Justinian's Digest and initially derived from Ulpian's commentary on the edict. Naturally, the 
compilers had no reason to include a regulation that did not apply in their day. On the other 
hand we know by now that the whole context, namely the procedures for summons, had 
changed considerably since the introduction of the extraordinary forms of procedure. 
Regrettably, there are no other passages that refer in more detail to the post-classical state of 
law. The only information we have in this respect derives from the fact that imperial officers 
were subject not to the ordinary courts of their district but enjoyed privileged jurisdiction. In 
civil or criminal proceedings initiated by or against officers of the imperial court, this 
jurisdiction was exercised by the magister officiorum.271 Provincial governors had to be sued 
before the court of the responsible praefecti praetorio or the vicari. In any case, the emperor 
had to be informed of a pending case.272 Taking into account the deterioration within the 
sphere of the post-classical administration, it is obvious that in practical terms this system of 
privileged jurisdiction carried considerable risk of abuse. It is likely that, esprit de corps, 
selfishness and protectionism made it almost impossible to initiate an action against an 
imperial judge, quite apart from the unlikeliness of winning such a case.273 
Despite the inconclusiveness of the answers to the questions posed here, it not superfluous to 
consider these aspects. In particular, the concept of praetorian leave to summon offers a 
starting-point for subsequent developments, for instance in (South African) Roman-Dutch 
269 D 2.4.4.1-3. See also Jones, Later Roman Empire , 518-519. 
270 Theme stressed by Weinrib, Phoenix 22 (J 968), 35 with respect to magistrates. 
271 Thlir and Pieler, Gerichtsbarkeit, 451; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 544. 
272 C 1.26.4. See Thlir and PieJer, Gerichtsbarkeil , 452; Kaser and Hackl, ZPR, 535 fn30. 
273 Thiir and Pieler, Gerichlsbarkeil, 450. 
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law. The same applies to the underlying idea of procedural protection of supenor 
administrative or judicial officers. 274 
5 OTHER FORMS OF JUDICIAL ACCOUNT ABILITY 
In addition to civil liability, brief reference should be made here to criminal liability as a 
second and alternate means of judicial accountability.275 Criminal liability historically derives 
from the so-called leges, which during the days of the Republic were promulgated by the 
comitia, initially the assembly of the Roman people. Except for early Roman law under the 
XII Tables, criminal liability of judges was always separated from civilliability.276 
Two mam leges must be mentioned: the lex Cornelia de sicariis and the lex Julia de 
repetundis. According to the lex Cornelia, in capital (criminal) cases a magistrate or a iudex 
questionis who conspired or accepted a bribe faced the death penalty. In practice, however, the 
death penalty was replaced by exile. The regulations of the lex Julia imposed a fine and 
infamia on those judges who accepted a bribe in either civil or criminal cases. Liability under 
the leges was subject to some extensions in late classical law. Under the lex Cornelia, 
punishment for corruption on the part of a judge may now have applied not only to capital 
cases but also to others less serious. The customary penalty was exile and confiscation of 
property. The lex Julia, too, was extended. It applied to improper judgements motivated by 
reasons other than corruption, for instance anger or hatred. Under a third lex, the lex Cornelia 
Testamentaria, imperial judges were sentenced to confiscation of property, deportation and 
loss of citizenship if they disobeyed an imperial statute or deliberately refused to apply a rule 
of the ius publicum. 277 
The relation between judges' civil and criminal liability in Roman law may be summed up in 
the words of Geoffrey MacConnack: 
274 See below at chapter VIl4. 
275 Generally see MacConnack, Liability of the Judge, 4-5 , 6-9 and 10-16. 
276 See above at 2 1. 
277 See MacConnack, Liability of the Judge, 25-27 . 
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" ... there can in the Republic and early Principate have been little overlap between the edict and the 
leges. The former was confmed to judges sitting in civil cases and imposed liability for failure to 
observe the basic procedural requirements of the judicial office ... The leges were concerned 
primarily with judges sitting in criminal courts and imposed penalties for various kinds of judicial 
misconduct including the acceptance of bribes." 
Ajudge who was bribed to give a (procedurally) wrong judgement may have been liable under 
both the edict and one of the leges. In this event, the actions may have run concurrently_ It is 
evident, however, that in Roman law civil and criminal liability practically never fell together 
in one action. As we will see in the following chapter, this aspect provides an important 
distinction in the development of the concept of judicial liability in early medieval law. 
"Kings and princes are chosen among nations so 
that, by fear of them, they may restrain their 
people from evil, and constrain them by laws to a 
good life. If aJl men were free of fear, who would 
be able to keep anyone from wickedness?" 
(St Isidore of Seville I) 
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III EARLY MEDIEVAL LAW 
1 INTRODUCTION 
From the reign of Emperor Constantine at the beginning of the fourth century A.D., Roman 
law was increasingly subject to a process of vulgarisation. This general tendency came to a 
halt in Byzantium during the sixth century. The counter-movement peaked, as was discussed 
earlier, in the Justinian classicism embodied in the famous Corpus Juris Civilis. In the western 
part of the empire, however, such renaissance did not take place before the eleventh century. 
By the beginning of the sixth century, the Roman empire had been divided into three main 
~oups of civilisations: the Graeco-Christian Byzantine empire; the Arab-Islamic world and 
the Latin-Christian West.2 From 476 A.D. the latter, in its entirety, fell under the control of the 
now sovereign Germanic kings. Already under Roman rule, Visigoths, as so-called foederati 
(allied mercenaries), had settled in what is today southern France, Spain and Portugal; 
Ostrogoths moved into the Italian peninsula and the western parts of the Balkans; 
Burgundians settled around Lyon in Burgundy; and various tribes of the Franks (Salic and 
Ribuarian) found themselves in northern France, in Belgium, the Netherlands and the western 
parts of Germany along the Rhine river north of Mayence.3 
I Quoted in KeJly, Western Legal Theory, 109. 
2 Van Caenegem, Historicalfntroduction, 16. 
3 See Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe, 4-5 ; Kelly, Western Legal History, 84-88; Goffart, Techniques, 103-
127 (Visigoths), 127-162 (Burgundians) and 176-206 (Lombardians); King, Vis/gothic Kingdom , 1-6 and 13-19; 
Hattenhauer, ERG, 89-91 ; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 28-36; Van Zyl , Geskiedenis, 43-45 ; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 
358-360. 
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The history of the centuries between 500 and 800 is full of paradoxes. The process of 
settlement of the barbarian tribes in the west was characterised by plundering and massacres 
on the one hand and, on the other, by the assimilation of the victors, who, to a large extent, 
accepted Roman institutions and Roman customs. The new forms of government reflected 
both the political and military impotence of the Romanic popUlation and their active co-
operation with the Barbarians. It was a truly revolutionary situation.4 The obvious cultural 
descent in these Germanic kingdoms from the level attained in the age of antiquity no doubt 
affected the legal sphere also. 
A number of codifications by the early medieval kings have come down to us, and are good 
evidence of the process of vulgarisation of private law. Vulgarisation may be understood as, 
essentially, a simplification of abstract classical thinking in its substantial and methodical 
perfection.5 The vulgarisation that originated in the post-Diocletian Roman period was even 
more drastic in the successive Germanic kingdoms. Moreover, Germanic legal concepts 
increasingly became mixed in.6 In this regard, one might refer, for instance, to the diminishing 
4 Seston, Verfall des R6mischen Reiches, 603 , This might be further exemplified by the following numbers. The Romanic 
population of Spain in the fourth century A.D. has been estimated at about 9 million. The invading Visigoths were 
estimated merely at about 200 000. It was for military reasons that Roman emperors, bishops, generals or administrative 
officers gave way to the Barbarian intruders. In light of the outnumbering of Barbarians by the Roman population it is clear 
that the end of the (West) Roman Empire was not the death of the idea of a Roman Empire and even less so the death of 
Roman civilisation in most of its former provinces. See also Kelly, Western Legal Theory, 92-95. 
5 For the history of the term Roman vulgar law see Levy, West Roman Vulgar Law, 2 and the critical work by Kop, 
Vulgaire Romeins Recht, 23-70. Kop argues that the term vulgar law was introduced mainly by the positivistically inclined 
German scholars of the second half of the nineteenth century, who identified with the Roman classical jurists and 
consequently felt obliged to separate apparently inferior emanations outright from the truly classical sources. Post-classical 
Romans certainly never drew a distinction between classical and vulgar law as Mayer-Maly states convincingly in 
Romisches Vulgarrecht, 1135. Levy in his Vulgarrecht states at 2 that vulgar law circumscribes all those definitions and 
rules of the law in effect that deviated from the rules of the high classical system without deriving from imperial 
enactments. Vulgar law grew without control, based merely upon the necessities and realities of post-classical everyday 
(legal) life. It was formulated in a more or less skilful manner by the jurists of this age. Levy also stresses that the social 
climate in general had changed considerably since the high classical age: what had been the heart of the high classical 
system, namely individualism as well as the free initiative of each member of society, was replaced by the efficiency of an 
autocratic state, an economic revolution, an upheaval of social hierarchies, the vanishing of the formulation of procedures. 
Beyond doubt, substantive law yielded to this onslaught. Further see Kaser, RPL, 7; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis , 53-55 
particularly fn20; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis , 41-44; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 371-376; Kobler, BUder, 31. 
6 Levy, West Roman Vulgar Law, I and 10: "With his reign [Emperor Constantine] commences that section of Roman legal 
history which characterises the intervening period. This period lasted well into the sixth century. In the West, in particular, 
the vulgar law maintains itself much beyond the age of Justinian. As late as the eight century, the Frankish collections of 
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of a proper theory of causation or fault. Already in the West, under Roman law, vanous 
meanings had become attached to culpa. As we have shown earlier, it indicated unjustified as 
well as culpable acts or even omissions. Occasionally, it was also used to describe delicts in 
general. However, the worked out meaning of negligence developed later in Byzantium under 
Justinian was clearly never achieved. 7 At a later stage, particularly in the more Germanic 
influenced leges, the strong tendency to return to the more simplistic system of objective or 
strict liability prevailed.8 
Two groups of these leges must be distinguished.9 The Edictum Theodorici was legislated at 
an early stage of development (between 453-467 A.D.), and is considered to have been one of 
the last Roman edicts enacted in the name of the Emperor Maiorian by a provincial governor 
(the praefectus praetorio Galliarum Magnus of Narbo) for the Visigoths under their King 
Theuderic II.!O Early in the fifth century A.D., the now sovereign Burgundian king Gundobad 
and the Visigoth Alaric II, with the assistance of Roman jurists, enacted a collection of 
various Roman legal texts for the Roman popUlation of their kingdoms, the so-called lex 
Romana Burgundionum and lex Romana Visigothorum (Breviarium Alarici), respectively.!! 
formulae and the lex Romana Curiensis furnish striking proof of its continuing efficacy and strength. But Gennanic ideas 
appear more and more frequently, particularly in the Burgundian, Lombard, and Frankish kingdoms. Correspondingly, the 
pure vulgar law loses ground, though a definite time limit cannot be set." VinogradofT, Roman Law in Medieval Europe, II 
describes this process as folJows: "Thus the output of the older jurisconsults ... went overboard at the time of the Visigothic 
codification, as too leamed and too complicated for the age." 
7 See Levy, Vulgarrecht, 99: "Das Vulgarrecht des Westens reichte nicht in solche Tiefen. Die begrifJlichen Gegensatze 
wurden mehr verwischt ais gekidrt. Culpa .. . bezeichnete bald ein rechtswidriges. bald ein schuldhafies Tun oder 
Unterlassen. Bisweilen stand es einfachfur delictum." For the development under Justinian see again above at chapter II 2 
3 12. 
8 Schmidt-Speicher, Rechtsbeugung, 18: " ... die das germanische Recht beherrschende Erfolgshaftung ... "; Hahlo and Kahn, 
Legal System, 353: "In meting out punishment, the ding considered only the effect of the deed. Subjective culpability ... was 
not taken into account. It made no difference whether the harm had been done intentionally, negligently or accidentaJly." 
9 For the following see Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe, 6-31 . More recently see Wormald, Germanic 
Kingship, 105-138; CoJlins, Early Medieval Spain, 24-31; King, Visigothic Kingdom, 6-11; James, Origins of France , 81-
91; Van Caenegem, Historical introduction, 16-29 with bibliography; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 55-63 and Roman Private 
Law, 56-60; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 42-44; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System , 372-377; Kunkel , RG, 135-136; Kroeschell, 
Rechtsgeschichte, 30-33 with useful references and bibliography, see further 53-56 and 70-71. 
10 Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 55 and Roman Private Law, 58; Kunkel, RG, 143; Hattenhauer, ERG, 90-91. 
II The lex Romana Visigothorum for instance' included an abbreviated version of the Codex Theodosianus , an abstract of 
Gaius's institutes, the Epitomae Gai, an excerpt from the Sententiae Pauli, as well as some constitutions from the post-
classical Codices Gregorianus and Hermogenianus and the Nove//ae Post-Theodosianae. All except the excerpts from 
Gaius's work have been commented on in a so-called lnterpretatio. See VinogradofT, Roman Law in Medieval Europe, 9-
13 for a helpful overview. The lex Romana Burgundionum was based on similar material , although the component parts 
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These leges may still be identified as belonging to Roman vulgar law in the narrow sense 
since they drew essentially upon Roman law. 12 It is noteworthy that, for instance, the lex 
Romana Visigothorum remained the basic codification in Spain and southern France well into 
the high Middle Ages. Only from the thirteenth century, was it replaced by the incorporated 
and adapted Corpus luris Civilis. 13 
Parallel to the enactment of the lex Romana Burgundionum, King Gundobad legislated the so-
called lex Burgundionum for the Gennanic population of Burgundy. 14 From the early sixth 
century, the Gennanic Kings increasingly enacted leges of this second kind, which contained 
more Gennanic than Romanic legal concepts. I5 There were, for instance, the Frankian lex 
Salica (about 500) and the lex Ribuaria (about 620 A.D.) or the Visigothian lex Visigothorum 
(about 650 A.D.). It appears that all these enactments were strongly influenced by the Codex 
Euricianus (about 475 A.D.), an enactment ofthe Visigothian King Euric. I6 An important role 
was played by the Edictum Rotharis (643 A.D), the law of the Lombards. 17 From 568 A.D. to 
about 650 A.D, the Lombards, a Gennanic tribe originally from the middle section of the 
were not presented separately as in the Visigothian lex, but were incorporated in one text. For more details as to the leges 
Romanae see Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 58-59 and Geskiedenis, 55-58; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 372-373; 
Kunkel, RG, 144-145; Collins, Early Medieval Spain, 27-29. 
12 There is ongoing discussion of the characteristics of the early medieval codifications, whether only the leges Romanae or 
also the supposedly more Germanic leges nationum Germanicarum were based on Roman vulgar law. See Collins, Early 
Medieval Spain, 26-30 and Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 51-52 for an overview. 
13 Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe, 7; Van Caenegem, Historical Introduction, 17 fu I, Hattenhauer, ERG, 92: 
"Die for das abendlandische Recht wichtigste Leistung vollbrachten die Westgoten. Man kann getrost von ihnen sagen, dajJ 
sie das romische Recht uber Jahrhunderte des Frilhmittelalters hinweg gerettet haben." 
14 This duality of enactments is a manifestation of the so-called principle of personality, which means that Germanics and 
Romans each continued to live and had to be tried in accordance with their own laws. See also Kaser, RPL, 7; Van Zyl, 
Geskiedenis, 52-53 and Roman Private Law, 57; Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe, 15-18; Van Caenegem, 
Historical Introduction, 19. 
15 Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelilae, 67 observes: "Von allen germanischen Rechtsaufzeichnungen ist die lex 
Visigothorum am starksten vom romischen Recht beeinflujJt worden; mit Recht kann man von einer weitgehenden 
ZUriickdrdngung des germanischen Elements in diesem Gesetzbuch sprechen." 
16 He was the brother of the above-mentioned Theuderic II and father of Alaric II who legislated the lex Romana 
Visigothorum. See Collins, Early Medieval Spain, 25-29; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 56 fu21 and Roman Private Law, 58 
fu167; Kunkel, RG, 144. 
17 The Lombards were probably the legally most advanced Germanic tribe and developed a relatively high standard of 
administration of justice. It is little wonder therefore that the first law school was erected in the eight century at Pavia, the 
capital of the Lombardian kingdom, from where the revival of a legal science swept over to Bologna and from there to the 
rest of medieval Europe. See Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 563; Stein, Romisches Recht und Europa, 79-
80; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 487-488; Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe, 39-40. 
74 
Danube River, controlled the deserted marshes of the River Po in northern Italy, which they 
conquered from the weakened Byzantians who, under Justinian's generals Belisar and Narses, 
had defeated the Ostrogoths some decades earlier. 18 In later centuries, there appeared the lex 
Alamannorum (about 729 A.D.), the lex Baiuvariorum (about 740 A.D.), the lex Saxonum and 
the lex Frisionum (around 800 A.D., in parts of what is today the Netherlands). 19 
2 THE POSITION AND STATUS OF JUDGES WITHIN THE EARLY MEDlEV AL 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
It is beyond the scope of this work to provide a detailed picture of the superstructure of the 
administration of justice and of the role, functioning and staffing of the courts of all the early 
medieval kingdoms that spread on the domain of the former Roman Empire. To this day, 
many ' of the related aspects of this 'dark age' are subject to speculation and scholarly 
controversy. Moreover, the various Germanic kingdoms hardly followed a uniform pattern. 
On the contrary, we have to deal with a variety of solutions and, further, with a period that 
lasted for some 600 years, leaving room for diverse developments. Nevertheless, for a better 
understanding, it is essential to sketch at least the most important lines of development. 
Two basic concepts appear to have dominated the administration of justice of the early Middle 
Ages. The courts sat either with a single judge who, as in the post-classical legal system 
conducted the hearing and gave judgement in persona; or adjudication was provided for in a 
bipartite system whereby judges and so-called 'law-speakers' were involved in the process of 
adjudication.2o Under the latter system, the judge was limited to presiding on the bench and to 
18 See De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 30-32. As mentioned earlier, the Byzantine Empire retained control of the area around 
Ravenna, Rome (seat of the Pope) as well as lstria, Naples and parts of Calabria. The separation of Italy into a Byzantine 
(later Papal) and a Lombardian (later Frankian) section was decisive in the Italian (legal) history of the following seven 
centuries. See especially below chapter IV I. 
19 Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 60-61; Hahlo and Kahn, Lega/ System, 376-377; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 142-143. 
~o Dawson, Lay Judges , 37; Weitzel, Gerichtsverfahren, 1333: "Das Mille/alter kannte zwei Grundmode//e des 
Gerichtsverfahrens ... Zum einen lebte der (spdt-) romische ProzeJ3 fort, in dem ein oder mehrere (Beamten-) Richter 
zug/eich vorsafJen und urteilten .. Das Modell wurde von den Westgoten, Burgundern und Langobarden ubernommen ... Zum 
anderen bi/dete sich ein friinkisch-deutsches Gerichtsverfahren aus .. . Vorsitz, ProzeJ3leitung und Urteilsvo//zug kamen dem 
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exercising the courts' authority. The judgement as such was proposed by the law-speakers, 
who were laymen with some legal knowledge. The judge declared the judgement to the parties 
to the lawsuit only after the 'bystanders', the assembled community of local people, had stated 
their approval or disapproval of the proposed verdict. 21 Scholars have considered bipartition a 
typically Gennanic concept that came to be fused with vulgarised Roman concepts only by 
retention. Not surprisingly, therefore, we can trace the influence of bipartition predominantly 
in those areas of post-Roman Europe which were only slightly subject to Roman legal 
influence, namely the northern and eastern part of the Frankish empire; whereas in Italy, 
southern Gaul and Spain, the single judge remained a common feature .22 
Furthennore, it is important to note that the post-classical Roman hierarchy of courts with its 
flawless appellate system, including appeals to the responsible governors, vicarii, praefecti or 
even to the court of the emperors, disappeared and was replaced by a vast number of local 
jurisdictions, in fact one court for each county. These county courts (so-called mallus, 
conventus) in principle were based on the ancient Gennanic ding. 
In the Visigothian kingdom, an undivided system of administration of justice, based upon the 
relatively strong Roman influences that continued to prevail, covered both groups of the 
population, Visigoths as well as fonner Roman citizens. As inferior judges adjudicated a 
vicarius comitis or a iudex territorii, commonly referred to as iudices locorum. These judges 
were appointed by the king and controlled by a count (comes) as well as by a duke (dux). The 
judges generally sat as single judges, and any contribution from other members of the local 
community was strictly prohibited. The local judges had to decide the law on the basis of the 
Visigothian leges. The highest court was the court of the king, who decided all questions of 
law that had not as yet been settled by the leges.23 
The Burgundian leges do not contain precise details of the system of adjudication. Most 
likely, justice was administered on the local level by two judges, a Burgundian and a Roman 
count (comes or iudices deputati). The royal court apparently had jurisdiction for all suits that 
Richter ZU, wdhrend das Urteil bei der Gerichtsgemeinde bzw. ihren Representanten, den Urteilern, lag." Further note 

Driippel, Richter, 833-834. 

21 Dawson, Lay Judges, 37; Weitzel , Gerichtsverfahren, 1334; Kobler, BUder, 76-79. 

22 Weitzel, Gerichtsverfahren, 1333; Driippel, Richter, 833 . 























could not be settled by application of the leges, as well as for instances of denial ofjustice and 
wrongful judgements. 24 
Quite distinct from the situation in Burgundy and in the Visigothian empire, was the 
administration ofjustice based upon strong Germanic traditions in Frankia during the reign of 
the Merovingians. Two distinct courts administered justice. One was the ancient Germanic 
people's or folk court, the so-called mallus or ding; the other was the king's court (curia 
regis). The local mallus was presided over in the early days by a thunginus, a figure of some 
local power and importance. He was assisted by seven laymen who were supposed to have at 
least some legal knowledge, the so-called rachinburgii. They, too, came from the ranks of the 
freemen or may have been members of the local gentry.25 Apparently, the rachinburgii were 
selected anew for every trial. 
It is much debated whether it was exclusively the rachinburgii who decided on the law or 
whether the thunginus or the assembled local community were aLso involved in the process. 
The prevailing opinion is that under Frankish law the thunginus upheld the court's formal 
authority, conducted the trial and called on the rachinburgii to deliberate on the verdict. It was 
up to the rachinburgii to decide upon the relevant questions of law and to propose a verdict 
that was in accordance with the norms of the law. The proposal was read to the assembled 
local community and had to meet with popular acceptance in order to become a valid and 
binding judgement.26 At the time, the folk court was held in the open air, commonly near a 
sacred place, under a group of trees, on top of hills or near springs. The thunginus generally 
sat somewhat elevated on a stone and faced the east. Directly before him, on a lower level, sat 
the rachinburgii. Parties to the suit faced the west and appeared directly before the court. 
24 Padoa Schioppa, Ricerche Sull'Appello, voU 127 and 130-132; Schmitt-Weigand, RechtspjIegede/i/ae, 78 . 

25 James, Origins ofFrance, 88; Dawson, Lay Judges, 35-37; Van Caenegem, Historical Introduction, 25 ; Hahlo and Kahn, 

Legal System, 395-396; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 49-51; Nehlsen-von Stryck, Rachinburgen, 383 ; von Olberg, Rachinbiirgen, 

127-130; Geffcken, lex Salica, 213, Kobler, Bilder, 76-79. 
26 For fairly similar proceedings of confinnation of legislation see Kelly, Western Legal Theory, 101. Further Hahlo and 
Kahn, Legal System, 354 and 357; Hattenhauer, ERG, 38; Dawson, Lay Judges, 37-38 fnlO with further references. In a 
sense this notion of bipartition bears a superficial resemblance to the Roman fonnulary system of proceedings. Kroeschell, 
Rechtsgeschichte, 44 states: "Erst imfruhen Millelalter aber und sicherlich nich/ ohne romischen EinjluJ3 ist den das Urteil 
sprechenden Rechtskundigen ein Richter vorgesetzt worden, der die Verhandlung eroJJnet und leitet und zum SchlufJ den 
Spruch verkundet. Hier erst en/stand also jene Zweiteilung in Richter und Urteiler, die bis zum Vordringen des gelehrten 




Somewhat outside this inner circle stood the rest of the local community, who were obliged to 
appear on court days. 27 
As early as the sixth century, it became evident that the local count (comes, grafio), a royal 
servant furnished with administrative, military and fiscal authority, had come to playa pivotal 
role in the administration ofjustice in the local districts. 28 Initially, in legal matters, the count 
was solely responsible for the execution of judgements. He was permitted, therefore, to join 
the court proceedings. Later, these tasks appear to have been delegated to subordinate 
officials, namely the centenarius or the vicari us. The counts increasingly concentrated on 
replacing the traditional thunginus on the bench. This development led to an interesting result: 
the organs of state co-operated with the ancient elements of folk justice. In time, the counts 
gave some of this newly won judicial authority, mostly in legal matters of less importance, to 
the centenarii or vicarii. Serious cases such as murder, physical injury, arson, theft, robbery or 
inheritance disputes remained under the jurisdiction of the count. This division clearly formed 
the root of the emerging division into a superior and inferior judiciary.29 
The Frankian king's court was, initially, presided over by the king. In due course, however, 
the major-domo of the palace30 (maiordomus, Hausmeier) took the chair during the 
proceedings. It was only the final judgement that was left to be affirmed by the monarch. 
Since the king and his household were itinerant, travelling from one palace to another, from 
villa to monastery to settlement, there was simply no place where the king could be expected 
to be at a certain time. 3l Hence, the king's court sat wherever the king was and whenever he 
decided to hold a court day. The king's court had unrestricted jurisdiction in all legal matters 
within the empire. In practice, however, this was not possible. Thus, only cases of outlawry, 
death sentences against members of the nobility or instances of denial of justice or challenge 
of proposal (Schelte) regularly came before the king' s court, apart from those cases that were 
tried owing to the accidental presence of the king in the county. In addition, it was only at the 
king's court that the so-called judicial duel or trial by battle was conducted, which was 
27 Kobler, Bi/der, 78 and 151-153, Hattenhauer, ERG, 35-38. 

28 For details on to the structure of the administration of the courts in (Carolingian) Frankia see particularly McKitterick, 

Carolingians, 87-89. Further Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 395; Dawson, Lay Judges, 35-39; Kobler, Bi/der, 157. 
























nothing other than institutionalised combat used as a (quite irrational) mode of proof in 
. I I d' 32resolvmg a ega Ispute. 
One of the most enduring effects of the reign of Charlemagne, the most influential monarch of 
the Carolingian successors of the Merovingians, was the reformation of the system of 
administration of justice. In the people's courts, resort was no longer to the ad hoc elected 
rachinburgii, but to scabini (lay assessors or doomsmen), commonly members of the local 
gentry (meliores homini) who were appointed as permanent members of the court and 
consequently provided for greater stability in the administration of justice. Owing to the 
strengthening of the influence of the scabini on the judgement, judges of the Carolingian and 
later the German Empire (at least at the local courts) were for centuries to remain non­
professionals and were restricted to the presidency of their respective courts. Other 
modifications concerned the people, who were no longer obliged to appear on any court day 
but only on three fixed court days each year. At these general meetings (echte Dinge), serious 
crimes were tried by the counts in much the same fashion as of old, which meant the inclusion 
of the people in the final judgement.33 Ordinary cases were tried as so-called gebotene Dinge 
by the centenarii or vicarii. 
Another modification derived from the introduction of so-called miss; dominici (royal agents). 
They supervised the administration of the counts and other officials in the name of the king in 
their respective counties (missatica), which obviously included the supervision of the 
administration of justice. The missi regularly took the chair for the count or the inferior judges 
when necessary.34 Undoubtedly, the missi domenici are a clear indication of the prevailing 
Carolingian policy of centralisation and uniformity.35 
31 McKitterick, Carolingians, 78; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System , 364 and 396. 

32 For details see Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water, 103-126; Kobler, Bilder, 79-83 . 

33 See Dawson, Lay Judges, 38. 

34 Fouracre, Carolingian Justice, 789. 

3S For development from the reign of Charlemagne, see generally Van Caenegem, Historical introduction, 25; James, 

Origins oj France, 88; McKitterick, Carolingians, 78-79 and 91-93 (administration of Justice), 93-97 (missi domenici); 

Fouracre, Carolingian Justice, 777 et seqq and specifically on the missi at 780 et seqq; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 

362-368 and 395-398 ; Schmitt-Weigand, RechtspjlegedelikLe, 7 and 26-28; Battenberg, Schollen , 1463-1468; Dnlppel , 

Gericht , 1323; Kern, GerichtsverJassungsrecht, 6-7. 
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Within the Lombardian kingdom, the king was head of the regular and the judicial 
administration, both within his household and throughout the country. He was the guardian of 
justice and peace and acted as highest court in judicial matters. On the local level (civitas), the 
kings were represented by the dukes as well as by the gastalds. The latter were local 
representatives of the state particularly in the cities but they were also responsible for the 
demesne of the state.36 Initially, dukes and gastalds frequently coexisted in the same cities or 
districts. At a later period, they operated not in the same civitas but in separate districts which 
came to be known as iudicaria. Both kinds of administrative officers were commonly referred 
to as iudices civitatis, which in itself is evidence of the frequent ambiguity of the term iudex in 
early medieval law.37 In the border districts, another order of judge, the so-called sculdais38 , 
seems to have been subordinate to the iudices civitatis. 
Originally, Lombardian judges, like their Visigothian and Burgundian brethren, adjudicated 
without the assistance of law-speakers drawn from the local community. Apparently this 
changed after the Frankish conquest of the Lombard kingdom (773-774), which resulted in an 
adoption of certain typically Frankian concepts.39 The Lombardian kingdom became an 
important sub-kingdom (regna) of the Frankish empire, administered by Pippin, a son of a 
Charlemagne.4o The duces were replaced by the Frankish counts. The kingdom was divided p 
into counties, which came to be congruent with the various Italian ecclesiastical dioceses. In e 
addition, the Frankish missi supervised, and frequently presided at, the local courts. We also e 
have evidence of the introduction of the scabini, an indication that a bipartite system prevailed n 
in Italy from the ninth century onwards.41 In turn, the sculdahes sooner or later disappeared or a 
lost their jurisdiction. c 
36 Wickham, Early Medieval Italy, 51 and 159. 
37 Wickham, Early Medievalltaly, 39 emphasizes this point when he refers to the central (royal) administration of the state 
at Pavia: "The maiordomus...had public duties, both household and administrative .. . but also functioned at least partly as 
royal representatives in the rest of ltaly ... They heard troublesome court cases in the provinces .. . The judicial functions make 
it difficult to disentangle their separate tasks, and the palace officials, like the dukes and gastalds in the provinces, are all 
often caned iudices." 
38 Ibid. 41-42. 
39 See Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, 54-55 . 
40 From 774 A.D., the Frankian monarchs carried the title Rex Francorum et Langobardorum. 
41 Wickham, Early Medieval Italy, 48 and 53; McKitterick, Carolingians, 96. 
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As has been said, a prominent feature of the early system of administration of justice was the 
ambiguity of the term iudex. The courts were presided over by men of some local standing, 
generally members of the gentry. Frequently these boni homines had other, so to say, purely 
administrative offices thrust upon them. This is particularly evident as regards the counts, who 
received dues and tolls, levied military forces and supervised the upkeep of roads, bridges or 
public buildings.42 The counts, acting in purely administrative functions, were also referred to 
as iudices. Further, it is obvious that early medieval judicial officers were simply lay judges. 
They did not receive a professional legal education, and were made eligible for judicial office 
purely by their social standing. These boni homines were expected to show the virtues of the 
ideal judge: veracity, impartiality, wisdom and incorruptibility. Decisions had to be pleasing 
to God, since God himself was to judge the judges on the day of the Last Judgement. Clearly, 
these expectations were based upon Christian influences. 
As will be seen, these moral expectations based upon the Christian doctrine of salvation in a 
sense complemented the disciplinary function of judicial liability. A further means of control 
emerged in the judicial oath or written declarations. From the days of the Carolingians, the 
oath of fidelity, which was obligatory for all citizens, was considered insufficient to ensure the 
proper administration of justice by the judges.43 The Lombardian king Ratchis had already 
expected from his judges a pledge to hold court personally, to apply the law in a fair and 
equitable manner and not to accept any gifts. In 829 A.D., an instruction to the Carolingian 
missi advised the removal of incompetent scabini and the appointment of new ones after 
approval by the local community. Thereafter, the new scabini had to swear not to propose any 
deliberate misjudgements.44 
42 McKitterick, Carolingians, 88. 

43 Generally with regard to the Carolingian oath of fidelity see ibid. at 88-89 . 

44 Schmitt-Weigand, Rechlspflegedelikte, 99. 
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3 	 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF DELICT AS A BACKGROUND TO JUDICIAL 
LIABllJTY 
The vulgarisation of the law and the closely related decline of scientific knowledge also 
affected provisions regarding judicial liability. It is generally in the nature of the vulgarised 
legal material on which some of the leges barbarorum were based that no reference 
whatsoever was made to classical sources of Roman judicial liability, leave alone those 
passages that appeared only from 530 A.D. in Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis. Consequently, 
we need not enquire into the role of judicial liability within the category of quasi-delicts in 
early medieval law: western Roman vulgar law never accepted the considerably refined 
category of quasi-delicts.45 
Furthermore, early medieval law did not separate the criminal, civil and even disciplinary 
liabilities of judges properly, as had sometimes been the case in Roman law.46 The most 
significant reason for this development, besides the effects of vulgarisation, was the influence 
of the so-called system of compository fines which prevailed in most of the leges. According 
to this concept, if a court was convinced of the guilt of the accused and did not apply the death 
penalty, the culprit had to be sentenced to the payment of a fine. The court had no discretion 
in deciding the amount. It was bound by elaborate tariffs included in the various leges which 
regulated the fines applicable for every single kind of wrongdoing. Two thirds of this sum 
(compositio) was bestowed on the injured party and one third (fredus) on the iudex involved.47 
The compository fines operated as remedies to buy peace in the literal meaning of the word. It 
stood in contrast to the common reaction to an offence, namely the private vengeance of the 
victim and his clan. 
Typically for a comparably unadvanced legal system, the lack of trade and the absence of a 
market based upon the exchange of money - as well as the fact that society was a 
conglomerate of clans rather than a territorial state - made it virtually superfluous to develop a 
refined system of contractual and delictual obligations as forms of civil liability, and to 
45 Levy, Vulgarrecht, 341: "Diese Kategorie [of quasi-delicts] ist dem Vulgarrecht, wie zu erwarten , uberhaupt nlcht 
geldufig·" 
46 See above at chapter II 5. 

47 For the system of compository fines generally, see Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System , 35 I -354; Kroeschell, 











separate these from criminal liability. If there was no death penalty, criminal punishment as 
well as civil compensation culminated in a single monetary fine. This fine was composite in 
that the impairment of the legal order and the encroachment on the economic interests of the 
individual had not yet been separated.48 Thus, wherever the following passages touch upon 
fines payable by a judge to an injured party, one should not lose sight of the fact that this fine 
was not identical with pure civil compensation. Compensation for judicial wrongdoing in 
early medieval law was, rather, part of a hotchpotch of offences which are regarded separately 
today as crimes, delicts or even breaches of contract. 
It is interesting that, compared to the fines that were payable in cases of physical injury or 
theft, the fines for judicial wrongdoings tended to remain at the lower end of the spectrum.49 
Only at a later point of the development is it evident that certain leges removed civil 
compensation from the fine and thus developed a somewhat separate concept of pure civil 
liability of judges, a development of particular importance to our subject.5o The system of 
composite fines in early medieval law and the branching off from civil compensation was 
almost identical with the development of Roman law. There, too, punishment initially entailed 
the infliction of an evil (killing or bodily injury) on the wrongdoer, which expiated the 
wrongful act and gave satisfaction to the victim. Later, money compensation was introduced. 
At first, this was only the voluntary redemption of ancient vengeance; in later times it 
continued to exist as the sole form of punishment under private law and became an obligation 
imposed on the wrongdoer. 51 
48 Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspjlegedelikte, 132: "Die BujJe hat vielmehr einen gemischten Charakter. da die im Unrecht 
liegende Storung ckr Rechtsordnung und die Beeintrdchligung der Vermogensinteressen noch nicht abstrakt getrennt sind 
und daher auch keine Trennung der sich aus dem Unrecht ergebenden RechtsJolgen vollzogen ist. Die BujJe isl sowohl 
PrivatstraJe ... als auch die Summe for den Ersatz des Schadens." 
49 Ibid. at 42 and 127. 
50 Ibid. at 133: "In einem jiingeren Entwicklungsstadium verselbstdndigt sich auch die Schadensersatzquote. nachdem sie 
lange mit dem Strafanreil zusammen in der BujJe enthalten war." 
51 Kaser, RPL, 166-168, 182-184 and 249; Van Zyl, Roman Private Law, 330-33[; Wesel , Geschichle des Rechls, 181: 
"Hier [in the Law of Delict] nimml das staatliche Rechl seinen Ausgang. zundchst immer in ungelrennrer Einheil von 




4 JUDICIAL LIABILITY FOR WRONG JUDGEMENTS AND DENIAL OF JUSTICE 
Provisions for judicial wrongdoing that emerge from the early medieval sources are mainly of 
two types: denial ofjustice and wrong judgements. Wrong judgements - non secundum legem 
iudicare - implied two things: the misapplication of a relevant regulation of the lex by the 
judge and, additionally, infringement of the general postulates of justice. In the light of the 
strict formalism that prevailed in early medieval law, it is obvious that a wrong judgement lay 
wherever the judge or the rachinburgii decided contrary to the written law. Generally, judges 
could not exercise any discretion; only the legally more advanced Lombardians recognised 
discretionary decisions. A case had to be referred to the king whenever a question of law arose 
that was not resolved by the lex.52 
From the Visigothian Breviarium Alarici, it appears that judges were obliged to know and 
respect the law:53 "Perpensas serenitatis nostrae longa deliberatione constitutiones nee 
ignorare quemquam nee dissimulare permittimus.,,54 This was more than a mere technicality. 
A few passages later, the Breviarium ordered that judges who disregarded prescripts had to 
face punishment: "Multabuntur iudices, qui rescripta contempserint aut distulerint.,,55 Civil 
sanctions against judges receded into the background, as is colourfully illustrated by a passage 
from the Breviarium, whereby a judge who decided contrary to the laws had to be deported to 
an island. 56 
In various passages, we are confronted with typical instances of judicial wrongdoing. Once 
again reference is made to judges who, owing to partiality towards one party or from 
52 McKitterick, Carolingians, 101: "A count would judge according to a case, consult the codes and see if there was a 
stipulation covering it. If there was not, then he would have to decide by himself to appeal to the king. In other words, the 
law codes are to be understood as working drafts, subject to alteration and addition." 
53 For more details on regulations of judicial liability in the earliest Visigothian codification, see the most recent study by 
Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 515-523. And further, Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, 69-76; Cohn, 
Justizverweigerung, 141-155 (with regard to denial ofjustice). 
54 Lex Roman Visigothorum, C. Theod. 1.1.2 from Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 516 fn30. While researching 
this thesis at the University of Cape Town 1 did not have access to the editions of the various leges. However, I have used 
the rich material provided inter alia by Schmitt-Weigand, Siems, Padoa Schioppa and also Cohn for citation of the primary 
sources. The respective reference will be included at the end of each footnote. 
55 Lex Romana Visigothorum, C. Theod. 1.2.5 from Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 517 fn33. 
56 Sententioe Pauli V.25.4: "Judex, qui contra sacras principum conslitutiones contrave ius publicum, quod apud se 
recitatum est, pronunlial, in insulam deporlatur." From Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 518 fn37. 
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irresponsibility, did not give a hearing to the other party. Quite typically for this early fonn of 
development, judges were ordered to pay a fine at the value of the suit not to the other party, 
but to the state.57 Thus, it appears that the Visigothian kings began to develop an interest in 
the proper administration of justice and secured this interest by means of direct control over 
the judges. In a sense, therefore, one may speak of mixed compository and disciplinary 
liability in early Visigothian law. 
Amazingly, the lex Romana Burgundionum does not deal explicitly with any kind of judicial 
accountability, let alone civil judicial liability. On the other hand, there are some interesting 
references in the lex Burgundionum. Particularly noteworthy is a passage from the so-called 
Prima Constitutio, a preceding procedural manua1.58 Here, for the first time, a clear distinction 
is drawn between instances of wrong judicial decisions on grounds of corruption and on 
grounds of naivety or carelessness (per simplicitatum aut negligentiam). In case of the fonner, 
the judge was sentenced to death; in the latter case, the judge was ordered to pay 30 solidi and 
the case was reheard.59 Unfortunately, it is not possible to verify whether the money was to be 
paid to the king or to the injured party. 
According to a passage from the Lombardian Edictum Rotharis, dukes or iudices who denied 
justice in cases of actions for material restitution had to pay 20 solidi each to the king and the 
plaintiff. In addition, the case remained pending.60 The Lombardian law provided for fairly 
refined distinctions with regard to wrong judicial decisions. In a complementary statute to the 
Edictum, enacted by King Liutprand (712 A.D.-744 A.D.) in the year 721 A.D., it was 
57 Lex Romana Visigothorum , C. Theod. II.1.6 Interpretatio. From Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 519 fn47. 
58 Generally with regard to Burgundian law see Cohn, Justizverweigerung, 104-110; Padoa Schioppa, Ricerche 
Sull'Appello, yoU 127-132; Schmin-Weigand, RechtspjlegedelikJe, 78-81; Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 
527-530; Schmidt-Speicher, Rechtsbeugung, 18-19. 
59 Lex Burgundionum Pr.Const.ll: "Si quis sane iudicum, tam barbarus quam Romanus, per simplicitatem aut 
negligentiam praeventus, forsi/an non ea quae leges continent iudicabit et a corruptione alienus est, XXX solidos se noverit 
solviturum, causa denuo discussis partibus iudicanda." Taken from Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspjlegede/ikte, 81 fn587 , see 
also Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 529 fn 1 00. 
60 Edictum Rotharis 25: "Si quis res suas ab alio in exercitu requisiverit et noluerit illi reddere, tunc ambulit ad ducem; et 
si dux illi aut iudex, qui in loco ordinatus est a rege, veritatem aut iustitiam non servaverit, conponat regi et cui causa est. 
solidos viginti, causa manente." From Schmin-Weigand, Rechtspjlegedelikte, 41 fn298 and also Siems, Bestechliche und 
Ungerechte Richter, 531 fn 112. For more details on judicial liability under Lombardian law see Padoa Schioppa, Ricerche 




accepted for the first time that discretion was an essential aspect of the process of judicial 
decision making. If a judge had decided on the grounds of the written law contra legem, he 
had to pay the king as well as the injured party the above-mentioned sum of 20 solidi each. 
However, if the judge decided wrongly per arbitrium, that is where a pertinent lex was 
missing or, in other words, he had to use his discretion to arrive at a judgement, the judge had 
to take an oath that he had not misapplied the law because of corruption or deliberate 
injustice. 61 This remarkable passage thus re-introduced the notion of culpability, at least in 
instances where the judges had to make discretionary decisions. Negligent misjudgements in 
such instances were dealt with differently from deliberate ones. 
To trace other indications of judicial liability in the leges from the middle of the seventh 
century onwards, we have to turn once again to the Visigoths and their lex Visigothorum, 
which applied to Visigoths and settled Romans alike.62 One passage of the lex is particularly 
interesting because it confirms what was said above with regard to Lombardian law, namely 
that a number of codifications influenced by vulgar Roman law never ceased to accept at least 
some notion of culpability as the base of judicial liability. In one passage it is regulated with 
regard to delay ofjustice that a plaintiff in an action against a judge had to prove the delay as 
well as the judge's fraus. Fraus must be understood as very near in meaning in those days to 
dolus malus.63 The next passage probably contains the text that most resembles post-classical 
Roman law. Here, the legal consequence of judicial wrongdoing is civil liability of the judge 
and the requirement for liability is dolus malus. For cases of denial ofjustice, it was regulated: 
" ...quod si dolo aut calliditate aliqua ad hoc videtur iudex differre negotium, ut una pars aut ambe 
naufragium perferant, quidquid dispendiis super octo dies a die cepte accionis causantes 
pertulerint, reddito sacramento, tatum eis iudex reddere conpellatur.,,64 
61 Liutpr.28: "Si iudex contra legem iudicaverit, conponat solidos quadraginta, medietatem regi et medietatem cuius 

causam fuerit. Et si forsitans iudex causam per arbitrium iudicaverit, et iudicium eius rectum non conparuerit, non sit 

culpavelis nisi preveat sacramentum regi, quod non iniquo animo aut corruptus a premio causam ipsam non iudicassit, 

nisi sic ei legem conparuissit; et sit absolutus. Nam si iurare non presumpserit, conponat ut supra dictum est." From 

Schmitt-Weigand, RechtspjlegedelikJe , 46 fn338 ; Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 533 fn118; Padoa Schioppa, 

Ricerche Sull'Appello, vol.! 153 fn9 . 

62 Enacted during the reign of King Reccesvinth (649-672). For more details see Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte 

Richter, 536-545; Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspjlegedelikle, 66-67. 

63 Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 540; Cohn, Justizverweigerung, 150. 





























A choice text in this respect occurs in the lex Romana Curiensis (late eight century) which 
applied in parts of what is today Switzerland and northern Italy.65 A judge who intentionally 
(aut per neglegenciam aut per dilacionem) denied justice to a party was held personally liable 
for the full damage.66 
In addition, with regard to the determination of the amount payable to the injured party, the lex 
Visigothorum is also comparable with Roman law. Quite remarkably, under Visigothian law, a 
iudex was liable to the injured party in cases of denial ofjudgement or wrong judgement not at 
a fixed composite fine but at the concrete value of the damage suffered by the party through 
the judge's mistake or incompetence. It is obvious that this provision had more of a 
rei persecutory character than the usual fixed fines. 
Ifwe leave aside the classical heritage within the leges barbariorum and turn to the apparently 
more Germanic lex Salica, we find another remarkable source in title 57, which confirms the 
unique role of the rachinburgii within the Frankian administration of justice.67 According to 
this passage, it was not the judge but exclusively the rachinburgii who were subject to 
differentiated liability: in cases of denial ofjudgement, these rachinburgii had to pay a sum of 
3 solidi to the injured party68; where they had adjudicated against the law (non secundum 
legem), they had to pay five times that amount, that is 15 solidi.69 Notably, there was 
apparently no indication of the relevance of any subjective or fault elements in the 
determination of the judges' liability in early Frankian law.7o 
65 See for details Meyer-Marthaler, Romisches Recht in Riitien, 44-50; Soliva, lex Romana Curiensis, 1930-1931 ; Van Zyl, 
Geskiedenis,57-58. 
66 Lex Romana Curiensis 11.6.2: "Si quicumque iudex aut per neglegenciam aut per dilacionem aut per qualemcumque 
premium hominem de sua causa dilataverit ... quidquid ille homo de ipsa causa damnum habuerit omnia de ips ius iudicis 
facultate illi reddatur, qui aput eum iusticiam non potu it invenire." From Cohn, Justizverweigerung, 146. 
67 For more details on judicial liability under the lex Salica see Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 546-547; 
Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspjlegedelikte, 8-14; Schmidt-Speicher, Rechtsbeugung, 16-18; Geffcken, lex Salica, 213-217; 
Cohn, Justizverweigerung, 47-71 . 
68 See Geffcken, lex Salica, 57 or Kroeschell, Rechtsgeschichte, 37: lex Salica T.57 § I: "Quod si illi legem dicere 
noluerint, septem de i{/js rachineburgiis, mallobergo schodo est, ante culcatum solem, CXX denarios quifaciunt solidos III 
singuli culpabiles iudicentur." 
69 Ibid. § 3: "Si vero illi rachineburgii sunt et non secundum legem iudicaverint, is, contra quem sententiam dederint, 
causam suam agat et si eis potuerit adprobare, quod non secundum legem iudicassent, aliis DC denarios qui faciunt 
solidos XV quisque illorum culpabilis iudicetur." 

70 Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikle, 12: "Die BujJen wurden oJJenbar ohne Rucksicht auf den Grund der 

Urteilsverweigerung verwirkt, mochten die Rachimburgen nun in doloser Absicht oder aus Gesetzesunk.enntnis k.ein Urteil 

87 
To tum to the lex Baiuvariorum, once again, owing to the influence of the Visigothian 
codifications, we are faced with more differentiated regulations.7l According to the prevailing 
opinion, in early Bavarian law prior to the integration of the duchy into the Carolingian 
empire, justice was administered by a single judge. Hence the reference in the lex is not to the 
rachinburgii but to a iudex. In cases of wrong judgements given contra legum nostrarum 
statuta, a judge was liable for a sum that made good twice the amount involved in the case he 
had wrongly judged. Again, Bavarian law refers to typical examples of judicial misbehaviour, 
namely to miscarriage of justice due to corruption: Where "Judex si accepta pecunia ...", this 
judge was considered to have acted intentionally72; whereas a wrong decision on the basis of 
an error, per errorem, was invalid and the judge was considered to have acted without fault. In 
modern tenninology, he was, in a sense, justified.73 Unlike the Frankian lex Salica, subjective 
criteria evidently played a role.74 The Bavarian lex extended the Visigothian antecedent in that 
it not only granted to the injured party double compensation but, in addition, imposed on the 
judge an obligation to pay to the state (jiscus) a disciplinary fine of 40 solidi. The Bavarian 
dukes took a serious interest in the proper administration ofjustice. 
Similar regulations can be found in the lex Alamannorum. Liability for wrong judgement lay 
at a fme of 12 solidi. In addition, compensation was payable to the injured party by the judge 
if the latter deliberately misapplied the law, for example, though desire, envy or fear. Whether 
liability was attached to negligent misjudgements remains a matter of doubt. Furthennore, it is 
not entirely clear whether the fine was payable to the state or to the injured party. Civil 
sprechen." And Cohn, Justizverweigerung, 58 observes: "Das Gesetz macht keinen Unterschied bezuglich des Grades der 
Verschuldung der einzelnen Urtheiler ... n. 

71 For details on the Bavarian and Alemanian leges, see Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 551-554; Schmitt­

Weigand, RechJspjlegedelikte, 83-85 and 87-88; Schmidt-Speicher, Rechtsbeugung, 18-19; Brunner, Deutsche 

Rechtsgeschichte, 360-361; Cohn, Justizverweigerung, 155-157. 
72 Lex Baiuvariorum H.17: "Judex si accepta pecunia male iudicaverit, ille qui iniuste aliquid ab eo per sententiam 
iudicantis abstulerit, abalata restituat. Nam iudex perperam iudicaverit, in duplum ei cui damnum intulerat cogatur 
exsolvi, quia ferre sententiam contra legum nostrarum statuta praesumpsit: et in jisco cogatur XL sold persolvere." From 
Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 552 fn185, also Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspjlegedelikte, 88 fn636 . 
73 Lex Baiuvariorum ILI7: "Si vero nec per gratiam nec cupiditatem, sed per errorem iniuste iudicavit, iudicium ipsius in 
quo errasse cognoscitur, non habeat jirmitatem, iudex non vocetur ad culpam." From Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte 
Richter, 552 fn 186; Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspjlegedelikle, 88 fn638 . 
74 This point is made by Schmidt-Speicher, Rechtsbeugung, 18: "Gerade in der Behandlung der Verschuldensfrage 
unterschieden sich die jriinkischen Stiimme von denen der anderen deutschen Stiimme." Schmitt-Weigand, 
Rechtspjlegedelikle, 88: " .. jede bewuftte Rechtsbeugung [sollte) erfaJ3t werden..." 
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compensation covered the actual damage and, unlike the Bavarian lex, lack of knowledge 
apparently was not available to the judge as a defence.75 Once again, both leges contain 
references to some of the typical reasons for judges' misapplication of the law, for example, 
. fi 76COlTIlptlOn or ear. 
The remammg leges enacted during the reign of the Carolingians,77 namely the lex 
Thuringorum, lex Saxonum and particularly the lex Frisionum, do not contain any regulations 
with regard to judicial liability and accountability. The reason for this must be seen in an 
important alternative means of Carolingian administration which at the same time came to the 
fore: the so-called capitularies or royal constitutions.78 The capitularies received their name 
from their arrangement into chapters (capitularia). They were not part of an abstract general 
codification but, rather, single concrete ordinances of the kings. The capitularies symbolised 
the fading within the Frankian monarchy of the persistent spell of the vanished Roman 
Empire, which, as we have seen, continued to affect the administration of the Germanic 
kingdoms up to the early eight century. 
Like their crossing79 of the traditional Roman administrative and cultural border of the Rhine 
for the conquest of the North and East (Friesland, Saxony, Thuringia),80 the ideal of being 
truly Christian rulers who brought to their people the kingdom of God while on earth was a 
new direction in which the Carolingian kings and emperors moved. Charlemagne defined this 
endeavour as the norma rectitudinis, the binding scale of absolute justice and fairness which 
implied a duty to protect the king's poor subjects (pauperes) from his more powerful ones 
75 Lex Alamannorum 41.1: "Si autem per cupidatem aut per invidiam alicuius aut per timorem contra legem iudicaverit, 

cognoscat se deliquisse et J2 solidos sit culpabUis, cui iniuste iudicavit, et quod per ilium damnum passus est inuste, Ule 





76 Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, 88: "Fur die Redalaoren waren eben die Bestechlichkeit die typische Ursache und 





77 Until 711-911 A.D. in Germany and until 987 A.D. in France. 

78 For this form of enactments, see Van Caenegem, Historical Introduction , 21-24; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System , 378 ; 

Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 63-64; Kroeschell, Rechtsgeschichte, 73-77 with further references. For a more detailed account of 

the (comparably advanced) administration of the Carolingian empire see McKitterick, Carolingians, 77-103. 

79 The Carolingians were an Austrasian, that is Germanic, noble family which came to hold the position of maiordomus of 

the Merovingians, who in tum remained more of a Gaulish-Roman dynasty. 

so Kroeschell , Rechtsgeschichte, 71 states that the Rhine: " ... noch lange nach dem Abzug der Romer, ja bis ins Millelalter 

hinein, eine Kulturscheide blieb, und zwar auch in verfassungshistorischer Hinsicht ." 

89 
(potentes).81 This new ideal of the Carolingian kings, as well as their emphasis on 
administrative law, is also evident from the relevant regulations on judicial liability and 
accountability. In fact, what is commonly known as the Carolingian refonn intensively 
focused on the proper administration of justice.82 No longer was the relation between the 
judge and the injured party of crucial importance, but that between the erring judge and the 
king. 83 Thus, a strong disciplinary element was introduced into early medieval Frankian law of 
judicial liability. 
Various capitularies deal in depth with judicial carelessness, partiality and corruption with 
regard to wrong and unfair judgements.84 Judges were supposed to know the law they had to 
apply. Judges had to take an oath before God and his locum tenens on earth, the king, to 
adjudicate in a correct manner according to their (legal) knowledge, without accepting any 
presents.85 These demands document a remarkable ecclesiastical influence, and scholars have 
pointed to both Charlemagne's advisor Alcuin and to St Isidore of Seville as the sources of 
this. enduring influence and inspiration.86 Undoubtedly, the Carolingians increased the 
81 See Kroeschell , Rechtsgeschichte, 75 and Van Caenegem, Historical Introduction, 21; Fouracre points to the influence of 
Alcuin on Charlemagne and states in Carolingian Justice, 778: "It was the ruler 's duty to protect his people as vigorously 
as possible, and ... to lead them to salvation through a constant supervision of their moral life ...". Note also his comments at 
779. 

82 Aspirations and reality of which are the general theme of the excellent contribution by Fouracre, Carolingian Justice, 

quoted extensively throughout this chapter. 

83 Fouracre, Carolingian Justice, says at 779 that when "... legislation came down to specifics, the subject was often the 

conduct of presiding judges." Note further Siems 's comments in Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 559. 

84 See particularly the references in Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 556 fn199 and Fouracre's reference in his 

Carolingian Justice at 779 to the two famous Carolingian reform capitularies, the Admonitio Generalis of 789 and the so­

called Programmatic Capitulary of 802. 

85 Fouracre, Carolingian Justice, 777 states: "The idea of righteous kingship committed to the eradication of corruption 

found clearer expression in the reign of Charlemagne.. . ". And at 779 he remarks that the demands of the kings ".. . boiled 

down to demands that those in the field [of administering justice] act more justly, resist bribery, flattery and perjury and 

defend the churches, the poor, widows and orphans." Note also Hlotharii capitulare missorum, a 832, Cap.lI.202.c.5.p 64: 

"De iudicibus inquiratur, si nobiles et sapientes et Deum timentes constituti sunt; iurent, ut iuxta suam intelligentiam recte 

iudicent et pro muneribus vel humana gratia iustitiam non pervertant nec difJerant et, quod iudicaverint, conjirmare sua 

subscriptione non dissimulent." From Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 556 fn199. 

86 See Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 558; Fouracre, Carolingian Justice, 778-779; Kobler, Bilder, 66 and 























pressure on judges.87 Deficient counts had to be reported to the Emperors, and faced 
admonition and dismissa1.88 
In conclusion, it may be said that early medieval law on judicial liability was characterised by 
three main aspects: 
As distinct from Roman law, civil judicial liability was no longer included in a complex 
system of delictual liability. Frequently, it was blended beyond recognition with criminal or 
disciplinary regulations. It simply became part of an unsystematised catalogue of compository 
fines granted to an injured party. Only sporadically does civil liability in its true sense appear 
from the sources. There was no worked out and underlying theory of causation or fault that 
applied in an abstract and generally applicable manner to the various examples of 
infringements of rights by judges. On the other hand, SUbjective criteria in respect of judicial 
liability did not decline entirely in all leges. Some codifications continued to include 
references to deliberate or intentional acts on the part of the judge, which had to be present 
before liability could arise. Infrequently there were even clear allusions to fraus and acts 
committed dolo malo as well as to negligence. 
Secondly, there is an analogy between the development ofRoman law and the development of 
early medieval law. In both instances89, it was initially the compensation of the injured party 
vis-a-vis the judge that received the main attention. Later, however, a somewhat mixed 
approach appeared. Mainly for policy reasons, judicial liability was retained in Roman law as 
a preventative measure by way of an indirect threat of liability which was easily imposed on 
the judge by an injured party's individual claim. A similar, albeit not identical, concept of an 
anticipated sanction seems to have emerged in the development of medieval law, where there 
were provisions for a fine payable to the state (for instance in the Lombardian and Bavarian 
leges), as well as for dismissal and control of judges (in the Carolingian capitUlaries). The 
conceptual difference from the Roman system lay in that in early medieval law the kings 
could truly avail themselves not only of an indirect control device, but of immediate royal 




88 See Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 558-559, with reference to fnn211 and 212. 

89 It is obvious that one has to be very careful in speaking of a uniform early medieval legal system. At present the term is 





disciplinary powers. 90 It is in this sense that St Isidore of Seville's remark as to the kings' 
generating fear of them applies here. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that early medieval law did not address itself to cases of infringement 
of personality rights by judges. This was probably because Roman vulgar law (from about the 
fourth century) had already lost a fixed concept of iniuria, and iniuriam facere had come to 
mean defamation as well as unjustified damage to property. 91 Apparently, in the rough and 
ready days of the early Middle Ages, the protection of personality was not a flower that could 
flourish within society or in court. 
However interesting these early medieval regulations may appear, they left hardly any traces 
in the further development of the concept of judicial liability. The general pattern of 
development of the ius commune in the legal orders of continental Europe from the eleventh 
century onwards, which were based predominantly on either the incorporation of Roman law 
as it was cast by Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis or on the emerging principles of canon law, 
makes it apparent that the simplistic or even archaic early medieval leges had to pale into 
insignificance before more advanced systems or schools of thought. 
5 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS AND THEIR PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The above categories of pure as well as mixed fOIms of civil judicial liability in early 
medieval law provide us with some theoretical knowledge. But what were the practical 
implications of judicial liability in early medieval law? How and at which court could an 
aggrieved party sue a judge? What were the chances of obtaining judgement against a judge or 
the law-speakers? Finally, what was the connection between judicial liability and the 
possibility of appeal, if such a concept existed? 
90 Siems, Bestechliche und Ungerechte Richter, 559 says: "Man setzt nicht auf nachtragliche Sanktionen, sondern auf 

Vorwirkung durch Vorgabe von Maflstaben, Oberwachung, Druck und letztlich sagar Austausch der Funktionstrager." 

However, Schmidt-Speicher, Rechtsbeugung at 17, remains sceptical. For the development in Roman law see above text at 

chapter 1I 2 3 fn J76-179. 






















The crucial effect of the development of a comprehensive appellate system on judicial liability 
in Roman law has been described in the previous chapter. It has been stressed, further, that the 
aspect of appeal is of particular importance throughout the entire historical development of 
judicial liability. Under the Roman fonnulary system, judicial hability was necessary to 
mitigate the consequences of the lack of any system of appeal.92 Similarly, under the early 
medieval legal systems, a party who felt primarily aggrieved by a judge or a court had no 
access to appeal in the ordinary sense to a higher COurt.93 The sole possibility for a party to 
challenge the proposal or the final judgement was submission of a counter-proposal. The 
Frankians referred to this as the Schelte (scolding ofajudgement).94 
That the challenging of a judgement or a proposal bears only a slight resemblance to an 
ordinary appeal is clear from its immediate outcome in those none too gentle days, namely a 
serious attack on the integrity of the judge or the proposers of the judgement. In other words, 
the Schelte in itself was a delict and gave ground to an entirely new dispute. In the earliest 
days, particularly in Frankia, this dispute was decided instantly before the court by means of 
fonnal evidence. The burden of proof was entrusted to the challenger. However, the modes of 
evidence in those days cannot be compared with today's. There were only irrational modes of 
leading evidence in cases of Schelte, for instance by oath and so-called oath-helpers or by 
ordeal, i.e., drawing lots or engaging in judicial battle, the iudicium Dei par excellence. If the 
plaintiff failed to win the battle, the judgement apparently was considered just and right and 
the plaintiff himself would have committed a serious offence which made him liable to the 
judge or the proposers.95 
However, during the reign of the Carolingians, the Schelte to some extent was supplemented 
by the possibility of a complaint to the curia regis. Aggrieved parties had the option of 
demanding an instant trial by battle or of petitioning the king to inquire into the challenged 
decision. Like the initial concept, however, this new opportunity remained a delict in its own 
right. It is interesting to note that this general principle is also evident from legal systems other 
than the Frankian, even where a challenge did not necessarily lead to trial by battle. According 
92 See above text at chapter II 2 2 fn 116-124. 

93 For the following section see the detailed presentation by Schmitt-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikte, 134-143. 

94 Weitzel, Gerichtsverfahren, 1335, Kaufmann, Urteilsschelte, 620. 

95 Kobler, Bilder, 81 and Bartlett, Trial by Fire and Water, 105-108 but see also 114-J 16. 

93 
to the Visigothian leges, if a complaint was not upheld by the king, the complainant was 
obliged to pay a fine of the amount in dispute, or, in cases of insolvency, was subject to 100 
lashes. In Alemanian law, the unsuccessful complainant at the court of the duke was sentenced 
to a fine payable to the aggrieved judge. Lombardian judges were paid by the appealing party 
a fine of 20 solidi that was imposed when the king decided that a challenged judgement had 
been in accordance with the law. Together with the more drastic early Frankian regulations, all 
these provisions have in common that unsuccessful challenges of judgement immediately 
amounted to delicts in their own right and led to liability of the complainant, notably at the 
same amount the judges had to pay for misjudgements. Unsuccessful appeals and 
misjudgements, to use a pictorial expression, related to each other like a mirror image. 
The fact that the amount of the fine payable by both the judge in a case of a misjudgement, or 
by the parties in a case of unfounded challenge of judgement was identical in most of the 
leges leads to the conclusion that the procedure for compensation or a fine probably derived 
from the tribes' earlier regulations with regard to the Schelte before the king or the duke. For 
instance, according to the lex Salica, an unsuccessful party did not receive a fine of 15 solidi 
but was liable for exactly that sum to any of the rachinburgii whose proposal he had 
challenged.96 In the days of the lex Alamannorum, a party had to pay a fine of 12 solidi to the 
judge whose judgement was upheld, and the same used to apply in Lombardian law where 
half of the fine of 40 solidi was given either to the judge or to the complainant, depending on 
the final judgement of the king.97 And under the lex Visigothorum, the losing party was 
obliged to pay the judge the value of the case at dispute as a fine, the same consequence being 
imposed on a judge for misjudgement. Only the alternative of corporal punishment was more 
severe for the unsuccessful party, who received 100 lashes compared to a mere 50 lashes 
inflicted on the judge.98 
In the light of the fact that a complainant ran a high risk of having imposed upon him exactly 
the same fme he expected to have imposed on the judge, the question arises to what extent 
judicial liability was only a theoretical postulate in those days. It is self-evident that a 
complainant had to be very sure of his grounds before challenging a judicial decision. 
Meanwhile, it must not be overlooked that under the earlier leges, especially in Frankian and 
96 Above text at 4 fu69. 
97 Above text at 4 fun 60 and75. 
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Lombardian law, the counts responsible locally became the judges of the folks' courts. 
Undoubtedly, they were very influential and wealthy local figures and it was exactly that 
position of power that had led to their selection. In addition, there were many counties which 
did not see their kings for decades, and even the Carolingian royal missi frequently were not 
seen for months. Thus, it seems quite unlikely that there were many pauperes in the early 
Middle Ages who seriously tried to bring the judicial errors of the local courts before the king, 
leave alone the option of trial by battle. In this regard, Paul Fouracre referred to the problem 
of how to "...distrain the well-off, and to bring the powerful to justice ...".99 However, the 
procedure might have been of practical importance where the complainant enjoyed a similar 
social status to that of the count or the scabini.100 
98 Above text at 4 fn62 et seqq. 
99 Carolingian Justice, 798. 
100 Schmin-Weigand, Rechtspflegedelikle, 142 observes: " ...dafJ die Praxis desfruhen Miltelalters in vielen Punlaen anders 
ausgesehen haben wird. .. und das der Kampf ums Rechl fur den weniger Mdchligeren vermutlich sehr muhselig und 
erfolglos gewesen isl." This point is also stressed by Fouracre, Carolingian Justice, 790-791 who states: "What all these 
people [those involved in the fair administration of justice] ... had in common with the counts was a certain degree of social 
privilege which was at least in part derived from their role in the judicial process, and which meant that it would be difficult 
to bring them to justice." 
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"Et in iudieialibus iudex negligens Jaeere 
iustitiam delinquit in Deum, el in prineipem, et 
inpartem." 
(Paridis de Puteo) 
IV LATE MEDIEVAL ITALIAN LAW 
THE POSITION AND STATUS OF JUDGES IN THE MEDIEVAL ITALIAN 
ADMIl\ITSTRATION OF mSTICE 
11 Introduction 
With respect to the Middle Ages J M Kelly has aptly said: 
"By 1100 the era of Germanic migration, understood in the widest sense to include the adventures 
of the Vikings and Normans which came long after the fall of the Western Roman empire, was 
more or less over. The waves had reached almost the last recesses of the shore ... Something like 
European stability, at any rate in comparison with the 'Dark Ages', was in sight.,,2 
Europe's population, trade and economy began to grow. The most remarkable regions in this 
process were undoubtedly northern Italy and Flanders, both of which will have our attention in 
this chapter and the next.3 In Italy, where the classical Roman urban traditions had never died, 
the highest standard of urbanisation was reached in the north, particularly in Lombardy and 
Tuscany. 
T B Macaulay once wrote: 
"During the gloomy and disastrous centuries which followed the downfall of the Roman Empire 
Italy had preserved, in a far greater degree than any other part of Western Europe, the traces of 
ancient civilisation. The night which descended on her was the night of an Arctic summer. The 
dawn began to reappear before the last reflection of the preceding sunset had faded from the 
horizon. It was in the time of the French Merovingians and of the Saxon Heptarchy that ignorance 
and ferocity seemed to have done their worst. Yet even then the Neapolitan provinces, recognising 
)De Puteo, De Syndieatu. 563 n.6. 
2 Kelly, Western Legal Theory, 114. 
) For a noteworthy approach to trace the common roots of particularly Italian and Flemish Renaissance in the field of 
history of art see Castelfranchi Vegas, Italien und Flandern . 
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the authority of the Eastern Empire, preserved something of Eastern lmowledge and refinement. 
Rome, protected by the sacred character of her Pontiffs, enjoyed at least comparative security and 
repose. Even in those regions where the sanguinary Lombards had fixed monarchy, there was 
incomparably more of wealth, of information, of physical comfort, and of social order, than could 
be found in Gaul, Britain, or Germany.,,4 
From Italy and her preserved urban civilisation intellectual rebirth spread to other parts of 
Europe, later becoming the momentum for the Renaissance in its true sense.5 It was also Italy 
that provided for a change from a closed and essentially agricultural manorial economy to a 
market economy. International commerce and trade, enormous circulation of capital and 
increasingly refined banking began to characterise business in the influential northern Italian 
cities of Milan, Venice, Florence, Genoa, Pisa and others.6 
These cities, which are commonly described as city republics (although one may not draw too 
broad a comparison with the characteristics of modern republics), were ruled and controlled 
by a relatively developed and effective central administration. In other words, the Italian cities 
became the forerunner of politico-systematic changes that were to sweep through Europe: the 
emergence of the sovereign and centralised territorial state which in due course replaced the 
traditional feudal order of the fragile Germanic kingdoms, where monarchs in constant fear of 
too powerful local rulers had to maintain a perpetual circuit of their territories in order to 
secure their authority, and where there was relatively little organisation, centralisation, 
accountability and public mindedness. It is evident that it was the unsatisfactory state of feudal 
society that ultimately forced the emergence of the Italian communes as political 
heavyweights. The kings and their feudal potentates barely managed to control upper Italy. 
There was no co-ordination and no shaping policy, and central administration was an illusion. 
In practice, real authority in northern Italy was local authority.7 
4 Macaulay, Machiavelli, 66-67. 
5 A very interesting model of the general process of assimilation of classical culture in medieval Europe has been suggested 
by Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant, I et seqq. Mandonnet distinguishes three different phases: the first is based more on 
social aspects during the early Middle Ages, when the remaining Roman institutions were eagerly revived by some of the 
monarchs of that period, as the whole movement of the renavatio imperii makes particularly evident. A second, more 
scientific phase, took place in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, namely widespread acceptance of Greek philosophy and 
natural sciences as well as the revival of jurisprudence, most noteworthy in Italy. Finally, there is the phase Mandonnet 
describes as the aesthetical, from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, when classical styles of art, architecture or literature 
were widely adopted. This period is the one we describe as the Renaissance. 
6 The earliest banks in the modem sense were founded as early as the twelfth century at Genoa and Venice. See Hahlo and 
Kahn, Legal System , 467. Generally with regard to the economic revival that commenced from the tenth century see 
Martines, Power and imagination, 9-12 and the compendium by Piergiovanni , Growth ofthe Bank. 





















In the legal sphere, too, Italy set the scene for the revival of more refined concepts than in 
Germanic law, although the latter had been enriched to some degree by Roman vulgar law. 
The first law school, subsequently followed by numerous others, emerged at Bologna, around 
1100 AD, under the leadership of a man named Irnerius. He and his followers, the so-called 
quattuor doctores and their students, pioneered the study of the Digest of Justinian, which 
carried the wealth of classical Roman legal authority which had been lost in the mist of the 
'Dark Ages' for more than 500 years. With the other three parts of his compilation, Justinian's 
Corpus Juris Civilis as it now came to be known, received intense attention from scholars, as 
well as from the emperors, the popes and the trading community in the Italian cities. Each of 
these parties evoked the authority of the recovered Roman law for their individual legal, 
political or economic purposes. 
The sophistication of its legal material made Roman law particularly suitable to meet the scale 
of new demands. Thus, it was first the school of the Glossators (c. 11 00-c.1250) and later that 
of the Commentators (c.1250-c.1400), that established Roman law " ... as the supreme 
expression of legal and political reason, and set its course which would lead to its reception 
into, and fusion with, the relatively less sophisticated native systems of the medieval 
states...".8 Of this process, the later course of development in the Netherlands is another 
excellent example. 
The rebirth of Roman legal science had, among other effects, a direct influence on the 
development of the Italian judiciary.9 Initially, the teaching of Roman law at the universities 
provoked a revolutionary form of systematic legal training. In due course, the rising Italian 
cities were supplied with lawyers trained and highly skilled in Roman law who could serve as 
judges, notaries, advocates or officials, replacing the traditional laymen. JO Not only did the 
personal experience change, but also the institutions that administered justice. Soon most of 
the multi-member courts of the type organised during the early Middle Ages, whose members 
were typically laymen, were replaced by small and comparatively efficient courts of 
fi I ' dges. II.pro eSSlOna JU 
S Kelly, Western Legal Theory, 122. 

9 Drawn from the title of Engelmann 's work Die Wiedergeburt der rijmischen Rechtskultur in Italien . 

10 Dawson, Oracles, 124-125. For details see below at 1 4. 

II Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 53; Classen , Richterstand, 72; Dawson, Oracles, 131 with further references at fn9 . 
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Finally, judicial accountability and liability came to be dogmatically keyed into the relevant 
principles of post-classical Roman law of judicial liability. Meanwhile, certain aspects of 
medieval law clearly went beyond and modified the Roman concept of judicial liability, the 
most important being the emergence of so-called syndication, a procedure in every respect 
extraordinary for an action against ajudge. 
12 The system of administration of justice and relevant factors in its formation 
It is practically impossible to refer to a uniform system of administration of justice in Italy in 
the High Middle Ages. For the purposes of this work, the most relevant developments took 
place in the northern Italian city republics. It is desirable, hence, to concentrate on the 
developments in this area. Italy itself was split into three major regions: the Norman south, the 
Pontifical State in central Italy and the north which, from the eleventh century onwards, 
resembled increasingly a checkerboard of self-willed cities and the territories belonging to 
them and of the numerous territories under the control of episcopal or feudal potentates. In 
theory, at least, they all were subject to the bearers of the Italian crown, the German emperors. 
In practice, Italy was nothing more than a geographic expression - the Italian peninSUla. 12 
The economically booming cities of the north soon emerged as political strongholds. The 
movement in favour of self-government resulted from growing emancipation of the 
conununes from their feudal municipal rulers. Generally, these were the bishops who had 
already been granted rights by the German emperors prior to the wars of investiture. 13 During 
the fierce investiture controversy, which wholly absorbed papal and imperial resources, the 
cities took advantage of the moment of weakness of both opponents and created their own 
elected and independent self-governing institutions. 14 Professor Lauro Martines neatly 
described this process as follows: 
12 Martines, Power and imagination, 7. 

13 See generally ibid. 12-21. Castagnetti, Mark Verona-Treviso, 32-34 with regard to Verona. 

















"Between about 1080 and 1130, in town after town, the budding commune reached out for more 
and more self-government, using one power against the other, pope against emperor, bishop against 
antibishop, or papists against imperialists. The commune triurnphed.,,15 
This unique process of communal formation was based upon gradual encroachment 
characterised by two distinct approaches: men of rank and property in the city formed 
voluntary associations and then reached out for the political power of the city's ruler or else 
turned the existing associations into citizens' bodies with public jurisdiction. Thus, the 
formation of the Italian communes may properly be described as an act of political and social 
assertion where local leaders - after years of the considerable instability of feudal and papal 
authority16 - were resolved to have self-government. By the end of the twelfth century, 
municipal autonomy had been completely established: the cities' new rulers soon levied taxes, 
organised local police forces, legislated local statutes and administered law, recruited soldiers 
or declared war and peace on behalf of the citizens (pro se et sociis suis) and not in the name 
of the former rulers, i.e., the bishops (pro se et pro domino nostro episcopo). Not de iure but 
certainly de jacto, the cities emerged as independent bodies within the empire. 17 
At first, most of the cities were ruled by the so-called consuies, who were elected for one year 
by the municipal council. 18 Hence, reference is frequently made to the consular commune as 
the early form of city government. 19 The emerging communal constitution may be defined as: 
".. . an association of men bound together by an oath and common interests. They swore to aid and 
to defend one another. They pooled their prestige and their minute jurisdictions ... and they invested 
their consuls ... with executive and judicial powers. The associates - that is, the members of the 
commune - swore to obey and follow the consuls, who in turn swore to defend and uphold the 
association in all its rights and interests.,,20 
Consequently, the consuies held wide legislative, executive and judicial functions. Judicial 
powers, which are of particular interest to us, were frequently vested in the body of consuies 
15 Martines, Political Violence, 340 and Keller, HZ 211 (1970),61. 

16 Martines, Power and Imagination, 18-21. See also Political Violence, 340-342. 

17 Martines, Power and Imagination, 21 states: "Once the commune won recognition, it pressed inexorably for more and 
more power, until it had the bulk of local authority de Jacto , whatever the claims of ceremony and legal theory." Note also 
Martines, Political Violence , 341 and Fried 's comment in his excellent work Juristenstand at 77: "Was der Kaiser J158 
zunlckforderte, halle sich der "populus" Itingst genommen." With regard to the quotes in the text see quotes see Fried, 
Juristensrand at 78. Dilcher, Lombardische Stadtkommune , 170-177 which contains a valuable overview of the usurping of 
the so-called regalia or sovereign rights. 

18 For a detailed description of the consular commune see particularly Martines, Political Violence, 26-29; SbriccoJi's 

enlightening analysis in Justice, 37-44; Fried, Juristenstand, 73-80 (Bologna) and 174-180 (Modena) . 
19 For the origins of the term ' commune' see Hyde, Faction and Civil Strife , 279-283. 
20 Martines, Power and Imagination, 27 . 
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itself, as was the case at Verona, Vercelli, Perugia, Modena (until 1171) or Milan. Thus, 
jurists had to perform both political and judicial tasks?l Generally, the sub-divisions of the 
consulate were staffed by consuls who had been councillors (assessores) of the former courts 
of the bishops or margraves.22 At Milan, apparently, four of these consules iustitiae sat as a 
municipal court with general jurisdiction.23 Similar regulations applied at Verona and 
Vercelli.24 Or, as was the case at Perugia, the consuls sat together with especially appointed 
local professional judges.2s Frequently, however, the body of consules remained an executive 
organ, devoid of any judicial functions, as was the case at Pisa, Parma and Bologna.26 
Professor Classen's discussion of the situation at Pisa includes the example of a body of 
consuls who did not form a consular court but called upon judges to administer justice in the 
name of the city. In the second half of the twelfth century, three courts existed at Pisa, namely 
the curia legis, the curia usus and the curia appellationum. The first court, staffed by three so­
called iudices publici, adjudicated according to written law, which was Langobardian and 
Roman law, and, from 1160, according to the first book of the local statute of Pisa, the 
constitutum legis.27 The five judges (previsores) of the curia usus applied common law, 
which, from 1160, was embodied in the second book of Pisa's statute, the constitutum usus. A 
court of five judges (cognitores), the curia appellationum, functioned as a court of appea1.28 
What is essential to take note of here is that from the end of the eleventh century the early 
medieval bipartite system whereby judges and law-speakers were involved in the process of 
adjudication was replaced by a more advanced system, a system where a single judge or a 
21 All references in what follows to the variety of local statutes issued by the cities have been drawn directly from the works 
of Classen, Kantorowicz, Fried and of course Engelmann. With respect to the consuls see Classen, Richterstand, 47: "Es 
gab also einen vergleichsweise kieinen Kreis von Juristen, der mit sehr groJ3er Kontinuitdt an der Stadtregierung teil 
hat..."; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 53-54; Ficker, Italien, 317-321. For a study of the developments of the Umbrian town of 
Perugia see Blanshei, Perugia, 164-165. With regard to Modena see Fried, Juristenstand, 182. 
22 For example in Pisa. See Classen, Burgundio, 16. Fried, Juristenstand, with regard to Bologna, 78. See also Engelmann, 
Wiedergeburt, 54, Ficker, Italien, 316-3 17. 

23 Classen, Richterstand, 46. 

24 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 54. 

25 Maire Vigueur, Justice et Politique, 314. 

26 Classen, Richterstand, 68-75; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 54; Ficker, Italien, 316-317; Martines, Power and Imagination , 

29; Fried, Juristenstand, 80: "Nach 1150 delegierten die Konsuln in Zivilsachen die Richter, wie sie auch sonst Beamten 

ernannten. " 
27 For details on this remarkable codification see Classen, Richterstand, 82-88 . 
28 Classen, Richterstand, 70-72 the number ofjudges at the various courts, however, was subject to alteration . The numbers 






bench ofjudges was responsible for the entire law suit, including the finding of facts and law, 
that is for the decision as such.29 
After the end of the wars of investiture and the interregnum, the emperors from the house of 
Hohenstaufen temporarily re-established the long-lost imperial authority in northern and parts 
of central Italy.30 The cities, which in the meantime had become fairly self-confident, made an 
anned bid with considerable success for the preservation of the independence that they often 
enough had secured only by barefaced usurpation. They resisted any pressure to accept the 
emperors' military, political, administrative and fiscal sovereignty. A military conflict raged 
between the cities and the emperor Frederick I Barbarossa from 1162-1177, during which the 
northern Italian cities formed the so-called Lombardian Alliance. Ultimately, the conflict 
brought the cities closer to the papal faction which lived in strict opposition to the detested 
emperor. Those cities and territories Frederick I Barbarossa conquered saw the replacement of 
the traditional consules by so-called foreign podestas who ruled the cities as autocratic 
governors in the name of the emperor.31 Other cities which had been more co-operative and 
did not rebel against the reinstitution of imperial power were granted the right to choose a 
domestic podesta.32 
However, after losing the battle at Legnano (1176), Frederick I Barbarossa had to accept the 
de facto autonomous status of the northern Italian cities in the Peace of Constance (1183).33 
He granted the cities the privileges, inter alia, of unrestricted administration of justice and of 
enacting their own local laws. Consequently, the cities were now empowered to determine 
29 This is stressed by DiJcher, Lombardische Stadtkommune, 173. 

30 For the following see Martines, Power and Imagination, 24-26. 

31 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 54: "In den Suidten wurden vom Kaiser fremde Potestaten (oft deutsche) als Obrigkeit 

eingesetzt, die auch die Justiz unter Beirat der einheimischen Rechtskundigen ausiibten." Seidlmayer, Geschichte ltaNens, 

186: " ... Podesta ... Name und Amt sind urspriinglich staujisch-kaiserlicher Herkunft." Note further Ficker, ltalien, 321-324; 
Fried, Juristenstand, 81-82; Stern, Criminal Law System, 77; Hattenhauer, ERG, 240 and 253 and Martines, Power and 
Imagination, 25, who deals with the podestaral government in more detail at its second stage after the formal recognition of 
the communes' autonomy at the Peace of Constance 1177. 
32 Fried, Juristenstand, 82. 
33 Zorzi, La Justice Penale, 51; Martines, Power and Imagination, 26 states: "The articles of the Peace of Constance 
became the formal foundation of corrununal autonomy, and ever after the freedom of the cities was to be taken back to the 
imperial recognition allegedly contained there." 
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their own administrative, legislative and judicial organs.34 Although a number of cities 
returned to the traditional consular constitution (eg. Bologna 1164-1194), it became obvious 
during the thirteenth century that the majority favoured the podesta constitution. 35 By the 
fourteenth century, there was practically not a single city in northern and central Italy which 
was not administered by a podesta. 36 The reasons for this development are fairly evident in 
light of subsequent political events. 
The communes' consolidation from 1183 onwards soon led to intense rivalries between the 
cities. Their unity in their continuing struggle against Frederick's successors, Henry VI and 
the great Frederick n, was soon severely undermined by their tendency to separatism and 
internal rivalries. Some joined the emperors' faction; others, encouraged by the Pope, 
continued their opposition.37 Or, as Andrea Castagnetti once described it: 
"Verona, loyal to the emperors entered into a pact with Venice against the papal Padua, which was under the 
rule of a reform-conscious bishop, but also against Ravenna and Treviso regardless of the fact that the 
archbishops of the former were partisans of the emperor and that the latter, even though it had a count who 
sided with the church, was loyal to the imperial faction.,,38 
Growing partisanship found expression in two terms: Parte Guelfa (the papal faction and the 
faction of territorial independence from the empire) and the Parte Ghibellina (the imperial 
faction) . These two terms echoed like war cries throughout Italy:39 "Eeclesiam Guelfa nutrit 
pars, Imperiumque Gibellinorum pars seelerata nimis.'.40 
34 Zorzi, La Justice Penale, 5 I states: "Avec La paix de Constance de 1183, Frederic ler avait reconnu aux villes italiennes 
lajuridiction "tam in criminalibus causis quam in pecuniariis [ . .], tam in civitate quam extra civitatem", d'o/;. se serait 
par la suite developpe, de facto, ce ius statuendi qui representa la clefde voute juridique de I 'autonomie politique acquise 
entre-temps par les communes italiennes ... au cours de decennies suivantes, la faible presence imperiale permit aux 
communes de continuer I 'erosion des prerogatives souveraines et de developper une ample autonomie." See also Martines, 
Power and Imagination, 26; Dilcher, Lombardische Stadtkommune, 172. 
35 For Bologna see Fried, Juristenstand, 82. 
36 Zorzi, La Justice Penale, 54; Weber, WirtschaJt und Gesellschaft, 761 states that during the entire thirteenth century 60 
northern Italian communes elected together 5400 podestas. 
37 Martines, Political Violence, 341. 
38 My translation of Castagnetti's work Mark Verona-Treviso, 35. 
39 The label Guelf derives from the word Welfen. The House of Welfen in Germany was antagonistic to the emperors of the 
Hohenstaufen dynasty. For many years their capital was Brunswick. Initially, therefore, it denoted the papal faction. The 
term Ghibelline derives from the town Waiblingen in Swabia nearby of which the Hohenstaufen originated. It indicated the 
imperial faction. For illuminating comments on the conflicts see especially Hyde, Faction and Civil Strife, 293-300. Further 
Seidlmayer, Geschichte ltaliens, 138, Fasoli, Oligarch ie, 17 and Stem, Criminal Law System , 116 









Before long, polarisation gripped the cities themselves and paralysed public life. The cities' 
aristocratic families (nobiles, maiores, potentes), supposedly faithful to the emperors, 
clashed with the middle and lower classes, the so-called popolo, pedites, minores, initially 
organised by neighbourhood societies, later by the influential craft guilds.41 In opposition to 
the aristocrats, the popolo soon identified itself as of the Parte Guelfa. Although the conflict 
continued within the cities, as time passed the classic Guelph-Ghibelline division became too 
narrow to explain the political and social changes in Italy. In internal politics particularl/2 
there is no doubt that the blistering controversies within the communes must be seen against 
the background of a class struggle.43 
Until the popolo arrived on the scene, active citizenship was restricted to those few residents 
who met certain property qualifications, i.e., period of residence as well as social 
connections. Passive citizenship, on the other hand, which above all included full payment of 
taxes and military service, belonged to all residents. Only men with full-fledged citizenship 
were eligible for public office and participation in the communes' political councils. The 
popolo in its struggle against the two most disturbing elements, namely political inequality 
and fiscal injustice, evidently made growing efforts to enter the political scene, to take over 
government, to win representation in the councils, to staff the administration, etc.44 Beyond 
this schism, however, were the divisions of internal partisanship, so that even the craft guilds 
were at loggerheads, not to speak of the rivalries between influential noble families. 45 Soon, 
any election, any political decision, any administrative measure aroused endless feuds of the 
4J For an overview on the various popular organisations see Martines, Power and Imagination, 51-58. FasoJi, Oligarchie, 
16-17. 

42 Hyde, Faction and Civil Strife , 295-297. 

43 It has been a point of intense controversy, especially in the 19605 and 1970s, to what degree the communal age must be 

interpreted as a class struggle. For details and references see inter alia Blanshei, Perugia, 152; Becker, Florence, 237-245; 

Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft states at 761 that the " ... Parteibildung der Guelfen und Ghibellinen war allerdings zum 

Tei! reichspolitisch und sozial bedingt...". See further Sbriccoli, Justice, 42-44; Fried, Juristenstand, 78; Fasoli, Oligarchie , 

12-17. At 20-29 Fasoli provides a very useful overview of developments in practically all the important towns of the Emilia 

Romagna and Piedmont. 

44 See for details Martines' account in Power and imagination, 45-51 , further his Political Violence, 333-340, especially at 

339; Salzer, Signorie, 16-23; Fried, Juristenstand, 76. See also Blanshei, Perugia, 159-162, 17 J-181 and 183-185 with 

respect to the situation at Perugia. 

45 See Blanshel , Perugia , 125-126 who states that civil disorder arose from different sources, the greatest being probably 

".. . the private feuds and vendettas of the noble consorterie .. .". Further Martines, Political Violence, 334-335 . 
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vanous dynasties, families, parties and classes. The SUspIcIons of the losers resulted in 
revolts and counter-revolts. No less a man than the great Dante described the state of his 
beloved Italy in those days in the following words: 
"Italy, slave, home of anguish! Look around ... search, if anywhere is peace! Those who are 
surrounded by one wall and one moat, they slaughter one another in eternal strife .. .".46 
In order to secure, amidst this hate, jealousy, conflict and confusion intra muros, at least some 
degree of administrative impartiality, the towns began to look with favour at the emperor's 
decision to have the cities administered by foreign administrators.47 With regard to the 
situation at Florence, Professor Brucker comments: "All Florentines realised that the survival 
of republican government depended upon the maintenance of a certain type of internal peace 
and harmony.'.48 To accommodate the immediate need to safeguard at least the cities' 
administration and to remove, in particular, the administration of justice from the permanent 
feuds of local partisanship, an extraordinary form of administrative government came to the 
fore in the form of podestaral government.49 The swing from consular to podestaral 
government is evidence of the crucial need for an united authority. This need was obviously 
imposed by increasingly conflicting social forces within the communes and, to a degree, by 
wars with other cities. 50 
46 My translation from Seidlmayer, Geschichte Italiens, 202. 
47 For additional measures to control civil disorder at Perugia see Blanshei, Perugia, 195-198. For Siena see Bowsky, 
Anatomy ofRebellion, 231-233 and 270-272. 
48 Brucker, Florentine Politics, 85. 
49 Kantorowicz, Gandinus, 52: "Die Erscheinung dieser Podestas, die als eine Art politischer Impresarios mit einer von 
ihnen bezahlten, aile Rollen besetzenden und eine Welt fur sich bildenden Truppe zu kurzem Gastspiel von Ort zu Ort das 
Land durchzogen, steht in der Weltgeschichte ohnegleichen do. Sie ist geboren aus der Not der Zeit ... wenigstens 
einigermajJen unparteiische, unbestechliche ... Beamte schafJen zu wollen. Denn keine Stadt durfte hofJen, solche auf dem 
vom HajJ und von der Eifersucht der Parteien, der Geschlechter, der Zunjie und dem Ehrgeiz der einzelnen tief 
durchwuhlten Heimatboden zu jinden." See also Zorzi, La Justice Penale, 54: uLe probleme de I 'ordre public et du 
controle de l'administration de lajusice monopolisa, au cours de la seconde moitie du Xllle siecle. .la querelle politique 
entre groupes de "popolo" etforces aristocratiques." Fried, Juristenstand, 83. 

50 Martines, Power and Imagination, 42; SbriccoIi, Justice, 41-42 and 51-52 who affirms the view that the establishment of 

the podesta fonn of government has to be seen as an outcome of the situation in which the typical city society in conflict 
found itself. Remarkably it is this aspect which is fiercely opposed by Professor Engelmann in his Wiedergeburt at 15-41 
and 53-72. Engelmann insists that it was the Roman legal science of the classical period which was transferred in pure form 
to the Italian city states and it was this 'culture of justice' that gave birth to the advanced system of po des tara I government. 
Criticism followed stante pede of this fairly prejudiced historical view, by inter alia Wieacker, ZjGS 60 (1941), 591-601 





The podesta5J was elected by the city's councilor a special electoral commission and was 
engaged by means of a formal contract for a certain period, usually six months to a year. After 
the termination of the contract, a podesta was not eligible for resumption of office in that city 
for many years and moved on to another city to take on a new office. 52 The podesta had to be 
a foreigner and he was not to have any relatives in town. Usually he was a nobleman. He 
headed the municipal administration; but did not rule the cities politically, a power which 
belonged to the cities' councils acting in co-operation with the podesta. The podesta 
represented the city in its foreign relations, he presided at council meetings, he handled the 
daily affairs of administration, and sometimes even led the military forces at warfare. The 
words of Professor Kantorowicz, borrowing from the world of theatre to describe th~ 
podestas, are unmatched: 
U • •• [Podestas were] like political impresarios who traversed the land for brief guest performances with their 
travelling companies whose existence was born solely from the misery of those days.,,53 
It was not necessary for the podesta to be a trained jurist, but he was required to have 
experience ofpublic life. Officially, he was also in charge of the administration ofjustice. He 
was responsible for the hearing of all appeals. At first instance, however, justice was 
administered by a number of judges who belonged to the podesta's entourage (iudices 
potestatis) and whom he engaged before he commenced his duties and for whom he 
promised to make regular provision. Undoubtedly, the judges were the podesta's most 
important officials. The senior judge regularly functioned as vicar, that is as the podesta's 
51 Other terminology: rectores; in Rome: senatores. It should be noted that the podesta was not the only chief magistrate 
drawn from foreign cities. Larger communes especially had other superior foreign officers who shared administrative 
powers with the podestas on the basis of separate jurisdictions. For instance, at Florence there existed an additional captain 
of the people and an executor. Generally Weber, WirtschaJt und Gesellschaft, 761-762. For developments at Florence see 
Stem, Criminal Law System, 33-40; Martines, Lawyers, 130-133; Kohler, Florentiner Strafrecht, 181-187; for Perugia see 
Blanshei, Perugia, 166. These officers also held judicial jurisdiction. However, for the purposes of this work it is enough to 
concentrate on the podesta. Firstly, it was the podestas who appeared in practically all Italian cities and thus can be seen as 
the generally accepted expression of the underlying concept. Secondly, in cases of deadlock the podesta had precedence 
over all other superior officers (Martines, Lawyers, 133 and Kantorowicz, ZSS (RAJ 44 (1924), 238, Fasoli, O/igarchie, 16­
17). In Perugia in the fourteenth century there appears also a iudex iustitie. Blanshei, Perugia, 168-169 suggests that he was 
very much the successor of the former podesta whose tasks varied only slightly from his. However, the more correct view 
appears to be that of Maire Vigueur, Justice et Po/itique, 316, i.e., that in fact the iudex iustitie acted as the judge of the 
syndicature court who heard all charges against the conduct of the judges while in office. 
52 Zorzi, La Justice Penale, 55 ; Martines, Power and Imagination, 42; Fried, Juristenstand, 83. 
53 My translation from Kantorowicz, Gandinus, 52. For the full quote see above fn49 . 
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deputy. 54 The sphere of jurisdiction of a judge was identical with the jurisdiction of the 
podesta, except that the judge's extended only to one defined segment. The judges were 
allowed to act only where their podesta had jurisdiction. 55 
However, distinctions in legal matters between the podesta and his judges were not easy to 
draw. At Florence, the civil judges had jurisdiction and mixed imperium in civil and mixed 
cases. Mixed imperium was jurisdiction over civil and minor criminal cases. However, 
judges also decided serious criminal cases together with the podesta. They even possessed 
the latter's power of discretion (arbitrium), which meant that the judge himself had 
discretion in proceeding, recognising and punishing. In other words, he, too, could initiate 
inquiry, leave out parts of pending trials or change penalties. The apparent difference was 
that the podesta retained sole imperium as the highest jurisdiction over all civil and criminal 
cases and, despite the judge's right to decide a case legally, the podesta had the exclusive 
right of sovereign sanction, as well as the power to supervise his judges since he was 
generally liable also for their misconduct.56 
The podesta's entourage (familia) was not composed exclusively ofjudges but of a variety of 
other office holders. In addition, he was obliged to furnish a number of knights (miles or 
milites) and mounted equi who were responsible for the local police force; a cadre of notaries 
as lower-grade judicial officers; berroarii or berrovarii as subordinates of the miles; 
bannitores and nuntii who functioned as messengers. Occasionally, the podesta had to 
provide for the executioner and gaoler (custodes carceris or cameris).57 In fact, the podesta 
was obliged to bring along with him all the personnel necessary, from his deputy down to the 
gaoler and the policemen. 
54 Stem, Criminal Law System, 50; Martines, Power and Imagination, 42-44; Blanshei, Perugia, 165-166; Weber, 

Wirtschaft und Gese//schajt, 761-762, Fried, Juristenstand, 84. 

55 Note, however, that it was sometimes difficult to draw a clear line between the foreign iudices potestatis and the local 

iudices communis. The latter also accepted the podesta's authority, but, to complete confusion, only for jurisdictions 

subject to pennanent 're-definition', as appears from Fried, Juristenstand, 84-87. See also text below at fn63 et seqq. 

56 With regard to the relationship between the podesta and his judges at Florence see Stem, Criminal Law System, 51-52. 





57 For details as to Bologna see Kantorowicz, Gandinus, 49-63; for Florence, Stem, Criminal Law System, 47-62, offers 

most detail. Also Kohler, Florentiner Strafrecht, 189-196. Kohler's work is critically reviewed by Stem, Criminal Law 

System, 250-252. Further Dawson, Oracles, 124-125 and 134-135; Kantorowicz, ZSS (RA) 44 (1924), 240-241 and 

Martines, Power and Imagination, 43-44. For a general overview see Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 59-62. 
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The actual number of judges engaged varied according to the needs and regulations of the 
cities' the podesta had contracted with. It ranged between one and eleven. 58 The judges' local 
jurisdiction was regulated extensively by statute law. At Bologna, according to the statutes of 
1250 for instance, a iudex vicarius functioned as the podesta's deputy. There was, further, a 
iudex ad discum aquile for civil law suits; a iudex sindicus who had jurisdiction for any 
wrongdoing committed by officials while in office; a iudex ad discum ursi for execution of 
civil judgements; as well as a iudex ad maleficia who was assigned responsibility for 
criminal law cases. 59 
According to the statutes of Florence of 1415, the podesta had to provide for eleven judges. 
Of these three had to be criminal judges and six civil judges, supplemented by two iudices 
collaterales. These judges were delegated to the six sestieri, the quarters of Florence in those 
days.6o Hence one civil judge had responsibility for one quarter. A criminal judge was in 
charge of two sestieri and a iudex collaterale of three. All judges had to change their 
jurisdiction after three months. In practice, however, it appears that by the time of the early 
fifteenth century, due to the dramatic decrease in the popUlation of Florence, the podesta 
made use of only four judges.61 At Milan, for instance, the statutes of 1351 required the 
podesta to provide for seven judges, of whom two had to be criminal judges, as well as for 
four knights and 24 notaries. At Genoa, according to the statutes of 1363, the podesta was to 
bring only three judges, compared to seven iudices and another seven notaries at Perugia 
(statutes of 1342). Pistoja required the podesta to bring four judges, Brescia six, Parma two, 
Piacenza seven and Lucca and Mantua five judges along with various other personne1.62 
It must be stressed that the courts of these foreign judges formed only one, albeit the most 
important, part of the system of administration of justice in the cities. At Florence, for 
instance, from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, no fewer than 38 different 
courts supplemented the ordinary courts' work. These tribunals had regular jurisdiction in 
matters of self-governing institutions such as the guilds or in cases of mercantile law. There 
58 See Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 59-61; Kohler, Florentiner Strafrecht , 189. 

59 Kantorowicz, Gandinus, 57-58; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 58. 

60 Martines, Power and Imagination, 49 and Lawyers, 133. 

61 Kohler, Florentiner Strafrecht, 189-190; Stem, Criminal Law System , 48-49 and 61 ; Martines, Lawyers, 133. 

62 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 60. 
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existed also a number of ecclesiastical courts since the clergy was subject exclusively to the 
church's jurisdiction.63 Furthermore, communal officials, whose authority derived from the 
executive sector of government, increasingly invaded the traditional courts' jurisdiction.64 
Judges of these courts were not drawn from the podesta's familia, but generally belonged to 
the local guild of judges.65 It appears, thus, that the foreign judges were directly subordinate 
to the podesta and only then to the city of service. This characteristic feature was expressed 
in the common saying that the foreign judge was iudex communis et domini potestatis, as 
opposed to the iudex communis. 66 
Prior to commencement of their office, the judges, together with their podesta and the 
remaining members of the familia, were sworn in. At Florence, for example, this took place at 
a solemn ceremony at the Dome before the 300 members of the concilio generali and the 90 
members of the concilio speciali, the two corporations that assisted the podesta in political 
matters.67 In taking this oath, the judges swore to carry out their duties of office, namely to 
administer justice in an equitable, manner and according to the local statutes, as well as the ius 
commune. They had to show evidence of sufficient legal training, experience and knowledge 
of the relevant laws, and to acknowledge responsibility for syndication that took place at the 
end of their term of office. Faithfulness to these duties of office (fides) was, beyond doubt, 
essential for proper administration of justice, and, as we shall see, any contravention led to 
delictual and criminal liability.68 
However, the traditional podestaral form of government, which was not too dissimilar from 
what preceded it, was destined for only temporary acceptance. From the late fourteenth 
century onwards, it became evident that the popular commune under the now increasingly 
dominant popolo was practically impotent in pacifying the cities. The popolo in opposition 
63 Martines, Lawyers, 133; Stern, Criminal Law System, 40-43 ; Zorzi, La Justice Penale, 54 remarks that: "A I 'epoque 

communale, presque chaque ville eut au moins deux magistratures judicia ires principales [he refers to the podesta and the 

captain of the people), et, autour d 'elles, un ensemble cherent d 'aulres Iribunaux dectoriels (administratijs, corporatijs et 

ecctesiasliques) . " 

64 Stern, Criminal Law System, 40-43; Kantorowicz, ZSS (RA) 44 (1924), 237-238. 

65 With regard to the judges' guilds, see especially the references below I 4 at fu94-96. 

66 Kantorowicz, Gandinus , 55; Fried , Juristenstand, 86 and particularly at 151-157 for the situation at Bologna and 184 and 

186 with regard to Modena. 

67 Stern, Criminal Law System , 74-75 ; Kohler , Florentiner Strafrechl , 183-184, 192. The text of an oath can be found at 

Kantorowicz, Gandinus, 179. 
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was by no means the same as the popolo in victory. While united in opposition to the 
nobiles, the popolo was able to command much wider support, namely by attracting the 
upper middle class, lower middle and lowest class. When the nobiles had been weakened and 
political representation won, the strong guilds saw their primary aim realised and the popolo 
in the narrow sense (senza brache) soon lost their support.69 
It has been indicated above that the emergence of podestaral government is prime evidence 
of the profound and widespread unsteadiness, violence, instability and lawlessness in the 
republican commune.70 The logical consequence of the inability also of the podestaral 
government to maintain internal order in the cities was the rise of strong leaders and their 
clans, the signores, such as the Medici, the Este, the Visconti, the Gonzaga or Carrara. The 
despot was expected to overcome factionalism and anarchy. In fact, not the sole but the 
decisive reason for his rise was that the citizens, particularly the upper middle classes, the 
influential bankers and merchants, were weary of conflict. They wished to have civic peace 
and to pursue their profitable businesses, even at the price of despotism. 
Add to this the increasingly successful efforts of the most powerful and influential cities to 
consolidate their territories at the expense of their weaker neighbours, and renaissance Italy 
emerges on the map: the Kingdom of Naples, the extended Papal State and the Republics of 
Siena, Florence, Lucca, Genoa and Venice as well as the Duchies of Ferrara, Savoy, Milan 
and Mantua which stretched from Tuscany up to Lombardy.7l The rise of the signore meant 
the end of the traditional role of the podesta, best seen in the erosion of the traditional centres 
ofjudicial dispensation, namely the courts of the foreign judges and the appellate function of 
the podesta. 72 The above-mentioned executive commissions and tribunals, which had already 
been endowed with remarkable judicial powers, managed to acquire increased jurisdiction 
from the traditional courts. And it was no longer the podesta, but either the newly formed 
courts ofjustice or the signores personally, who usually heard appeals. 
68 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 363-364. See also below in this chapter at I 3 2; 3 1 and 3 2. 

69 The term senza brache means without trousers and described the lowest members of society. Similarly the so-ca1\ed 





70 Weber, Wirtschafl und GeseilschaJt, 761-762 and see above at fun 45 et seqq. 

71 For a detailed analysis see Martines, Power and Imagination, 66-71 and 94-102; Salzer, Signorie, 20-23. 

72 For the following see Martines, Power and Imagination, 102-108, particularly 106-107 and further Lawyers, 130-142; 

Dean, Criminal Justice , 16-39. At variance is Stem, Criminal Law System, xvii. 
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In some of the cities the podesta was turned into a superior but ordinary administrative 
magistrate, subordinate to the signore, devoid of any judicial functions . In others, the 
podesta 's courts retained full-fledged civil and criminal jurisdiction, but appeals were heard 
by other organs. Often the podesta and the traditional courts lost even their civil jurisdiction 
to new institutions. Generally, the podesta remained a foreigner, elected by the Signore and 
his wilful city council. 
The consequences for the judiciary appear to have been less severe. Although the emergence 
of new jurisdictions filled with local judges drawn from the local guilds diminished the need 
for foreign judges at the traditional courts, the judiciary evidently continued to be much 
needed. By the time of the rise of the signore, the standard of legal learning, as well as the 
requirements that had to be met by prospective judges, had improVed dramatically. Thus, the 
only difference for the judges was the end of constant travelling. Candidates now tried 
increasingly to matriculate in the judges' guilds of their mother cities in order to find an 
appointment at one of the courts reserved for local judges. 
Even though these final developments lasted well into the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, it must be noted that it was at the time of the podestaral government that a refined 
concept of judicial liability was introduced in Italian law. Hence, for the following analysis 
of this development, emphasis will be placed on the pre-signoral period. Moreover, in due 
course, judicial responsibility by means of the syndication procedure was enforced regardless 
of whether the judge was of foreign or local birth. 
1 3 Institutional aspects 
1 3 1 Independence of the judiciary 
Judicial impartiality and independence was secured fundamentally by the requirement that the 
judges, like the podesta, had to be foreigners . This supposedly put an end to any conflict of 
interests within the jUdiciary. Elected local judicial officers did not necessarily have poorer 
legal knowledge than foreigners, but it was almost predictable that they would not remain 





of their legal credentials and, therefore, could easily be made responsible for any errors. 
Moreover, because of their extraneous status, these judges devoted their time and energy 
exclusively to their offices and not to internal feuds. 73 In the interests ofjudicial independence 
and impartiality, judges were not supposed to have any relatives in the town of their service. 
They were not allowed to return for service under a different podesta for a minimum period.74 
Some statutes went as far as to prohibit any socialising with the judges during their term of 
office: "Et teneatur non habere aliquam conversation em cum potestate vel a/iquo de sua 
./ . " 75 amllQ....fi 
According to an order of the council of the Hundred of Florence in 1299, it was regulated that 
neither the podesta nor any member of his familia in cases of illness was allowed to consult 
the same doctor longer than one month.76 Disguised extortion was dealt with by means of a 
general law prohibiting the granting of loans to judges.77 The podesta and his familia usually 
lived together in the podesta's palace, the podesta being permitted to bring his wife and 
children to the town of service.78 Particular importance was attached to statutorily fixed 
salaries. Unlike judges under post-classical Roman law, the judges of the high medieval 
Italian town courts did not receive a share of the court fees. On the contrary, they received a 
fixed monthly salary. This was paid by the podesta, who received a truly princely salary from 
the towns and had to ensure that the various members of hi s familia obtained their share. 
At Bologna, Professor Kantorowicz tells us, according to the statutes of 1253, the podesta 
earned c. lib. 1 900 p.a. In 1294 already, he received approximately lib. 4 800 p.a.79 In 
Florence, the podesta in 1287 received approximately lib. 6 000 p.a., which, according to the 
statutes of 1415, rose to lib. 11 550 p.a.80 The above mentioned annual salary of lib. 4800 at 
Bologna represented approximately 800 times the minimum of those days, which lay at c. lib. 
73 Giuliani and Picardi, Responsabilita del Giudice, 33-34 state: "II sindacalo coslilui un efficace stromenlo per realizzare 
il diritto del cittadino al buon giudice: disinleressalo, compelenle e responsabi/e." See also Stern, Criminal Law System, 6­
8. 
74 Kantorowicz, ZSS (RAJ 44 ( 1924), 23 8 and 250. 
75 Kohler, F/orenliner Sirafrechl, 194. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. at 193; Engelmann, Wiedergeburl, 66-68; Kantorowicz, Gandinus, 52-54; Dawson, Oracles, 134. 
78 Kantorowicz, Gandinus, 52 and 54 and ZSS (RAJ 44 (1924), 241. 
79 Kantorowicz, Gandinus , 51 . 
80 Kohler, Florenliner Sirafrechl, 191; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 70. 
6 p.a. 81 An idea of the immensity of these sums is gained by converting them into today's 
figures. The annual income of a podesta at the end of the thirteenth century at Bologna, would 
equal an overall figure of c. R5 760 000.82 It is fair to assume that a podesta retained about 
half of this salary for himself after paying the members of his familia. In today's figures this 
would amount to a personal income of c. R2 880 000, an amount which made the profession a 
highly lucrative one indeed. Professor Kantorowicz indicates further that a judge at Bologna 
most likely earned approximately lib. 180 p.a., which was still 30 times the minimum of those 
daysY A thirteenth century judge's income would be equivalent to around R216 000 p.a. 
today. 
1 3 2 Threat of removal and accountability 
Even though problems related to this aspect will be discussed in detail below under the rubric 
of procedural aspects ofjudicial liability, a brief overview is needed at this early stage to fully 
appreciate the concept ofjudicial liability in Italian medieval law. 
In essence, it was not possible to remove a judge before his contract expired. However, this 
might have been considered superfluous since reckoning took place at the termination of 
service, anyway. At the end of his term, the departing podesta and his familia, including of 
course the judges, were obliged to remain in the town of service for a period of about three 
weeks. They were subjected to a formal inquiry into their conduct throughout the entire period 
of their service. This came to be known as syndication. 
Syndication had no precedent in Roman or Germanic law and, thus, was an absolutely novel 
approach to judicial liability. 84 It is interesting that, simultaneously, similar concepts appear to 
81 Kantorowicz, Gandinus, 51. A podesta's acknowledgement of receipt of salary can be found at 181-182. 
82 The relative value in Rand was estimated as follows: according to the Handbuch der Dritten Welt , 34 the minimum 
income 1993 in South Africa was at R600 per month, that is R 7 200 p.a. This value has to be multiplied by a factor 800 and 
30, respectively. 
83 Kantorowicz, Gandinus, 57 fn4. 
84 For details on the whole topic of syndication see the standard work by Paris de Puteo (Paridis de Puteo de Napoli), De 
Syndicatu. Further the works by Baldus de Perusio, Tractatus Singularis in Materia Syndicatus; Angelis de Perusio, De 
Syndicatu; Dulceti, De Syndicatu and Cataldini (Cataldinum de Boncompagnis), Tractatus in Materia Syndicatus and 




























have developed in south-eastern France, particularly in the Duchies of Savoy, Geneva, in the 
Dauphine as well as in parts of the Massif Central in central France, and also in Spain where 
it was known as the residencia procedure.85 Like any other official, a judge could be called to 
account for misconduct in office. Besides civil liability, which we will discuss in detail below, 
syndication provided for the institution of a criminal action against the holder of a judicial 
office who conunitted a wrong. 
The idea behind syndication, which was to have a decisive effect on the further development 
of judicial liability, was to ensure strict obedience to the law by the judiciary. Over the period 
of service, the judges had been paid enOTI11OUS salaries by the cities they had contracted with. 
They had been granted extensive rights and had wielded enormous power. Their independence 
and impartiality was secured by severe laws. Their considerable powers were granted purely 
as a desperate effort to guarantee the effective and just administration of justice and to allay 
the hatred and the suspicions that pervaded the towns. However, if the foreign judges did not 
Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 514 et seqq; Giuliani and Picardi, La Responsabilita, 32-37; Dawson, Oracles, 134-138; 
Crescenzi, EG 4 (\983) 383-391; Padoa Schioppa, Ricerche Sull'Appello, vol.II 201 fn16; Schrage, Legal History 17 
(1996) 105; with regard to developments at Florence see Masi, RlSG 1-2 (1930), 43-115 and 331-411; Martines, Lawyers, 
143-145; Stem, Criminal Law System, 137-149. 
85 For details see Leguay, Syndic, 371-372. For the developments in Spain see the work by Bermudez Aznar, Corregidor. 
For a useful overview on the situation at Castile see Elliot, Imperial Spain, 81-87. It is fascinating to see the far reaching 
similarities between the development of the municipalities in Castile in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and that of 
the Italian communes. Castilian cities also were given charters of liberties (jueros) that granted vast areas of communal land 
to the municipalities, as well as rights to form a general assembly (concejo), which initially was staffed by the heads of the 
most influential local families (vecinos) . The vecinos in tum elected the various municipal officials, amongst them ordinary 
administrative officers (regidores) and, of course, a number of judicial officers (alcaldes). Alongside these officials there 
appeared from the fourteenth century onwards a new institution, the so-called corregidor, who came from outside the town 
to supplement the local government officials. Like the early podestas in Italy who were designated by the Hohenstaufer, the 
corregidor was elected by the king. When the Crown in fifteenth-century Castile collapsed, the cities increasingly came 
under pressure from local magnates and competing factions within and were frequently divided by feuds and disorder. 
When Queen Isabel won the crown and moved on to restore the internal order of the towns, the corregidores were the chief 
instrument created to realise her ambitious goal. The corregidores were assigned administrative and judicial duties. They 
had to originate from another city and remained in office only for two years. They were not required to be legally trained; 
hence, they were advised by two alcaldes mayores and assisted by a number of the local judges (alcaldes). However, 
jurisdiction remained with the corregidores. Finally, similar to the podesta, at the termination of his term the corregidor 
was subject to an inquiry into the conduct of his office, the so-called residencia. As a matter of fact the pattern of 
development in Spain might serve as an additional argument to those that have been forwarded (inter alia by Wieacker and 
Genzmer) to counter Engelmann's high flying thesis of a culture of justice which he considered the fountain of the 
podestaral form of government. See above at fn50 . 
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comply with the law, the rules, the duties and the oath that guided their office, they were held 
accountable for any mistake or omission. 
1 4 Professionalism and legal education of judges 
Undoubtedly, judicial knowledge and training improved dramatically during this late medieval 
period. During the early consular commune, based upon the early medieval model, members 
of the local community adjudicated as lay judges.86 Already by the end of the consular 
commune, however, a considerable degree of professionalism had begun to prevail.87 Even 
though judicial functions were still perfonned by citizens of the towns and not yet by 
foreigners, it is evident that local statutes required at least some judges to have some kind of 
legal qualification. 
A good example in this respect is Pisa. Two oaths of office, the so-called brevia consulum of 
the years 1162 and 1164, have been preserved. These brevia regulated in much detail the 
various obligations and duties of the judiciary.88 They also provide a useful overview of the 
judges of the three courts of justice at Pisa. All three judges of the curia legis, at least one 
judge of the curia usus and two judges of the curia appellationum had to be so-called 
legisperiti or legisprudentes. The meaning of the tenn legis peritus is not explained. It 
appears, however, that the legis periti were men who were capable of applying the constitutum 
legis and the legal material contained in this law book, namely Langobardian and Roman law. 
These men (also frequently tenned iurisperiti) had to have some legal qualification to be 
eligible for their high judicial office. In this they were distinguishable from men involved in 
legal matters who had nothing but a superficial knowledge of law, the so-called sapientes.89 
The emergence of the tenns legis perili or iurisperiti indicate the fonnation of a legal 
. 90 pro fieSSlOn. 
86 Engelmann, Wiedergeburl, 53; Giuliani and Picardi, Responsabilila , 32: " ...il giudice communale non era unJunzionario 
di carriera ...". See also above at I 2. 
87 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 341-342. 

88 With regard to these brevia see Classen, Richlersland, 69-70 . 

89 Classen, Richterstand, 72-73 and Burgundio, 16-17; Fried, Jurislensland, 167. 

9Q This is the general theme of Fried 's work Jurislensland. For his own conclusions see especially at 36, 170, 244 and 247­
251 . See further Horn, Soziale Slellung, 129-/36. Only a brief overview can be provided here. 
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The only institutions in the second half of the twelfth century that imparted detailed legal 
knowledge, particularly of Roman law, were the newly founded universities. The pattern of 
development in Pisa is evidence that, from the twelfth century, Italian communes increasingly 
relied on legal professionals for the progressive administration of justice, and that lay judges 
were being driven out of the ranks of the judiciary. It further indicates growing interaction 
between legal education at the universities and the demands of the 'market', especially in the 
northern Italian towns. Fried makes the point that: 
"The arumal appointment of a podesta, the steady increase in communal judicial posts, even more 
so the demands of a society in which one did not enter into a contract or make a will or testament 
without having consulted a jurist, all caused a considerable increase in the demand for (legally) 
trained jurists. ,,91 
Unlike England where the training for the legal profession was taken out of the hands of the 
universities well into the nineteenth century, the Italian (and later other continental European) 
universities became the smithy of legal training.92 
A growing tendency to staff the courts with professional lawyers also appears from the 
statutes of other cities. At Verona in the twelfth century, for example, 8 of the 24 judges had 
to be trained lawyers. At Vercelli, lay judges were only allowed to give judgements by 
consent, or, as was the case in Como, only in cases up to the amount of 100 solidi. 93 Another 
feature of the formation of a legal profession can be seen in that, from the twelfth century, 
only members of the newly emerging local guilds of judges and notaries, the so-called 
societates, collegia, fratalia or artes (entry to which was reserved for trained jurists) became 
91 "Die jiihrliche Berufung eines Podesta, die Zunahme der kommunalen Richterstellen, die Bedurfnisse der gesamten 
Gesellschajt, die keinen Vertrag, kein Rechtsgeschiijt, kein Testament mehr ohne Beisein von "iudices" abschlojJ, erh6hten 
den Bedarfan Juristen." My translation of Fried, Juristenstand, 158. One might add that trained lawyers entered other fields 
besides local/foreign jUdgeships. To name just a few: they became advocates (advocati), notaries, administrative advisors 
(councillors) of their mother towns, were employed on the ruler's curiae or in the service of the church. As advocates and 
notaries, particularly, jurists had an important impact on medieval politics as the wars on investiture or the famous dispute of 
Frederic I Barbarossa and the Italian towns on the occasion of the imperial diet at Roncaglia 1158 show. See Hom, Soziale 
Stellung, 132-134; Fried, Juristenstand, 160. 

92 De Wet, Liability for Wrongful Conduct, 169; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 341; Kantorowicz, ZSS (RAJ 44 (1924), 237­
239. Social consequences of the increased demands of the 'market' are stressed by Hom, Soziale Stellung, 131: "Die 
soziale Geltung der studierten Juristen entfaltet sich in dem MajJ, in dem sich dieser Anspruch verwirklicht, d.h. 
Fachkenntnisse... nachgefragt werden und Amter und oJJenlliche Funkiionen von diesen besetzt werden." With regard to the 
situation in England see Van Caenegem, Historical Introduction, 79 and fnlOS as well as below at chapter VI 1 3. 





eligible for local judicial office:94 "Who was not matriculated from the guilds could not render 
a judgement, nor give a consilia.,,95 Professor Martines refers us to the procedure of 
matriculation of the Modena guild of judges and advocates in the late thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries. After paying his matriculation fee, the applicant was screened by the 
guild consuls and, not more than eight days later, he had to present himself before a board of 
eight judge-lawyers. The applicant was required to bring along the Digest and open the book 
at any page he wished and to discuss the chosen passage with the judges. He passed the 
examination ifhe won all eight votes.96 
The growing appreciation of legal knowledge, training and education in this period is further 
evident from another fact. The term iudex in medieval Italian law, as previously, retained 
some degree of ambiguity.97 Besides its frequent usage to describe the bearer of judicial office 
as such, it was a title, an honour.98 Titles which appear to have been granted, especially in the 
eleventh and early twelfth century, were either the so-called iudices domini imperatoris or 
domini regis, aule regie, aule imperatoris, civitatis as well as iudices sacri Lateranensis 
palatii. Judges were granted these honours regardless of any immediate connection with 
specific judicial offices, by either the emperors or the popes, in recognition of their legal 
abilities and knowledge, which, particularly in comparison with the earlier state of affairs, 
must have been impressive.99 The bearers of these titles could act either as judges or as legal 
advisors to (higher) courts, to the bishops or to the kings. From the second half of the twelfth 
century, however, the meaning of the term iudex again assumed a different nuance: iudices 
were now persons who enjoyed legal training at a law school and who were exclusively 
occupied with the administration ofjustice in the courts. 
94 Generally see ibid. 47-48. For Florence see Stem, Criminal Law System, 53 and most detailed Martines, Lawyers, 26-40. 

For Perugia see Maire Vigueur, Justice et Politique, 325-326 and Blanshei, Perugia, 151 ; for Siena see Bowsky, Anatomy 

of Rebellion, 246-247. For Bologna (societas doctorum, advocatorum et iudicum) and Modena (collegium iudicum et 

advocatorum) see Fried, Juristenstand, 44, 163 and 225 . 

95 My translation from Fried, Juristenstand, 44. 

96 Martines, Lawyers, 32-33 . Further Fried, Juristenstand, 225. 

97 Fried, Juristenstand, 24 states: "Das lateinische Wort "iudex " halle seit romischer Zeit man chen Bedeutungswandel 

erfahren Die hoheren Beamten spdtantiker Zivilverwaltung und die Verwalter des Konigsgutes in karolingischer Zeit 

hiefJen in gleicher Weise "iudex ", hallen aber sonst nicht viele Gemeinsamkeiten und unterschieden sich ebenfalls wieder 

von den "judices " Oberitaliens im 11 . Jahrhundert ." This confirms what has been said in chapter II I 3 fnn88 and 259 and 

chapter III 2 fn37 . 

98 A comprehensive overview is provided by Fried, Juristenstand, 24-36 . 
























Under the emerging podesta constitution, judges were without exception required to be 
trained jurists. In keeping with the improvement and expansion in the education of practising 
jurists at the law schools, the demands placed on the judiciary for legal expertise increased. 
Ultimately it became evident that the smaller communes in particular were unable to provide a 
sufficient number of capable local jurists to staff the courts. And, increasingly, local lay 
judges were unable to match the knowledge of the jurists who appeared before them. It is not 
surprising that the cities took action and required compulsory legal training at an Italian 
university before a judge could be engaged by a podesta. The statutes of Bologna of 1250 
required local jurists to have passed at least five years oflegal studies at a university: 
HE! nul/us possit esse iudex communis nec vocari ad aliquod dandum cons ilium nisi ipse studuerit 
in scolis V ann is in legibus."IOO 
Four years of study were required according to Vicenza's statutes from the year 1264.101 The 
1328 statutes ofModena declared that a judge had to have studied for five years. 102 
A meaningful distinction, however, was made between merely legally trained judges, judges 
who were legal scholars, the so-called doctores, and scholars at law at one of the law schools, 
the so-called doctores actu iegens. 103 For a doctoral degree in civil law, lawyers were required 
to have attended law school for six to nine years and to have passed a certain examination. \04 
To obtain an ordinary law degree, which soon came to be obligatory for a judgeship, it was 
necessary to have studied law for at least five years. lOS In consequence of these requirements, 
legally trained judges were expected to have a command of the legal curriculum taught at any 
university, that is the basic (ordinarie) principles and the general theories of law including the 
Codex and the Digestum vetus. Doctores were expected, beyond the legal basics, to be skilled 
100 Quoted from Hom, Soziale Stel/ung, 135 . 
10 1 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 48; Fried, Juristenstand, 163. 
102 Martines, Lawyers, 33, Fried, Juristenstand, 225 . 
103 With regard to the doctores see Fried's overview at Juristenstand, 9-24. With regard to the doctores actu legem see the 
footnote directly below. 
104 Kantorowicz, ZSS (RAJ 44 (1924), 237; Weimar, Doktor-.viirde, 425-442. Weimar makes the point that, initially, the 
doctoral degree qualified one to lecture at the University of Bologna and was not considered a qualification for a legal 
career outside the university. By the late thirteenth century, however, the University had separated admittance to the college 
of teachers, including venia legendi, from conferral of the doctoral degree. Thereafter, the degree must be considered an 
academic title. See also Fried, Juristenstand, 21 and particularly 22 as well as Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 492 fn47 . 
105 Stem, Criminal Law System, xi and 52-53; Martines, Lawyers, 31 and 33, Fried, Juristenstand, 160 fn20 and 163 . 
118 
in the handling of the (extraordinarie) sources of Roman law, the ius commune, the Gloss and 
the statutes. Later, they were supposed to have knowledge of the communis opinio, as well as 
the principles of interpretation of legal and statutory sources. 106 
At Bologna, for example, the podesta had to provide for three judges Jorenses, legales et 
sapientes atque instructos in iure, Jacto et consuetudine who had practised for a minimum of 
five years. 107 According to the statutes of 1454, of the five judges that were required, at least 
two had to be doctores legum of ten and five years standing, respectively. At Milan, the vicar 
had to be a legum doctor. Similar regulations in other cities, namely Florence, Rome, Perugia, 
Pavia, Bergamo, Genoa, Verona and Orvieto, required the podesta elect to bring with him at 
least one to three doctorati, sufficientes doctorati, bonus jurista de melioribus or legum 
doctores. 108 Here must be noted the important tendency to make distinctions within the 
judiciary according to the expected degree of legal knOWledge. Upon this important 
preliminary question was based the assessment of whether or not a case of breach of duty was 
to be presumed where unambiguous evidence of wrongdoing was lacking, or, in cases of 
imprudentia, at what amount the judge was liable. 109 
The other side of the coin is that, for two reasons, syndication or judicial liability played a 
considerable role in evoking and intensifying further reception of Roman law. llo Firstly, since 
there might be liability for practically every kind of judicial wrongdoing, judges tried to 
escape possible accusation of lack of legal knowledge. Hence, from the twelfth to the 
thirteenth century, they depended largely on the authority of the Glossators, the legal doctors 
and experts of that age, and finally on Accursius' Great Gloss in order to base their 
judgements on recognised principles of law. 1II Consequently, judges, or rather their fear of 
106 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 358-359; Fried, Juristenstand, 225-226. 

107 Ibid. at 60. A remarkable account of both the legal education and professional career of the well known Italian jurist 

Albertus Gandinus is provided by Kantorowicz, ZSS (RAJ 44 (1924), 230. 

108 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 60-62; Stein, RomischEs Recht und Europa, 52-53; Kohler, Florentiner Strafrecht, 189 with 

regard to Florence. 

109 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 345 and 358. See below at 3 I; 3 2 and 3 6 2 for details. 

110 For the following see generally Kelly, Western Legal Theory, 122-123; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 489-496; Van 

Caenegem, Historical Introduction, 47-55; Stein, RbmischEs Recht in Europa, 80-85 and 117-122; De Vos, 

Regsgeskiedenis, 51-62; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 179-186,215-228 and 338; Wesel, Geschichte des Rechts, 311-313. 

J J I Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 192-194 (with respect to the Great Gloss): "Noch viel wirksamer war die umfassende 









































syndication, played a large part in promoting the exaggerated importance given to university 
scholarship. 
As the Great Gloss receded into the past in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, new themes 
and legal problems emerged for the successors of the Glossators, the Commentators. The heart 
of the Commentators' approach was not merely the application of the exegetical method, i.e., 
the assimilation and comprehension of the Corpus Iuris by means of formal logic, but the 
correlation of Roman law with the law of their times, with customary and statutory law and 
even social realities. They adapted the acquired law to the needs of their time and worked out 
doctrines of practical value. They used the former to enrich the other sources of law and thus 
helped it to playa vital role in legal practice. I 12 Soon it was the so-called communis opinio, 
the common opinion, in which inter alia the views of Bartolus and Baldus carried primary 
weight, that took over the authoritative position of the Great Gloss. The extraordinary prestige 
Bartolus carried is well evidenced by the famous jingle: "Nemo romanista nisi bartolista". 
For the constitution of the common opinion it was certainly not necessary for all scholars to 
agree on the point in question. It sufficed that those authors who agreed on it had the greatest 
renown as well as the strongest arguments on their side. It was not merely a counting but a 
weighing of the opinions at stake.l\3 When in doubt, the judges preferred to follow the 
common opinion rather than to stumble into liability for lack of knowledge in following a 
minor opinion, or as Paridis de Puteo once put it: "Et iudex excusatur in syndicatu, si est 
secutus opinionem alicuius Doctoris vel glossatoris, licet faciat iniustitiam.,,114 These 
practical observations indicate that there existed a hierarchy of legal sources in the ius 
commune that the judge was obliged to follow when he was about to decide a legal problem. 
First, he had to check whether or not there was explicit legislation, either in the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis or in statute law. The common opinion of the scholars or doctores was to be followed 
as a guideline where no legislation of any kind applied or had to be interpreted, or where law 




112 Van Caenegem, Historical Introduction, 50; Bahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 493. 

113 Dolezalek, Stare Decisis, 14; Kelly, Western Legal Theory, 122. 

114 De Puteo, De Syndicatu, 552 n.2. Note further Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 222, 228-229 (with respect to the communis 

opinio): "Die Autoritat des beruhmten Namens und der vorherrschenden "communis opinio " mujJte in der Praxis ebenso 







texts did not provide for a solution, so that arguments had to be drawn from analogous legal 
situations. Where no such authority applied, the judge was, so to speak, unbound by authority 
and free to decide for himself 115 
This strong leaning in practice towards the common opinion in turn increased the pressure on 
the law schools to adapt their teaching from exclusive reference to the Great Gloss and led, 
later, to the singling out of the communis opinio. 116 Ultimately, the doctores themselves 
became involved in the process of administration of justice since judges increasingly sought 
their advice (consilia) in difficult or doubtful cases in order to escape liability. To the extent 
that external experts' cons ilia was formally binding on judges, the latter were usually exempt 
from all personal liability. I 17 
In analysing the pattern of development, meanwhile, the fruitful circulation of institutional 
and legal models and the formation of uniform judicial practice in the fields of the ius 
commune and statute law that came in the train of the podestas, their judges and other 
functionaries in their continuously moving up and down town and country should not be 
overlooked. I 18 
The emergence of podestaral government, the acquisition of foreign professional judges by the 
cities, the existence of judicial liability in cases of the slightest culpa and, consequently, the 
growing tendency of judges to follow slavishly the legal authorities are all striking aspects of 
the background to civil judicial liability, which will now be discussed in more detail. 
115 A useful overview is provided by De Puteo, De Syndicatu, 552 n. I-555 n.7; Cataldini, Tractatus in Materia Syndicatus, 

nn. 33-35, n.38 and n.49 . Further note Amodeus, Tractatus Sindicalus, nn.122-123 . 

116 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 178-179: "Das Glossenwerk des Accursius ... hat nicht nur den Rechlsgelehrten eine wertvolle 

Vorarbeil fur die wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis .. . geboten, sondern auch den Rechtslehrern und ihren Schulern .. . die notigen 

Hilfsmittel zum selbstdndigen Gebrauch der Quellen geliefert." Further at 239: ..... beschrdnken die Rechtslehrer ihre 

Ausfuhrungen in den Vorlesungen ...aufdie Wiedergabe von Auj3erungen beruhmter Rechtslehrer und die Festslellung der 

vorherrschenden Meinung ... ". See also his comments at 338. 

117 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 408-415 . 

















2 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF DELICT AS A BACKGROUND TO JUDICIAL 
LIABILITY 
With regard to the applicable principles of delictual liability, the medieval Italian jurists, the 
so-called Glossators and their successors, the Commentators, relied almost entirely on the 
Corpus luris Civilis. Consequently, legal principles derived from Germanic law became 
increasingly irrelevant in Italian legal practice, particularly so with respect to judicial liability. 
None of the above-mentioned Frankian or Langobardian concepts of judicial liability 
succeeded in the long run. 
Although the Italian doctrine made extensive use of the fault requirement, of dolus and culpa, 
this terminology was by no means identical with our modem terminology. Any wilful conduct 
that was directed either at an undutiful or unlawful result was considered as fault at large or 
culpa in a broad sense. In order to stress the uniformity of the fault requirement, Bartolus 
introduced a scheme of five different degrees of culpa in the wider sense, namely culpa 
latissima, culpa latior, culpa lata, culpa levis and culpa levissima. 1l9 The first two were 
indicative of dolus, that is dolus verus and, somewhat more constructively, dolus 
praesumptus, whereas the remaining three indicated culpa in a narrow sense. 
In light of the development of Italian law, it may be said that culpa latissima or dolus verus, 
that is the 'true' dolus, never reached the scope of our modem concept of intention. This is 
true not so much with regard to the direction of the will and consciousness of wrongdoing, but 
as regards the general scope of the term dolus. Dolus remained essentially dolus malus as it 
came to be understood by Justinian. Hence, it indicated particularly reprehensible conduct. It 
was described by a wide range of meanings: as the opposite of bona fides, that is as mala 
fides, as malitia, as animus nocendi or as fraus. 120 It is evident that these meanings of dolus 
correspond only to some extent with our modem concept of intention, which requires a wilful 
and conscious act regardless of the criterion of reprehensibleness. In our modem view, 
fraudulent intent (Arglist) is no longer considered the sole typical appearance of dolus but 
merely the morally most objectionable. 
119 Engelmann, Schuldlehre, 18-19; Wesenberg and Wesener, Privatrechtsgeschichte, 49. 
120 Engelmann, Schuldlehre, 37-38 and Wiedergeburt, 355. 
122 
Further, Italian jurists accepted that dolus required a person's consciousness of the 
unlawfulness of his or her conduct. 121 This is obvious from the use of the tenn mala fides, 
which in those days, as distinct from (for example) modern South African law, indicated not 
merely the motive behind an act but a particularly reprehensible attitude, which undoubtedly 
entailed consciousness of unlawfulness. Paulus Castrensis stated generally in an advice that 
dolus could lie only where someone was actuated by malevolence, not where he was actuated 
by something he consciously considered lawful. 122 Errors as to fact (error facti) as well as to 
law (error iuris) and mere ignorance of law (ignorantia iuris) , consequently, played an 
important role in determining Gudicial) liability for dolus. 123 
Whereas dolus verus remained in substance dolus malus, the category of dolus praesumptus 
must be seen as new. 124 Since it played a considerable role in judicial liability, a brief 
overview is in place. There were two categories of dolus praesumptus, one substantial (dolus 
praesumptive essentialis or dolus ratione essentiae)125 and one fonnal (dolus praesumptive 
probatus or dolus respectu probationis). For the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to describe 
further the fonnal category, which denoted something of a procedural trick to establish dolus, 
an artifice, so to speak, where, for various reasons, dolus could not be ascertained. Hence, the 
object of the fonnal dolus praesumptus was simply to avoid the still frequent deficiencies in 
the law of evidence of those days.126 The underlying idea was that unless evidence to the 
contrary had been established, the judge would assume that the usual course of events had 
taken place (the presumed course of events) and that the person involved had acted with 
dolus. 
Such a presumption shifted the onus of proof to the person against whom the presumption 
operated. The Italian jurists developed three distinct types of formal presumptions: 
121 Engelmann, Schuldlehre, 41-49, Engelmann, Irrtum und Schuld, 250-25J. 
122 Consilia, vol.II c.277 n.4: " ... movetur ad aliquod malum propter solam malignitatem animi, non propter aliquid aluid, 
quod credit esse bonum." 
i23 Engelmann, Irrtum und Schuld, 250-255 and Schuldlehre , 41-49. 
124 For the following see the detailed treatment by Engelmann, Irrtum und Schuld, 56-76, Schuldlehre, 127-135. An useful 
overview is also provided by Pauw, Persoonlikheidskrenking, 48-52. Further Dolezalek, Stare Decisis, J6-17. 
125 The dolus praesumptive essentialis denoted another type of dolus. It was an intermediate form of culpability somewhere 
between the most severe form of dolus, i.e., dolus verus, and the severest form of culpa, i.e. , culpa lata. See Engelmann, 
Schuldlehre, I 29. 



















praesumptiones iuris, praesumptiones necessaria, and praesumptiones iudicis. The so-called 
praesumptiones iuris were regulated by legislation. Judges were obliged to apply them while 
hearing evidence. Such a legislated presumption was considered non-rebuttable and therefore 
it produced a legal fiction. Another type of presumption was the praesumptio iudicis (also 
praesumptio probabilis, facti, hominis, naturae). This presumption was not regulated in 
legislation and it was left to the judge to decide in the circumstances of the case whether there 
was sufficient indication of the existence of dolus. This presumption was rebuttable by the 
defendant when leading evidence to the contrary. It was also acceptable that the defendant, 
against whom the presumption operated, took an oath (iuramentum purgationis).127 A special 
appearance of the praesumptio iudicis can be seen in the presumption of consciousness of 
unlawfulness in cases where all elements of dolus were certain and the defendant's final resort 
to a plea of error iuris appeared to be highly incredible. Here the presumption of 
consciousness of unlawfulness, therefore, led also to a presumption ofdolus. 
To return to the general outline of delictual liability it may be said that, generally, Justinian's 
model structuring the law of obligations, including the various categories of delictual liability, 
was preserved. However, the common opinion apparently favoured a five-fold instead of the 
four-fold scheme that had prevailed in Roman law. It was consisted of contract, delict, quasi­
contract, quasi-delict and variae causarum figurae. 
The actio legis Aquiliae retained its role as delictual action par excellence on the basis of 
liability for dolus and culpa. The actio also retained its characteristic mix of civil 
(reipersecutory) and criminal action. However, there are some indications that the emphasis 
was already being placed increasingly on its reipersecutory aspects. 128 Furthermore, 
distinctions between the initial actio and its extensions, the actiones utiles and actiones in 
factum, slowly began to fade. Initially, the actio remained restricted to liability for direct 
causation of physical damage to a corporeal being. However, with the emergence of the 
doctrine of interesse, the tendency to apply it in addition to cases of direct causation of 
patrimonial loss came to the fore. Indirectly inflicted patrimonial loss remained non 
127 Engelmann, lrrtum und Schuld, 75-76. See also Schmoeckel, Humanitdt und Staatsriison, 201-204 for further details 

and references to primary sources. 

128 Generally with regard to the development of the actio legis Aquiliae in Italian law see Wesenberg and Wesener, 

Privatrechtsgeschichte , 52; Kaufmann, Actio LegiS AquiJiae, 19 and 22; Lange, Schadensersatz und Privatstrafe, 10-13; 






actionable. The actio legis Aquiliae retained some penal consequences, notably litiscrescence. 
Further, the action was passively non transmissible. 129 
The Glossators and their successors also accepted the group of quasi-delicts as an autonomous 
category within the scheme ofobligations. 130 From the sources we can gather that they were at 
pains to explain the underlying denominator of the various quasi-delicts and their relation to 
other grounds of civil liability, an aspect that increasingly irritated jurists. As said elsewhere 
in this thesis, the subjective element of generalised fault remained the basis not only of 
delictual but also of quasi-delictual liability. 131 Italian jurists experienced problems similar to 
those that had already surfaced in Roman law in separating the group of quasi-delicts from 
ordinary delicts in a dogmatically satisfying manner. 
Typically for this age, jurists engaged extensively in explaining the flagrant contradiction of 
the Corpus furis by means of isolated exegesis. Since the Corpus furis Civilis represented the 
highest legal authority, the so-called ratio scripta, the exegesis method was used to prove the 
coherence and ultimately the practical utility of this compilation. 132 Hence, with regard to the 
distinction between delicts and quasi-delicts, the jurists did not focus on generalised answers 
or models. In their casuistic approach, the main attention was given merely to one aspect: the 
distinction between judges' and doctors' liability.133 The jurists of the time asked themselves 
whether or not there existed a dogmatically satisfying explanation for the fact that a doctor 
who operated unskilfully or negligently was liable under the lex Aquilia whereas a negligent 
judge's liability was based merely on quasi-delict. In spite of a number of explanations for this 
lack of consistency, a dogmatically satisfying penetration of the complex relation of delict and 
quasi-delict was not achieved. Not once, as the following overview shows, was the group of 
129 Wesenberg and Wesener, Privatrechtsgeschichte, 52-53; Kaufmann, Actio Legis Aquiliae, 21-22; De Wet, Liability for 

Wrongful Conduct, 172; Kiefer, Aquilische Haftung, 32; Lange, Schadensersatz und Privatstrafe, 153. With regard to 

delictual liability the Italian jurists were detennined to grant not only the interesse circa rem (for direct damages to a thing) 

but also the interesse extra rem which covered all indirect damages. See below at 3 6 1 for details. 

130 Hochstein, Obligationes QuaSi ex Delicto, 37. 

\31 See chapter I1 2 3 1 I at fn 199 and this chapter text before fn 119. 
132 Stein, Romisches in Europa, 80-82; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 489-492; Van Caenegem, Historical Introduction, 
48-49. 























quasi-delicts defined for what it really was, namely a conglomeration of (objectively based) 
instances of strict liability. 134 
Obviously, a differentiation of delicts from quasi-delicts or, casuistically, between the liability 
ofjudges and doctors, could hardly be based on the fault requirement, since in both instances 
liability was based upon negligence. Consequently, the jurists of the time engaged in finding 
alternative criteria. Whereas the Gloss confined itself to a mere comment that liability was: 
"speciale in iudice, aliud in aquilia,,135; Bassianus argued that a difference arose between the 
two in that loss caused merely by words, as in the case of a judge was less serious than when 
caused by a person's act, as in the case of a doctor. 136 Bassianus's pupil, Azo, proposed that a 
judge's simple decision was not yet a maleficium. However, a doctor's simple secare sufficed 
to commit a delict. Only male iudicare could bring about a judge's liability.137 Hence, the 
former amounted to a true delict and the latter was classified as a quasi-delict. 
Bartolus, who also accepted the fault requirement as the general basis of both quasi-delictual 
and delictual liability, attempted a differentiation on another ground, namely the judge's 
obligation to give judgement by virtue of his public office (necessitas muneris), an obligation 
which did not rest on a doctor's shoulders. A doctor may always refuse to treat a patient. 138 
Bartolus's view was shared by Angelus de Ubaldis 139, as well as by Alciati who refers to the 
134 See above at chapter II 2 3 1 and 2 3 1 2. 
135 Gloss 'Pecasse' D. de actionibus et oblig. 44.7.4 : " ... quare ergo non ex malejicio tenetur, ut in aquilia? Respodeo 
speciale in iudice: aliud in aquilia." 
136 Quoted at Giuliani and Picardi, ResponsabilitQ, 24 fn4: " .. .quia plus est damnum dare corpore in corpus quan verbis 
solummodo. " 
137 Azo, Aurea Summa, Inst.IV de obligationibus quae ex quasi delicto nascuntur, n.14: "Sed certe iudicare non assignatur 
inter genera malejiciorum nisi jiat dolo: imo potius deberet assignari inter genera benejiciorum. Secare autem, vel 
scindere, vel rem deteriorem constituere vel dare actionem his faciendis, per culpam, vel imperitiam, inter malejicia sine 
dubio reputatur unde aliud est in illis quam in iudice." Azo's view, however, was not uncontended, as is evident from De 
Bellapertica's institutionum, IV De ob/igationibus quae ex quasi delicto nascuntur, nnl-2 who considered the judge who 
misjudged due to imperitia committing a genuine delict as much as the doctor. 
138 Commentaria, tom. VI, Digestum novum, de act. et obI. 4 'si iudex ' n.1: "Dic, quod officium iudicis est necessarium, quia 
ex necessitate tenetur, in Aquilia voluntarie jit." The Commentary on the Institutes of Bartolus which frequently is quoted in 
this regard (see inter alia Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 42 fn65 ) has not been written by Barto[us but by the 
French jurist Jacques de Revigny. See for details Weimar, TR 35 (1967) 284 and 285 fn8 and Lange, Schadensersatz und 
Privatstrafe, 126 fn80 with further reference to von Savigny, System , 127. De Puteo, De Syndicatu, 560 affirmed that: 
"Judicare est munus publicum." 
139 Commentaria , 0.44.7 .5.4 'si judex ' n.5 : •• dic quod medicus semper agit ex salute hominis, sed iudex non, et ideoH 




distinction between the liability of the doctor who merely ex voluntate suscepit officium and 
the judge qui ex necessitate agit.14o 
In the last analysis, however, these concepts appear to be motivated purely by legal-political 
and not dogmatic considerations. Consequently, we do not gain any fundamentally new views 
with respect to a different dogmatic interpretation of the two categories. In much the same 
fashion, the Italian jurist Placentinus does not propose a different dogmatic approach at all and 
adheres to the fault criterion as advanced by the ratio scripta. However, the aspect that makes 
Placentinus's approach a quite remarkable step is that he appears to be the first author who 
further subdivides the category of quasi-delicts. Accordingly, we are asked to differentiate 
between the liability of a judge who adjudicates wrongly per imprudentiam and the instances 
of quasi-delicts where someone aliquatenus culpae reus est, ex eo quod alius vere 
delinquit. 141 Placentinus's theory thus indicated an aspect which became decisive in the future 
development of the category of quasi-delict which, ultimately, was not considered to contain a 
uniform ground for liability but to represent a hotch potch ofvarying situations. 
From Placentinus's view, the future could already be predicted: in the context of the uncritical 
acceptance of a generalised fault requirement as the basis of quasi-delictual liability during 
this and all later epochs of legal history, and in the context of the gradual and irresistible 
expansion of the actio legis Aquiliae as a generalised delictual action per se, the views of 
Placentinus and those jurists who followed in his footsteps inevitably diminished any 
remaining scruples in removing single elements from the category of quasi-delicts. 142 They led 
to a dispersal and to a gradual dissolution of the category and to an amalgamation with delicts 
in a narrow sense. This development represents exactly the position of the modem South 
African law of delict, where quasi-delictual liability is hardly discussed any longer. 143 In the 
140 Opera, tom.I pars.IV tit.V de Iiberis et posthumis L.XXIX.3. 

14 1 Institutionum, 4.5 pr: "Quasi delinquere quis dicitur duobus modis .. . ". 





143 Undoubtedly judicial liability has been fused with delicts based on fault. Other quasi-delictual actions such as the actio 

de ejJusis vel deiectis and the actio positi vel suspensi have survived within the frame of South African law of strict liability. 

However, they appear not to have flourished. A recent critic has tenned them anachronisms. See Wille's Principles ofSouth 

African Law, 703 . Further, on the South African usus hodiernus of quasi-delictual liability see Pauw, THR-HR 42 (1979), 





















321 and below chapter VII 2. 
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days of the Glossators and Commentators, meanwhile, quasi-delicts were not yet actionable 
under the actio legis Aquiliae. The actio in factum generally was believed to be the 
. . 144appropnate action. 
Finally, if we investigate the development of iniuria and the actio iniuriarum as another 
means by which judicial officers were held liable, similar to Aquilian and quasi-delictual 
liability, the Glossators and Commentators accepted the state of Justinian's law of injuries as 
the basis for their own approach. 14S In the writings of the Italian jurists the actio iniuriarum 
had already begun to show some resemblance to the modern South African law of injury. This 
is particularly true with respect to the emergence of animus iniuriandi. 146 As in the 
development of Aquilian liability, subjective elements now came fully to the fore. With regard 
to the essential elements of iniuria, the latter term was retained as a common denominator and 
contumelia was considered to be the essence of iniuria. This notwithstanding, other meanings 
of iniuria, particularly in the sense of inequity and injustice, remained relevant. The latter two 
meanings were especially important in judicial liability. The classical division of iniuria into 
verbal and real impairments came to be supplemented by injuries in writing (iniuria literis).147 
The generalised fault requirement with regard to the actio iniuriarum was interpreted to mean 
that liability could only be imposed on a CUlprit who had been actuated by dolus. 148 
Henceforward, the gist of the actio iniuriarum became animus iniuriandi. 
Glossators and Commentators agreed that the actio iniuriarum retained its character as a 
private penal action. Like other actiones poenales, therefore, it was passively and actively 
intransmissible. 149 The action had to be brought within one year. ISO With respect to judicial 
liability, the actio iniuriarum's private penal character is further evident in that the actio 
iniuriarum was essentially considered a subsidiary action available to the prejudiced party 
144 Gloss ' Discriminis' C. de poena judo 7.49.2: "Si autem sine dolo hoc est per imprudentiam, tunc teneatur actione in 
factum .. .". Note also Gloss 'Litem Suam' Inst. 4.5 pro 
145 Walter, Actio lniuriarum, 60; Burchell, Law ofDefamation, 8-9. 
146 Burchell, Law ofDefamation, 9. 
147 Pauw, Persoonlikheidskrenking, 35-36: " ... dat dit [animus iniuriandl} 'n subjekliewe element inhou en dot die doder op 
een of andere wyse moes gewil het dot die benadeelde leed opdoen. .. anders as in de Corpus Juris, animus iniuriandi 
gelykgestel is aan dolus. "; Ranchod, Foundations, 32-33; Walter, Actio Jniuriarum, 61. 
148 Pauw, Persoonlikheidskrenking, 37; Walter, Actio Jniuriarum , 61. 
14 9 ibid. 62-63 . 
150 ibid. 63 . 
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alongside other criminal actions, of which one has to distinguish two: first, actions based on 
ordinary crimes (crimen ordinaria) such as battery, culpable homicide, false imprisonment; 
second those based on special crimes of office, although these may not be compared too 
broadly with the somewhat modern category of crimes committed by public officials. In those 
early days, in the laying of a criminal charge against a judge, it was more appropriate to speak 
of certain crimes that emanated more than others from the public sphere and, hence, received 
primary attention. Reference here can be to instances where a litigant suffered prejudice from 
wrong judgement (falsum) or from extortion (crimen repetundarum).151 
3 JUDICIAL LIABILITY FOR WRONG JUDGEMENTS 
In light of the fundamental influence of post-classical Roman (Justinian) law on the 
development of Italian law from the eleventh century onwards, it is not surprising that the 
legal principles of judicial liability for misjudgements were derived to a considerable extent 
from Roman law. Only to a very small degree were these regulations complemented by the 
cities' statutory laws. On the other hand, it is essential to note that the necessary organisational 
and procedural basis for judicial liability was revamped in its entirety at that stage. In this 
respect, therefore, comparisons with Roman law may be made only cautiously.152 
3 1 Liability for dolo malo misjudgements 
In high medieval Italian law, judges were held liable for dolo malo misjudgements. 153 This 
dogma arose for two main reasons: At first, the dominant influence of the Corpus furis Civilis 
15 1 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 435-436. 
152 Genzmer, ZSS (RA) 61 (1941),335 . 
153 De Puteo, De Syndicatu, 613 n.24 makes the general statement that: "Officiales habentes adminislralionem rerum 
publicarum. tenetur de dolo, lata et levi culpa"; Angelis de Perusio, De Syndicatu, n.6 and n.10; Baldus de Perusio, 
Tractatus Singularis in Materia Syndicatus, n.13; Cataldini, Traclatus in Materia Syndicatus, n.1 58; De Beliapertica, 
Institutionum, IV De obligationibus quae ex quasi delicto nascuntur, n.3; Aiciati, Opera, tom.I1I pars.J lib.II de pactis 
L.XXIX.73; Azo, Aurea Summa, Inst.lV de obJigationibus quae ex quasi delicto nascuntur, n.l ; Gloss 'Tenetur' D. de 


























on the development of Italian law took full effect. Accordingly, the passage in D 5.1.15.1 
became the point of departure for the Italian doctrine ofjudicial liability for dolus: 
"Judex tunc litem suam facere intellegitur, cum dolo malo in fraudem legis sententiam dixerit. 
Dolo malo autem hoc facere videtur, si evidens arguatur eius vel gratia vel inimicitia vel etiam 
sordes: ut veram aestimationem litis praestare cogatur." 
The jurists' firm trust in the authority of the Corpus Iuris Civilis made it unlikely that they 
would call into doubt the position of post-classical Justinian Roman law. Contemporary 
discussion as to the variable position of judicial liability in pre-classical, classical or post­
classical Roman law, which has gained much inspiration from, inter alia, research on 
interpolations and discoveries such as the lex Irnitana, was absolutely foreign to the Italian 
jurists of those days. 154 Secondly, acceptance of a generalised fault requirement as the basis of 
all delictual liability made liability for dolus a matter of fact. 
As said above, Italian jurists considered an act committed dolo as wilful misconduct in full 
consciousness of its unlawfulness.155 Even though wrongfulness did not appear as the sole 
element, no doubt existed as to its being an essential prerequisite for delictual liability.156 
Accordingly, Italian doctrine accepted judicial liability for dolus as liability for any 
disadvantageous (detrimental) judicial conduct committed wilfully and consciously. Liability 
for dolus as the gravest form of culpability was understood as the counterpoint to judicial 
liability for culpa. 157 What, then, was considered disadvantageous (detrimental) judicial 
conduct in those days? 
Jurists considered as such any dolo malo misjudgement or other infringement of the interests 
of the parties committed to the judge's care that were due to the judge's violation of his 
judicial duties. 15S Violation of judicial duties came to include lack of the required and 
expected legal expertise as well as lack of perception. It also included the judge's lack of 
experience, despite his affirmation to the contrary at the time of his employment in the narrow 
154 See above at chapter II 1 3 and 2 2 I. 
155 See above at 2. 
156 Kaufmann, Actio Legis Aquiliae, 20: "Rechtswidrigkeit und vorallem das Verschulden waren bereits im Corpus juris bis 
zu einem hohen Grad entwickelt worden." Engelmann, Schuldlehre , 41-49; Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 1007 
(Roman law), 1028 (usus modernus). 
157 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 354; Giuliani and Picardi, Responsabilita, 30-31 . 
158 Baldus de Perusio in his Tractatus Singularis in Materia Syndicatus provides for a useful overview at n.4, n.1 0 and 
n.13. Further note Angelis de Perusio, De Syndicatu, n.6 and n.7 (with exceptions). 
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sense), and, moreover, any neglect of conscientious and painstaking exercise of judicial 
office. 159 
Once violation of duty had been established, usually through a wrong judgement that had 
occurred in consequence, it was open to the judge to plead any of the accepted justification 
grounds. Of all the generally accepted justification grounds, such as vis and metus, youth, 
mental disorder, and mistake (error), the latter is of particular interest here. 160 According to 
the Italian doctrine, liability for dolus was ruled out where the essential requirement for 
responsible conduct, namely the individual's unhampered expression of will, was lacking due 
to ignorance or mistake. Generally, fault could result only from conduct that was free from 
mistake. Since consciousness of unlawfulness was considered an essential aspect of liability 
for dolo malo wrong judgements, any mistake as to the element of unlawfulness obviously had 
serious consequences with regard to liability. 161 For the relevance of this mistake to 
consciousness of unlawfulness, it was immaterial in practice whether the mistake was as to 
facts (error facti), as to law (error iuris) or was due to mere ignorance of law (ignorantia 
iuris). This is affirmed by the Gloss which stated the general rule as follows: " ... quaelibet 
ignorantia etiam juris excusat a dolo.,,162 For obvious reasons a judge who pleaded mistake 
usually relied on either error or ignorantia iuris. But were error and ignorantia iuris regarded 
as excusable, or - to refer to the well-known maxim - did error or ignorantia iuris non 
nocet?163 
In the light of the ever-growing expectations of judicial expertise described above, an excuse 
for wrong decisions, particularly with reference to error iuris or ignorantia was likely to be 
met with incredulity. It is at this crucial point that Italian jurists applied the concept of dolus 
159 Examples are provided by De Puteo, De Syndicatu, 378 et seqq. nn. 1-4,385 et seqq. nn.4-5; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 

355 and 364. It must be remembered that compliance with these duties, as well as legal expertise, perception and experience 

was guaranteed by the judge's fonnal oath of office and contract of service. 

160 For an useful overview on deficiencies in the fault element see Engelmann, Schuldlehre, 23-33 . 

161 Engelmann, Schuldlehre, 41-48, Irrtum und Schuld, 250-255 and 267 et seq. and 304-315, further Wiedergeburt, 356­
357. 

162 Gloss 'Justa ducti' C. ad leg. Fla.de plagiariis 9.20.14. Mayer-Maly, Rechtsirrtum, 302 defines both elements as follows: 





163 For an overview see generally Zimmennann, Law of Obligations, 604-609 (with respect to contractual theory), also 

Zimmennann and Hellwege, 'Error iuris non excusat . und das 'law ofrestitution ', 1367-1371; Mayer-Maly, Rechtsirrtum, 

303-304 and Error Juris, 147-169 (mainly on Roman law). 
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praesumptus. There operated no praesumptio iuris or even a praesumptio iuris et de iure 
against judges by which they were considered always to be in command of legal expertise. 164 
Hence, it was generally open, even to judges, to plead mistake as to law. This 
notwithstanding, a simple praesumptio iudicis came into operation. Accordingly, in an action 
against a judge it was up to the deciding court to presume dolus where circumstantial evidence 
indicated very strongly against the judge's not having legal knowledge in spite of his 
contention to the contrary. To state the matter correctly, it was not dolus that was presumed 
but legal knowledge. 165 
It is not surprising that such a presumption oflegal knowledge was not easily accepted. On the 
contrary, careful differentiation was absolutely essential. A distinction was made, firstly, 
according to the legal expertise that was required for the judicial office the defending judge 
occupied when he gave the wrong judgement and, secondly, according to the judge's actual 
legal education. Here comes into play the difference discussed earlier, namely that between 
judges who were merely legally trained and those who were truly legal scholars, that is 
doctores. Certainly the degree of legal expertise expected from a doctor iuris was 
considerably different from that expected of an ordinary trained judge. Ordinary judges were 
expected to be acquainted with the generally accepted principles of law and the basics of legal 
theory, in as far as these were part of the universities' four- to five-year legal curriculum. 
Doctores who acted as judges were expected to have additional knowledge of the sources of 
the ius commune, of local statutory law and the Gloss, as well as of the various distinctions of 
the communis opinio and the rules of legal interpretation. 166 
Generally, these specific presumptions of legal expertise were held against judges' claims of 
error iuris or ignorantia. Especially gross contraventions and mistakes as to the proper 
application of the law generally led to a praesumptio iudicis of legal knowledge and, 
consequently, to a presumption that the judge had misjudged with dolus. It must be stressed, 
164 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 357, lrrtum und Schuld, 58-59. 
165 Reference should be again to the text after fn 127 above, where it was indicated that a specific type of dolus praesumptus 
operated in cases of mistake as to law. Whether or not error iuris was at issue, according to Mayer-MaJy, Rechtsirrtum, 303 
depended largely on both the burden of proof and the rebuttal of presumptions: "Durch die striklen Beweisregeln des 
romisch-kanonischen Prozesses wird auch der Rechtsirrtum zu einer Frage der Beweislastverteilung und der Vermutung." 
166 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 358-359 and above at I 4. 
. 
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however, that it was always open to a judge to rebut this preswnption. 167 It was then up to the 
judge to substantiate the claim that his misjudgement was due to carelessness or laxity and not 
dolus. 
It speaks volwnes for the prestige and reputation of the judicial office, as well as the high 
esteem in which bearers of this office were generally held, that it was argued by some jurists 
that a dolo misjudgement was hardly to be expected; the preswnption, rather, lay in bona fides 
and conscientiousness on the part of the judge: "In dubio iudex, qui male judicavit, 
praesumitur fecisse per ignorantiam et non per dolum ... ".168 And Alciati stated: 
"Praesumitur pro judice, sit est bonus et recte faciat ea, quae officio suo incumbunt. ..Et facit, quia 
ad illud officium ut plurimum eliguntur literati et honesti viri, unde merito pro eis 
praesumitur.. .".169 
To be provocative one might say that this 'counter' preswnption balanced the effect of the 
initial praesumptio iudicis. This does not mean that in practice there existed hardly any cases 
of judicial liability for dolus praesumptus. In fact, in most cases, great reluctance to rebut the 
initial praesumptio iudicis, awkwardness, scruples and professional conceit probably 
prevailed, particularly on the part of the doctores. If, therefore, a judge was not willing to 
plead embarrassingly negligent or careless conduct of office in rebuttal, he had to bear the 
consequences of liability for dolus praesumptus. In civil law, unlike criminal law, unrebutted 
dolus praesumptus gave rise to full liability ex delicto for dolus verus. 170 In this regard, the 
actio legis Aquiliae certainly appears to have been the appropriate action. 171 
This admittedly schematic approach reveals: Whatever the judge chose to do, either to rebut 
the preswnption of legal knowledge or to resist this very embarrassing solution, he loaded 
liability on himself, i.e., liability for dolus or liability for imprudentia. 172 Thus we can say that 
in Italian ius commune in one way or the other a hard line was taken on a judge pleading 
167 Engelmann, lmum und Schuld, 74-76, Wiedergebur/, 359-360. 

168 Amodeus, De Sindicatu, n.128, note also his observations in his Trac/a/us Sindicatus at n.114. Affirmed by Dulceti , De 

Syndicatu , n.25 and De Puteo, De Syndicatu, 501 n.14. 

169 De Praesum/ionibus, Reg.III. praes.9 n. l. Note further De Puteo, De Syndica/u , 533 n.1 0: "ludex qui male iudicavit, in 

dubio praesumitur per ignorantiam iudicasse." 

170 Engelmann, lrrtum und Schuld, 76-77 and Wiedergebur/, 360-361. 

171 Pauw, THR-HR 42 (1979), 247; Engelmann, Wiedergeburl , 344 and 354; Schrage, Legal History 17 (1996), 104; 

Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Deliclo, 38 . 

















mistake: error or ignorantia iuris nocet. This result again appears to be sound in light of the 
general position that has developed since the days of classical Roman law, namely that only 
where the law was not easily determinable for a layman a mistake of law was possibly 
regarded as excusable. 173 From what has been said earlier it is evident that Italian judges from 
the second half of the thirteenth century onwards had left that sphere of laY/knowledge far 
behind them. 
3 2 Liability for imprudentia 
The liability of judges for imprudentia was of exceptional practical relevance in the Italian 
law of judicial liability of the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries. 174 In this field of law, too, 
Justinian's late Roman heritage continued to live on since quasi-delictual liability, under 
which judges' liability continued to be classified, was dogmatically based firmly upon fault. 175 
The state of judicial liability for imperitia or imprudentia under the fault requirement IS 
obvious from the application of the sentence imperitia culpae adnumeratur as it derives from 
the Gloss.1 76 The general assimilation of imprudentia/imperitia with culpa or, rather, with the 
lightest form of culpa, namely culpa levissima, results from the medieval doctrine's general 
exclusion of liability for mere accident (casus fortuitus): " ..fuit casus fortuitus, et sic non 
173 Zimmennann, Law of Obligations, 605. For the development in the ius commune see 608 et seq; Mayer-Maly, 
Rechtsirrtum, 302. In his contribution Error Juris, 168 Mayer-Maly termed this tendency of Roman law to discriminate 
increasingly against error iuris an 'Ansatz zur Harte'. 
174 See above at I 3 I and I 3 2 and below at 5. See also Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 362: "Diese Haftung allein hat der 
richterlichen Verantwortlichkeit in Jtalien seit dem 13.lahrhundert die grojJe Bedeutung for die Rechtspflege und 
Rechtsentwicklung gegeben. Ohne sie hiitte der SyndikatsprozejJ seinen Zweck eine rechtmiijJige Politik tatsachlich zu 
sichern nicht in dem MajJe erreichen. .. kbnnen." 
175 Liability for imprudentia was based upon Jnst 4.5 pr; D 44.7.4 (in Roman law D 44.7.5) and D 50.13.6. See above 
chapter II 2 2 1 and 2 3 1. Note Gloss' Litem Suam' Inst. 4.5 pr; De Rosate, Digesti Novi, De variis & extraordinariis 
cognitionibus L.V; De Puteo, De Syndicatu, 533 n.7: "Iudex qui iudicavit per imperitiam, lenelur in quantum bono vim 
videbitur aequum, scilicet in quantum facere palest." Note further 609 n.15; Amodeus, Tractatus Sindicatus, n.122: "Si 
autem per imperitiam tulerunt iniquam sentenliam contra casum legis vel statuti, tenentur ... ". Further see Alciati, Opera, 
tom. III pars.! lib.I1 de pactis L.XXIX.74; Azo, Aurea Summa, !nst.IV de obligationibus que ex quasi delicto nascuntur, n.l; 
A de Ubaldis, Digesti Novi, de actionibus et obligationibus 'si iudex' n. l. 
176 Gloss 'Pecasse' D.44.7.4: " ... alias deliquisse. Vere peccavil: quia imperilia culpae annumeralur." See also Engelmann, 
Wiedergeburt, 381; Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 38; Schrage, Legal History 17 (1996), 104. 
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tenetur...".177 Consequently, in cases of carelessness due to imperitialimprudentia, it was 
exclusively culpa on the part of the iudex that applied, because " .. .inter levissimam culpam, et 
casum !ortuitum, nihil est medium". 178 
Italian doctrine provides us with considerably more certainty than Roman law as to the 
circumstances which resulted in judicial liability for imprudentia. 
"Primum exemplum est de iudice, qui cognoscens inter me et adversarium meum per suam 
imprudentiam vel imperitiam contra iustitiam meam pronunciavit credens aequum de me facere. 
Iste enim iudex dicitur litem facere suam, hoc est damnum alterius in se transferre. In id etiam 
mihi tenetur, in quo per imperitiam suam me laesit." 179 
Essentially, this breach of duty implied inappropriate treatment, deliberation and decision of 
cases by a judge. The same reasons for this breach of duty must be considered as those 
described above, namely lack of required and expected legal expertise (frequently referred to 
as ignorantia), as well as lack of perception (error in the narrow sense), lack of experience, 
and neglect of conscientious and painstaking exercise of judicial office. The only distinction 
now was that not particularly blatant or dolo conduct but a negligent breach of duty that led to 
a misjudgement was considered sufficient for liability.18o In particular, liability for 
imprudentia already arose where a judge, for the above-mentioned reasons, overlooked 
relevant passages of the Corpus furis Civilis or the local statutes. Furthermore where he 
adjudicated in flagrant contradiction to legal principles laid down in the Gloss or, later, by the 
communis opinio (opiniones ita!orte).181 Consequently it was stated: " .. .iudex iudicans contra 
" fi' I' " 182communem OplnlOnem aCl! l!em suam.. . . 
177 Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 38 fn35 and 35 full and Engelmann, Schuldlehre, 207-210. 

178 Quoted at Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 35 full; Hoffmann, Fahrlassigkeit, 36; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 

361 and 368-369. 

179 By Accursius, quoted as in Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 365 . 

180 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 364. See also the overview provided for by Cataldini, Tractatus in Materia Syndicatus, 

nn.33-35, n.38 and n.49 . 

181 De Puteo, De Syndicatu, 552 n.2. 

182 Aretinus, Instilulionum, de obligationibus quae ex quasi delicto nascuntur 'si iudex' n.4. See also De Puteo, De 
Syndicatu, 552 n.2: HEt iudex excusatur in syndicatu, si est secutus opin. alcuius doclOris, vel glossatoris, lieet facial 
iniustitiam." Note Amodeus, Tractatus Sindicalus, n.122: HEt idem si iudicat contra communem opinionem per Doctores 
communiter approbatam qUia est in culpa." Amodeus also refers to Bartolus and states that: " ... ubi dixit, quod licel iudex 
sequalur opinionem, quam mulli DOClores tenenl, si est mala, lamen lenelur in syndicatu." Further see Schrage, Legal 

















If a judge deviated from the general opmIOn, he had to explain convincingly that the 
prevailing opinion resulted in inequitable consequences or that the common opinion's 
interpretation of the legal sources was wrongly based. Generally it was not considered 
sufficient for a judge to defend himself merely by reference to the state of Roman law. The 
communis opinio could not be criticised only on the basis of Roman law, which, particularly 
from the age of the Commentators, was considered as the basis of the prevailing doctrine but 
no longer its essence. On the other hand, a judge was considered free from liability where he 
had to decide in areas of the law which were considered controversial by legal scholars 
themselves and where he based his judgement on the opinion of those scholars with the 
greatest renown (magis communis opinio). If this was not possible, the judge was free to adopt 
his personal view. 183 In view of all that has been said above, it appears that, to evade personal 
liability, judges were best advised to follow slavishly the authority of the Corpus Juris, the 
relevant statutes and the Gloss, later the communis opinio. 184 
At this stage, it is possible to take a closer look at the characteristics of the liability ofItalian 
medieval judges. As we have seen, judicial liability arose from a breach of duty. The judge's 
obligation of faithful exercise of office (fides officii) was based on the oath of office as well as 
the contract the judges signed with the cities. The latter, in particular, made judicial liability 
appear like a kind of liability for private professional mistakes. The judge on signing the 
contract agreed to administer justice in a proper manner. Furthermore, he assured the other 
party (the city) of his legal qualifications, experience and expertise. Once he misapplied the 
law, he committed a breach of contract like any other professional who had undertaken a 
specific task. Seen from this angle, judicial liability leaves the public sphere and becomes an 
ordinary kind of professional liability, not much different from the liability of doctors, lawyers 
or artisans. 
This, however, is to overlook one aspect. To characterise judicial liability as a form ofliability 
for professional mistakes on the basis of private contract is to ignore the parties that suffered 
damage from the judicial wrong. Having never contracted with the judge prior to judgement, 
they did not have any legal rights derived from such a contract. Hence, judicial liability as a 
form of private professional liability applied only with regard to the legal relations between 
183 Ibid. 14; Engelmann, Wiedergeburl, 395. 

184 De Puteo, De Syndicatu, 552 n.1 and 2; Amodeus, Tractatus Sindicatus, n.122-123. 
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the judge and the city. From this it follows that judicial liability, regardless of its strong 
private law connotations, was most likely characterised by the oath of office, whereby the 
judge pledged to fulfil his duties to the city and to the people. Apart from the identical 
promises made under the contract, the judge swore submission to the syndication process at 
the end of his tenn of office. It was this process of syndication essentially that provided the 
various (private) parties that might have suffered from a wrong decision of the judge with the 
opportunity to sue the judge for damages. In consequence, one may continue to characterise 
medieval judicial liability as a fonn of personal civil liability within public service or 
employment. 185 
From what has been said so far, it is clear that Italian judges were liable for any kind of culpa. 
For legal and political reasons, it was still foreign to the jurists of those days to consider any 
limitation ofjudicial liability. Unlike, for example, the Roman-Dutch jurists of later centuries, 
they had not a single thought of restricting liability of judges to dolus or culpa lata. Any such 
restriction would have been contrary to the legal political background of judicial liability: 
rigorous liability of judges for dolus and any kind of culpa was considered the conditio sine 
qua non of the apolitical, independent, impartial and effective public administration ofjustice 
within the communes. 186 
As in the case of liability for dolus, an error as to law generally excluded fault and, 
correspondingly, liability for imprudentia: any judge who, due to carelessness, gave 
judgement on the basis of a mistake or from ignorance of the actual legal duties of his office at 
least in theory was considered to be limited in the exercise of his free will and was 
consequentlyexcused.187 
On what line of reasoning could the need for the widest possible liability of judges be 
balanced with the doctrine of mistake? Needless to say, the doctrine of dolus praesumptus did 
not apply to liability for culpa. It seems that it was the jurist Dinus who showed the way by 
means of an ingenious evasion: 188 
185 Engelmann, Wiedergeburl, 364 and 369. 

186 Ibid. at 369-370 and see also fnS at 370. 

187 See generally the detailed analysis in Engelmann, lrrtum und Schuld, 47-52 and 132-137. 

















"Si quis asseril se iurisperitum, cum canonici et civilis sil iuris ignarus, et praetexlu assertionis 
fueril assumptus in iudicem et p er imperitiam iudicavit, videlur fuisse in culpa, quia se immiscuit 
rei ad se non pertinenti.,,189 
Dinus was the first jurist to construe the judge's fault as simply a kind of indirect culpability. 
Fault was considered to exist indirectly where the judge rendered a wrong judgement for 
reasons that lay in his personal condition, i.e. , lack of legal experience and expertise. 190 In 
such cases, it was the judge who had created the situation in which he had given the wrong 
judgement. He had either carelessly assumed office against his better knowledge or 
irresponsibly pretended to legal expertise when he had none. The Italian jurists transformed a 
dogmatic concept into a basis for judicial liability, a concept one might specify in modem 
terms as a form of assumptive culpability. The breach of duty was simply advanced to an 
earlier stage. It was not the judicial decision as such that was considered the exclusive reason 
for liability but the decision of the judge to accept office despite lack of legal expertise and 
expenence. 
Finally, along with the above-mentioned improvement in theoretical and practical legal 
education, the demands on the judiciary rose steadily and were linked with the requirements 
for liability for imprudentia. As with liability for dolus, varying degrees of legal training and 
expertise played a role in the establishment of liability. The Italian jurists provided an 
attractive solution through the relatively flexible structure of awarding damages. Generally, 
the scope of damages was settled according to the actual damage that occurred. As indicated 
elsewhere in this thesis, however, the exact scope of damages for judicial liability under the 
scope of the quasi-delicts remained a discretionary decision left to the second judge.191 It was 
up to him to determine the scope of damages according to the circumstances: whether those of 
a judge who was merely trained legally or of a legal scholar who was a judge. Hence, the 
system ofawarding damages left a rather flexible tool in the hands of the judge. 
189 Quoted at Hochstein , Obligaliones Quasi ex DeliCia, 39 fn42 ; see also Engelmann, Wiedergeburl , 375. 

190 For more detail with regard to the slightly different dogmatical approach in cases of negligentia, see Engelmann, 

Wiedergeburl , 373. 

191 See text below at 3 6 2 fn224. 
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3 3 Liability for omission 
The principles ofjudicial liability for dolus and imprudentia applied also to omissions. In this 
regard they may be seen as exceptions to the general opinion of those days, according to 
which liability for omission was possible in cases of dolus, culpa lata and culpa levis, but not 
culpa levissima. l92 Accordingly, judges were liable for the full interesse in cases of dolo 
omissions or for a discretionary amount in cases of imprudentia omissions. 193 Of particular 
relevance to judicial liability were those cases where judges, owing to gross or simple lack of 
judicial conscientiousness (ex negligentia), failed to deliver a correct decision. 194 The contrary 
opinion of Bartolus, according to which liability for dolus and imprudentia in cases of 
omissions should always be at the full interesse, was not generally accepted. 195 
3 4 Special features of judicial liability according to statute law 
Regulations on judicial liability that were found in the above-mentioned sources of the ius 
commune were supplemented by the statute laws of the various cities. 196 As long as they were 
not identical with the ius commune, the latter were generally accepted as lex specialis. Under 
the terms contra iustitia or contra ius, the statutes covered all the breaches of judicial 
duties. 197 
Deviations from the ius commune related especially to the scope of liability. Most of the older 
statutes did not include any particular regulations as to the exact scope of liability. Some 
statutes referred generally to the obligation of the judge to pay damages (damnum) or damages 
and costs (damnum cum expensis). Consequently, in respect of liability for imprudentia, it was 
merely a question of interpretation whether or not the discretionary rule of the ius commune 
also applied.198 Other statutes determined the full payment of damages without distinguishing 
between liability for dolus or imprudentia. Thus any discretionary reducing of damages in 
192 Kaufinann, Actio Legis Aquiliae, 20 . 

193 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 366-368. 

194 See above 3 I text at fu 159 and particularly 3 2 text at fun 179-180. 

195 For a full account of the dispute see Engelmann, Wiedergeburt,366-368. 

196 For the following section, extensive information once again was drawn from Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 415-421 . 
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cases of imprudentia was ruled OUt. 199 From the fourteenth century onwards, statutes 
increasingly provided for detailed regulation of the scope of liability. It is noteworthy that they 
occasionally entailed even harsher consequences for liability for dolus than under the ius 
commune. For instance, the statutes of Milan from 1351 regulated that a judge who had been 
bribed had to be sentenced to the payment of four times the amount of the full interesse; in 
cases of dolo misjudgements, he was obliged to pay three times that sum. 200 The statutes of 
Pavia from 1393, of Parma from 1494 and of Bergamo from the early fifteenth century 
received the regulations from Cremona from 1387 according to which judges in cases of dolo 
misjudgements had to pay four times the value of the suit, from which half the amount went to 
the plaintiff. In cases of imprudentia, the amount of damages was determined according to the 
syndicate judge's discretion, that is according to the principles of the ius commune?OI 
3 5 The relationship between judicial liability and availability of appeal procedures 
Unlike the Roman jurists, Italian jurists discussed in detail the influence on the liability of 
judges of the possibility of appeal against a wrong decision. This aspect might be considered 
another instance of the Glossators and Commentators extending the position of Roman law. 
Furthermore, in later centuries some of the most influential arguments against rigorous 
liability of judges flowed from the relationship between judicial liability and appeal, as will 
become evident in the following chapter. In this respect later jurists utilised the early Italians' 
views in support of their arguments. 
In the first instance, it is obvious that, regardless of any legal-political argument against 
judicial liability such as the protection of judicial independence and impartiality, for which, 
apparently, the time was not yet ripe, one of the strongest arguments is that liability is 
superfluous where it is far easier and less controversial to appeal against the wrong decision. 
Not surprisingly, this notion could develop only in the context of the emergence of a reliable 
and effective system of appeal. It is little wonder then that it appeared neither in pre-classical 
Roman nor in Germanic law. However, it was not discussed in classical or post-classical law 
either, although a system of appeal was at hand. 
199 Ibid. at 418 . 
200 Ibid. at 41 9. 
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It was the Commentators who finally raised the question when they addressed the plaintiffs 
responsibility for failing to overcome a wrong judgement. The question was to what extent a 
judge was protected by factors such as: waiver of the right to an appeal prior to or after the 
disputed judgement, or subsequent withdrawal of an appeal, or deliberate failure to appeal, or 
confirmation of the initial judgement by the appeal COurt. 202 
Generally, the communis opinio rejected any implied restriction of judicial liability. This view 
was based on the rejection in the Gloss of the notion that a party who failed to appeal against a 
wrong decision had only himself to blame, on the rather vague ground that the party might 
have had some reason for not appealing: " ... quia causa subesse potuit ... ".203 
Clarity, however, was provided by Bartolus who, with regard to the most frequent case, 
namely failure to appeal, made the point that the party's omission per se did not affect the 
judge's own mistake, i.e., the wrongful application of a norm. Furthermore, Bartolus argued 
that appeal procedures and the claim for liability were based procedurally upon two absolutely 
distinct matters of dispute. Finally, he argued that there was no reason to believe that failure to 
appeal against a decision amounted to acceptance of the content of the decision.204 The 
communis opinio is in agreement with Bartolus up to this point.2os However, the jurists did not 
support Bartolus's efforts to limit the scope ofjudicialliabiliry206 particularly in cases where a 
higher court confirmed the initial judgement on appeal. In cases such this, Bartolus favoured a 
201 Ibid. at 420-42l. 

202 For the following see especially Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 397-405 ; further Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 

45-47; Padoa Schiappa, Ricerche Sull 'Appello, vol.lI 202-203. 

20l Gloss 'Novi iuris' D.2 .2.1. 

2()4 Commentaria, tom.X, Consilia, Questio IX n.7, n.9 and n.17. De Puteo, De Syndicatu , 169 n.6: "Et licet qui non 





20S Amodeus, De Sindicatu, n.133: "Et praedicta inlellige, quod iudex tenetur in syndicatu, sive per dolum sive per 

imperitiam male iudicavit, quando pars a senlentia non appellavit ...quod si sententia est iniqua, iudex tenetur, sive pars 

appellet, sive non, sive succunbat in appellatione sive non, etiam condemrwtus conseculus luit interesse a dice 

appellationis, qui eam conjirmavit quia uterque tenetur ex sua causa & suo delicto." For an overview see also De Puteo, 

De Syndicatu , 170 nn.6-9. 



















restriction of liability.207 Regrettably, Bartolus does not provide us with arguments for his 
opinion.208 As will become apparent in subsequent chapters Bartolus was ahead of his time 
and in later centuries his opinion began to make an important impact since his approach 
formed the basis of one of the most effective arguments for restriction ofjudicial liability. 209 
To return to the communis opinio, a valid point in law was that the possibility open to a party 
to mitigate his loss by appealing against a wrong decision did not per se oblige him to do so ­
in principle he had a free choice between lodging an appeal and holding the judge personally 
liable for a wrong decision. 
36 Damages 
As has been indicated before, the characteristic division of liability in Justinian Roman law 
continued to be valid in Italian doctrine, namely liability for dolo misjudgements as 
distinguished from liability for misjudgements committed with imperitia. This division also 
had an impact on the assessment of damages. 
3 6 1 Damages in cases of misjudgements given per dolus 
From the time of the Glossators there emerged a concept of assessment of damages freed of 
traditional Roman formal procedure. Emphasis now lay on the concept of interesse.2lo For 
centuries, Accursius's definition of interesse essentially remained the basis of all definitions: 
interesse was loss suffered and the profit forfeited, i.e., "Interesse est damnum emergens et 
207 Commentaria, tom.x, Consilia, Questio IX n.20: " ... aut in causa appellationis appellator succumbit, et sic sen/entia 

prima fuit confirmata, et tunc iudex non poterit conveniri, talis enim sententia excusat iudicem." Note also Cataldini's 

comments with regard to an appeal judgement that revealed new evidence in his Tractatus in Materia Syndicatus, 49: 





208 See again Commentaria, tom. X, Consilia, Questio IX n.20. 

209 For details see Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 403-404. Also Padoa Schioppa, Rlcerche Sull'Appel/o, 203 fn 19; Hochstein, 

Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 45-46 and see below at chapter V 4 1 4. 

210 See for an excellent overview in English Erasmus, THR-HR 38 (1975), 112-118; further, Lange, Schadensersatz und 
Privatstrafe, 6-32 and Wieling, Interesse und Privatstrafe, 9-16 . 
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lucrum cessans ex quo aliquid fieri cesset."Zll With this definition, Accursius achieved two 
things: firstly he emphasised the principle of compensation (loss suffered).zlz Secondly, due to 
its subjectivity (loss suffered by the individual), the definition ignored any objective or 
external limitations. Hence, the plaintiffs full loss became recoverable, including the loss of 
profits. Thus, Accursius's definition provided for a considerably wider and more flexible 
concept than the Roman id quod interest.Z13 
Without going into too much detail, it is essential to realise that with regard to the crucial 
question of what losses were recoverable by a plaintiff, interesse was subdivided into an 
interesse circa rem and an interesse extra rem. Z14 The fonner indicated compensation for 
direct loss only, at the value of the thing lost; the latter denoted compensation also for 
consequential loss. Thus, in the law of delict, the interesse included consequential losses 
(interesse extra rem), i.e., the totale interesse.Z15 With regard to judicial liability for dolus, 
therefore, the totale interesse or totum was not limited to the value in dispute, but covered all 
the direct and indirect losses flowing from the wrong judgement, including for instance the 
costs of the suit (litis impendia) and other incidental expenses. The totum hence represented 
the maximum compensation ex delicto for wrongful judicial conduct committed with dolus.216 
However, as in Roman law, the Italian jurists had to take cognisance of the fact that the 
sources did not refer generally to the interesse but to the vera aestimatio lites as the relevant 
211 Gloss 'Possible est' C.7.47. Confirmed by Baldus de Ubaldis, Consiliorum, l.Cons.291 n.6: " ... interesse est aestimatio 
alicuius utilitatis non habitae propter alicuius factum iniustum, vel cessationem iniustam: ex quorum doctores." 
212 This proved to have another effect. With the emphasis on compensation, punitive aspects of liability were increasingly 
ignored. This development, undoubtedly, also impacted on the change in perception of the actio legis Aquiliae from a 
mixed legal action (criminal and civil) to an exclusively reipersecutory action. 
213 Erasmus, THR-HR 38 (1975), 112-113; Wieling, Interesse und Privatstra[e, 9 and 12; Medicus, Id quod interest, 302­
303; Lange, Schadensersatz und Privatstrafe, 16-17. See also above at chapter II 2 4. 
214 This process was much more complex than can be described here. The Glossators' concept of interesse was already 
subjected to criticism by the Commentators as well as by the French ultramontani, who feared unlimited liability. See for 
details Wieling, Interesse und Privatstrafe, 14-23 and 37-41 and Lange, Schadensersatz und Privatstra[e , 24-32. Despite 
their criticism, the majority of authors accepted that the interesse extra rem was always granted in cases of delicts. In this 
respect the approach of Accursius to the question of damages in instances of judicial liability can be accepted as sound. See 
Lange, Schadensersatz und Privatstra[e, 27; Wieling, Interesse und Privatstrafe, 31, 32 and 41; Erasmus, THR-HR 38 
(1975),116-117. 
215 Engelmann, Wiedergeburl, 346 and 354; Erasmus, THR-HR 38 (1975), 116; Wieling, Interesse und Privatstrafe, 31,41. 























scope of liability in cases of dolo misjudgements.217 The question is whether vera aestimatio 
lites was identical with the totale interesse or whether it denoted something different, a 'plus' 
as Professor Engelmann has suggested. To Engelmann, veram litis aestimationem not only 
incorporated the totum but also the entire interesse the party would have secured had he or she 
won the case, even if that amount by far exceeded the totale interesse.218 On the other hand, 
Engelmann confesses that neither the Gloss nor the jurists deal with this aspect in great 
detai1.219 His sole argument derives from a comment by Bartolus, who refers to the interesse 
that reaches beyond the mere interesse at the time of dispute: "Si vero agitur propter 
malefactum... si scienter, venit interesse extrinsecum, ... ".220 
With respect, Professor Engelmann is, to my thinking, wrong. What to him amounts to an 
somewhat dubiously extended interesse is not essentially distinct from the interesse extra rem. 
On the contrary, Bartolus's extrinsic interesse refers precisely to interesse extra rem which is 
in addition to the simple interesse circa rem and hence covers the totale interesse.22I The fact 
that no comment on the exact scope of the aestimatio litis can be deduced from the works of 
the jurists is strong support for the argument that no specially extended liability applied to the 
dolo acting judge. This view is in accord with that of the majority of the writers, who concede 
that the expanded fonn of interesse is the one applicable to delicts.222 
217 See for instance Cataldini, Tractatus in Materia Syndicatus , n.158: .....si iudicet per gratiam dolum, vel iniuriam, vel 

inimicitiam, punitur in veram lucis aestimationem ... " and n.134: "Iudex qual iter plures condemnare debeat, ut quilibet ad 

totam summam teneatur." Alciati, Opera, tom.I1I pars.I lib.II de pact is L.XXIX.73: .....nempe ut si dolo malo, aut per 

gratiam male iudicaverit, in totius litis aestimatione condemnetur." Baldus de Ubaldis, Consiliorum, 2.Cons.196 n.2: 

" ...condemnandus in expensis, & damnis provenientibus occasione litis." Gloss 'Aestimationis' C. de poena judicis 7.49.2; 

De Puteo, De Syndicatu, 535 n.14. 

218 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 354-355. 

219 Ibid. at 355: "Eine niihere Erkiarung der Bedeutung der "vera aestimatio lites " gibt die Glosse nicht. Auch die Lehre 

beschd.fligt sich damit nicht ...Auch bei der eingehenden Behandlung der Frage des zu ersetzenden Interesse in der 

Vorlesung zu V/I. C. de sentent., quae pro ed quod inerest, wird von Bartolus, Baldus, Salicetus, Fulgosius , Decius u.a. 

nichts naheres aber die Leistung des "aestimatio litis" gesagt." 

220 As quoted by Engelmann in ibid. 

221 This is ascertainable from Bartolus's own words in Commentaria, tom.X. Consilia, Questio IX n.19 where he denies 

liability of the iudex in cases of a void judgement (sententia est nulla): ..... quando sententia est nulla, iudex non facit litem 
suam sed quo ad totale interesse. sed quo ad expensas propter noc factas, & caetera damna ...". See also Wieling, Interesse 
und Privatstrafe, 39. Similarly Lange, Schadensersatz und Privatstrafe, 125 in his discussion of the liability of the judge in 
his extensive thesis indicates all existing peculiarities with regard to the vera aestimatio lites. Note Erasmus, THR-HR 38 
(1975), 116 who states that: " ... the interesse extra rem (extrinsecum) denoted compensation for consequenrialloss." 




3 6 2 Damages in cases of misjudgements given per imprudentiam 
The scope of liability in cases of litem suam facere per imprudentiam was determined not by 
reference to the loss suffered but was at the discretion of the (second) judge: " .. .in quantum de 
ea re aequum religioni iudicantis videbitur ...".223 It has been pointed out above that this 
regulation gave the (syndicate) courts a rather flexible doctrine to determine the liability .ofthe 
judge in the event of carelessness or ignorance.224 The availability of a discretionary decision 
made it possible to take into consideration various aspects such as the degree of legal 
expertise and experience of the judge, the gravity of the judge's culpability or neglect, and 
also any possible contributory negligence of the injured party. However, the latter occurred 
only in very rare circumstances.225 In the main, contributory negligence was not yet accepted 
as a relevant factor in the assessment of damages.226 
4 LIABllJTY FOR INFRINGEMENTS OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS 
The term iniuria was generally applied to a number of situations where judges conunitted 
professional mistakes. Iniuria in its most conunon meaning was characterised by contumelia 
or disregard of another's personality. However, as indicated, iniuria also continued to be 
understood in the sense of inequity and injustice. The latter two especially were of 
considerable importance to judicial liability since wrong judgements, the infliction of torture, 
or imprisonment all obviously caused an infringement of personality rights when conunitted 
with animus iniuriandi. Theoretically at least, an action under the actio iniuriarum was 
conceivable for any of these acts since all of them could easily be covered by the term iniuria 
22.l lnst 4.5 pr; Gloss 'Discriminis' C. de poena judo 7.49.2: "Si autem sine dolo hoc est per imprudentiam, tunc teneatur 

actione infactum, in quantum bono iudici videtur." Amodeus, Tractatus Sindicatus, n.127: " ... si potestas vel iudexfuit in 

levi vel levissima culpa, non tenetur iudex insolidum, sed quantum religioni syndicorum aequum. videbetur." Alciati , 

Opera, tom.lII pars.! Iib.II de pactis L.XXIX.76: "... ex imprudentia quatenus de bono et aequo visum fuerit ..." . A de 

Ubaldis, Digesti novi, de actionibus et obligationibus 'si iudex' n.2: " ... ideo ex hac imperitia puniendus venit quatenus 

religioni syndicator is sui videbitur equum fore." De Puteo, De Syndicatu, 533 n.7: "ludex qui iudicavit per imperitiam, 

tenetur in quantum bono viro videbitur aequum, scilicet in quantum facere potest .. . " . See also Engelmann, Wiedergeburt , 

377-383; Lange, Schadensersatz und Privatstrafe, 125. 

224 See above at 3 2 fn I 9 \. 























if applied in its wider sense. In practice, however, it seems that (initially at least) the Italian 
jurists preferred to redress these forms of judicial misconduct by means of criminal actions 
rather than the actio iniuriarum; for often the conduct complained of would constitute a crime 
under the lex specia/is - for instance a wrong judgement constituted falsum, and a wrongful 
sentence to torture resulting in death was punishable under the lex Cornelia de sicariis.227 
Where none of the special crimes applied, recourse lay to the private penal actio 
iniuriarum.228 One of the reasons for this subsidiary use of the actio iniuriarum might be seen 
in the application of the concept of dolus praesumptus also in cases of liability under the actio 
iniuriarum. In order to appreciate the position of the Glossators and Commentators in this 
respect, it is essential to distinguish between three aspects, namely the general position with 
regard to the application of dolus praesumptus under the actio iniuriarum; secondly the 
general exception to the normal preswnption, and thirdly the question of whether judicial 
liability falls under this exception. 
Generally, a (formal) preswnption of dolus also applied to the actio iniuriarum.229 Where a 
prima facie injurious act was established by the plaintiff, to overcome the difficulty ofproving 
a state of mind, animus iniuriandi (dolus) was simply presumed. An ordinary praesumptio 
iudicis already came into operation with certain indications of so-called atrocitas facti, for 
which an infringement of personality rights sufficed?30 
This preswnption appears to have been limited in a nwnber of cases, causing now the plaintiff 
to assume the burden of showing that the defendant had in fact been motivated by animus 
iniuriandi. Where the plaintiff was unable to do so, the defendant was presumed to have acted 
without animus iniuriandi and thus could not be held liable. 
226 Lange, Schadensersatz und Privalslrafe, 71-73; Wieling, Inleresse und PrivalSlrafe, 223. 

227 Stock, Amlsverbrechen, 64, 78; Schmidt-Speicher, Rechlsbeugung, 16; Engelmann, Wiedergeburl,436. 

228 A useful overview on the various consequences both podesla and judges had to fear in cases of iniuria (in its wide 

sense) and the relationship between the various actions is included in Amodeus, Traclatus Sindicatus, nn.l 09-119. For 

liability under the actio iniuriarum see n.l11. 

229 That is rightly stressed by Pauw, Persoonlikheidskrenking, 50: "Hierdie onderskeid tussen formele en maleriele dolus 

praesumptus is van groot belang vir sowel die dolus-begrip as vir animus iniuriandi." Further, Walter, Aclio Iniuriarum, 

61; Ranchod, Foundations, 37; Engelmann, Schuldlehre, 132. 

230 Engelmann, Schuldlehre, 132: "Allerdings sah man einen genugenden Prasumtionsgrund schon in der 'alrocilas 

[acli · ... Bei den Meislen ist aber unler 'alrocilas [acli' mehr die schlimme Arl der Handlung nichl nOlWendig der schwere 

Erfolg zu verslehen. sodajJ sie nichl beijeder T6Iung vorliegl. aber schon bei einfacher Injurie vorhanden sein kann." 
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But did judicial liability fall under this exception? Apparently it did, since D 47.10.13 
imposed a full onus on a plaintiff to prove that a person in authority had committed a prima 
facie iniuria.23 I In light of the close interaction between purely administrative and judicial 
offices in those days, there is no reason to believe that this exception did not apply to judicial 
officers. From Amodeus we learn for instance that in a case where an accused was tortured 
and dies while in custody the judge was presumed to have not acted either intentionally (or 
negligently) if the accused was an adult and robust person (maturae et robustae).232 
If one were to classify this exception dogmatically by comparing it to the situation under the 
actio legis Aquiliae, it appears that once again there operated a counter-presumption in favour 
of the jUdiciary. This privilege must be seen as the product of, firstly, the prestige and repute 
of the judicial office which granted to those who held it considerable scope for infringement 
of personality rights, and, secondly, of the need for effective administration of justice, all of 
which squares well with the importance that was attributed to the judicial office in medieval 
Italian townS.233 
This privilege was not unlimited; but (as in Roman law) none of the authorities provides us 
with a detailed statement on when precisely the limitation applied. Most likely, the judge had 
to overstep the boundaries of his office (excedere fines officii), but we are left in the dark as to 
the limits.234 
5 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS AND THEIR PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
An essential feature of judicial liability in medieval Italian law is the aspect of enforcement, 
the so-called syndication or syndicate procedure. In fact, the system of virtually unrestricted 
liability for any kind of judicial culpability becomes intelligible only if we take into account 
both the triggering causes and the practical aspects of procedural enforcement. 
231 See also Waiter, Actio Iniuriarum, 61; Ranchod, Foundations, 39. 

232 Amodeus, De Syndicatu, n.114. 





















The legal-political background that was responsible for the rigorous system ofjudicial liability 
in Italy of the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries has been dealt with in great detail in the 
introduction to this chapter. Reference was made primarily to the rise of the podesta form of 
government, including its characteristic features like the frequent recruitment of external 
judges for short terms to guarantee the impartial and effective administration ofjustice, as the 
central means of restoring and protecting the cities' internal order. This considerable task was 
tied to far-reaching jurisdiction, princely remuneration and also to tremendously high 
expectations as to judges' professionalism, corresponding with the ever-growing 
professionalism at the law schools that had emerged in Italy since the late eleventh century. To 
realise the ambitious goals of podesta government, Italian jurists took the rules of judicial 
liability from Roman law and developed them to harmonise with the principles of the ius 
commune. On the level of procedural law, the features of the ius commune came to be 
supplemented by the regulations of syndication. It is no exaggeration to say that it was only 
with the appearance of syndication that judicial liability assumed its rigorous form. 
The object of the syndicate procedure was to subject the podesta and his officers, including 
the judges, to a formal inquiry into their orderly exercise of office over its entire term. Owing 
mainly to restricted jurisdiction outside their borders, Italian communes had no chance of 
seizing foreign officials after they had left the town of their office. Consequently, any possible 
complaints with regard to irregularities, corruption, denial ofjustice or misapplication of laws 
had to be heard before the official left town. The actual justification for any such complaint 
was determined according to the relevant principles of civil or criminal law. Legal 
consequences were imposed directly and without delay. The dogmatic foundation of the 
syndicate procedure lay in the doctrines of the ius commune, but the relevant regulations were 
embodied primarily in the local statutes, which took cognisance of specific situations and the 
peculiarities of each town.235 
234 See the remarks by Joubert JA in May v Udwin 1981 I /(A) 13 (E) - 14 (D). 
235 There have been efforts in legal historical literature to base the law of syndicate procedure particularly on Roman law. In 
this regard Professor Engelmann in Wiedergeburt at 469 and 503 takes into account the Codex's fifty-day-rule (c. \.5 \.3) 
which applied to imperial servants and obliged them to stay on for that time in the province of their service for the sake of 
accountability. Furthermore he based Italian syndicate procedure on the Roman municipal procedure of accountability, for 
which see Mommsen, RS, 767 and Curchin, Local Magistrates, 66-67 who deals particularly with the Spanish usus; note also 
Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 515-516, as well as on the Roman crimen repetundarum. With regards to the latter see 
Mornmsen, RS, 723-725; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 517 and Genzmer's critical remarks in ZSS (RAJ 61 (1941), 349-350. A 
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In this context, both the ius commune and the local statutes provide us with extensive legal 
material so that we are able, for the first time, to draw a complete picture of the system of 
procedural enforcement ofjudicialliability.236 
The term syndicate procedure derives from the Latin syndicus, which in Roman terminology 
indicated the legal advisor of a corporation.237 This form of process can be characterised by 
the entering of various civil or criminal claims against the podesta and his officials, a 
considerable percentage of which were instituted by the cities directly. Consequently, it was to 
some extent the syndici communes who were active before the syndicate courts to represent 
the cities in their claims, petitions or announcements. The term syndicate procedure can thus 
be explained as a terminological mixing of the cities' office of syndicus with the function of 
the syndicate courts. It must be understood that a city's syndicate court was by no means 
identical with the ordinary courts of the podesta and his foreign judges. The syndicate court 
was a special court for the purpose of reviewing the outgoing podesta and his judges. 
In addition, one should not make the mistake of considering all members of the syndicate 
courts legal professionals.238 The composition of the syndicate courts was not homogeneous. 
According to the ius commune, the newly elected podesta and his judges served as syndicate 
judges of their predecessors.239 According to statute law, however, (to which primary attention 
must be accorded) the number of judges in syndicate courts ranged from three to eight and, in 
smaller communes, was as small as one. The majority of these judges were not legal 
different interpretation is provided by Stem, Criminal Law System, 138 with reference to Masi , RISG 1-2 (I930), 50-51. 

According to her, the basis of the syndicate procedure must be seen in the realities of city government under the bishops 

before the communes assumed self-government. Reference is made to the bishops' episcopalis audienta, which used to be an 





236 At this point, reference must be made again to the fonnidable work by Engelmann who quotes practically all relevant 

sources of the ius commune and statute law at Wiedergeburt, 467-585. Dawson, Oracles, 134-138 relied on Engelmann 's 

book for his presentation of syndication. Further comments are included in Masi, RISG 1-2 (1930), 45-115 and 331-411 ; 

Padoa Schioppa, Ricerche Sull'Appel/o, vol.II 201-203 ; Giuliani and Picardi, Responsabilita, 32-37; Stem, Criminal Law 

System, 137-149; Martines, Lawyers, 143-145. Genzmer, ZSS (RAJ 61 (1941), 345-354 provides a useful summary of 

Engelmann 's work. Some infonnation is also provided by Schrage's contribution in Legal History 17 (1996), 105. 

237 See D 3.4.1.1. and D 50.4.18 .13 . 

238 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt , 494. 










professionals but lay judges selected from the ranks of the local citizenry by drawing lots or 
by election. A remote similarity to the procedure at the time of the Roman Republic cannot be 
denied, but was not acknowledged by the jurists of the time. 
Generally, the syndicate judges were assisted by a legally trained jurist from one of the local 
guilds of jurists (iudex or doctor legum). 240 The incoming podesta and his officials frequently 
acted in a double role. They functioned as executive officers with regard to the judgements 
and titles handed down by the syndicate courts and were further assigned control of the 
syndicate court's administration of justice.241 The syndicate courts were acknowledged as an 
extraordinary organ of administration ofjustice. The court gathered only for the purpose of the 
syndicate procedure, that is for about 7 to 15 days.242 It is a remarkable indication of the 
precarious and unstable situation of those days that cities introduced considerable safeguards 
to ensure the impartiality and independence of the syndicate judges. For instance, syndicate 
hearings were conducted in the communal palace on consecutive days without postponement. 
The syndicate judges were not permitted to leave the palace during that time. It was forbidden 
to meet the syndicate judges while the hearings were pending.243 From the fourteenth century, 
it is reported that some cities recruited members of their syndicate courts once again from 
foreign judges.244 A special syndicate court was sometimes created to syndicate the original 
nd· 245sy Ices. 
Originally, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it was exclusively foreign judges 
who were subject to syndication.246 This did not mean that local judges did not face legal 
responsibility for professional mistakes. Rather, one must assume that local officials 
throughout the year were tried by the podesta and his judges before the ordinary courts. From 
240 Martines, Lawyers, 144; Engelmann, Wiedergeburl, 495-499; Stem, Criminal Law System, 146; Genzmer, ZSS (RAJ 61 

(1941),348; Masi, RiSG I (1930), 138; Dawson, Oracles, 137. 

241 Engelmann, Wiedergeburl,485 . 

242 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 492 and 522. 

243 Stem, Criminal Law System, 147; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 508-509; Dawson, Oracles, 138. 

244 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 495, 497 and 51 \-5\2. 

245 Engelmann, Wiedergeburl, 512-5) 3; Genzmer, lSS (RAJ 61 (1941),349. Engelmann would certainly not have supported 

this critical conclusion. To him the syndicate procedure and what triggered its appearance are worth a particularly positive 

approach. More critical are Dawson, Oracles, 137 fnl2 and Wieacker, ljGS 60 (1941), 591-601. For a critical assessment 

of Engelmann's biases see above at fn50. 

246 The podesta's familia was generally included in liability on the basis of specific legislation. See Engelmann, 
Wiedergeburl,506-507 . 
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the fifteenth century, however, local officials were increasingly subject to the extraordinary 
syndicate COurtS.247 The jurisdiction of the syndicate courts was relatively extensive. It 
covered all conceivable civil actions against judges for dolo or imprudentia misjudgements; 
furthermore, criminal actions and any other claims on the grounds of either ius commune or 
statute law that arose during the tenn of office.248 The limited jurisdiction of the towns make 
it plain that from the day of departure from the town of service, no further action could be 
taken. 
In the light of this locally as well as temporally restricted means of acting against foreign 
judges, it is evident that those regulations carried prime weight that ensured the judges' 
subordination to the syndicate proceedings. The chief protective measure was the oath of 
office, whereby the podesta and his familia pledged to remain in the town for a certain period 
after tennination of office and to appear personally before the syndicate court. In addition, the 
contract of service carried much the same obligations. Over and above this, there are frequent 
indications of the fmnishing of bail, surety or pledges. From the early fourteenth century, the 
cities regularly withheld the final two months salary, about one third of the full salary, as a 
pledge. The law of liens and pledges applied not only to the salary but in addition to the 
equipment, books, horses, arms, in short the official's whole inventory. A further means to 
subordinate the foreign judges to the syndicate proceedings must be seen in the frequent 
obligation imposed on officials to waive their right to appeal against the syndicate court's 
decision.249 Finally, statutes strictly prohibited any deviation from the rigorous rules of 
syndication. Only by means of fonnal legislation were officials and judges exempted from 
SUbjugation to the syndicate procedure.25o 
If we turn our attention to the procedure itself, it will become obvious that syndication was 
neither a purely civil nor a criminal procedure but appears to have been a fonnal inquiry as 
well as a summons which combined a multitude of actions against the foreign officials. Under 
247 Stem, Criminal Law System, 143; Dawson, Oracles, 137; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 471-473 . According to Masi, RlSG 
\·2 (1930), 85 this was already the case in fourteenth century Florence. 

248 Stem, Criminal Law System, 139; Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 473 and 502-505; Genzmer, ZSS (RAJ 61 (J 941),348. 

249 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 483-490; Dawson, Oracles, 137; Stem, Criminal Law System, 147; Genzmer, ZSS (RAJ 61 

(1941),347; Kantorowicz, ZSS (RAJ 44 (1924), 260. 





















the roof of the syndicate procedure thus fell such different civil actions as the actio legis 
Aquiliae, the actio infactum or the private penal actio iniuriarum. 
Syndication was instituted with the selection and appointment of the members of the syndicate 
court within the first few days after the new podesta and his officers had assumed office.251 
Subsequently, commencement of syndication was announced publicly and calls were made 
upon the people to come forward with any complaints or actions within a prescribed period. 
Generally, this period was set at about 7 to 15 days and matched the time limit of the 
d·· d 252syn lcatlOn proce ure. 
In practice, the syndication procedure was informal. Under both the ius commune and statute 
law, conventional principles of procedural law were limited. This is evident for instance from 
the assertion of claims. The prevailing opinion together with the Gloss considered a formal 
statement of claim superfluous in an civil action against a judge for damages. The institution 
of an action was ex non scripto.253 A later opinion, however, sought the restriction of 
informality on small claims. The regulations embodied in the statutes permitted even greater 
informality. A plaintiff could institute his action in an informal manner orally or in written 
form. Over and above this, it was not necessary, contrary to the ius commune, to provide for a 
specific application or reference to a specific action. For instance, it was not necessary to 
subsume a dolo or an imprudentia misjudgement under the actio legis Aquiliae or an actio in 
factum, respectively.254 In other words, the basic appearance of an informal actio syndicatu 
levelled any distinctions between the various actions including the actio iniuriarum. All 
actions came to be instituted under a general actio syndicatu. 
This strong tendency against formality prevailed also in the syndicate proceedings 
themselves.255 Once again, meaningful extensions were contained in the statute law. To all 
251 Engelmann, Wiedergeburl, 489-490,522-523; Kantorowicz, ZSS (RAJ 44 (1924), 247-248 and 257-260 provides an 
interesting account of the practical implications (and risks) of the office of foreign judge in the thirteenth century at 
Bologna. 
252 Engelmann, Wiedergeburl, 523, 535-536 and 567-572; Genzmer, ZSS (RAJ 61 (J 941), 351. 
253 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 526. 
254 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt , 529-534. 
255 Ibid. 541-542: "Der SindikalsprozejJ ist nach der gemeinrechtlichen Lehre ein aujJerordentliches Verfahren, in welchem 
zivilrechtliche Ansproche ... mundlich und form los "sine libe//o" nach der vorherrschednen Lehre a//gemein, nach anderen 




actions, civil or criminal, there applied an abridged and informal procedure. This concentrated 
procedure was further relieved of any requirements as to writing, fixed hearings or pleadings. 
From the thirteenth century a uniform procedure applied to all conceivable actions against a 
judge. Due to the principal aim, namely to provide as soon as possible for transparency in all 
legal matters, the syndicate judges were soon assigned full discretion to verify not only the 
specific claim instituted but to extend the inquiry into all relevant acts. 
Consequently, syndicate courts were empowered to use unrestricted 
notwithstanding the ordinarily strict requirements (denunciato, infamatio, notorium), in order 
to decide even civil claims for dolo or imprudentia misjudgements?56 Civil and criminal 
aspects were completely fused. Thus, the actio de syndicatu commenced with 
inquiry. In cases of reasonable suspicion, there followed a so-called special inquiry through 
interviewing all who appeared to have been involved in the case, including the judge himself, 
the plaintiff, the advocates, attorneys and witnesses, in addition to the evaluation of other 
evidence such as records and judgements. Therefore, the statutes also referred to the ius 
inquisitionis generalis et specia/is of the syndicate judges. From this it follows that the Italian 
syndicate procedure was nothing other than an official (ex officio) inquiry. It was frequently 
the case that the syndicate courts relied on professional legal advice either from the notable 
jurist who was assigned to the court or from other external advisors.257 
If after hearing of all evidence the syndicate court came to the conclusion that the complaints 
were unfounded, the proceedings were terminated with a fonnal acquittal. The loser had to 
bear the expenses.258 If the plaintiffs claim was considered justified, there applied the general 
rules as to execution. Execution was enforced by the incoming podesta and his familia. In this 
respect the practice of retaining one third of the officer's salary proved quite effective in itself 
A successful plaintiff merely had to apply to the podesta for payment of the sum the judge 
259owed him in consequence of the judgement of the syndicate COurt. Either by express 
256 See Sbriccoli, Justice, 48-52 for details. 

257 Martines, Lawyers, 144- J45 indicates that at Florence the syndices regularly adopted a group of up to four professional 

lawyers as consultants. 

258 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 529. 

259 Ibid. 585; Kantorowicz, ZSS (RAJ 44 (1924), 266. 

153 
legislation or by oath of office, any appeal against the decisions of the syndicate court was 
excluded.26o 
It may be said without exaggeration that the Italian syndicate procedure represented a totally 
new aspect of judicial liability. This is undoubtedly true with regard to the substantive law of 
judicial liability, which indicated a further refinement of the Roman law, but is even more so 
with respect to the procedural means of enforcement that were developed by the nalian jurists 
or the statutes. Without intending to anticipate the following chapters, it may fairly be said 
that under Italian syndicate procedure there prevailed a higher degree of procedural 
enforcement of claims against judges by private plaintiffs than at any other time in the course 
of European legal history. The level of judicial accountability to litigants was considerably 
higher than in any subsequent period. 
260 According to ius commune , however, appeals against judgements of the syndicate were not prohibited. Hence, wherever 
the statutes lacked precise regulation, the rules of ius commune applied, Engelmann, Wiedergeburt, 577-581 and 574-577. 
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"Car parmy la varieu} des affaires humaines, 
parmy Ie nombre injiny des lOD:, ordonances, 
& coustumes, parmy la diversite des opinions 
des hommes, parmy la malice des parties, 
parmy la negligence d 'aucuns Advocats, 
parmy la surprise des Procureurs, parmy 
'·ignorance des Greffiers, qu 'elle apparence 
y auroit-il, qu 'un luge deust garantir tous 'es 
iugements qu 'il rend de saine consciences, & 
avec droite intention? 
(Charles Loyseau l ) 
V ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 
1 INTRODUCTION 
From the tenth century to the Peace of Westphalia (1648) the 17 Netherlandic territories, with 
the exception of Flanders and Artois, belonged politically to the Holy Roman Empire of the 
German nation. The various provinces of the empire were administered by the successors of 
the counts and dukes who, as has been shown for the earlier Carolingian period, were the 
emperor's chief local executive officers. Typically for this pattern of historical development, 
the Low Countries consisted of two earldoms, four duchies, six counties and five territories. 
From the late fourteenth century, most of these 17 territories came under the rule of the 
Burgundian dukes either by purchase, marriage or military force. However, it appears that 
under neither Burgundian nor Habsburgian rule (from 1477), nor during the Republic (from 
1581), did the latent peculiarities of the Dutch territories and cities cease to exist. 2 Thus, the 
labelling of these territories in the plural - Low Countries - mirrored exactly the reality. 
On the surface, the general pattern of development in the Netherlands from the fourteenth 
century onwards was typical of the prevailing political tendencies throughout Central Europe 
I Du Droict des Offices, 1.14.31 . 






that gave birth to the modem state. 3 This general development led from the feudal monarchy 
of post-Carolingian times to a fonn of government where active estates (clergy, nobility and 
cities) frequently participated in the ruler's government (Stdndestaat), to government where 
the rulers increasingly drove the estates out of government (Fiirstenstaat), from where it was 
only a small step to absolutism. An important step in this transfonnation process in the Dutch 
provinces was the establishment by the Burgundian dukes of a centralised and omnipotent 
administration in their realm. 
This marks the emergence of what Professor Kantorowicz has referred to as the 'King's first 
body': the dukes became supreme judge, legislator, chief executive,fiscus, all in one, and thus 
the incarnation of the non corporeal and immortal body politic (the crown). This was distinct 
from the 'King's second body', the dukes in their mortal, that is natural, capacity, the body 
natural. 4 To serve the aims of their' first body', the dukes created a general council of advice 
which occasionally sat as a central court of appeal and from which a separate and pennanent 
appeal court emerged in due course. 
University educated jurists, frequently from the ranks of ambitious bourgeois or lesser 
noblemen, assisted the dukes in the administration of justice, the enactment of legislation, and 
the detennination of domestic and foreign affairs, and they managed the monarch's domains, 
finances and military affairs.5 With regard to the dispensation of justice, the rulers were 
hesitant to become personally involved too often and, even though the councils' decisions and 
verdicts continued to be made in the name of the ruler, the majority were pronounced by the 
councils themselves by delegation of the monarch's authority.6 Hence, there appeared a group 
of state servants on the benches of the sovereign's courts who were 
"...content with fulfilling the increasingly technical tasks for which their legal training had well 
prepared them in a spirit of obedience and respect within a new vertical and coercive relationship 
of master and subject. ,,7 
3 Van Caenegem, Historical Introduction, 99-106 and Place of the Low Countries, 13-14; Lutz, Reformation, 15-16 and 
particularly 126-130. 
4 Kantorowicz, The King 's Two Bodies, 13 quoting Blackstone, Commentaries, voU 249. 
5 De Schepper and Cauchies, Legal Tools , 250. 
6 Hartung, Verfassungsgeschichte, 46 in this respect refers to the characteristic custom of leaving a seat free for the absent 
monarch at state council meetings. See also De Monte ver Loren and Spruit, Hoofdlijnen, 137; De Schepper and Cauchies, 
Legal Tools, 250. 























It is evident that the Burgundian rulers and subsequently their successors, the Spanish kings of 
the Habsburg dynasty, were not only interested in controlling these servants of the state; they 
succeeded in doing so. Councillors came to be salaried exclusively by the rulers; they were 
transferable and removable and thus held office only by the grace of the ruler (soo langhe alst 
ons gelieven salJ. 8 There were prospects of promotion, sometimes even ennoblement, but, 
above all, the new-style councillors were made individually responsible to the rulers by 
various technical and legal means.9 In consequence, judicial liability once again became a 
valuable policy instrument, now in the hands of the Burgundian and Habsburgian monarchs in 
their quest for centralisation and control of public institutions. There can be no doubt that, by 
the middle of the sixteenth century, Charles V and Philip n ruled the Netherlands as a typical 
Fiirstenstaat from where it was only a small step to true absolutism, characterised by the triad 
of sovereignty, raison d'etat and polWe, i.e., public order in the widest possible sense. 10 
However, the situation in the Netherlands may not have been as typical of the situation in 
Central Europe as appears at first sight. At the time, there probably existed in Europe few 
areas where the provincial estates had become as strong as in the Netherlands. On the basis of 
numerous privileges and exemptions granted to the growing cities, from as early as the twelfth 
century, the Low Countries emerged as an economic stronghold, the only region in Europe 
that could compare with the central and northern Italian region. The Low Countries were 
easily among the most urbanised in late medieval Europe. I I Ghent, Bruges, Rotterdam, 
Amsterdam and Antwerp were actively engaged in trade, the latter two accounting for a 
turnover in the early sixteenth century of over 50% of all goods traded in Europe. 12 The 
largest cloth manufacturing industry in Europe was for a time concentrated in Flanders; Delft, 
Haarlem and Gouda were famous for their breweries. With regard to the financial sector, 
8 Ibid. at 250 and 255. 

9 Ibid. at 255 and 264 states: "In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Burgundian-Habsburgian monarch became the 

supreme judge, who could control and judge his civil servants, as well as supreme 'legislator', and, finally the dominant 

authority able to grant grace." 

10 Wesel, Geschichte des Rechts, 354; De Blecourt and Fischer, Kort Begrip I, 27-28. 

II The Burgundian Low Countries had no less than 208 cities of which 16 counted more than 10 000 inhabitants. Only six 

of these cities lay in the province of Holland. In comparison, around 1500, there existed in the entire German Empire c. 3 

000 towns with city rights, of which a mere 12 to 15 had more than 10 000 citizens. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 

Ghent and Antwerp, respectively, were the largest and second largest town north of the Alps. See Lademacher, 

Niederlande, 21-25 and Lutz, Reformation, 7 for details. 

12 Kinder, Atlas, 245; Lademacher, Niederlande, 18-21; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 526 . 
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Antwerp's stock exchange was one of the most important in Europe.13 Like the Gennan 
emperors of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Italy, the Spanish-Habsburgian rulers kept a 
close eye on the Low Countries, from which they collected seven times as much in taxes as 
they gained from the silver consignments from the Americas. 14 
The clash between the economically vibrant and politically strong Dutch provinces and 
Charles V and his son Philip IT, as soon as the latter pushed for centralised, dynastic structures 
of government at the expense of the estates, is the central theme in Dutch history of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This power struggle was intensified by religious 
controversy and the tremendous gains made by Calvinism, Lutheranism and Anabaptists from 
the sixteenth century onwards, especially in the powerful northern provinces. Charles V, and 
more so Philip IT, were disinclined to yield to Protestantism. IS The struggle ended in the 
victory of the estates, and in 1581 the northern provinces declared their breakaway from Spain 
in the famous placard of dismissal. Undoubtedly, this development sent shock waves 
throughout Europe and put a dramatic end in the Netherlands to what seemed an open road to 
absolutism. In 1581, there emerged a state that was a complete deviation from the usual 
European pattern of the age. It was a state not absolutist but republican, not central but 
federal; and it was not nationalism that prevailed but a healthy sense of local partiCUlarism: 
the Republic of the United Netherlands. 16 
But even the Dutch had difficulty with a poiitical system devoid of an hereditary ruler, the 
belief being deep-rooted that the source of all authority was the monarch, the indivisible 
sovereign who was legislator, head of government and supreme judge. The gap left by the 
dismissal of Philip IT was not filled by another monarch and even the so-called governors, the 
stadhouders from the House of Orange-Nassau, Prince Maurice and Prince Frederick Henry, 
J3 Zeeden, Hegemonialkriege, 104. 

14 Kinder, Atlas, 245. 

15 De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 131-133; Lademacher, Niederlande, 34-36, 71; Zeeden, Hegemonialkriege, 105; Van Deursen, 

Hel Koppergeld, 154-170; Lutz, Reformation, 77-79. 

16 Van Deursen, Het Koppergeld, 155-156; Lademacher, Niederlande , 152 states: "Das Land stand abseits der 

europiiischen Norm. Es entwickelte sich als Republik inmitten eines Staatensystems und zum reil gegen eine 

Miichteumwelt, die den Lehren des AbsolUlismus anhing. Es pflegte seine vorrevolutioniire Struktur der ko/lekJiven 

Souveriinildlen... Gemessen an den zentralistischen Tendenzen der europiiischen Umwelt, bot die Republik ein System der 





never managed to rise above what was at most a quasi-monarchical position. The crucial 
question thus was: Who would be the sovereign of the Netherlands after independence? 
In the final analysis, the Republic may be considered a statenbond whose members, the 
provinces, were republics in their own righe? who had renounced the right of secession, ten 
ewygen daghen. This notwithstanding, for all practical purposes the powerful northern 
provinces were ruled by the regent-patriciate, which jealously guarded its ancient privileges, 
laws and customs. 18 On a national level, so to speak, the hoge overigheid consisted of the 
Estates-General as the government of the Republic, as well as the raad van state and the 
stadhouder. In domestic affairs, each province was governed by an estate, its own stadhouder 
and its own superior law courts which heard appeals from the local provincial court. 
In provincial government, particularly in the most important province, Holland, the cities 
continued to hold a key position. Economic development was not seriously curtailed by the 
struggle for independence from the Spanish-Habsburgians. After separation and 
independence, the cities of the north soon became leaders in global trade. Inventions in the 
field of shipbuilding, a large commercial fleet, financial resources, commercial long­
sightedness, as well as the foundation of trading companies such as the Dutch East India 
Company (YOC), established the Netherlands as a maritime world power of the first rank 
during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries; and this, in tum, led to the prosperity of 
the entire country. 
However, from as early as the second half of the fourteenth century, the cities' steady growth 
in economic and political power was accompanied by growing conflict between town and 
country and, moreover, by increasingly pressing internal social problems in the cities. As in 
Italy, there emerged factionalism and the divergent interests of the so-called regent-patrician 
class (groot burgers), wealthy merchants and manufacturers, and those of the klein burgers as 
represented by the co-operative craft and artisan guilds, and the wage workers, the so-called 
17 The truth of this becomes impressive from Van Poelgeest's discussion of the difficult procedure for appointment of the 
members of the Hoge Raad, which apparently was a permanent apple of discord between the province of Holland and the 
province of Zeeland. Included in Bijdragen 103 (1988), 27-35 . See further Zeeden , Hegemonialkriege, 380. Accordingly 
Holland's importance is stressed by the fact that during the seventeenth century 57.1 % of the inland revenue rooted in 
Holland (50 % Amsterdam) whereas the following two provinces (Friesland and Zeeland) contributed a mere llA % and 
11 % respectively. 
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creesers. 19 While the patrician class increasingly lost its influence to the guilds at Flanders 
from 1350 onwards,20 patricians in the northern provinces managed to keep a tight grip on the 
magistracy by means of the so-called vroedschap, colleges of local honoraries of up to 80 
members, where membership was restricted by income.21 These vroedschaps formed the 
foundation of the republican oligarchies whereby, in practice, a few related families ruled the 
cities, the cities' seats in the estates and, consequently, the country. As Professor Lademacher 
aptly conunents: " ... connubial entanglement made the rule of very few [in)to the rule of [a) 
few relatives.,,22 As early as 1581, the provincial estates of Holland decided that the cities' 
local magistracy was no longer to be staffed partly by members of the guilds, but exclusively 
by members of the regent-patriciate.23 
To belong to the group of regents, one had to be 'qualified', to use a seventeenth century term, 
that is, one had to be a person of quality, of good lineage, of good connections and of ample 
wealth so as to be able to set aside one's own occupation when called to public service.24 
Could a mere burgher do such and maintain himself and his family? The answer of course was 
that he could not, as may be gleaned from the words of the famous Dutch writer Joost van den 
Vondel, who asked his readers: 
"Whether the judge who is amply supplied with goods 

And money, does as much harm to the law, 

As a poor beggar, who will fITst sort out the case, 

And then devour the poor [by demanding] presents and gifts .,,25 

18 Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 532; Lademacher, Niederlande, 152-153 and 159-166. 

19 For an interesting classification of social classes in republican Netherlands see Van Poelgeest, Bijdragen 103 (1988), 23­
24 (on the basis of Roorda and Groenhuis). 

20 Van Caenegem, Place of the Low Countries, J5 observes: " ... it is not generally realised how close Ghent, 8ruges and 

Ypres have been, in the days of James and Philip van Artevelde, to the foundation of ltalian type urban states of an a­

monarchical, ifnot an anti-monarchical type." 

21 In the Groot Placaet-Boek, voU 43 there appears the following passage: "De sleden hebben meeslal ... een Col/egie van 

Raden ofte Vroetschappen, gheconstitueerl zynde van de nOlabelste uyten midden va de ganzsche Burgerye." 

22 Lademacher, Niederlande, 207; Lutz, Reformation, 105 . 

23 Ibid. at 204. 

24 For the following see Lademacher, Niederlande, 201-215. At 206 Lademacher refers to the raadspensionaris 

Oldenbarneveldt who once said that children had a claim to their fathers ' posts if they proved worthy of their descent by 

means of alliancie, professie and diens/e. The first indicated an acceptable marriage, whereas professie and diensle referred 

to a dignified profession and a lifestyle in accordance with the generally accepted mores of society. See further Van 

Deursen, Hel Koppergeld, 155-170; De Monte Ver Loren and Spruit, Hoofdlijnen, 173 . 

25 Quoted at Van Deursen, Het Koppergeld, 160. 
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In other words, wealth kept one from corruption. 
Considering the power and the importance of the cities, the country was in effect ruled and 
controlled by a relatively small end exclusive oligarchy. And this development was not 
confined to the powerful cities; it appears to a similar degree in the platte land, for instance in 
the so-called gritenijen at Friesland?6 There can be no talk of democratic structures at the 
time of the Dutch Republic. Democracy was in fact regarded as pernicious by most Dutch 
writers in the seventeenth century since popular government would have brought people to 
power who"...have such a nature that they reject what is most useful, and always desire what 
is useless or forbidden.,,27 
If one compares the situation in the Netherlands with that in Italy some centuries earlier, 
despite a number of similarities, the practical outcome of the local internal conflicts in the 
Netherlands was distinctly different from the communal development of Italy. To some 
degree, the potential for social conflict also existed in the Netherlands, but at no point did the 
radical course of civil disorder take hold of the Low Countries as in Italy. Consequently, there 
is no indication that the cities were ever ruled by a foreign podesta or a similar figure to 
provide for impartial, effective and just administration. Not surprisingly, therefore, Roman­
Dutch law at no time provided for the rough and ready reality of a syndication procedure and 
syndicate courts. As will become obvious in due course, this had a strong effect on the scope 
ofjudicial liability. 
2 	 THE POSITION AND STATUS OF JUDGES WITHIN THE ROMAN-DUTCH 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
2 1 	 The higher courts 
The Dutch courts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had their foundations in the 
medieval court system, where a variety of jurisdictions, namely ecclesiastical, feudal, 
26 Lademacher, Niederlande, 206; Huussen, Bijdragen 93 (1978), 247. 
27 Van Deursen, Hel Koppergeld, 157. See also Lutz, Reformation, 105. 
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seigniorial and municipal, existed alongside the royal or princely jurisdictions.28 In line with 
what has been said above, the two most important aspects of the reformation of the medieval 
court system were a policy of centralisation and a trend towards professionalisation. 
Centralisation in the Netherlandic territories was established by the Burgundian dukes, as 
elsewhere, by making a whole hierarchy of institutions available to those who wanted to go to 
court: a central council, supra-provincial revenue courts, as well as intermediate courts. 
Generally this aim was achieved by expansion of existing institutions into powerful and 
efficient instruments of govenunent.29 Under Burgundian authority, the so-called Grand 
Conseil, which functioned both as an itinerant executive and a judicial council for all the 
territories, gradually emerged from the dukes' advisory body, the curia ducis, from 1435 
onwards. The establishment of central courts for the various provinces began in 1462, when 
Charles the Bold established the Hof van Holland, Zeeland en West Vriesland.3o The 
Instructien van de Hof van Holland, Zeeland and West Vriesland from 1531 show that the 
Court had appellate jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters for the three provinces 
mentioned. The seat of the Court was at The Hague. In the northern provinces, similar courts 
were established: for Friesland in 1499, for Utrecht in 1474 and for Gelderland in 1547; so too 
in the southern provinces (referred to from 1581 as the Spanish Netherlands), the Raad van 
Brabandwas established in 1427 and the Raadvan Vlaanderen in 1499.31 
However, in their quest for primacy and their pursuit of a centralisation policy, the dukes 
moved further ahead in 1473, and established the Groote Raad at Mechelen as a permanent 
court of appeal for the entire Burgundian realm, the so-called Groote Raad van Mechelen, also 
28 For a detailed overview of the development of the judiciary in the Low Countries since the Middle Ages see the standard 

work by De Monte ver Loren and Spruit, Hoofdlijnen; Hermesdorf, Rechtsspiegel. For a very useful diagram of the various 

powers that ruled the Netherlands in the sixteenth century see De Schepper, Gerichtliche Kontrolle, 59 and Zeeden, 

Hegemonialkriege, 380. Further De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 143-147; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 541-543; Hartog, 

Onrechtmatige Overheidsdaden, 16-18. See also Fockema Andreae, Staats- en Rechtsleven, 69. 

29 De Schepper and Cauchies, Legal Tools, 250. 

30 With regard to the Hofvan Holland see Van der Linden, ludicieele Practijcq, 1.3.14; Lademacher, Niederlande, 37. 

31 Dolezalek, Zivilprozessrecht, 64; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 474; Hosten et aI, Introduction, 309. See Hermesdorf, 

Oud Vaderlands Recht, 157 et seqq. For the Court of Gelderland see Fruin, TR 2 (1920-21),220 et seqq and 5 I 9 et seqq and 

for Zeeland see TR 3 (1922),30 et seqq. For the Raad van Braband see Van der Linden, ludicieele Practijcq, 1.2.12 and 

generally the work by Gaillard, Conseil de Brabant. For the Raad van Vlaanderen see Van der Linden, ludicieele Practijcq, 












referred to as the Parlement de Malines. 32 The Parlement de Paris, the High Court for 
northern France in those days, is commonly regarded as the source of inspiration and 
influence for the court at Mechelen.33 The court assumed temporary appellate jurisdiction for 
Holland, Zeeland, Flanders and Braband, later also for Friesland, Utrecht and Gelderland, 
although against strong opposition. After a temporary abandonment, the Groote Raad was 
reinstated in 1504. However, the northern provinces no longer referred appeals to the Groote 
Raad. For Holland, Zeeland and West Friesland, the Hofvan Holland began to function as an 
appeal court. 
As a consequence of the breakaway of the northern provinces in 1581, the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Hof van Holland was transferred to the so-called Hoge Raad in The 
Hague.34 This appeal court, however, had jurisdiction over only two of the seven republican 
provinces, namely Holland and Zeeland.35 The other provinces refused to transfer their 
appellate jurisdiction to the Hoge Raad. Thus, practically every province retained its own 
judicial hierarchy until, in 1795, the Hoge Raad finally became the highest appeal court for all 
. 36provInces. 
It has been indicated earlier that, in consequence of Philip II's dismissal in 1581, the 
remaining powers in the northern provinces, namely the Estates-General and the judges of the 
superior courts, were left without an ongoing monarchy which embodied the indivisible 
32 Hahlo and Kahn. Legal System, 474; Lademacher, Niederlande, 37; Wijffels, Legal Records and Reports, 182-206. By 
Wijffels more recently: TR 61 (1993),387-400. 
33 De Wet, Ou Slaywers, 104-5. Lademacher, Niederlande, 37 points out that it certainly was not by accident that Charles 
the Bold chose Mechelen as the court's seat. Mechelen belonged neither to Braband nor to Flanders. It was an ex-territorial 
spot on the map and its choice thus stresses the objective of centralisation. 
34 With regard to the Hoge Raad see Merula, Manier van Procederen, \.6.1.13 (2) [d]; Van der Linden, Judicieele 
Practijcq, 1.3.11-13; De Blecourt, TR 2 (1920-21), 428 et seqq; De Smidt, Hoge Raad, 207 el seqq. and most recently the 
excellent article by Van Poelgeest, Bijdragen 103 (1988), 20 et seqq. who provides a detailed account of the geographic, 
professional and sociological background of the members of the court in the eighteenth century as well as the various career 
patterns; further he analyses the complex procedures for appointment of the judges, the esteem in which judges of the Hoge 
Raad were held, and discusses the decision making process, rules for discharge of office and other aspects of judicial 
independence. 
35 For more details on the - sometimes overlapping - jurisdictions of the Hoi van Holland and the Hoge Raad see 
DolezaJek, Zivilprozessrecht, 71-73 and the authorities cited there. The frequent problems litigants could face due to this 
jurisdictiegeschille between the two courts are stressed by Van Poelgeest, Bijdragen 103 (1988),47. 
36 For the development of the judicial structure during the consecutive Batavian period and the period of restoration see 




sovereignty of the state. Remarkably, thus, reference was to the ware vrijheid when William n 
died in 1650 and for nearly 25 years the first so-called stadhouderloze tijdperk was in 
existence.37 Consequently, at a relatively early stage of European constitutional development, 
separation of powers, even if not fully worked out (there being no parliament), was at least 
admitted in the Netherlands in that those superior organs of state which continued to exist in 
the Republic were separate and differently staffed. 
L van Poelgeest for instance provides for a detailed account of the procedure of nomination 
and appointment of the judges (raadsheren) of the Hoge Raad in the province of Holland.38 
According to a ratio formula from 1596, the province of Holland regularly appointed seven of 
the obligatory ten judges39 (excluding the president of the court who was nominated and 
appointed at a special convention of the leden van de Staten van Holland en de Staten van 
Zeeland).4o In case of a vacancy, it was the Hoge Raad's privilege to supply a list of six 
candidates to the raadspensionaris of the Estates of Holland out ofwhich the appointee had to 
be drawn. The raadspensionaris then sent the list to the 18 towns of Holland with a seat in the 
Estates and to the riddershap. By means of a simple majority vote, the 19 members of the 
Estates chose three candidates. In those times when Holland had no stadhouder (1650-1672, 
1711-1747), the number one nominee was appointed and furnished with his letter of 
appointment (commissiebriej) by the Estates of Holland (and also of Zeeland). When a 
stadhouder was in office, his was the privilege of choosing one from the list of three nominees 
regardless of the order in which they were voted on by the Estates.41 
37 Lademacher, Niederlande, 181. 
38 The procedures at the various superior courts of the provinces, however, were not identical. This already appears from 
Van Poelgeest's account of the differences between the relevant procedure for the appoinnnent of the judges of the Hoge 
Raad, who were nominated on the Zeeland 'ticket', and that for judges appointed by Holland. See Van Poelgeest, 
Bijdragen 103 (1988),27-35 for details. With regard to the procedure in Friesland see Huussen, Bijdragen 93 (1978), 252­
258. 

39 Groot Placaet-Boek, vol.JI 856. 

40 Van Poelgeest, Bijdragen 103 (1988), 33. 

41 Van Poelgeest at 28 also points to the 'deals ' that were made prior the nomination of the three candidates for promotion 

to the Hoge Raad: In particular, smaller towns that were not as influential as, for instance, Haarlem or Amsterdam 'traded' 

their vote for political concessions in other fields. However, these realities cannot obscure the fact that the judges of the 

Hoge Raad were appointed by means of a comparably advanced procedure that ensured protection from undue influence by 






















'Separation of powers' if this term may - cautiously - continue to be used, was further 
established from 1581 onwards when the superior courts were relieved of the administrative 
duties which they had exercised since the days of their foundation.42 Henceforth, superior 
courts exercised unlimited jurisdiction in legal matters in their respective provinces.43 
The newly won independence of the supreme courts was by and large respected by the other 
arms of government. There were only occasional examples where other branches of 
government, such as the stadhouders, tried, in most cases not very successfully, to intervene at 
the courts.44 This situation was quite distinct from that in many other European states at the 
time, for instance in France or Prussia where the monarch's lettres de cachet (imprisonment of 
individual judges) and Machtspruche or Kabinettsjustiz (peremptory orders) became an 
increasingly attractive alternative means of control of the courts well into the end of the 
eighteenth century.45 
42 Huussen, Bijdragen 93 (1978), 249-250. See also the text above at I fn5. 
43 Fockema Andreae, Staats- en Rechtsleven, 79 states: "De voorheen monarchale gerechtshoven, dor de ins telling der 
nieuwe Stalen-organen van nagenoeg al hun bestuurs- en welgeversfunclies ontheven, zagen zich bepaaldelijk op de 
rechtspraak geconcentreerd en in een zekere legenslelling tOI de welgevende en besturende organen gebracht. Feilelijk was 
de onafhankelijkheid dezer rechlscolleges in hoge male verzekerd." Further see Huussen, Bijdragen 93 (1978),250. 
44 Van Deursen, Hel Koppergeld, 167-168. 
45 Dawson, Oracles, 250-257 and 365-366. Van Poelgeest, Bijdragen 103 (1988),47-49 includes an interesting detail with 
regard to what he calls a " ... milde, republikeinse vorm van 'Kabinellsjusliz '... ". He points to the so-ca1ledjuslitiebesogne of 
the province of Holland, a body that consisted of II representatives of the 10 most influential towns of the province, the 
riddershap and the raadspensionaris of the Estates of Holland. The jusliliebesogne exercised its jurisdiction in cases where 
parties were at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Hoge Raad in polilieke zaken. One such dispute arose for instance in 
1702 over the question of whether the King of Prussia or 10han WiJlem Friso, Sladhouder of Friesland, was entitled to the 
inheritance of the so-called Governor-King William III. On the surface a mere civil law suit was in the offing which clearly 
would have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Hoge Raad. Nonetheless, since it was evident that this question touched 
upon vital interests of the entire Republic the juslitiebesogne decided to affirm the jurisdiction of the Estates of Holland. 
However, Van Poelgeest also points out that during the eighteenth century the tendency of the Estates to interfere with the 
jurisdiction of the Hoge Raad declined dramatically. The last incident occurred in 1724, and in only 4 instances out of 22 
did thejustitiebesogne deny the jurisdiction of the Hoge Raad. 
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2 2 The lower courts 
A confusing variety existed in the Low Countries with regard to naming, appointment, 
organisation and jurisdiction of the lower COurtS.46 
On the platte land, justice in the lower courts was administered by a schout.47 Depending on 
the region, a schout was assisted by a number of schepenen or an azing. The court of the 
schout had jurisdiction in cases of minor offences as well as in actions for money or debt. 
From these courts of first instance, appeal was possible to the committee of baljuw en mannen 
or drost en mannen or directly to the hof of the province.48 The court of the baljuw or drost 
had first instance jurisdiction within the baljuwschap, as well as in cases relating to 
succession, land and feudal law.49 In the towns, the law was administered by baljuw en 
schepenen or schout en schepenen or gezworenen. In addition, the more influential towns, 
namely Amsterdam, Leiden, Rotterdam and The Hague, established inferior town courts. 
These were instituted either with special jurisdiction or with jurisdiction in respect of small 
claims. Furthermore, there existed a large number of special courts such as feudal, forest 
(houtvester en de meesters-knapen) , dyke (dijkgraaf ende hoge heemraden), tax (schepenen 
commissarissen), water, guild and market courts.50 
2 3 Professionalism and legal education 
The trend towards legal professionalism which began to prevail from the fifteenth century, at 
least in the superior courts, was the second important aspect of the development of the judicial 
system of the Netherlands. 
The developments that led to the replacement of the traditional rulers' curiae as royal law 
courts by a body of professional councillors who adjudicated simply by means of delegation 
46 For an overview see Van der Linden, Judicieele Practijcq, 1.4. 

47 Merula, Manier van Procederen, J.6.1.13 (2). 

48 Ibid. at (2) [eJ and [t]. 

49 See Dolezalek, Zivilprozessrecht, 68 and the authorities cited; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 475. 

50 Dolezalek, Zivilprozessrechl, 68-69. 
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have been touched upon elsewhere. 51 As, for instance, in Italy from the twelfth century 
onwards, the judges of the various hole as well as of the Hoge Raad had to be doctors of law 
or at least licentiates in law. The Instructie van de Hoi van Holland (1531) required that the 
court consist of a president and eight councillors who had all to be professionally trained 
lawyers.52 Moreover, the list of raadshere of the Hoi van Holland included such well-known 
names as Nicolaus Everhardus, president of the court from 1509-152853 ; Pelgrim van Loo, a 
distinguished judge from 1576-158754 ; and Johann Loenius, judge at the court from 1621­
1641.55 Other famous officers of the court were none less than the great Hugo Grotius, who 
acted as advocaat-jiskaal from 1607-1614, and Willem van Alphen, who acted as secretary of 
the court from 1631-1681.56 
The Hoge Raad consisted of a president and ten trained councillors who held office for life. 57 
Members of this court included Cornelius Neostadius (1584-1606), Jacob Coren (1621­
51 See above at I. De Schepper and Cauchies, Legal Tool, 250-251 make the point that the rulers only occasionally 

continued to take an active part in the admin istration of justice. An exception to the rule was the famous case of the trial of 

the counts Egmont and Hom who, together with William of Orange, were the leaders of the revolt against the Spanish­

Habsburgians and, in 1568, were sentenced to death by Philip II roughly a year before their arrest and trial. 

52 De Bh~court and Fischer, Kort Begrip /, 430. Merula, Manier van Procederen, 1.6.1.13 (2) mentions "Personen uit de 

beste en Geleerdste, mitsgaders ervarenste ...". 

53 Author of the Responsa sive consilia, see for more details Roberts, Bibliography, 116 and Dekkers, Bibliotheca, 53; De 

Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 164; De Wet, Ou Skrywers, 114. 

54 See Roberts, Bibliography, 194 and Dekkers, Bibliotheca, 103; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 323 and 371; De Vos, 

Regsgeskiedenis, 170; De Wet, Ou Skrywers, 180. 

55 Author of another collection of decisions titled Decisien en Observatien (1721) see Roberts, Bibliography, 194 and 

Dekkers, Bibliotheca, 102; De Wet, Ou Skrywers, 141; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 222 and Van ZyJ, Geskiedenis, 376-377. 

56 With regard to Grotius see for more details below 43. On W van Alphen note Roberts, Bibliography, 34 and Dekkers, 

Bibliotheca, 3; De Wet, Ou Skrywers, 137; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 181; Van ZyJ, Geskiedenis, 381. 

57 Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 542. 
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1631),58 the eminent Cornelis van Bynkershoek, judge from 1704-1743 and the court's 
president from 1724 until his death59, and the latter's son-in-law, Willem Pauw.60 
Relatively recent studies, for instance for the Raad van Braband, have shown that from as 
early as the second half of the fifteenth century, up to the year 1600, the percentage of 
councillors of the Raad with a university law degree never dropped below 66%. From 1525 
onwards, the percentage was never less than 95%.61 Most councillors with a university degree 
had studied either canon law or Roman law or both at Louvain (82,4 %), Orleans (25%) or 
Bologna (10,5%).62 The same pattern prevailed in the superior courts of the northern 
provinces. However, with the emergence of the first Dutch universities at the end of the 
sixteenth century, many judges were graduates of a local university.63 By the end of the 
eighteenth century, most superior judges, even in the remote and undeveloped areas of the 
northern Low Countries, were holders of a doctorate oflaw.64 
58 As collectors of important court decisions of the Hoge Raad, both authors are predecessors ofComeJis van Bynkershoek 

and his son-in-law Willem Pauw. Neostadius (Comelis Mathiasz van Nieustad) published a collection of court cases in his 

Utriusque Hollandiae, Zelandiae et West-Frisae curiae decisiones (1617) on which see De Smidt, Hoge Raad, 209; see 

also Roberts, Bibliography, 224. Further Van Heijnsbergen, Geschiedenis, 98. Jacob Coren is well known for his 

Observationes XLI rerum in supremo senatu Hollandiae, Zelandiae et Frisae judicatarum (1633). Note Roberts, 

Bibliography, 89. See also Van Heijnsbergen, Geschiedenis, 98. For further references see Zimmennann, RHR, 21-22; De 

Wet, Ou Skrywers, 133 (Coren) and 126 (Neostadius); De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 170 (Coren) and 169-170 (Neostadius); 

Van Zyl, Geskiedenis , 321 and 324 (Coren) and 371-372 (Neostadius). 

59 He left his collection of cases titled Observationes Tumultuariae to Willem Pauw, which was published in this century in 

four volumes by Meijers et al. For his other important works, see Roberts, Bibliography, 68. For a brief biographical sketch 

and further references see Feenstra, Van Bynkershoek, 107. See further Zimmermann, RHR, 32-36; De Vos, 

Regsgeskiedenis, 200-204; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 367-370; De Wet, Ou Skrywers, 160. 

60 Pauw continued the work of his father-in-law in his Observationes Tumultuariae Novae edited by Fischer et al. For more 
references on Pauw, see Zimmermann, RHR, 22 and 35, De Wet, Ou Skrywers, 183; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 202; Van 

Zyl , Geskiedenis, 369-370 and 407-408. 

61 See the remarkable study by De Ridder-Symoens, Conseil de Brabant, 285. 

62 Ibid. at 294. 

63 With regard to the situation at Flanders, Van Caenegem, Historical Introduction, 80 fnlO6 states: .. .. .. in the course of the 

sixteenth century legists [so called since they had studied at university the leges of the Roman emperors] became ever more 

numerous until they obtained a monopoly. At the parlement ...and the Great CounciLof Malines, all the councillors were 

doctors or graduates in law." The first Dutch universities were Leiden (1575), Franeker (1585), Groningen (1614), 

Leeuwarden, Utrecht (1636) and Harderwijk (1648). With regard to the emergence oflega\ university education in the Low 
Countries see inter alia Zimmermann, RHR, 22-24; as well as Coing, Handbuch, 58·59; Stein, Romisches Recht in Europa, 
161·162. Enlightening are also the comments by Lademacher, Niederlande, 312-327. 

64 Van Poelgeest, Bijdragen 103 (1988), 25 states that two thirds of the raadsheren of the Hoge Raad held a doctorate from 





Most (43) of the 47 judges on whom Van Poelgeest based his research on the Hoge Raad, 
joined the Bar either at the Hoge Raad or the Hoi van Holland before they were called to the 
Bench. Van Poelgeest states that an average of 15 years lay between the termination of 
university training and appointment to the Bench.65 The Hoivan Friesland had 12 raadsheren 
ordinaris who were appointed for life. The letter of commission generally spoke of bekwaam 
en rechts-ervaren persoon, though Huussen tells as that a candidate had, inter alia, to be a 
born Frisian or to have a Frisian wife or to have lived in Friesland for 20, later 10, years. The 
candidate also had to be a protestant (ware gerelormeerde religie) and a doctor or licentiaat of 
law as well as a matriculant of the Bar of the Hoi van Holland. 66 Given the ability and 
knowledge of the judges, the application of the law in the higher courts of the Low Countries 
was, understandably, at a high level. 
While much was expected of the judges, the situation that prevailed in the lower courts was 
very different from that at the superior courts. The seventeenth and eighteenth century local 
judges in the Low Countries are referred to in the Latin legal literature as iudex but also as 
rechter or magistraet. These local judges held an honorary (i.e., unpaid) public office and 
administered the law in the name of the province or the cities.67 In this respect they must be 
distinguished from the Roman iudex or the Italian foreign iudex. In addition, the term 
magistraet in its administrative meaning of a member of a local municipal council of a Dutch 
town must be distinguished from magistraet in its judicial context as a member of the court of 
baljuw en schepenen or schout en schepenen.68 
65 Van Poelgeest, Bijdragen \03 (\988), 25. 

66 Huussen, Bijdragen 93 (1978),256. 

67 Voet, Commentarius, 5.1.39; Huber, Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt, 2.1.\5.6: " ...door publijk£ aUioriteit gestelt ... ". 

And at 22 he states: " ... worden. .. alle Rechters hooge of leege... onder dese beschrijvinge beklemt." Quoting from Huber's 

Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt the first time makes it necessary to point to fact that the original work consisted of two 

separate parts, with three titles each. P Gane based his translation in The Jurisprudence of my Time on the fifth edition, 

where both parts (and thus all six titles) were included in one book. Thus, the title numbers are different: for instance 

2.1.15.6 (vol.II, title I) of the Leeuwarden (1686) edition is 4.\5.6. in Gane's Jurisprudence of my Time. Since I have 
quoted from both works it is important to keep this in mind. With regard to the requirements, both theoretical and factual, 
of the offices of local and national government see Van Deursen, Het Koppergeld, 159-161 and Lademacher, Niederlande, 
201-215. 
68 Van Zurek, Codex Batavus, 'Magistraten' 3.5 n.2. See also Groenewegen, Tractatus , C.1.55.3 and 6; Wessels, History, 
163. 
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In contrast to the situation in the Italian towns (where the entire judiciary, whether inferior or 
superior, local or foreign, had from the twelfth century onwards to have at least a law degree 
requiring a minimum of four to five years of study at a law school), hardly any of the inferior 
judges in the Low Countries had ever read for a degree. 69 With regard to the earlier periods, B 
H D Hermesdorfwrote of the jUdiciary in the Low Countries: 
"Tach stelle men zijn verwachtingen amtrent deze schepengeleerdheid niet al Ie haag. We merkten 
al ap dat geschaalde juristen in de schepenbanken nag altijd een uitzandering varmen. ,,70 
This applied to inferior judges in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries alike.71 The towns 
elected their baljuws or schouts as well as the schepenen from the ranks of the burghers of the 
towns; but only for a term ofone year.72 And even though there existed the practice, albeit to a 
smaller degree than in Germany, of calling on professors of law schools or renowned 
advocates for professional advice (advysen), not much experience and expertise could be 
gained from one year of judicial service.73 In addition, the lower court judges were not only 
uneducated in law, but often had difficulty reading (legal) Latin, which had become 
increasingly important for the proper understanding and administration of the law of the Low 
Countries from the fifteenth century onwards. Although a number of important authors of 
Roman-Dutch law, beginning with Hugo Grotius, published some of their works in Dutch, 
Latin remained the language of the university-trained jurists well into the nineteenth century.74 
69 Hermesdorf in his Rechtsspiegel, 142 refers to Jan Matthijssen and stated that Matthijssen concludes from the oath of the 
schepenen that: " ... deze mensen 'gheleerde luden' moeten zijn al bedoelt hi} daarnu geenszins dat ze een universitaire 
scholing achter zich moeten hebben ." 
70 Ibid. at 146. 
71 See also Huber in his Jurisprudence of my Time at 4.15 .18: "It is, however, a fact that certain [lower) judges are 
appointed without skill in the law ... " . 
72 Van Poelgeest, Bijdragen 103 (1988), 24; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 476; see also Van Zurek, Codex Batavus, 
'Magistraten' 3.5 n.6, where it is said that no burgher might excuse himself from the office of schepenen without acceptable 
reason which bears similarities to the situation at the time of the Roman republic, for which see above at chapter II I 3. See 
further Groenewegen, Tractatus, C.1.55.3. 
73 Van den Bergh, Gerard Noodt, 283-284 and see below at fun254-257 . For the development of the Aktenversendung in 
Germany see inter alia Woeste, Akademische Viiter als Richter, 9-14 (University of Marburg); Baumglirtel, Gutachter- und 
Urteilstiitigkeit, 12-32 (University of Erlangen); Geipel, Konsiliarpra:xis, especially 3-35 (University of Tiibingen); more 
generally Kern, Gerichlsverfassungsrechl , 36-38. Further note Dawson's comments, Oracles, 196-213 . 
74 On Grotius and the publication of his fnleidinge in Dutch, see De Smidt, Expansion, 181. 
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The medieval lay judge used to 'find' the correct customary law in medieval case books and 
then apply it to the case.75 However, from the sixteenth century onwards, professional 
commentaries on customary law became increasingly authoritative. In a number of cases these 
commentaries were written by persons who had at some time been law professors, judges of 
the superior courts or even advocates. This new class of lawyers blended customary law with 
Roman law, which had gained the status in the Low Countries of a strong complementary 
source of law and increasingly replaced purely customary law?6 In their works, these 
commentators paid particular attention to the practical legal questions of the age.77 Indeed, 
this practical nature of Roman-Dutch law is considered one of its most important aspects.78 
Ulrich Huber, in his Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt, states that a judge had to be schooled 
in, first, the gemein and, secondly, the bysonder recht. This meant that a judge needed to 
know: " ... eerstelyk het Rooms-recht, ende ten !weeden de Ordonanntien van Frieslandt... ".79 
Needless to say, most lower court judges experienced severe problems with the vast, growing, 
complex and partly obscure legal material of Roman law. Taking all this into account, it is 
hardly surprising that the eminent Comelis van Bynkershoek, well known for his acid 
criticismSo, said of the judges of the lower courts that they " ... are often as incompetent to give 
decisions as an ass to play on the lyre."sl 
Thus, a split image emerges of the professionalism of the Dutch judiciary up to the late 
eighteenth century. The high degree of knowledge and expertise of the judges of the superior 
provincial courts contrasts sharply with that of the typical judge of the lower courts, who was 
75 For a raging discussion on the 'humanity' and the training of medieval and late medieval Dutch magistrates see De Mayer 

and Van den Elzen, TR 53 (1985),347. 

76 Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 516 state: "As in Germany, so in Hoiland, Roman law was applied as subsidiary common 

law.. .In practice Roman law played a far greater part than its status as a subsidiary common law may be thought to have 

warranted." See De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 147-161; Wille 's Principles of South African Law, 20-22; Wesenberg and 

Wesener, Privatrechtsgeschichte, 71-72. 

77 Van Caenegem, Historical Introduction , 9-10. Further see De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 162-163; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal 





78 For further detailed references to the development of Roman Dutch law as a jurisprudentia forensis see Zimmermann, 

RHR, 5 I-58 and 1990 JZ, 834 et seqq. 

79 Huber, Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt, 2. 1.15.13. 

80 See Zimmermann, RHR, 34. 






anything but a trained jurist and was selected for office on the basis of superior status rather 
than legal training. 
3 	 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF DELICT AS A BACKGROUND TO JUDICIAL 
LIABILITY 
With regard to developments in the law of delict relevant to the question of judicial liability, 
three aspects require specific attention. Of these the first is the general development of the 
three relevant actions, namely the actio legis Aquiliae, the actio iniuriarum and the actio de 
dolo. Attention will then be paid to the development of the terms dolus and culpa. Finally, the 
position ofthe group of quasi-delicts in Roman-Dutch law will be assessed. 
The Aquilian action of early Roman-Dutch law was considerably different from the actio legis 
Aquiliae of the Corpus luris Civilis. As we have seen, the latter was an actio mixta in that it 
had both penal and reipersecutory characteristics.82 By the end of the Middle Ages, however, 
the penal aspect of the action had declined in importance.83 This was in line with the general 
position in the ius commune, where the old delicti privata, though received in all systems 
except the French, had begun to shed their penal characteristics.84 
The reasons for the decline in importance of the penal aspects of the delicti privata appear to 
be threefold. Firstly the incorporated system of fixed fines (duplum, quadruplum, etc) within 
the delicti privata contradicted an established principle in the ius commune: "Hodie omnes 
poenae sunt arbitrariae". This meant that it was at the judge's discretion to reduce or to 
increase a sentence according to the circumstances of the case.85 Secondly, fixed fines were 
also contradictory to the principle in canon law whereby an injured party was permitted to 
82 See above at chapter IV 2 fn I 28. 

83 For an excellent overview on the course of development, see De Wet, Liability for Wrongful Conduct, 149 el seqq. See 

also Zimmermann, Law ofObligations, 918 el seqq, 969 et seqq. and 1019 et seq. 

84 With regard to the autonomous development in France where the actiones poenales were not accepted at all and thus 

deJicts which were part of the delicti privati were pursued only by means of public criminal procedure, see Coing, 

Europdisches Privatrecht, 506-507 and Dumas, Histoire des Obligations , 33 et seq. 




















receive compensation only for the actual loss suffered and not beyond.86 Thirdly, it seems that 
the growing evolution of governmental disciplinary power had led to exclusive prosecution in 
public criminal trials of most of the infringements also covered by the penal side of the delicti 
privata. 87 Parties could choose between public and private procedure, but for various reasons 
invariably opted for criminal procedure. The actio rei persecutoria, however, remained 
available after either of the two other procedures. Hence, in practice, the compensatory 
character was the only remaining feature of the delicta privata.88 According to Professor 
Coing, the transformation from actiones poenales or actiones mixta to exclusive actiones rei 
persecutoriae was complete by the seventeenth century.89 
This was also the case in Roman-Dutch law. T J Scott in his thesis on the historical 
development of the transmissibility of delictual actions in South African law has shown in 
detail how this process took place in the Netherlands. According to him, French rules of 
practice, which had been strongly influenced by canon law, played a decisive role in the 
Netherlands. Petrus Gudelinus (1550-1619), a writer from the Spanish Netherlands, inspired 
by the French practitioner Jean Imbert, was one of the first to point out that the system of 
poena privata was no longer applied in the Dutch provinces. 9o Writers from the northern 
provinces often referred to Gudelinus. 91 There was also frequent reference to Hugo Grotius, 
who stated at the end of his Inleidinge at 3.32.7: 
" ... the prosecution of crimes has almost entirely come into the hands of the Count and his 
officers ... However, although the same person is frequently entitled to something as compensation 
and also to something as penalty and although both of these are frequently included under one 
word, nevertheless they must for many reasons be distinguished one from another.,,92 
86 According to Coing, Europdisches Privatrecht, 504. See also De Wet, Liability for Wrongful Conduct, 181. 

87 Coing, Europdisches Privatrecht, 504-506. De Wet, Liability for Wrongful Conduct, 180. 

88 For a comprehensive study of the development of Aquilian liability in the German usus modernus, see the work by 

Kaufmann, Actio Legis Aquiliae. 

89 Coing, Europdisches Privatrecht, 510. 

90 GudeJinus, Commentarii de lure Novissimo, 3. 13: "Sed observandum est poenas istas pecuniarias dupli, tripli, 

quadrupli, iure Romano constitutas, moribus exolevisse; relicta tantum privatis, ejus quod sibi ex bonis abest, seu quod 

sua interest, judicio civili persequendi facultate, jisco solo poenas ob vindictam publicam judicio criminali persequente." 

With regard to Gudelinus see Roberts, Bibliography, 144. 

91 For instance Vinnius, Ad Institutionum, 4.3.9. 





Simon Groenewegen van der Made observed: "The action under the Lex Aquilia is not penal 
nowadays, but reipersecutory ... ".93 Antonius Matthaeus IT commented in his De Criminibus: 
"Finally it must be noted that present day [criminal] practice has almost entirely given up the 
assessing of damage as done by the Lex Aquilia.,,94 And Johannes Voet in his Commentary 
stated: "However the rule has prevailed by our customs ...action under the Aquilian law is no 
longer penal but is for the recovery ofproperty .. .".95 
With the disappearance of the penal aspects of the actio legis Aquiliae, the action was soon 
considered passively transmissible. Even more significant was the extension, finally, of the 
actio legis Aquiliae to cover purely patrimonial loss, a field that used to be covered in Roman 
law exclusively by the subsidiary actio de dolo in the event of damage inflicted dolo malo. It 
may be recalled that in Roman law patrimonial loss was recoverable only where it related to a 
specific corporeal asset in the possession of the plaintiff. Already at the time of the 
Commentators the emergence of the doctrine of interesse resulted in a cautious tendency 
towards extending the application of the actio legis Aquiliae, or at least the actio in factum, to 
instances where the plaintiff had suffered patrimonial loss without loss or damage to any 
particular item of his property.96 But since it was now widely accepted that no practical 
distinction existed between the extended actio in factum and the actio legis Aquiliae, the 
Aquilian action was certainly on its way towards becoming a general comprehensive remedy 
for the recovery of damages for all patrimonial harm caused with dolus or culpa. 97 
What was the relation of the actio legis Aquiliae to other delictual actions? Of particular 
interest to us is the relation to the actio de dolo. In Roman law, no concurrence of the two 
actions was possible since the actio de dolo was subsidiary to the actio legis Aquiliae. 
Furthermore, in cases involving damage to property, the actio de dolo was available only if 
the damage was committed dolo malo.98 It is evident that as long as the Aquilian action was 
restricted to damage to property, there was room for the actio de dolo. Once the Aquilian 
93 Groenewegen, Treatise, 4.3.\5. 
94 See On Crimes, 47.3.4. 
95 9.2.12. 

96 See the text above at chapter IV 2 fn 128. 

97 For details and further references see below at 4 4 fnn320-324 . 



























action began to move into the field of pure economic loss, there was little room for the actio 
de dolo - especially in view of its subsidiary nature.99 
As regards the actio iniuriarum: the Aquilian action and the actio iniuriarum were 
undoubtedly considered concurrent since the former came to be considered purely 
rei persecutory, whereas the latter remained a private penal action. In brief, it appears that the 
actio iniuriarum in Roman-Dutch law to a large extent resembled that in Roman law, 
particularly the law presented by the Glossators and Commentators. IOO In Roman-Dutch law, 
iniuria continued to have two meanings: the general meaning of any legal wrong and the more 
specific meaning of contumelious conduct. 
Arnoldus Vinnius states that: " ... iniuria est omne dictum jactumve ad contemptum, infamiam, 
aut dolorem alterius directum."lol Simon van Leeuwen understands iniuria as a delict where 
something is done or said with injurious intention. 102 Huber makes the point: "Injury is a 
crime deliberately committed with the effect of bringing another into ridicule and 
contempt.,,103 Dionysius Godefridus van der Keessel in his Praelectiones ad Ius Criminale 
considers an iniuria as " ... every act, or statement, committed with wrongful intent to cause 
insult, dishonour, contempt or distress to another."I04 Voet, more precisely, defines it as a 
" ... wrongdoing committed in contempt of a free human being, and by which his person or 
dignity or reputation is injured with evil intent.,,105 Generally speaking, authors considered 
corpus,jama and dignitas to be legally protected interests. 
An iniuria was committed either by acts (re), words (verbis) or writing (literis).106 However, 
some authors deviated from or supplemented this scheme. 107 Iniuria by act generally 
99 Ibid. at 109. 

100 Recent works with regard to the reception of the actio iniuriarum in Roman-Dutch law include inter alia: Zimmermann, 

Law ofObligations, 1062 et seqq; Ranchod, Foundations, 62 et seqq; Pauw, Persoonlikheidskrenking; 59 et seqq; Walter, 

Actio Iniuriarum, 64 et seqq; Davidtsz, Animus Iniuriandi, 132 et seq; Burchell, Law ofDefamation, 10 et seqq. 

101 Vinnius, Ad Institutionum, Inst.4.4.pr. 
102 Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, 1.5.25.1. However, it ought to be noted that Van Leeuwen follows Grotius's approach 
rather than the classical Roman law position. See also Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 359. 
103 Huber, Jurisprudence ofmy Time, 6.8.1. 
104 Van der Keessel, Praelectiones ad Jus Crimina/e, 47.10.1. 
105 Voet, Commentary, 47.10.1 . See also Davidtsz, Animus Iniuriandi , 164. 
106 Huber, Jurisprudence ofmy Time, 6.8.13 or Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt, 2.3.8.13; Van der Keessel , Praelectiones 
ad Jus Criminale 47.10.2; Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis , 1.5.25.7. 
: 
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involved the physical infliction of hann l08 by beating or wounding, but also covered 
numerous other acts; for example: lo9 the restriction of an individual's freedom by false 
imprisonment; the vexatious institution of court proceedings; obscene gestures or negative 
caricatures or plays; forcible entry into another's house or property; and acts directed against 
the honour and the reputation of females. Iniuria by words could be inflicted by making 
defamatory statements about someone, including the singing or recitation of defamatory 
songs or poems. IIO Iniuria by writing included any written statement published animo 
iniuriandi. III Iniuriae by writing were considered more serious than iniuriae by words. I 12 As 
a private penal action, the actio iniuriarum prescribed after one year. 113 
So far in this section, only occasional reference has been made to dolus or animus iniuriandi 
and culpa as subjective requirements for liability. From the content of earlier chapters, it is 
predictable that this aspect continued to play a considerable role in Roman-Dutch law of 
judicial liability. The process that led to the extension of Justinian's general system of 
culpability (in the sense of fault) during the age of the Glossators and Commentators has been 
discussed earlier. I 14 As described, dolus was considered to consist of dolus verus (manifestus) 
and dolus praesumptus, whereas culpa (in the narrow sense of negligence) consisted of culpa 
lata, culpa levis, culpa levissima. This notion was widely accepted in Roman-Dutch law. lIS 
Franciscus Kersteman in his Rechtsgeleerd Woorden-Boek concluded that culpa " ...woord 
verdeeld in drie soorten te weeten lata, levis en levissima.,,116 Diodorus Tulden in his 
\07 For instance Voet. Voet, Commenlarius, 47.10.7 somewhat unhappily added an iniuria consensu. See also 

Zimmermann, Law ofObligations, 1065. Matthaeus, De Criminibus, 47.4.1 .1 included iniuriae gestus obscoenus and per 

picturam. See for further comments Walter, Actio fniuriarum, 76 fu67. 

108 Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, 1.5.25.7. See also Voet, Commentarius, 47.10.7; Van der Keessel, Prae/ectiones ad 

Jus Criminate, 47.10.2 ad corpus; Huber, Jurisprudence ofmy Time, 6.8.14 or Heedendaegse Rechtsge/eertheyt, 2.3.1.14. 





110 Voet, Comrnentarius, 47.10.8 or Van der Keessel, Prae/ectiones ad Jus Criminate, 47.10.2 ad existimationem. 

III For more details see Walter, Actio fniuriarum, 81-83; Ranchod, Foundations, 73-74 both with vast references to other 

primary and secondary sources. 

112 Schrassert, Practicae Observationes, Cons. 23.45 ; Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, 1.5.25.9. 
113 Van Leeuwen, Rooms-Hollands-Reg/, 4.37.3; Van der Keessel , Prae/ec/iones ad Jus Criminate, 47.10.19. 
114 See above chapter IV 2 fun 119 et seqq. 
lIS See for instance Voe!, Commentarius, 9.2.13; Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, 1.5.1.3-4 and Rooms-Hollands Regt, 
4.32.1 . 


















commentary on the Institutes refers to it.lI7 Johannes Jacob Wissenbach in his 
Exercitationum, under the heading ad regula juris, makes a general analysis of the law on 
dolus and culpa. 118 
Acting with dolus verus or dolus manifestus was, undoubtedly, the most severe case of 
judicial misconduct. However, it appears that dolus verus was no longer considered dolus 
malus in the sense of fraud or particularly reprehensible conduct. On the contrary, a multitude 
of terms appear from the various sources. Reference is made, inter alia, to dolus as 
prerequisite for certain crimes. 1l9 Voet's definition of dolus in his commentary undoubtedly 
owes its inspiration to Labeo's classical defmition of dolus malus in the sense of fraud120, but 
he also makes reference to mere dolus without indicating fraud or dolus malus. 121 In his 
Beginselen des Rechts, Voet mentions bedrog as having the meaning of dolus. 122 
Van Leeuwen describes dolus as animus et affectus delinquendi l23 , or, more narrowly, as 
" ...nec dolus, aut caliditas aliqua intercesserint ... ,,124, or as openlijk bedrog. 125 Kersteman 
refers to dolus as argUst or opzet, which indicates either fraud or intention. 126 In the eyes of 
Vander Keessel, dolus directus exists where a person acts with voluntas and animus necandi 
whereas dolus indirectus requires merely animus laedendi. In cases of dolus directus, thus, the 
will of the CUlprit had to be directed at a specific result. Mere animus laedendi was indicative 
of the intention to injure someone.127 Huber frequently refers to the terms opzet, boos opzet, 
quaet opzet or bedroch 128 , as well as to dolus. 129 And Van der Linden makes the point that 
boos opzet lay where there was the intention to kill another person, when imand zig 
117 Ad Institutionum, Inst.3 .Cap 7, Tulden states: "Culpa lata vero est negligentia vel imperitia quae eumque alteri 

damnosa & distinguitur in latam, levem, & levissimam". 

118 Exereitationum, Disp. 4.6-7. 

119 Matthaeus, De Criminibus, Prolegomena 1.2. 

120 Commentarius, 4.3.1. 

121 Voet, Compendium luris, 4.5 and his Elementa luris, 4.5. 

122 Voet, Beginselen des Reehts, 4.3.6 and 4.5. I. 

123 Censura Forensis, 1.5.1.3-4. 

124 Ibid. at 2.1.8 .9. 

125 Rooms-Hollands Regt, 4.32.1. 

126 Aanhangzel Rechtsgeleer/ Woorden-Boek, 'Dolus'. 

127 Praeleetiones ad Jus Criminale, 48 .8.3. 






voorgenomen heeft een doodslag te begaan, en dezelve op de voorgenome wijze ter uitvoer 
brengt...".130 Furthennore, Dutch writers equated the tenn animus iniuriandi, which as we 
know frequently relates to the actio iniuriarum, with intentie om te willen irljurieren 131 , with 
oogmerk om te beledingen 132 or with intentie om te irljurieren. I33 Obviously, animus 
iniuriandi was also equated with opzet or dolus. 134 
In light of the foregoing, it must be asked what exactly constituted animus iniuriandi or 
dolus. 135 An acceptable overall view is that of Ranchod, who argues that in Roman-Dutch 
law animus iniuriandi was established only if two requirements were met: firstly, the 
defendant had to be aware of the wrongfulness of his acts and secondly, he must have acted 
with the intention to injure. 136 
Besides the tenns opzet, intentie, animus iniuriandi or dolus, there remains the tenn dolus 
malus. Dolus malus in Dutch had the meaning of argelist, argUst or boos opzet and indicated 
particularly fraudulent or reprehensible conduct, as was also meant by dolus in post-classical 
Roman law and by the Glossators and Commentators. Hence, from Roman-Dutch law 
onwards, we have a clearly divided meaning of dolus: the more general one of mere intention 
and the narrower one of fraud (dolus malus). One meaning, however, that was never attached 
to dolus or dolus malus in Roman-Dutch law was that of a bad motive. Thus, the Roman­
Dutch jurists did not confuse the two issues of state of mind and the underlying motive. This 
conclusion is of considerable importance for the development of modem South African law. 
129 Positiones Juris, 4.5.2. 

130 Regtsgeleerd Handboek, 2.5.5, see also 2.16.2. 

131 Kersteman, Rechtsgeleert Woorden-Boek, 'Injurie'. 

132 Van der Linden, Regtsgeleerd Handboek, 1.16.4. 

133 Schomaker, Selecta Consilia et Responsa Juris, vol.JJ Cons. 1.57 .16. 

134 See also Pauw, Persoonlikheidskrenking, 79 and 82-83 for a detailed overview. 

135 Some authors hold that mental elements did not play an important role. The discussion recorded in this footnote relates 

to the situation under the actio iniuriarum. From the aforesaid it seems feasible, however, to apply these principles to the 

question of dolus in general. For details see Walter, Actio Iniuriarum, 95 quoting De Villiers, Law of Injuries , 28; 

McQuoid-Mason, Law of Privacy, 10 I. Others hold that mere awareness of the wrongful nature of the conduct was not 

sufficient for animus iniuriandi but that in addition the intent to defame another was required. See Ranchod, Foundations, 

75 interpreting numerous comments by the Roman-Dutch authorities to this effect. 

136 Ranchod, FoundatiOns, 76·79 with reference to De Damhouder's Practycke in Civile Saecken , 123; Matthaeus, De 

Criminibus, 47.4 .1.7 ; Voet, Commentarius, 47.10.20; Huber, Praelectiones Juris Civilis, In5t.4.4.I; Schomaker, Se/ecta 

Cons ilia et Responsa Juris, vol.V Cons.63.8.1 0 and 11 ; Van der Keessel, Prae/ectiones ad Jus Criminate, 47.10.1. 
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The threefold concept of culpa had also to be applied in assessing potential liability, including 
judicial liability. The rule imperitia culpae adnumeratur retained its validity.13? Thus, 
generally speaking, any injurious inexperience or lack of skill or care on the part of a 
supposed expert led to liability.138 However, this rule was not applied consistently to all 
experts or professionals. Groenewegen and Van Leeuwen were amongst the first to articulate 
the view that doctors and advocates were not invariably held responsible for lack of skill. 139 
Somewhat literally, Groenewegen refers to the 'earth' which often enough covers the fatal 
consequences of doctors' lack of skill in treating their patients. Likewise, with regard to the 
judge who acted with imperitia, he was to ask the crucial question of whether Roman-Dutch 
law accepted the notion that judges should be held liable for dolus and culpa, with which 
imperitia was equated. 
The final aspect to be discussed in this section is the position of the group of quasi-delicts in 
Roman-Dutch law. 140 With reference to Roman law as it existed under Justinian, as well as to 
developments in the ius commune since the eleventh century, the Dutch jurists accepted the 
fourfold scheme of contract, quasi-contract, delict and quasi-delict. Accordingly, they 
followed in the main Justinian, who defined culpability as the cornerstone of delictual liability 
and who extended this principle, without too many scruples, to quasi-delictual liability. A 
distinction was drawn here between obligations ex malejicio and quasi ex malejicio. 141 
However, as in other countries, the category of quasi-delicts proved a major source of 
dissatisfaction for the Dutch jurists. Given their acceptance of the Justinian fault basis of 
quasi-delict, they found difficulty in justifying the retention of this category in the system of 
137 For more details see Scott, Imperitia Culpae Adnumeratur, 124 and 130-140. 

138 Particular attention was paid to doctors, advocates, craftsmen, muleteers, midwifes and masters of ships. See Grotius, 

In/eidinge (1939), 3.33 .5; Vinnius, Ad Institutionum. 4.3.7.8; Voet, Commentarius, 9.2.13 and 23; Huber, Prae/ectiones 

Juris Civilis, Inst.4.3.8. 

139 Groenewegen, Tractatus, 4.3.7. 1 and 2; Van Leeuwen, Rooms-Hollands Regt, 4.39.4. 

140 With regard to quasi-delictual liability in Roman-Dutch law see Van der Merwe, Verschu/densunabhiingige Haftung, 

456-484; Pauw, THR-HR 42 (1979), 249. Further De Blecourt and Fischer, Kort Begrip 1, 320; Feenstra, 

Romeinsrechte/ijke Gronds/agen, 162; Zirrunermann, Law of Obligations, 17 et seq and 1126 et seqq; Godding, Droit 

Prive, 500-503. On the development of the quasi-delicts in the ius commune in general see Coing, Europaisches 

Privatrecht, 395 and particularly, of course, the work by Hochstein , Obligationes ex delicto, 70-93 . 

141 Grotius, In/eidinge (1926), 3.32.2; Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, 1.5.1.1 ; Van der Keessel , Prae/ectiones ad Jus 
Criminale , 3.32.2; Van der Linden, Regtsgeleerd Handboek, 15.1 and 6; Huber, Jurisprudence ofmy Time , 2.8.1, 2.8.3 and 
Beginze/en der Regtkunde, 4.1 .6-8; Voet, De Beginse/en des Rechts, 4.5.1; Vinnius, Ad Institutionum, 4.5 . 
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obligations. Why should there be quasi-delictual liability for culpa when the actio legis 
Aquiliae had emerged as the prototype of delictual liability for both dolus and culpa? 142 
A remarkable interpretation was provided by Hugo Grotius. When analysing his explanations, 
however, we need to bear in mind that Grotius was a practitioner of natural law and that the 
concept of delictual liability as discussed in his works De lure Belli ac Pacis and lnleidinge 
tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleertheyd was based on his theory of natural law. In Grotius's 
view, legal relations between individuals were regulated by the ius civile, i.e., positive law, 
which was the product of Roman law blended with Dutch customary law. However, the 
foundation of the positive law could be found only in the ius naturale, the system of law 
governed by objective reason. For an obligation to arise under the ius naturale required the 
free exercise of wil1.143 Accordingly, Grotius fOlTImlated the following general proposition 
based on the will of the individual as the foundation of liability in the law of delict: 144 
"Malejicium hic appellamus culpam omnem, sive in faciendo, sive in non faciendo, pugnantem 
cum eo quod aut homines communiter aut pro ratione certae qualitas facere debent. Ex tali culpa 
obligatio naturaliter oritur si damnum datum est, nempe ut id resarciatur." 145 
Any wilful act or omission that was wrongful (not necessarily in the criminal sense) and 
directed against the property, life, body, dignity or freedom of another person, gave rise to 
delictual liability on the part of the wrongdoer. 146 Though he was influenced by the doctrine of 
restitutio and the Spanish moral-theologists Domenicus Soto and Diego Covarruvias, and 
most of all by Hugo Donellus, Grotius was the first to formulate such a general basis for the 
law of delict. 
The requirement ofwilful conduct or omission as the basis ofliability implies that, as a matter 
of principle, there should be no liability without fault. Nevertheless, Grotius continued to 
differentiate in his lnleidinge between obligations arising from delict (misdaed) and 
\42 Zimmennann, Law o/Obligations, 1126-1128; Van der Merwe, Verschuldensunabhiingige Haftung, 460, 462 and 464. 
143 Grotius, lnleidinge (1926),3.1.19. 
144 On the influence of Donellus on Grotius see Feenstra, BIDe 22 (1991),342-343 and Hugues Doneau, 231 et seqq. 
145 De lure Belli ac Pacis, 2.17.1. 
146 In his fnleidinge (1926), 3.33.1 Grotius refers to .. ...1 'leven, 1 'lichaem. de vrijheid, de eer en de goederen." For more 
details on the general development of the law of delict under Grotius and the various influences on him, see Feenstra, 
Quelques Remarques, 74 el seqq. with numerous references. With particular regard to the development of the law of delict 
see Feenstra, Deliklsrechl bei Grolius, 429-436, also available in Acla Juridica I (1958),27-29; see further by Feenstra, 
Hugo Grot/us, 259; Zimmennann, Law 0/Obligations, J 032- J 033; Benohr, ZSS (RA) 93 (1976), 209-213. 
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obligations arising from quasi-delict (misdaed door wet-duidinge).147 In 3.32.22 he attempted 
to explain quasi-delicts as follows: 
H ••• the civil law, seeing that some wrongful acts, even though they have taken place, are difficult to 
prove, has, in certain cases, introduced obligations analogous to obligations arising from crime." 
Obviously, Grotius did not consider quasi-delicts as a genuine part of the superior ius 
naturale, but, rather, as a 'lower' form of liability. Quasi-delicts were thus of a somewhat 
makeshift nature, characterised by the fact that difficulties of proof necessitated a relaxation of 
the fault requirement: in the case of quasi-delicts, damage was simply attributed to a person, 
not arbitrarily but because of the relationship between himself and the person or thing that 
inflicted the damage. In view of the difficulty of establishing fault, the person was in a sense 
again presumed to have committed a delict. 
According to 3.38.1, together with 3.32.22, of the Inleidinge, this difficulty of furnishing 
proof was recognised by the law as so-called wettelicke oorzaecke, i.e., as being sufficient for 
the arising of a quasi-delictual liability, the misdaed door wet-duidinge. Quasi-delicts, thus, 
were simply instances of damage being attributed to a person (ex iusta causa) who did not 
himself inflict the damage or where it was difficult to prove a culpable act or omission. 148 
However, damage was not attributed to a person arbitrarily but only where that person stood 
in a particular relationship to the person or the thing that inflicted the damage. 149 Prime 
examples of quasi-delictual liability for Grotius were: the case of fire that originated in one 
person's house and spread to other houses; the traditional quasi-delictual remedies except for 
the liability of the judge; the actio de pauperie; or - a frequent source of litigation in the 
Netherlands - collisions ofunmanoeuverable ships. 
The liability of judges is not dealt with under subsection 38 but under subsection 37 of the 
third chapter of Grotius's Inleidinge, where he discusses wrongful acts against property, that is 
ordinary delictual liability. The reason for this was, as will appear in more detail below, that 
147 Grotius, fnleidinge (1926), 3.32.23; 3.38. 

148 Grotius, fnleidinge (1926), 3.38. l. 

149 Grotius, fn/eidinge (1926), 3.38.1 and Van der Keessel, Prae/ectiones furis Hodierni, 3.38.1; Schorer, Aanteekeningen, 
3.38.2-8 ; Huber, 8eginzelen der Regtkunde, 2.4.1.7 distinguishing between eigentlyke and oneigentlyke misdaden: "Ten 2. de 
eigently ke zyn altoos feiten by de daders selfs begaen: de oneigentlyke zyn doorgaens feiten by andere begaen. ende die 
toegreeckent worden ... ". 
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he considered a judge's breach of duty as genuinely culpable delictual conduct which was by 
its very nature unlawful and which obviously was not difficult to prove. 
Grotius's theory, which appears to have been by far the most useful and satisfactory 
explanation of the category of quasi-delicts, was not accepted by all Roman-Dutch jurists. 150 
By and large, it was followed only by those writers who used Grotius's Inleidinge as the basis 
of their own contributions or who wrote commentaries on Grotius's work. 151 Most jurists 
belonged to the group that wrote commentaries on the use ofRoman law in the Low Countries 
and more or less followed the classical presentation of the Corpus Iuris Civilis 152 , which 
hinged on the traditional conviction that, generally speaking, dolus was required for delicts 
and mere culpa was sufficient for quasi-delicts. This view is best articulated by Johannes Voet 
who states in his commentary at 27.7.6: 
" ... according to very familiar principles of the Civil law an action .,. on quasi-wrongdoings could 
be available on the ground of slight or very slight negligence, and of ignorance, lack of skill and 
weakness without any fraud on the part of the person who was sued.,,153 
Some authors also used quasi-delicts as a convenient drip pan for other cases where damage 
had occurred without fault and was somewhat fortuitous, as in the case of liability under the 
actio de pauperie. 154 
150 Grotius's approach to the true character of quasi-delicts is considered by Hochstein as particularly remarkable. Grotius 

was the first author to find a convincing common dogmatic denominator for the different components of quasi-delicts since 

classical Roman law: To Hochstein, Grotius's view of the category of quasi-delicts gave rise to a liability which was of an 

objective rather than subjective nature and which was based upon the difficulty of submitting evidence. See Hochstein, 

Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 10 l. 

151 Wessels, History, 279. See further the interesting outline by Jansen of the frequent use of Grotius's De Jure ac Pacis by 

Dutch law professors in the eighteenth century: Jansen, TR 55 (1987), 1 14. To this group belong writers such as S van 





152 To this group belong writers such as J Voet, A Matthaeus II, A Vinnius, U Huber, 0 G van der Keessel (in his Dictata). 
153 See further Van der Keessel, Dictata, 4.5.pr; Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, 1.5.30.1; Wissenbach, Exercitationum, 
9.Disp.21.22; Huber, Heedendaegse RechtsgeleerlheYl, 2.3.3 and 4: " ... in de oneygentlijke misdaden is noit quaet opzel, 
maer aileen achleloosheil." See also Huber's Beginzelen der Reglkunde, 2.4.1.6-8. Voet states in his Beginselen des 
Rechts, 4.5.1: "Misdaet door wetduiding in 't gemeen is, welke niet uil bedrog ofgrool verzuim, maer uil eenige onkund.e of 
onvoorzichligheil voorlkoomt ... ". Similarly in his Elemenla Juris, 4.5 and in his Compendium Juris, 4.5: "Quasi deliclum in 
genere esl, quod non ex dolo vel lata culpa, sed aliqua sui aut suorum imperilia vel imprudenlia oritur ... ". Vinnius, Ad 
Jnstilulionum, 4.5 argued that quasi·delicts were not ordinary delicts but something closely alike: "Quasi maleficium est 
omne factum, quo quis proprie quidem dici non potesl deliquisse, sed tamen quod malefiCio est proximum." Further 
Feenstra, Romeinsrechlelijke Grondslagen, 162. 
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For the purpose of this thesis, it is essential to note that, according to the view of the majority 
of Roman-Dutch writers of the time, judicial liability was no longer considered a form of 
quasi-delictual liability. Although it is true that judicial liability was still often discussed in the 
commentaries under the rubric of quasi-delicts, the reason for this lay in the slavish adherence 
of most jurists, for the sake of tradition, to the Roman scheme of obligations. Only very few 
had the courage to choose a different form of presentation. That the majority of Roman-Dutch 
jurists excluded judicial liability from quasi-delictual liability, therefore, is not spelled out 
clearly anywhere; it is possible only occasionally to draw this conclusion from their discussion 
of relevant matters. 155 This is the logical conclusion to be drawn from the fact that the 
majority of Roman-Dutch jurists restricted the liability of judges to those cases where the 
judge had been actuated by dolus. In their view, culpa or imperitia were insufficient to 
establish liability, which can only mean that judicial liability was no longer considered to be 
quasi-delictual in character. It may be said, therefore, that for both Grotius and the more 
traditional Roman-Dutch school the approach of Placentinus (discussed earlier) had carried 
the day.IS6 By the time of Roman-Dutch law, the category of quasi-delicts had been broken 
apart: judicial liability ceased to be considered a quasi-delict and became a true delict. 
JUDICIAL LIABILITY FOR WRONG JUDGEMENTS: 

THE DNERGENT OPINIONS OF ROMAN-DUTCH WRITERS 

In what follows this pattern will be observed: those writers will be discussed first who restrict 
judicial liability to dolus, followed by those who advocate a more traditional view, namely 
liability for dolus and culpa lata or, as will appear from the discussion of Ulrich Huber's 
contribution, liability for every form of culpability. Finally, reference will be made to the 
154 Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, \.5.31.2-10; Grotius, Inleidinge (1926) , 3.38.10; Van der Keessel , Praelectiones Iuris 

Hodierni, 3.38.1 and 10. For a detailed analysis of Van Leeuwen 's concept see Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 

89-92. See further Van der Merwe, Verschuldensunabhdngige Haftung, 457, 469-475 and 478-483 and Zimmermann, Law 

ofObligations, 1129 and fu251. 

155 For instance (not concluding) Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, 1.5.7.5 and Rooms-Hollands Regl , 4.33.10; Voet, 

Commenlarius, 5.1.58 . 

156 See above text at chapter IV 2 fn 141 et seqq. 
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approach of Grotius, who, like Huber, favoured liability in all cases from dolus down to the 
slightest culpa. Grotius's reasoning, however, was very different from that of Huber. 
Generally there exists no relevant passage by any of the Roman-Dutch jurists who deal with 
the issue of judicial liability on the question of what exactly was considered an actionable 
judicial wrong.157 However, as in Italian medieval law, this appears to have required a 
culpable breach of a judicial duty, a wrong judgement in the broadest possible sense. 
Conceivable wrongs were misapplication or misinterpretation of laws, facts and basic legal 
principles of customary or Roman law or of Roman-Dutch law, as well as delay or denial of 
justice. 158 Judicial duty varied with the different judicial offices to be performed and the legal 
knowledge that had to be applied. Accordingly, when called to the bench, judges in the Low 
Countries had to take an oath which spelled out clearly what was expected of a judge. 159 In 
addition, privileges and keuren (local statutes) defined judicial duties. Reference in this 
respect should be made, for instance, to the famous Privilegie van de Vrouw Maria of 14 
March 1476. 160 
More generally Kersteman has stated in this regard: 
"Op dat dan een Rechter syn ampt wei betrachte moet hy weten dat hem vyf dinghen meest te 
vlieden staen. .. Dese dan zyn Onwetenheyt, Liefde, Haet, Vrees ende Begheerte. Onwetenheyd die 
ghemeenlyck met onervarenheyt vergeselschapt is maeckt dat al will schoon yemandt recht 
oordeelen by't niet en kann doen uyt oorzsaecke syns onwetenheydts die nochtans een rechter niet 
en excuseert .. .".161 
157 The following more recent contributions provide for a general overview on the development ofjudicial liability in Dutch 

legal history: Van Zeben, Onrechlmalige Daad, 209-212; De Smidt, Rechlsprek.en, Raadsheren en Rechlspraak, 68-70; 

Hartog, Onrechlmalige Overheidsdaden, 18-23. 

158 Consullalien, 3.90.66: "£en RegIer laedeerl iemand wanneer by oordeeld legens hel regl of slatuil.; Voet, 

Commenlarius, 5.1.20; U/rechlsche Consul/alien, 3.25.15. and 3.87; Huber, Jurisprudence ofmy Time, 4.27.1-2: "Among 

others those inferior judges are liable to this, who often allow many weeks, or indeed months to pass without holding court 

days, by which all cases get into disorder and confusion." 

159 See Merula, Manier van Procederen, 4.6.2. The passage on a corrupt judge (7) was highlighted and printed in bold 

letters in Merula's edition. See further De Damhouder, Practycke in Civile Saeck.en, 2.1-3 and 9.1-10 and Van Leeuwen, 

Manier van Procederen, 125-128. 

16°Han/_Vesten ende Privilegien , An. 4, 6 and 7 in Groo/ Placaet-Boek., voUI 660 e/ seqq. See also Groenewegen, 

Trac/a/us, C.3.1.14.pr. For numerous references to duties and the expectations made of judges in the late mediaeval period 

see Hennesdorf, Rech/sspiegel, 130-154. 

161 Kersteman , Rechtsgeleert Woorden-Boek, 'Rechters'. See also De Damhouder, Practyck.e in Civile Saeck.en, 9.5. 
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Finally, exempla like the Judgement ofCambyses described in the Introduction served, even in 
legal manuals such as De Damhouder's Practycke in Civile Saecken 162 or Matthaeus's De 
iudiciis disputationes XVII,163 to admonish judges as regards their duties. 
4 1 The majority view: liability for dolus only 
4 1 1 Paulus Christianaeus 
Paulus Christianaeus (1553-1631) was born at Mechelen. l64 After completing his legal studies 
in Italy, he practised as an advocate at the Groote Raad at Mechelen. For more than 30 years 
he also functioned as syndicus (raadspensionaris) of the city of Mechelen. Although he came 
from the Spanish Netherlands, Christianaeus was a well-known authority among Roman­
Dutch writers and was frequently quoted by them. 165 The work for which he is best known is a 
collection of more than 1 300 decisions of the Groote Raad titled Practicarum quaestionum 
rerumque in supremis Belgarum curiis actarum et observatorum decisiones. This collection 
provides an in-depth view of the development of the law from the Glossators until the 
sixteenth century, with many references to Italian, French, Spanish and German authorities. 
In the fourth volume of his Decisiones Curiae Belgicae, at 4.95, Christianaeus discusses 
various aspects of the liability of the judge under the title De poena Iudicis qui male iudicavit 
vel eius qui Iudicem vel adversarium corrumpere curavit. It should be noted that 
Christianaeus was not discussing the question of judicial liability under the heading of quasi­
delicts. Since his work was based on court decisions, it did not follow the scheme of the 
Institutes or the Digest. After summarising the position of the judge in the Institutes, he 
proceeds to analyse the legal position in his time. He refers to a comment by Budaeus on the 
increase in recent years in the number of cases where not only judges but also arbiters and 
witnesses had to make the case their own; in other words where they were sued for damages. 
162 Ibid. at 2.14. 

163 Arnstelodami, (1666). On the title page. See also De Smidt, Rechtspreken, Raadsheren en Rechtspraak, 69. 

164 As to more bibliographical details see Maes, THR-HR 12 (1949), 73 ; Roberts, Bibliography, 78; De Wet, Ou Slaywers, 

120; Dekkers, Bibliotheca , 36; De Vas, Regsgeskiedenis, 167, Van Zyl , Geskiedenis, 339-340. 

165 See particularly De Wet, Ou Skrywers , I 13 . 
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Christianaeus's position with regard to the scope of judicial liability can be deduced from his 
comments at 4.95.1. Here he states clearly that a judge who per imprudentiam gave a bad 
judgement did not make the case his own: "Sed si per imprudentiam male iudicet, non dicetur 
statim litem suam fecisse .. .". On the other hand, the judge who acted with dolus malus could 
be held liable by a party.166 Unfortunately, Christianaeus does not provide any detailed 
argument or justification for his statement. 
At the very end of this passage, however, Christianaeus makes an interesting reference to the 
situation in France. He indicates that the French law of judicial liability appeared no longer to 
be based on Roman law, that is on the iudex, qui litem suam fecit. According to the well­
known Frenchman Bernard Automne: " ... hic titulum recessisse a moribus nostris ...".167 It is 
equally regrettable that Christianaeus did not take things further at this point since, as will be 
seen, French jurists had by far the greatest influence on the development of Roman-Dutch law 
in this regard. 
412 Arnoldus Vinnius 
Amoldus VilUlius (1588-1657) was educated at the University of Leiden and became a 
professor at his alma mater in 1633. 168 Through his teacher Tuningius, Vinnius may be 
considered a second generation student of the great Hugo Donellus. 169 His most famous work 
is the commentary In quatuor libros Institutionum Imperialium commentarius academicus et 
forensis. This work was intended to be as much an academic textbook as a practical handbook 
and on the strength of it Vinnius is widely considered the first exponent of the so-called Dutch 
elegant school. Besides the original Roman text, he supplies the reader with a vast amount of 
information on the European ius commune as well as on important Dutch peculiarities. As far 
\66 See, Decisiones Curiae Belgiae, 4.95.1: " ... sed dumtaxat si dolo malo iudicauit ad fraudandam sententiam legis. ut uni 
partifauet. & alteri noceat. & sic euidens argui potest eius vel gratia. vel inimicitia vel sordes ... n. 
\67 (1587-1666), in his Conferances du Droict Francais with regard to the relevant passage in the Codex, that is ad titulum 
XLIX de poena iudicis qui male iudicavit.R. 
168 For more details see Smits, Rechtsgeschiedenis, 122; De Wet, Ou Skrywers, 133; Roberts, Bibllography, 314; Van 
Heijnsbergen, Geschiedenis, 53; Ahsmann, Vinnius, 638; Stein, Rdmisches Recht in Europa, 164-165; Zimmermann, RHR, 
42 with further references; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 180; Van Zy\, Geskiedenis, 353-354. 
169 With regard to the influences of the French elegant school on Vinnius see Van Warmelo, Acta Juridica 3 (1961) 45 et 
seqq and Beinart, SALJ69 (1952),157. 
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as the contemporary Dutch law embodied in his commentary is concerned, Vinnius relied 
strongly on Grotius and Christianaeus. 17o Numerous editions of Vinnius's commentary were 
published throughout Europe well into the nineteenth century. 171 Other works by Vinnius are 
his Tractatus de pactis, de juridictione, de col/ationibus, de transactionibus (1646) and his 
Jurisprudentiae contractae sive partitionem juris civilis libri IV (1624). 
Vinnius's opinion on the liability of the judge for a wrong judgement is to be found in his 
commentary on the Institutes under the title 4.5 pr. Following some general remarks on 
obligations arising from quasi-delict, he begins his comments with an explanation of the 
differences between the delictual liability of the medicus and the quasi-delictual liability of the 
iudex, the dogmatical problem that had earlier puzzled the Glossators and Commentators. 172 
As to the position of the law of his day, Vinnius comes to the clear conclusion that neither a 
doctor's error nor a judge's bad judgement made from ignorance or inexperience gave rise to 
any kind of liability.173 Vinnius's main reason for this view is, apparently, that an injured 
party could always lodge an appeal against the decision of the judge. This opinion is 
strengthened by two ofVinnius's comments on the issue. The first follows immediately on the 
passage cited above: " ...sed iniquitati sententiae occurendum est remedio appellationis." And, 
a little further, he states that it was not unfair to a judge that in cases of wrong decisions per 
imperitiam the remedy of lodging an appeal was open to the parties: 
"Ei, qui remedio appellation is utitur, quod hodie in casu proposito necessarium est, non est 
aequum adversus judicem, a quo appellavit, hanc actionem dari. ,,174 
Ifhe acted dolo, however, the judge committed a genuine delict l75 and would be held liable. 
170 With regard to the use of Christianaeus's collection of cases by Vinnius see particularly Meijers, Grote Raad, 170 and 

Stein, Romisches Recht in Europa, 164. 





172 See generally chapter IV 2 fn 130 et seqq. 

173 Ad Institutionum, 4.5 pr: "Moribus hujus aevi neque errata medicorum in judicium vocari solent, ut alibi quoque 

notavimus: neque judex et sententia sine dolo malo tantum per imperiliam prolata tenelur " 

174 Ibid. at 4.5 pr 2. 

175 Ibid. at 4.5 pr 3: "Dolus judicis ul verum & infame delictum severius vindicatur: nam qui. largitione, odio, vel gratia 

depravatus iniquam sententiam dixisse arguitur, &famae dispendium palitur, & veram /itis aestimalionem ei, quem laesit, 

praestare cogifur. " 
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Vinnius was the first to introduce into Roman-Dutch law the 'appeal argument', as I call it, 
which was used by numerous other authors. He directed attention to at least four l76 French 
jurists as authority for his view on limited judicial liability inter alia Philibert Bugnyonl77, and 
Jean Papon. 178 These jurists are renowned, among other things, for their treatment of the ius 
gallicum, the French statute law and common law in force in sixteenth century France. 179 
Of importance also is Vinnius's restriction ofjudicial liability to cases involving dolus, which 
indicates for the first time that the classical understanding of the liability of the iudex, qui 
litem suamfecit was no longer preserved as a form of quasi-delictual liability in Roman-Dutch 
law. Apparently, there was no room for judicial liability under the roof of quasi-delicts when 
such liability was limited to cases involving dolus. 180 
176 lnfonnarion as ro Eguinaire Francois Baron de Kerlouan (Baro) and Joseph Ludovici who were also referred to by 
Vinnius are rare. 
177 (1540-1590), Bugnyon, Traicte des Lou Abrogees stares at 9-10: "Maintenant ilz ne font que Ie cerfde sciemment mal 
iuger, usans de telz motz, Si gravaris, appel/a: bien asseurez que Ie iuges superieurs ne les contraindront asoubstenir leur 
iuge, quod mutuas sibi praestent operas, & velut mutuo muli scabunt ...Aussi Ie tiltre de conveniendis magistratibus D. n 'est 
point usite: Et n 'est permis a aucun recourir contre les juges pour leur mal iuge, ny pour la repetition de ses despens 
dommages et interestz, equelz on condamne seulement les parties qui plaident, sans avoir cause ny droict legitime au 
sousteanable, ains plustost par animosite calonie et audace, que autrement." And at 93 Bugnyon observes: "Poena legis 
Aqui/iae Gal/os, arbitratu iudicis irrogatur: ut si quis liber vulneratus sit. Nec sine dolo, vel culpa manifesta, mulcta ex 
hac caussa inf/igitur .. . Auiourd 'huy, comme a desia este dict. tout Ie contraire se pratique, et ne fait on que intimer Ie juge 
qui a donne la sentence, de comparoir par devant Ie juge d 'appel, s'il treuve que bon luy soit, ou que la matiere et cause 
d 'appel Ie touche en aucune chose. Litis tamen omnes sumptus litigator sustinet, nisi iudex dolum, aut concussionem 
admiserit. En forte qu 'on adiourne tousiours la partie. Et se void peu sou vent, que combien que iudex dolo, culpa, vel 
propter inimicitias sententiam tulerit, in veram propterea litis aestimationem condemnetur, comme il seroit bien la raison, 
et Ie commande la glosse." 
178 (1505-1590), Recueil d'Arrestz, Jib.6.2.13 and 21 and lib.19.1.22. The passages include no reference to liability for 
negligence or imprudentia except for liability in cases of avarice. 
179 See De Wet, Ou Slaywers, 87 fn40 and De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis , 90. 
180 See again above at 3 text following fn 154. 
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4 1 3 Simon Groenewegen van der Made 
Simon Groenewegen van der Made was born at Delft in 1613. 181 He died in 1652, not yet 
forty years of age. According to a note by Professor Feenstra, Groenewegen was a distant 
cousin of Hugo GrotiUS. 182 Groenewegen was educated at the University of Leiden and 
graduated with a doctorate in 1634. After a short period as an advocate in The Hague, he 
became secretary of his home town of Delft. Groenewegen is known for his commentary on 
Grotius's Inleidinge, published in 1644, but the work that really established him as one of the 
most important Roman-Dutch authorities is his Tractatus de legibus abrogatis et iniusitatis in 
Hollandia vicinisque regionibus, which was first published in 1649. And indeed Groenewegen 
set himself a gigantic task in this work: to examine every single chapter of Justinian's huge 
compilation in order to state which laws had been abrogated by disuse in the Netherlands. 183 
4131 Groenewegen 's analysis 
In Inst 4.5 pr., Groenewegen provides us with one of the most detailed analyses by a writer on 
Roman-Dutch law of the position of the law in the Netherlands with regard to judicial liability 
for misjudgements. From his comments can be gleaned the most enlightening infonnation on 
the true foundations of Roman-Dutch law of judicial liability. Groenewegen's approach had a 
tremendous influence on his fellow writers and merits detailed attention. 
Groenewegen strongly rejected the view that judicial liability for imprudentia prevailed in 
Roman-Dutch law in the seventeenth century. What he himself advocated was liability merely 
for dolus malus. He introduced two remarkable arguments to support his opinion. 
His first argument in favour of restricted liability was derived from the regula iuris D 
50.17.47: under the Roman law, an advisor could be held liable for his advice only where he 
had been actuated by dolus malus. Later, on the basis of this passage, the Glossators and 
Commentators advocated the view that legal advisors of judges and legal experts were liable 
181 For more details see De Wet, au Skrywers, 135-136; Roberts, Bibliography, 137; Smits, Rechtsgeschiedenis, 127; 

Wessels, History, 301; Van Heijnsbergen, Geschiedenis, 106; Stein, Romisches Recht in Europa, 165; Zimmermann, RHR, 

43-44; and in particular Beinart, TR 56 (i 988),333-340. 

182 See Beinart, TR 56 (1988), Addendum at 340 at the bottom. 

183 For criticism see Zimmermann, RHR, 44. 
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at the totale interesse for giving fraudulent advice, not under the actio legis Aquiliae but under 
the actio de dolo. Expressis verbis, however, the Italian jurists rejected any analogy with the 
liability of judges under the actiones legis Aquiliae and in factum. 184 This notwithstanding, 
Groenewegen was the first Roman-Dutch jurist to apply D 50.17.47 to the liability of judges. 
He held that, like advisors and legal experts, judges should be held liable only for dolus malus 
under the actio de dolo. 
Groenewegen's argument was that undue hardship would be inflicted upon judges, 
particularly inferior judges, if they: 
" ... in so difficult a science as that of the law and its practice, and amid so great a variety of 
opinions and such a multitude of cases that brook no delay ...were subjected to risk in each single 
case in which anything perchance escaped them as a result of lack of knowledge or want of 
skill.,,185 
Accordingly, the liability of judges ought to be restricted exclusively to cases where they had 
acted dolo malo. Groenewegen was the first Roman-Dutch writer to thus introduce into the 
discussion the important legal policy argument against too wide a scope of judicial liability. 
He focused on the lack of judicial ability, education, experience and expertise. The sombre 
picture Groenewegen painted of the state of the judiciary in the Netherlands is in accord with 
that outlined in the introduction to this chapter. As we have seen, the growing influence of 
civil law made the dispensation ofjustice more and more difficult for the untrained lay judges 
who sat on the benches of the lower courts. Consequently, exemption of judges from liability 
for lack of knowledge or want of skill became, increasingly, a political issue. 
It is this acknowledgement of the very real problems facing in particular the lower judiciary­
problems that posed a serious threat to the administration of justice in the Low Countries ­
that distinguishes Groenewegen' s reasoning from that of some of his less realistic fellow 
writers. The specific nature of Groenewegen's line of reasoning is particularly evident in 
comparison with preceding epochs. Groenewegen's argument convinced other writers and 
influenced legal opinion to such an extent that, thereafter, judges were held liable only for 
1&4 Engelmann, Wiedergeburt,424 . 
185 Treatise, Inst.4.5 pr.l. \Vhile Groenewegen refers to mistakes due to lack of knowledge or want of skill it is interesting 
to note that neither Groenewegen nor any of the other writers of Roman-Dutch law discussed the question of wrong 
judgements in the light of the doctrine of error or ignorantia iuris. Perhaps this doctrine did not square with the decided 
opinion of the majority of the Roman-Dutch jurists, i.e., that liability for wrong judgements at least given with imprudentia 
non nocel. For an exception see below at fn31 O. 
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dolus: which meant, in practice, that they were virtually exempt from civil liability for giving 
a wrong judgement. 
It is more than evident that, with respect to the restricted scope of judicial liability, 
Groenewegen was influenced mainly by French jurists of the sixteenth century. The French 
authors he quotes are inter alia Baro186, Bertrandus Argentraeus l87, Bugnyonl88, Automne189 
and Charles Loyseau.190 The fact that he also used two authorities from the southern 
provinces of the Netherlands, namely Franciscus Zypaeusl91 and Paulus Christianaeus, as well 
as Vinnius, is further proof of the overriding influence of what may be called the French 
school of judicial liability.l92 As said above, Christianaeus and Vinnius quote likewise from 
186 With regard to Baro see above at fn 176. 
187 (1519-1590). I was unable to trace Argentraeus's Commentarii in Consuetudines Ducatus Brittanie (1664) in which I 
intended to cross-check Groenewegen' reference from his Tractatus in Gennany. With respect to Argentraeus see 
Holth6fer, D'Argentre, 149; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 218 and 224; De Wet, Ou Slaywers, 81 ; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 89. 
188 For detai Is see above at fn I 77. 
189 Apart from the comments of Automne to which Christianaeus referred to (above at fn 167) he includes rich details as to 
the French usus. 
190 Du Droict des Offices, 1.14.31 : "Nous parlerons donc seulement des luges qui ont male iuge ... Or est-il bien certain, que 
les luges ne sont pas garants regulierement de leurs jugement & que ut consili}, ita iudicij non fraudulenti, nulla obligatio 
est." And he continues to ask: "Car parmy la variete des affaires humaines, parmy Ie nombre infirry des lolx, ordonances, 
& coustumes, parmy la diversite des opinions des hommes, parmy la malice des parties, parmy la negligence d'aucuns 
Advocats, parmy la surprise des Procureurs, parmy I'ignorance des Greffiers, qu 'elle apparence y auroit-il, qu 'un luge 
deust garantir tous les iugements qu 'il rend de saine consciences, & avec droite intention? & qui seroit celuy qui voudroit 
estre luge, pour etre au hazard d 'avoir autant de proces en son nom, comme il donneroit de sentences, dont iI n 'en 
faudroit possible qu 'un en to ute sa vie pour Ie ruiner? Seroit-ce pas avoir tousiours en iugeant I 'espee de Damocles 
pendue sur son chef" At 1.14.35 Loyseau makes the point that in contemporary French law (nostre pratique) a party may 
sue a judge only in cases of exhaustion of legal action: "Car tant que la clause estoit entiere, & que Ie griefestoit reparable 
par appel, la partie n 'avoit point de d 'occasion de quitter la voye ordinaire de poursuivre son ativersaire, pour s 'attaquer 
ason luge, par une action extraordinaire." Loyseau admits that: "Vray est que si en cause d 'appel il se trouvoit que Ie luge 
eust notoirement failli, iI pouvoit estre puny selon I 'arbitrage du Superieur".", but at the same time the judge does not 
make the case his own: "". mais pourtant il ne faisoit pas la cause sienne, c 'est adire, qu'il ne transferoit pas sur soy 
I 'evenement du proces." From the context of the foregoing passage and 1.14.34 it appears that Loyseau considers the 
French approach not congruent with Roman law: "II ya certains cas au droit Romain, esquels Ie luge fait la cause 
sienne.. . ", of which liability for corruption (1.14.37) or imprudentia (1.14.38) is restricted to inferior judges (luges 
delegues) since those are not 'gens d 'espee' or 'de lettres' (1 .14.39). 
191 (1580-1630), Notitia luris Belgici, lib.2 'De appellationibus' n.18: "In aliquibus locis, ut & in Gallia, Bugnion 
(leg.abrogl.l.sat.208.) solet ludex, qui pronuntiavit, tamquam qui litem suamfecerit, ad superiorem citari: quod alicubi 
adhuc obtinet, non ubique: sumptus tam en sustinet litigator, nisi ipse ludex a dolo aut sordibus condemnetur." For further 
details as to Zypaeus see De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 168; De Wet, Ou Slaywers , 122 and Van Zyl , Geskiedenis, 339-340. 
192 The influence of French writers on Groenewegen might also be drawn from the fact that most likely both the methodical 
approach (reviewing the practical application of the Roman law in the Low Countries) and the title of his Tractatus were 
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French jurists, namely Bugnyon, Baro and, further, Ludovici, and Papon. It is striking that 
neither Groenewegen nor the Roman-Dutch authors he quoted provide a single reference to 
the opinions of contemporary jurists from countries other than France, such as Spain or 
Germany. This is particularly interesting since jurists from other ius commune countries also 
dealt at some length with the question ofjudicial liability. 193 
Groenewegen's quoting exclusively from French authorities of the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century may be taken as merely another demonstration of the widespread belief of 
the so-called Dutch elegant school of law in the efficacy (translatio studii) of French 
jurisprudence. 194 However, to leave it at that would mean closing one's eyes to the fact that 
both the French and the Dutch approaches must be considered important indications of a 
refined theory of judicial liability which appears to have prevailed since the days of 
humanism. To find an acceptable explanation for the promoting of a change in judicial 
liability in Roman-Dutch law by an influential writer such as Groenewegen, the following, 
somewhat detailed, excursus into the acceptance of French ideas in this field appears to be 
necessary. 
inspired by the Latin title of Bugnyon 's Traicte des Lou Abrogees which was titled Legum abrogatarum et iniusitatarum in 
omnibus curiis, terris, jurisdictionibus et dominiia Franciae. This opinion is also shared by De Wet, Ou Slaywers, 135 
fn36. On this technique see what Ho1thOfer remarks in Coquille at 138 with regard to Coquille 's Institutions au droit 
Francois (1607) or Autornne's Conferance du Droict Francois or Bugnyon 's Traicte des Lou Abrogees, namely that works 
of this kind " ... tragen einem damals neuen, zuerst in Franla-eich, im J 7. Jahr. auch sonst in Europa aufkommenden 
Bediirfnis Rechnung, das gesamte innerhalb eines Landes anwendbare Recht ohne Riicksicht auf seine Provenienz 
geschlossen darzustellen. Hierzu boten sich verschiedene Modelle an. Man konnte entweder, von der subsididren Geltung 
des gemeinen Rechts ausgehend, dieses der Darstellung zugrunde legen und die partikularrechtlichen Abweichungen 
jeweils an den sachlich einschliigigen Stellen hinzujUgen." 
193 See at chapter VII 3 5 2 2 (c) (II) (y) fn516 et seqq. for references to writers of the Gennan usus modernus and the 
Pandectists. 
194 Zimmermann, RHR, 52-53; Wesenberg and Wesener, Privatrechtsgeschichte, 71-72; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 









4 1 32 	 Overview ofthe development ofthe superior judiciary in France and the civil 
liability ofFrench judges 
In France, the development of the superior jUdiciary is closely related to the emergence of the 
so-called parlements which came into existence from the first half of the thirteenth century. 195 
Following the same pattern of development as in the Burgundian curia ducis referred to 
earlierl96 , the Parlement de Paris emerged from the French kings' curia regis. University­
trained jurists successfully drove the feudal nobility out of the ranks of the king's council 
when it sat as a court of appeal. By the reign of Philip the Fair (1285-1314), the Parlement 
had managed to claim the entire royal appellate jurisdiction. In the following centuries, other 
parlements were created in addition to that at Paris. 197 
By the fifteenth century, the French judges had become largely independent of the king. The 
major reason for this remarkable development unparalleled in Europe at that time was that the 
judges of the parlements could not be dismissed after the purchase of public (judicial) offices 
became common practice in France. 198 The purchaser paid a sum of money to his predecessor 
according to the rank of the office. 199 Initially, the kings only tolerated this reluctantly. In due 
course, however, they tried to make a fortune by issuing conditional consent only when the 
appointee had paid a certain fee to the king. 
Undoubtedly this custom had a strong impact on judicial independence.2oo The kings lost all 
their influence with regard to selection, nomination and removal of recalcitrant judges. Due to 
the notorious emptiness of the public coffers resulting from expensive wars, such as the 
French engagement in Italy during the early sixteenth century, as well as conspicuous waste, 
the kings were forced to accept practically any nomination by the parlements in order to raise 
195 For the following see the detailed outline provided by Dawson, Oracles, 273-290. Further, see Mousnier, Institutions de 
fa France , 253-258; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 217-218. 
196 See above at 1 text at fn 4-9 and chapter 2 1. 
197 Namely at Toulouse (1279), Bordeaux (1451), Grenoble (1453), Dijon (1476), Rouen (1499), Aix-en-Provence (1501), 
Rennes (1554), Pau (1620), Metz (1633), Douai (1668), Besancon (1676) and Nancy (during the eighteenth century). For 
details see Musnier, institutions de la France, 254-256. 
198 Swart, Sale ofOffices, 5-10. 
199 Mousnier, Institutions de la France, 38. 
200 See Dawson, Oracles, 355-356. 
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money?OI On the other hand, they could hardly dismiss a judge since the buyer of the judicial 
office had to be reimbursed, which for the same practical reasons was impossible?02 
From the venality of office, it was only a small step to hereditary judicial office, the birth of 
the famous French noblesse de robe.203 From the earliest days, the parlements also retained 
the right to fill vacant seats on the bench by cooption. Further confinnation of the independent 
position of the French parlements derives from the fact that from 1493 royal edicts only 
became valid law when the edicts had been registered by the parlements, the so-called 
enregistrement. Frequently, the parlements simply denied registration and remonstrated 
(remonstrances). It was then up to the king to appear personally before the parlement and to 
enforce registration (lit de justice), in any event a most humiliating procedure?04 
It is evident that the French kings were not willing to accept their ousting by the parlements. 
Already in the fourteenth century, the kings assigned a certain jurisdiction to their Grand 
Conseil du Roi.205 Furthermore, they sought relief by means of the notorious lettres de cachet 
(imprisorunent of individual judges); by the establishment of 60 intennediate courts of appeal 
(presidiaux) below the parlementl06 ; and by the creation of special ad hoc courts staffed by 
dependent judges. The kings' failure to retain some kind of control of the superior courts, 
however, is indicated by the degree to which judges were held accountable for mistakes.207 In 
this respect, a new solution to the problem of judicial accountability, the French so-called 
prise apartie, must be noted. An analysis of the etymological roots of the tenn gives a 
valuable hint of the origins of this practice. Prise apartie literally means to take a person to a 
partie, that is to a duel. 
In the early Middle Ages, trial by battle was a common feature of the folk courts. In an earlier 
chapter, mention was made of the so-called Schelte at the Gennanic folk courts and the 
201 Swan, Sale o/Offices, 12. 

202 Dawson, Oracles, 353; Wesenberg and Wesener, Privatrechtsgeschichte, 68 . 

203 See Mousnier, Institutions de la France, 318-327 and Swan, Sale o/Office, 13-14 for details. 

204 For details see Dawson, Oracles, 362-365; Mousnier, Institutions de la France, 375-379; Meyer, Frankreich , 235 -237. 

205 Mousnier, Institutions de la France, 273-275 and 397-399. 

206 Ibid. at 260-264. 

207 This point is stressed by Giuliani and Picardi , Responsabilita , 50: "Nel XIV secolo il sovrano /rancese - come que{{o 

Inglese - incoraggiava if contro{{o del giudice sulla propria allivita normativa: in questa periodo va ricercata la preislOria 

di istituti /ondamentali - come I 'enregistrement - che sollevarono gravi conflilli istiuzionali nell 'eta dell'assolutismo ." 
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challenging of a judgement in cases of Rechtsverweigerung or denial of justice (the reference 
being to faussement de jugement and deni de justice et audience in France and Flanders).208 
Initially, there were various instances of denial of justice ego where the judge did not give a 
judgement; where the judge delayed his decision contrary to the local costuymen; where the 
judge gave his decision only on condition that a substantial sum of money was paid, or where 
he disregarded the opinion of the lawspeakers.z°9 In Flanders, from about the early fourteenth 
century onwards, the importance of the Schelte or faussement de jugement in cases of wrong 
judgements surpassed that of deni de justice. Originally where a party decided to challenge the 
judgement, the burden lay on the challenger to prove his complaint. The most impressive 
mode of leading evidence in those irrational days was trial by battle21O, a duel in court between 
the challenger and the judge. Here the judge was pris au court aune partie, in order, literally, 
to defend his judgement. However, at a later stage the remedy of faussement de justice was 
intended to grant to the parties an action against a judge or a court who " ... wetens en willens 
een vals vonnis hadden gewezen ...". In the fourteenth century, a battle was no longer required. 
On the contrary, it was now the local count and his representatives who decided on the 
success of the action.211 
Similarly in France the actual duel in cases offaussement de jugement must have fallen into 
disuse. Nevertheless, the idea of calling in a judge before a court to defend himself for a 
deliberate wrong judgement must have been very attractive to the French kings in seeking to 
restore their authority against the mighty parlements. Consequently, in 1540 for the first time, 
the term prise apartie was mentioned in the Ordonnance de la Normandie de Decembre by 
King Francis 1. In Art 1 we read: "Ne pourront les judges etre pris apartie, sinon qui I 'on 
maintienne par relief qu 'il y ait dol, fraude ou concussion ou erreur evidente en fait ou en 
droit ...".212 In 1573, Henry ill and, in 1667, Louis XIV followed suit with largely similar 
208 See also chapter III 5 and the authorities quoted there. For the course of developments from the fourteenth century 
onwards see Giuliani and Picardi, Responsabilita, 49-51; Buntinx, Audientie, 238-241. Note also Frewert, Ehrenmiinner, 
19-22. 
209 Buntinx, Audientie, 239. 
210 In the Netherlands reference was also to the so-called Kampgevecht. See Van Spaan, Verhandelingen, 18. 
211 Monballyu, TR 61 (1993),238; Buntinx, Audientie, 241-244; Ganshof, Faussement de Jugement, 115-140. 
212 Quoted from Giuliani and Picardi, Responsabilita, 56. See also in Automne, Conjerance du Droict Francois, in I. extra 
territorium, 20. 
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ordinances. Furthermore, the prise apartie continued to include those ancient instances where 
a judge denied justice, i.e., not through a wrong decision but no decision at al1.213 
Three aspects of the development of judicial liability in French law must be noted: Firstly, in 
the kings' ordonnances with regard to the prise apartie, there was no talk of the iudex qui 
litem suam fecit, and of traditional quasi-delictual liability. Thus, we can say that in French 
law of that age the kings put the liability of the judges on a new basis, which had nothing in 
common with the rules and principles of Roman law.214 This is explicitly confirmed by French 
jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who noted that the concept of the iudex, qui 
litem suamfecit was known in France, but that the doctrine was taught (and applied) outside 
of France: " ...haec questio potius est scholae quamfori.,,215 
This new basis of judicial liability is confirmed by the second aspect. On the basis of their 
own ordinances, the kings were soon forced to rule that judges could not be held liable by a 
party for any culpable mistake but only for dolus and culpa lata (dol, jraude ou concussion ou 
erreur evidente) and denial of justice. This was all the easier for the kings since the prise a 
partie lacked any of the traditional Roman roots that favoured a much wider scope of liability. 
Thirdly, a new dimension must be ascribed to the kings' efforts to institute judicial civil 
liability. Although an action for civil liability still had to be instituted by a private party, the 
interests of the individual that suffered from the judicial wrong were not considered nearly as 
important by the kings as the interests of the monarch himself, namely to utilise this kind of 
civil liability as an (indirect) means of controlling the judges. Consequently the French 
approach brought into the limelight a new conflict: that of the kings against 'their' judges on 
the benches of the parlements. Thus, for this age, considerations of professional liability, such 
as played an important role in the Italian ius commune216, were almost irrelevant. 
213 Pothier, Traites de la Procedure Civile et Crimine//e, partie III, IV: "Le dol, la fraude , ou la concussion du juge, 

donnent lieu a la prise apartie; if ya lieu a celie intimation dans tous les cas au:xquels les ordonnances prononcent la 

peine de la prise apartie, tel qu 'est Ie cas de deni de justice." 

214 Picardi and Giuliani, Code Louis, XLVIl-XLV/lI; Giuliani and Picardi, ResponsabilitlJ, 65-66. 

21 5 Louet, Recueil de Plusiers Arrests, 270 and De la Roche Flavin, Treize Livres des Parlemens, vol.X c.34 as quoted by 

Dawson, Oracles, 289. See again Loyseau, Du Droict des Offices, I. J4 .35 together with 34; Bugnyon, Traicte des Lou 

Abrogees , 9-10 and Automne, Conferances du Droict Francais , ad titulum XLIX de poena iudicis qui male iudicavit.R. 

2 16 Giuliani and Picardi, Responsabi/itCz, 52 . 
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Under an absolutist regime, the sovereign was clearly not interested in judicial privilege. The 
sovereign's judges were supposed to be organs of his will, devoid of any real autonomy. The 
powers of all branches of government were supposed to be concentrated in the monarch. That 
symbol of autocratic rule, Louis XN, is said, as a young man, to have uttered his famous 
phrase "L 'Etat, c 'est moil" to none other than the members of the Parlement de Paris.217 Civil 
liability and criminal liability ofjudges were in the monarch's interests already in the days of 
the late Roman empire and served to overcome corruption, partiality, inefficiency and 
decadence.2IS In the absolutist state, the main purpose of such liability was to make judges 
vulnerable and thus docile towards the sovereign. The French kings pressed for judicial 
accountability as an additional means of enforcing discipline and, by diminishing judges' 
autonomy, an indirect mechanism of control and conditioning.219 To this may be added the 
monarchs' growing fear of losing power to the increasingly professionalised bureaucracy, an 
aspect suggested by Max Weber.22o Weber convincingly argues that expert knowledge became 
the foundation of the power of the monarchs' servants. Hence, th.e sovereigns were at pains to 
find ways to use this expertise without at the same time forfeiting their own power. This 
strong disciplinary connotation of judicial liability might be inferred from Charles IX 
Ordonnance de Paris de Janvier 1563 at Art 27 where it is stated that judges had to face a fine 
of 60 livres and removal from office for wrong judgements (mal iuge'): 
"Les hauts lusticiers ressortissans nuement en nos Par/emens, seront condamnez suivant 
l'ancienne Ordonnance en 60.liv. parisis pour Ie mal iuge de leurs Juges. Lesquels aussi its 
pourront revoquer & distribuer a volonte de leurs charges & Offices, sinon au cas leursdits 
Officiers eussent este pourveus par recompense de services, au autres titres onereux." 
And in an Ordonnance by Francis I of 1539 we read in Art 141-143: 
"Les luges qui seront trouvez avoir faitfautes notables en I 'expedition des proces criminels, seront 
condamnez en grosses amendes envers nous, pour la premiere fois, 6 pour la seconde suspendus 
de leurs Offices pour un an, & pour la troisieme privez de leur Offices, & declarez inhabiles de 
tenir Offices Royaux. Et neantmoins seront condamnez en tous les despens, dommages & interests 
des parties, qui seront taxez & moderez selon la qualite de la matiere." 
On the other hand one must admit that these postulates not necessarily matched the reality. In 
other words, the scope ofjudicial liability, namely liability only for dolus and culpa lata is not 
217 Kelly, Western Legal Theory, 254. 

218 See above at chapter II 2 3 fun 176-179. 

219 Picardi and Giuliani have found the following (true) expression at Code Louis, XLV: "La magistratura non poteva pera, 

non avvertire, al di la deU'apparato sanzionatorio, un disegno di poiiliea iegisiativa, ehe mirava ad introdurre meecanismi 

di conlrollo e di condizionamenlo del giudiehe." 

220 WirtsehaJt und GesellsehaJt, 574. 
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evidence of the (practically) successful establishment by the kings of a mechanism of control 
of their judges. This shows that certain conditions in France, from the first half of the 
sixteenth century onwards, must have stimulated the movement towards limitation of liability. 
It was natural that judicial vulnerability would disappear and judges would become stronger, 
that is more autonomous, when they managed to emancipate themselves from the monarch. 
This could occur only when the judges had achieved an institutionally autonomous status 
within the monarch's government, in other words, when they acquired a considerable degree 
of independence. It was in keeping with the truly impressive independence of the French 
judges of the parlements that they fiercely rejected the monarchs' efforts to retain control of 
the judiciary by any form of disciplinary, criminal or civil accountability. In fact, the 
Ordonnance civile du mois d'Avril de 1667, which was part of the so-called Code Louis, 
further restricted judicial liability to dol, fraude ou concussion. The scope of liability no 
longer had much in common with Roman law or the Italian ius commune.221 
4133 	 The revolution of1581 as a breeding groundfor the French law ofjudicial liability 
in the Netherlands 
To return to the situation in the Netherlands, there is little point in arguing that the 
Burgundian-Habsburgian judges of the Dutch equivalents of the French parlements, the 
Parlement de Malines and the provincial raade, held an equally independent position during 
most of the sixteenth century. As in France, there was a strong degree of professionalism. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the Dutch judges held office only at the pleasure of the 
ruler.222 In addition, at least under the Burgundian-Habsburgian rulers there existed practically 
no purchase of judicial office223 , there was no talk about the councillors' right to fill their 
ranks by cooption, there was no obligation of enregistrement, and the Dutch territories never 
221 The foregoing quotes from Francis 1 and Charles IX are quoted in Automne, Con/erance du Droict Francois, ad titulum 
XLIX de poena iudicis qui male iudicavit. For details of further development see Giuliani and Picardi, Responsabilita, 57­
65; Picardi and Giuliani, Code Louis, XLV-XLVllI; Van Zeben, Onrechtmatige Daad, 210-211 as well as Schrage, Legal 
History 17 (J 996), 109-111 who appears equally to have based his research on the works quoted above. 
222 See the text above at fu8. 
m Swan, Sale o/Office, 70 refers to endemic corruptibility at the courts but he also makes the point that the Habsburgian 
rulers: " ... realised the dangers involved in the selling of their authority to their subjects." For the (unlawful) development 
during the time of the Dutch Republic see Van Poelgeest, Bijdragen 103 (1988), 30-33; Huussen, Bijdragen 93 (1978), 
257-259. 
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saw their ruler appear in persona before the courts in order to push through one of his 
enactments. In the tight grip of the rulers in which they found themselves, it is unlikely that 
the judges of the Burgundian-Habsburgian courts felt in a position to press successfully for 
any sort of privileged status, for instance by means of restricted criminal or civil liability. 
Arguments in favour of this view can be found in an article by Professor De Schepper.224 
According to De Schepper, it was common practice in the sixteenth century for cases ofminor 
offences committed by public servants (ambtsovertredingen) and criminal offences 
(ambtsmisdrijven) to come before the Groote Raad at Mechelen, which had ordinary 
jurisdiction (iustitia ordinaria) in cases of partiality, carelessness, abuse of power, etc. In 
addition, there was the sovereign's secret council (Geheime Raad) to which was assigned 
extraordinary jurisdiction (iustitia extraordinaria). Evidently, councillors of the supreme 
courts were as much subject to investigation and control by the procureur-generaal and a suit 
before the Groote Raad as any other servant of the sovereign. For instance, De Schepper 
refers to the case of a councillor of the Groote Raad itself who, in 1515, was sued and 
sentenced to temporary suspension of office for contumelious behaviour.225 Certainly a trial of 
this kind was primarily of a criminal character. From material accessible in South Africa, it is 
difficult to trace further details as to civil actions against councillors of the supreme courts in 
the Netherlands prior to foundation of the Republic in 1581. However, that this was not an 
impossibility is hinted at by De Schepper when he says: 
"Terzaake vervaagde de grens van de rechtspraak over ambtsovertredingen niet allen met de 
criminele, maar ook net de civiele rechtspraak De beide Hoven vertegenwoordigden in het laatste 
geval weer de vorst, die tevens als burgerlijk rechterde bestuursorganen en hun officieren 
control eerde. ,,226 
It is my opinion, in view of the relatively unprivileged status of the judiciary under the 
Burgundian-Habsburgian rulers, that the reason for the sudden upheaval in Roman-Dutch law 
(namely that within a few decades liability lay merely for grossly inappropriate and 
unacceptable conduct, that is for dolus) was closely related to the fundamental weakening of 
the principle of single, indivisible sovereignty in consequence of the dethronement of Philip II 
in 1581. After the Dutch revolution, there was no monarch with a strong interest in a 
vulnerable judiciary and the upholding of the ideal of indivisible sovereignty. The argument 
224 De Schepper, Gerichtfiche Kontro/le, 68-7l. 
225 De Schepper, Rechter en Administratie, 380. 
226 Ibid. at 382. 
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here is that the vacuum created by the revolution resulted in an elevation of the status of the 
judges. Suddenly the road was open for the fonnation of a more autonomous and consequently 
a more privileged judiciary. In fact, as pointed out earlier, from 1581 onwards the superior 
courts of the provinces emerged as institutions largely independent of the other arms of 
government. Consequently, this - in a sense - unexpected development was ideal ground for 
the undisturbed reception of the ideas of the French school of judicial liability by seventeenth 
century Dutch writers such as Groenewegen. 
In this context, however, it is important not to confuse the quest of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century French parlements for independence from the kings, or the Dutch jurists' 
efforts to qualify judicial liability in consequence of the weakening of the ideal of indivisible 
sovereignty, with those ideas of judicial independence and separation of powers that were 
introduced during the age of enlightenment by Montesquieu in his famous L 'Esprit des 
Lois.227 Only from about the second half of the eighteenth century was the time ripe for the 
idea of a truly emancipated and independent judiciary. And it was only from the beginning of 
the nineteenth century that the image of the modem judge began to take shape. An image 
which suggests the judge's independence as much from the sovereign as from the parties 
before him, as well as the protection of the judge's independence and impartiality through 
freedom from civil liability. Prior to the age of enlightenment, thus, the efforts of the judiciary 
(or the legal community, including the legal writers) to escape liability did not necessarily 
denote idealism or philosophical long-sightedness. Instead, these efforts were owing to more 
or less selfish motives as will become apparent from right below. 
Apart from these developments, an additional argument in favour of qualified judicial liability 
can be drawn from the socio-political realities of Dutch local life in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The idea that it was the members of the ruling local regent-patriciate 
who were particularly interested in judicial privilege is not implausible. Generally speaking, 
the leading local figures were not educated lawyers or administrative specialists. As pointed 
out earlier, they (or their kinship) were not professionals but men of 'quality' who were called 
m Simon, Unabhtingigkeit des Richters, 2. Kelly, Western Legal Theory, 253-258, and at 282 referring to M SAnderson, 
he records the belief which was commonplace in the political thinking of the enlightenment that the: .... . best form of 
government is one in which the individual is subject to known and clearly expressed laws; this ideal ruled out the arbitrary 
and uncontrolled 'oriental despotism' which every thinker of that age agrees in rejecting." 
200 
to honorary local office.228 Thus, much of the education argument of Groenewegen and others 
holds true. 
Consequently, it is almost certain that the powerful regents were at no stage interested in a 
professional local jUdiciary in the hands of state officials subordinate to a strong ruler. Hence, 
when the republic emerged and federalism was the rule of the day, the local regents very much 
favoured any development that kept judicial positions for the local lay honoraries, which to a 
large extent meant themselves or their families. Since it was the regent-patriciate which in 
practice held power in both the cities and the provincial estates, which in turn governed the 
countrl29, it is argued here that with regard to judicial liability the interests of the national 
post-revolutionary rulers coincided with the interests of the local rulers and, correspondingly, 
with those of the local judges, as much as with a large percentage of the judges of the superior 
courts. 
Professor Van Deursen in his well-known book Het kopergeld van de gouden eeuw provides a 
number of examples from which it is obvious that in everyday legal practice members of the 
ruling regent class frequently escaped liability for conuption, embezzlement and other 
irregularities. He makes the point that legal proceedings against a regent were generally 
considered to be hopeless and that persons of 'quality' fell outside the ordinary rules.23o The 
comments of Willem Schorer, then President of the Court of Flanders, also point in this 
direction. He once said that he would " ...prefer to paint justice as blind of one eye rather than 
ofboth...".231 
Seen from this angle, it is not surprising that in post-revolutionary Netherlands no one pressed 
for the retention ofjudicial liability as an instrument of control. It goes without saying that this 
argument could hardly be proclaimed openly either by the regents or by jurists such as 
Groenewegen, who, it must be remembered, was for most of his life secretary and legal 
228 See the text above at 1 fun22-25 and 2 1 fun 39-42. 
229 See for instance Van Poelgeest, Bijdragen 103 (1988), 23-24. Van Poelgeest makes the point that c. one fifth of the 
judges of the Hoge Raad belonged to the regent-patriciate class by birth (profession of the father). If we are to take into 
account the profession of the grandfather this number rose to two fifths and to three fifths if we take into account the class 
to which the respective fathers-in-law belonged. Husseen in his detailed account of the situation at the Hofvan Holland in 
Bijdragen 93 (1978), 257 makes a similar point where he refers to the sale of (judicial) offices in Friesland and states that 
obviously there existed a dramatic trend towards oligarchisering and a nog grotere verenging van het recruteringsveld. 
230 Van Deursen, Het Koppergeld, 165-167. See also Lademacher, Niederlande, 207-208. 
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advisor of his hometown ofDelft, one of the most influential cities in the Province of Holland. 
However, it is not improbable that, although not written, such was thought. 
4 I 3 4 	 Groenewegen 's adaptation ofthe French doctrine ofrestricted judicial liability to 
Roman-Dutch law 
If one is to consider the above-mentioned arguments as the breeding ground for the reception 
in Roman-Dutch law of the ideas of the French doctrine, practical difficulties must not be 
overlooked. Roman-Dutch law never formally accepted the prise a partie, making it 
impossible for Groenewegen to base his own approach with regard to the situation in the 
Netherlands on this special type of legal instrument introduced in France. Consequently, he 
was obliged to find an acceptable solution on the basis of those remedies provided by Roman­
Dutch law. 
It is this need to find an acceptable basis for restricted judicial liability that explains 
Groenewegen's approach of determining the relevant action under which a party could sue a 
judge. To restrict judges' liability, it goes without saying that for Groenewegen the actio in 
factum for imprudentia was out of the question. The actio legis Aquiliae also hardly suited his 
objectives since the Aquilian action lay for either dolus or culpa. An unintended result of its 
use would have been to restrict the application of the actio legis Aquiliae with regard to 
judicial liability merely to instances of dolo conduct. Inevitably, there was only one possibility 
left for Groenewegen: the application of the actio de dolo. It was the actio de dolo that 
provided for full restitution for pure economic loss in the event of dolus malus, an aspect 
which strikingly resembled the French requirement of dol, fraude ou concussion. 
It may be remembered that the dogmatical foundation of Groenewegen's restrictive approach 
derives from the passage in D 50.17.47, where the liability of fraudulent advisors and legal 
experts under the actio de dolo is discussed. However Groenewegen's approach is subject to 
the following criticism. While applying D 50.17.47, Groenewegen makes an extensive 
interpretation which is not only an extension but a softening of the rule. Neither in Roman law 
nor in the Italian ius commune was D 50.17.47 ever applied directly to instances of judicial 
wrongdoing. Moreover, it appears from Voet's comments on the subject, which will be 
231 Grotius, introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence, 3.37.9. 
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discussed in due course, that in Roman-Dutch law a judge's liability was generally not based 
on the liability of fraudulent advisors. In other words: giving expert advice and rendering a 
judgement was not the same even in those cases where judges, particularly lay judges of the 
lower courts, relied on the advysen of trained jurists, such as professors or advocates, in 
complicated matters of law and fact. 
Finally, another interesting aspect of Groenewegen's approach to judicial liability should be 
noted, namely liability in cases of denial of justice, the category of liability subsumed in 
French law under the term deni de justice. As a matter of fact, Groenewegen does not discuss 
liability for denial of justice under the same heading as liability for judicial mistakes. 
Furthermore, in comparison with the above instances, he does not include any reference to the 
French usus. Only in more remote passages ofhis commentary on the Codex and the Novellae 
does Groenewegen provide us with details: Persistent with his general view denial of justice 
also resulted in an actio de dolo. 232 
Undoubtedly, Groenewegen's approach generally of reconciling foreign (French) ideas with 
the situation in the Netherlands is a vivid example of the technique of the Dutch jurists of the 
seventeenth century. Groenewegen's arguments had an enormous impact on successive 
generations ofDutch jurists, among others Simon van Leeuwen. 
4 1 4 Simon van Leeuwen 
Simon van Leeuwen was born in Leiden in 1626 and educated at Leiden University. After 
years of practice as an advocate at the The Hague and Leiden, he became, shortly before his 
death in 1682, assistant registrar of the Hoge Raad.233 One of his chief claims to fame is that 
he was the first person to introduce the term 'Rooms-Hollands Regt' in legal textbooks. He 
used it as the title for one of his two major works, Het Rooms-Hollands Regt, a textbook on 
232 See Groenewegen, Tractatus, C.3.1.13.2 and 4, C.4.3.18 as well as Nov.86. See further Wassenaar, Praxis ludiciaria, 
1.233-237; Instructien van den Hove van Hollandt, Zeelandt ende Vriesland Art. 213 and 214; Voet, Commentarius, 
5.1.20. 

233 For more bibliographical details see Wessels, History, 306; Van Leeuwen's Roman-Dutch Law, Introductory Note; 





civil and procedural law which was published in 1664. His other major work is Censura 
Forensis, a systematic overview of contemporary civil law with all its various Roman, Dutch 
and foreign legal sources. VanLeeuwen was a very productive and well received author. His 
literary works, however, have been criticised.234 
Like most other Dutch authors, VanLeeuwen distinguished between wrongful acts due to 
dolus malus and those due to imprudentia. Generally speaking, his position was that a judge 
who gave a wrong judgement from lack of skill did not make the case his own.235 However, in 
the chapter on quasi-delicts in his Censura Forensis - where one would expect to find an in­
depth analysis of judicial liability - Van Leeuwen provides hardly any arguments to back his 
views. He merely refers his readers to the first of the two arguments advanced by 
Groenewegen at the same point, and to the authorities cited by him.236 The chapter on quasi­
delicts in his Rooms-Hollands Regt provides even less information. Nevertheless, Van 
Leeuwen's approach is generally consistent. Since, in his opinion, a judge could be held liable 
only for dolus, not imprudentia, and, in his view, the quasi-delicts covered only negligent 
actions, judges' liability no longer fitted into the scheme of quasi-delicts?37 Van Leeuwen 
thus had to find another place to discuss the liability of the iudex. 
This place, in both his major works, seems to be the category of delicts. In his Censura 
Forensis, Van Leeuwen discussed the liability of the judge even within the chapter on the 
crime of extortion. He discusses various aspects of this liability, namely extortion and 
corruption, as well as - important to our subject - wrong decisions due to dolus malus or 
imprudentia.238 Van Leeuwen begins his treatment of the topic with a discussion of the 
liability of a judge who accepts money to perform or not perform his duties in a certain way. 
In section five of this chapter of Censura Forensis, Van Leeuwen refers to the case of the 
Roberts, Bibliography, 183; Van Heijnsbergen, Geschiedenis, 102; Smits, Rechtsgeschiedenis, 126; Walter, Actio 

lniuriarum, 68; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 182-184; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 357-359. 

234 Note De Wet, Ou Slaywers, who can be quoted at 140: "Hy was 'n veelslaywer en 'n oorslaywer." See al.so 

Zimmennann, RHR, 45 with further references. 

235 See, Censura Forensis , 1.5 .7.5; 1.5.30.1; 2.1.8 .9; 2.1.31.17 at the end and 2.2.13.21. See further Rooms-Hollands Regt, 

4.33.10 and 4.39.3 at the end. 
236 Censura Forensis, 1.5.30.1. 

237 This is exceptionally clear from his comments in Censura Forensis Part 1 Book Vat 1.5.7.5: "..nor is he understood to 

have made the case his own, contrary to Ins!. 4.5.pr." 

238 Censura Forensis, 1.5.7. 
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judge who gives a wrong decision due to lack of knowledge. Van Leeuwen, like the authors 
analysed so far, denies any liability of the judge in this case. His central argument appears to 
be the 'appeal argument': 
" ... he who thinks he has been unfairly put upon by the decision of a judge can have the judgement 
. . d ,,239reversed byappea1to a supenor JU ge. 
This view is strengthened by what he says in his Rooms-Hollands Reg! about the right to 
appeal: 
" ... for it is a privilege extended to the injured ... party against the wrong and the stupidity of the 
judge. And as he, who uses his own right, injures no one so the party does not injure the judge by 
appealing ... ".240 
And in the procedural part of Censura Forensis, Van Leeuwen repeated his opinion that the 
remedy of appeal is an effective means for the injured party to obtain relief: 
"Sed moribus iudex per imperitiam male judicans litem suam non fecit, neque parti laesae tenetur, 
qui appelationis, aut revision is remedio uti potest.,,241 
It appears from these arguments that VanLeeuwen, more than any other writer so far assessed, 
recognised the importance of the right of appeal to the scope of judicial liability. What had 
been indicated already by Vinnius in his comments on judicial liability is elaborated on by 
Van Leeuwen. It is self-evident that the right of appeal (where it applies) warrants equity and 
objective justice at the level of a superior court; and a factual adjustment by means of delictual 
liability therefore no longer appears to be necessary. From the point of view of legal 
development, one can say that the arguments cautiously advocated by Bartolus in the Middle 
Ages now had, centuries later, a large impact on the scope of judicial liability envisaged in 
Roman-Dutch law.242 
Meanwhile, neither Van Leeuwen nor any of the other jurists included a direct reference to 
Bartolus's theory. Furthennore, it is interesting that no reference is made to the other 
arguments advanced by Bartolus in this regard, for instance the consequences of a party's 
omitting to initiate appeal procedures. The sole idea on which Roman-Dutch lawyers based 
their argument was the possibility of repeal or correction of the judgement a quo by the appeal 
court. Van Leeuwen, as a practitioner, believed that the possibility of appeal affected the 
239 Censura Forensis Partl Book Vat \.5.7.5 at the end. 
240 Van Leeuwen 's Roman-Dutch Law, 5.25.12. 
241 Censura Forensis , 2.1.3 1.17. 
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scope ofjudicial liability. He thought that because of the possibility of appeal the judge should 
not be held liable for all conceivable wrongs.243 
Interestingly, however, he and all his fellow writers, dared not to mention that in criminal 
proceedings appeal procedures practically did not apply. Criminal cases (except for trifling 
cases) were heard before the various hole and thus appeal procedures were not provided for, 
as appears from the Groot Placaet-Boek.244 Thus, the appeal argument, attractive as it is, 
lacked one important component in Roman-Dutch law to make it a truly effective remedy that 
could be raised in place of extensive judicial liability: The wide range of possible judicial 
mistakes in criminal matters simply was not covered by the appeal argument. From a modem 
point of view, obviously a scandalous state of affairs. 
Finally, it is not entirely clear whether Van Leeuwen in his Rooms-Hollands Regt also wished 
to apply Groenewegen's argument that judges lacked ability and expertise. He refers to this in 
4.33.11, the section which deals with the liability of the advocate. The original version of this 
section mentioned regts-voorspraak (advocates, lawyers) and not regters. However, it might 
be argued that, owing to the strength this argument had gained in the meantime in Roman­
Dutch law, Van Leeuwen also had in mind judges. That Van Leeuwen was well aware of the 
'ability argument' is emphasised by another relevant passage in the second part of his Censura 
Forensis, which focuses on procedural questions. In a chapter which deals with the liability of 
court officials, VanLeeuwen refers to the science of law as follows: 
"Sed quum munus illud in tam difficili Juris & Praxeos scienta, & tanta circum procedendi stylum 
atque ordinem varietate tantaque causarum moram non serentium multitudine versetur, ut nec 
plenum aliquando detur deliberandi tempus ... " .245 
242 See above at chapter IV 3 5. 

243 Brief general remarks on the questions relating to appeal procedures can be find at Dolezalek, Zivilprozessrechl, 89-92 . 

With regard to the roots of the Dutch appeal procedures in Flanders see the anicle by Monballyu, TR 61 (1993),237-274. 

For more details see Merula, Manier van Procederen, 2.8.1; 4.3.2.7; 4.4.1 .4; as to reformalie see 2.9.1 . Funher Van 

Leeuwen, Rooms-Hollands Regl, 5.25; Van der Linden, Judicieele Praclijcq, 1.24. For an additional aspect of the 

relationship between appeal procedures and judicial liability see below at 4 2 2. 

244 At voUI, 1061 el seq. Huber, Jurisprudence ofMy Time, 5.45.9 states: "We are speaking here of litigation of a civil, not 

of a criminal nature, since the Coun alone may decide in the latter, and from it no appeal of any kind lies in criminal 

matters. See also Huussen, Bijdragen 93 (1977), 246. 



















Summing up, it may be said that Van Leeuwen still recognised the existence of the group of 
quasi-delicts. However, he both extended and narrowed its scope. He included the actio de 
pauperie, but excluded the liability of the judge.246 VanLeeuwen restricted judicial liability to 
cases of dolo misjudgements. Clearly, this concept no longer fitted into his scheme of quasi­
delicts, which are restricted to cases of culpa. Consequently, he classified the liability of the 
judge as a true delict; and, moreover, discussed it within his chapter on extortion, which is a 
crimen laese majestatis. Thus, Van Leeuwen recognised the 'public' interest in the 
accountability of the judiciary, a tendency noted earlier in discussion of the French kings. Van 
Leeuwen agreed with Groenewegen that on the basis of D 50.17.47 the actio de dolo and not 
the actio legis Aquiliae was the appropriate actio for an action against ajudge.247 
415 Johannes Voet 
Johannes Voet (1647-1713) belonged to a well known Utrecht family of scholars. His father 
Paul was also a professor oflaw, his grandfather a professor of theology.248 Voet studied law 
at Utrecht and graduated - it is not entirely certain when - in France around 1668. He became 
a professor first at Herbom (Nassau), later at Utrecht and in 1680 at Leiden. Voet is generally 
considered to be not the most creative or innovative, but definitely one of the most influential 
of the writers on Roman-Dutch law.249 The work which laid the foundation of his enduring 
fame is his Commentarius ad pandectas (1698-1704). Each title of this work, which follows 
the arrangement of the Digest, deals first with Roman law and then with the ius hodiernum. 
The references that Voet includes in his commentary on Roman law as well as on authorities 
on the ius commune are impressive for their learning. Some humanist influences are traceable; 
he gives many examples of the forensic practice of his age; and he includes concepts of 
natural law. He may thus be considered a typical exponent of the Low Countries' usus 
modernus. Voet's contribution to legal science was not, however, restricted to the Low 
246 Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto, 89 et seq. 

247 Censura Forensis, 2.1.31 .17. 

248 The biographical literature on Yoet is vast. For a comprehensive overview see Zimmermann, RHR, 39 fn142, see also 

Ahsmann, Voet, 641; De Wet, THR-HR II (1948), 50-57; Van Heijnsbergen, Geschiedenis, 62; further Smits, 

Rechtsgeschiedenis, 124, Yan Zyl, Geskiedenis, 362-365; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 184-189. 

249 But see also the comment by Kotze, SAU 27 (1910), 196. Kotze describes Voet as the 'prince of compilers'. This is not 

necessarily derogatory. For a discussion see Zimmermann, RHR, 40-41 . 
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Countries. He was very influential in other European countries, and remains authoritative in 
South Africa today.25o 
Voet discussed the liability of the judge in his commentary in 5.1.58. In keeping with the 
historical development, he included both the criminal and the civil aspects ofjudicial liability. 
In a decidedly clear and intelligible manner, Voet provides what might be called the best 
summary of the Roman law of judicial liability written by a Roman-Dutch author. Four 
paragraphs suffice to infonn one about the most significant peculiarities of this liability. 
With regard to the law of his time, Voet, like most of his fellow writers, excluded judicial 
liability for mere imprudentia.251 This notwithstanding, Voet was the one Roman-Dutch jurist 
to indicate the significant practical consequences of the modified Dutch understanding of the 
scope ofjudicial liability, saying bluntly that dolus was practically impossible to prove: 
"In our customs .. .it is rather rare for the judge to make the suit his own by ill judging. That is 
because it is a trite rule that he is not made liable by mere lack of knowledge or unwisdom, but by 
fraud only, which is commonly difficult of proof." 252 
That Voet's opinion mirrored exactly the reality, particularly at the superior courts is apparent 
from Van Poelgeest's discussion of the decision-making process that applied at the Hoge 
Raad. Strict secrecy was imposed on the deliberations of the court. The judges faced 
impeaclunent and removal from office if they divulged internal infonnation to third 
250 On the influence ofYoet see Feenstra and Waal, SeventeenJh Century Leiden Law Professors, 81 et seqq. 
251 Schrage, Legal History 17 (1996), 107 indicates that Yoet's opinion is to some extent different from Groenewegen's 
view. Schrage bases this interpretation on Yoet's statement in his Commentary that the actio de dolo is not the only remedy 
available to an injured party in Roman-Dutch law. A judge can also be held liable on the basis of a quasi-delict although ­
contends Schrage - imperitia vel imprudentia itself is insufficient for liability. However, it seems to me, with due respect, 
that Schrage is wrong. Although Yoet seems to refer to quasi-delictual liability when saying that it is rare for a judge who 
gave a wrong judgement to make the case his own, in my opinion Yoet is applying 'wrong judging' more to the case of the 
judge who judges with dolus. Therefore his reference to litem suam facit seems to be, rather, his general paraphrasing of 
judicial liability. This is evident from the following sentence where Yoet gives as the reason for the rareness of this liability 
the fact that liability was not for imperitia aut imprudentia but for dolus, which was very difficult to prove. This is 
reinforced by the wording of the corresponding section in Yoet's Beginselen des Rechts , where at 4.5.4 and 5 he refers to 
"".hel geding het zyne maeken"." in the case of onkunde or onvoorzichtigheit as well as in the case of quaeder trouwe, that 
is dolus. Hartog's view with respect to Yoet's position is also somewhat inaccurate. In his Onrechtmatige Overheidsdaden, 
22 he states that ""Yoet en Van der Keessel ontkennen beiden de receptie van de regel over de gebondenheid van de iudex 
qui litem suam jecerit buiten kwade trouw of grof verzuim." However, there is no indication in any of Yoet's works 
including the Commentary that he favoured liability for culpa lata and dolus. 
252 Commentary, 5.1.58. 
208 
persons.253 Hence Voet's comments rightly point to the essential problem of judicial liability, 
i.e., the difficulty of proving that the judge (or in the case of a collegium the judges) dolo malo 
had broken the law. 
To further substantiate his view, Voet relied on what was also Groenewegen's main argument: 
it was unjust to hold judges - particularly lower court judges, who were unskilled in the 
science of law and had to hear a multitude of cases at very short notice - liable merely for lack 
of knowledge. It is questionable whether he also followed Groenewegen's reasoning that this 
principle derived mainly from the application of D 50.17.47. From Voet's commentary on the 
subject, it appears that Groenewegen's approach showed a somewhat superficial application 
of the principles governing the liability of advisors. 
In several passages in his commentary, Voet provides us with details on the common practice 
at the lower (lay) courts in the Netherlands of calling on advocates and law professors for 
professional advice (advysen). The details are evident from Voet's assessment of a good 
judge: "A judge is an honest gentleman and fair, having himself or in his assessors skill in 
law.,,254 Undoubtedly, it was " ...proper for him [the judge, to] take counsel from and to follow 
law, equity and sacred conviction together.,,255 There are a number of publications of the time 
in which this practice of calling for advice is reflected, to name only a few: there are the 
Utrechtsche Consultatien, Joost Schomaker's Selecta Consilia et Responsa Iuris; the Nieuw 
Nederlands Advys-Boek or the Hollandsche Consultatien. 
From Voet's comments we can draw some fairly detailed conclusions as to the scope of 
judicial liability where the judge requested professional advice. Two cases must be 
distinguished: that of the judge who asked for advice and followed it; and that of the judge 
253 Van Poelgeest, Bijdragen 103 (1988), 40. De Smidt, Hoge Raad, 207 observes: "The reasons for the decisions were not 
given: the judges' opinion is not apparent from the sentence. In the sentence, writers or other sources are never mentioned 
in support of an opinion." This observation, in a sense, once again confirms the correctness of the idea behind the so-called 
'narrow view' on judicial liability introduced in Roman law above at chapter II 22 2. 
254 Ibid. at 5.1.39. 
255 Ibid. at 5.1.5 I. See also in this regard Huber, who states in his Jurisprudence ofmy Time at 4 .15 .18: "It is, however, a 
fact that certain judges are appointed without skill in the law [Huber refers to inferior judges] ... for which reason they are 
accustomed in deciding disputed cases, and according to the ordinance obliged to employ the advice of jurists. They 
therefore usually call in the leading advocates in the Court, or even take them into their continuous service, when they are 
called stipendiary counsellors (pensionarissen) ." 
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who asked for but did not follow the advice, which in effect was treated as if the judge had 
never requested advice. Voet argues convincingly that only in the fonner case was the advisor 
or the legal expert (not the judge) liable, if actuated by dolus malus: 
"The Wlwisdom of an assessor however, by which justice had been pronounced otherwise than it 
should have been, ought not to prejudice the magistrate but only the assessor. ,,256 
In the case of the judge who requested but did not follow advice, it was the judge who was to 
be held liable when he had misjudged with dolus. 257 Consequently, at no stage was the judge 
himself held liable under D 50.17.47. Voet is much clearer than Groenewegen or Van 
Leeuwen in showing that this rule could not apply directly to a judge. 
As regards Voet's other works: His Elementa Juris is merely a short commentary on Justinian's 
Jnstitutes. 258 However, in 4.5.6 of his Beginselen des Rechts, after discussing Vinnius's 
comments on the difference between the liability of the judge and that of the medical doctor, 
Voet introduces the familiar 'appeal argument' to substantiate his view that judicial liability 
ought" to be confined to misjudgements involving dolus malus.259 This is in accordance with 
the opinion he expressed in his Commentarius. We can only guess whether Voet in the final 
analysis considered Groenewegen's 'knowledge argument' the more convincing, since he did 
not include the 'appeal argument' in his Commentarius. At least it is clear that Voet was well 
aware of both. In his Compendium Juris, Voet again made clear his view (but without giving 
any reasons) that Roman-Dutch law did not recognise a judge's liability for misjudging merely 
from lack of knowledge.26o At 5.1.21 he states: "Quod si iudex per imperitiam male 
judicaverit, non facit hodie litem suam; secus si dolo ... ". 
256 Commentary at 5.1.58. 
257 This also appears to have been the position in Germany at the time. See Geipel, Konsiliarpraxis, 28 . 

258 See also Wessels, History, 329. Roberts correctly remarked that Wessels was mistaken in suggesting that the Beginselen 

des Rechts was a translation of Elementa luris. See Roberts, Bibliography, 321. In fact, the latter does not cover any 
contemporary Roman-Dutch law. 
259 Beginselen des Rechts, 4.5.6: " .... noch een rechter wordt uit zyn vonnisse, zonder quaet bedrog aileen door onkonde 




260 The Compendium was a well known student's textbook, used throughout Europe. Its influence on South Africa has been 

minor since it was overshadowed by Yoel's Commentary. For more details see Roberts, Bibliography, 320; Wessels, 
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Since Grotius's opinion as to the liability of the judges was markedly different from that of 
many of his fellow authors, it is regrettable that we have no immediate comment on Grotius's 
view in Voel's Observationes?61 
Voet, beyond doubt, rejected a wide scope of judicial liability in Roman-Dutch law. Like 
Christianaeus, Vinnius, Groenewegen, and Van Leeuwen, he held that judges were liable only 
for dolus. Voet also advocated a division and, consequently, a weakening of the group of 
quasi-delicts, although in all his works except the Commentary on the Pandects, he discussed 
judicial liability under this rubric. What is not quite clear, however, is the relevant action for 
judicial liability. From his comments with respect to the application of the rule in D 50.17.47, 
it may be assumed that, in a suit against a judge for loss caused by a wrong judgement, the 
appropriate action was the actio legis Aquiliae, and not the actio de dolo. However, with 
regard to cases of denial of justice, the other category of judicial liability which Voet touches 
upon very briefly at 5.1.20, he approves liability under the actio de dolo.262 
4 2 The contrary opinion: liability for dolus and culpa lata 
Three eminent Roman-Dutch writers, Ulrich Huber, Dionysius Godefridus van der Keessel 
and Hugo Grotius appear not to have favoured the view that judicial liability lay for dolus 
alone. 
421 Ulrich Huber 
Ulrich Huber (1636-1694) is considered one of the foremost Dutch jurists between the time of 
Grotius and that of Van Bynkershoek.263 He was educated at the universities of Utrecht, 
Marburg, Heidelberg and Strasbourg.264 In 1657, he was called to his first chair at the 
261 Voet is not commenting on Grotius's view in this regard. 

262 Which is in accordance inter alia with Groenewegen and Wassenaar point ofview. For details see above at fn232 . 

263 Zimmermann, RHR, 36-39. 
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University of Franeker in the province of Friesland. After a brilliant career at this university, 
he became a judge of the HoJvan Friesland at Leeuwarden in 1679. However, he returned 
three years later to Franeker as a private scholar. Huber's vast number of publications 
established him as an authority in such fields as private international law265 , the law of the 
state266, and Roman-Dutch law.267 The fact that Huber was Frisian and that his Heedendaegse 
Rechtsgeleertheyt contains mostly Frisian law has called into question his status as an 
authority on the Roman-Dutch law applicable in Holland.268 In light of Huber's learning, his 
analytical abilities and his considerable influence on other non-Frisian writers, this judgement, 
appears to be unfounded.269 
Huber discusses the liability of the judge with different degrees of comprehensiveness in a 
number of his works. His first major work, Praelectiones Juris Civilis consists of two parts: 
commentaries on the Digest and the Institutes, respectively. The first part of the commentary 
on the Institutes was published in 1678, the remaining parts in 1689 and 1690. In his 
Praelectiones, Huber focused on Roman law but indicated the modifications Roman law had 
undergone in contemporary law.27o In the first part of the Praelectiones, at 4.5.2, we are 
exposed to a debate on the subject of judicial liability between Huber and the well-known 
Gennan scholar Christian Thomasius (1655-1728).271 Huber presents his positiones, which 
Thomasius answers with a scholium. Huber responds to the latter with his responsio and 
Thomasius defends his views with a final additio. Huber's remarks in his positiones include 
the view that judicial liability could arise from misjudgement, based either on dolus or on 
imperitia. 
Apart from noting that Thomasius would also render the misjUdging judge liable for either 
dolus or culpa, Thomasius's responses may be ignored here. However, he would apply to both 
dolus and culpa the actio legis Aquiliae, which means that he considered obsolete the actio in 
265 De Conflictu Legum. That is chapter 2.1.3 of his Prae/ecliones Juris Civilis . 

266 De lure Civitatis. 

267 Heedendaegse Rechlsgeleerlheyl and Praelecliones Juris Civilis. 

268 Acceptance of Roman Jaw in Friesland went beyond that in other Dutch Provinces, i.e., HoJiand. Thus Roman Jaw was 
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factum for judicial liability (and, presumably, placement among quasi-delicts). Unlike Huber, 
he did not render the culpa misjudging judge infamis. All this provoked a fierce rejection from 
Huber: 
"Actionem utilem legis Aquiliae ad suitatem litis producere nimis enorme videtur, ut modo 
demonstratum est. Diversitas condemnationis pecuniarie, quando culpa vel dolo male iudicatum 
est, evidenter col/ocata est in dl.J 5.§J de iudic. & hoc pro Nec est quod a communi sententia heic 
recedere jubeat." 
From the Praelectiones it seems, quite remarkably, that Huber favoured comprehensive 
liability for misjudgement. This would mean, at least in Frisian law of the seventeenth 
century, that judges would be held liable on the same scale as in Roman law and in high 
medieval Italian law. The question that now arises is whether this remarkable view of Huber's 
is confirmed in his other works. 
In his Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt, which first appeared in 1686, Huber discusses the 
liability of the judge under the heading Van oneygentlijke Misdaeden?72 This work, a 
commentary on Frisian law but also on laws elsewhere in force, dwells less extensively on 
Roman law than does the Praelectiones. Huber refers at 2.3.3.5 to the judge that qualijk 
oordeelt, buiten bedroch. As this is exactly the case of the iudex, qui litem suam fecit, we are 
familiar with the legal consequences in Roman law. In addition, Huber states at 2.3.3.6 that a 
judge acting deliberately commits a true delict as opposed to a quasi-delict. By and large, 
Huber here confirms the view he had put forward eight years earlier in his Praelectiones. 
Huber is first and foremost a Frisian author and, owing to a peculiar process of assimilation, 
Frisian law was much closer to Roman law than the law of the other provinces of the Low 
Countries?73 In analysing Huber's work, one is thus faced with the problem of distinguishing 
between his comments on Roman law and on contemporary Frisian or Roman-Dutch law. The 
question here is whether his comments, both in his Praelectiones and the Heedendaegse 
Rechtsgeleertheyt, merely describe the state of Roman law or whether they also represent his 
view of contemporary Frisian law. The Praelectiones generally tend to concentrate a great 
deal on Roman law. Furthermore, Huber does not refer explicitly at any stage of the positiones 
272 The chapter on Oneygenl/ijke Misdaeden appeared in the first edition in the third book of the second part. However, in 
the fifth edition which was edited by Huber's son Zacharias, and which was used by Gane, it appeared in the sixth book. 
See the remarks above at fn67. 
273 As to the complex process of reception of Roman Law in Friesland see De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 152-153; Van Zyl , 
Geskiedenis, 304-305; Wessels, History, 318; Gerbenzon, TR 27 (1959), 133-157. 
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to the usus hodiernus or to any opinion of contemporary writers, who were clearly against a 
wide scope of liability. Further, he rejected Thomasius's fairly modem contention that the 
judge was not to be rendered infamis. Thus, one tends to believe that Huber's remarks state 
the position of Roman rather than contemporary Frisian law. 
Uncertainty is compounded by Huber's Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt. At the very 
beginning of the relevant passages in this work, Huber refers to the fourfold arrangement of 
quasi-delicts according to Justinian, the Keyserlijke Rechten.274 He states the law of judicial 
liability in accordance with these Roman sources. However, three factors point away from the 
interpretation of the passages 2.3.3.5 and 6 of the Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt as a mere 
description of Roman law.275 Firstly, the title of the work itself is a strong indication that 
Huber's overall intention was to reflect the state of Frisian and not Roman law. Owing to the 
far-ranging acceptance of Roman law in Friesland, opinions frequently overlapped. This 
seems to be the case in the passages under consideration. Secondly, Huber, in other passages 
within the same chapter, points out where and how far contemporary law differed from 
Roman law. One could, therefore, argue, e contrario, that Huber would have done the same 
with regard to judicial liability had he contemplated any changes. Finally, in section 2.3.3.12 
he recorded the abrogation of the Roman double and triple fines in Friesland, which he was 
unlikely to have done if his remarks on the liability of the judge were intended to reflect only 
Roman law. 
Other works by Huber, not of the same importance as the Praelectiones or the Heedendaegse 
Rechtsgeleertheyd, are his Positiones Iuris and his Beginzelen der Regtkunde. In the former, 
which appeared for the first time in 1682, Huber - again following the scheme of the Institutes 
- briefly states at 4.5.2 the position of Roman law according to Justinian. The title of the 
second work, Beginzelen der Regtkunde in Friesland en elders gebruikelijk, which appeared 
in 1684, raises one's hopes of at last establishing precisely Huber's opinion. However, the 
passage at 4.3.3 in the Beginzelen introduces nothing new; in fact, it is identical with his 
Heedendaegse Rechtsgelef!rtheyd. 
274 "Sodaninge!eiten worden vier in Keyser/ijke Rechten gemelt ; ten I. A/s een Rechter qua/ijk oorde/t .. ,". 










It seems that Huber at this stage indeed favoured comprehensive judicial liability for 
misjudgements. Accordingly, Roman law on this point would appear to have been received 
without much modification in Friesland. This differs considerably from the view taken by 
contemporary writers, and underscores the peculiarity of the development of the law in 
Friesland. 
However, Huber's last work, Eunomia Romana, sheds new light on the issue of judicial 
liability. It appeared posthumously in 1700. An earlier edition titled Disputationes juridicae 
pro eunomia romana appeared between 692 and 1694.276 Eunomia Romana is important in 
our context in two respects: Firstly, Huber does not confine himself to a general outline of the 
problems as in his other works. Secondly, it is the only work in which he expressly refers to 
the opinions of Roman-Dutch authorities outside Friesland, as well as to the particular Frisian 
usus. 
For a proper understanding of the relevant passage in the Eunomia Romana, it is essential to 
recognise that Huber, in subsection one, was dealing with the state of judicial liability in the 
Low Countries outside Friesland. It is only in subsection two that he refers to the peculiar 
Frisian position.277 In this work, finally, it becomes absolutely clear that Frisian law, and 
Huber's opinion on the requirements for judicial liability outside Friesland, namely in 
Holland, are not in conformity with the views of other Roman-Dutch authors. In particular, 
Huber makes reference to the view of Groenewegen, which was analysed earlier.278 Although 
Huber singled out Groenewegen, he seems to have been well aware that Groenewegen was 
merely a (leading) exponent of the opinion of Roman-Dutch authorities in favour of the 
limited liability ofjudges.279 
276 Roberts, Bibliography, 161. He reveals that the Eunomia contains disputations by students of Huber, inter alia even by 
Van Bynkershoek. Since the first edition is not available in South Africa, it cannot be established who actually disputed the 
passage under consideration. However, taking into account the predictably strong influence of Huber on his students it 
appears that at the end of the day the opinions were Huber's. Roberts in his bibliography states with regard to Wissenbach's 
Exercitationum ad 50 Pandeclarum libros (1653-1658) at 339: "This work includes a number of his student's disputations, 
a practice quite common in those days. Possibly because the dissertations with which the pupils obtained their...degree were 
in fact largely the work of the teacher himself." 
277 See generally Eunomia Romana, 415 .1 and 2. 
218 See above at 4 1 3. 
279 See Eunomia Romana, 415.1: "Hujus loci jus non servari neque servandum esse. docet Groenewegius. auctorilalibus 
hominum clarissimorum adduclis ... Ubi sane plerique Commenlalores ila de usu temporum adjirmant ... ". 
' 
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It is obvious from Huber's comments that he not only disagreed with Groenewegen's 
conclusion - that judicial liability existed only for dolus - but that he also rejected 
Groenewegen's reasoning as unsound: 
"Quid est aliud, mores arguereflagitiosae ab Eunomia Romana discrepantiae, si hoc non est? Vel 
nisi, ut pene videtur, hoc agat ille fat is. " 
Huber greatly disliked Groenewegen's freedom of interpretation in abrogating the clear 
Roman rules of law. Even his efforts to soften his criticism, by asking whether 
Groenewegen's contentions were advanced ironically, cannot camouflage his complete 
rejection of the latter's contentions. However, analysis reveals that Huber himself was not 
arguing entirely without artifice. Where he quoted from Groenewegen's passage in the 
Tractatus, Huber left out those sections where Groenewegen lists his arguments as to why 
judicial liability ought to be limited to cases of dolus - arguments which are not without 
legitimacy and persuasiveness?80 In addition, it is not easy to see why Huber denied the right 
of Groenewegen and other writers to abrogate the Roman rules, while (as will be apparent 
from what follows) he himself advocated at least a partial abrogation. 
Meanwhile, the most important passage in Huber's Eunomia Romana in this context is that 
where Huber qualifies the position of Groenewegen and other non-Frisian writers. According 
to Huber, the liability of the judge outside Friesland had to be distinguished from that within 
Friesland. Outside Friesland, liability arose for dolus and culpa tam en gravis et 
inexcusabilis?81 Since culpa gravis was equated with culpa lata, the liability of the judge was 
restricted to cases of gross negligence, which, nevertheless, was wider than the scope of 
liability advocated by other Roman-Dutch writers. Unless the various cities passed local 
statutes which protected judges from every kind of liability, in order that they might judge 
without fear of the consequences, these requirements for liability remained the law.282 
280 Huber quotes from Groenewegen's Tractatus rather freely. From the passage at praefertim subalternis Huber departs 
from the original text by Groenewegen and summarises the relevant text as follows: ".. .. si toties ipsi tenerentur, quoties iis 

a/iquid per imperitiam aut per imprudentiam exciderit." Compare Groenewegen 's own words at Tractatus, Inst.4.5.pr. 

281 See at Eunomia Romana, 415.1: "Enimvero quanquam Magistratus hoc loco etiam lege Aqui/iae teneri dicuntur, hoc ita 

nullo modo capiendum, ul de cujuvis generis culpa teneanlur; Sed de factis ejusmodi, quorum in hoc loco exampla 





282 Ibid. at 2: .. ...nisi quod in mullis eivilatibus ea Magistraluum municipalium potentia est. ut civum querelas & aliquando 








However, in regard to the law of Friesland, Huber once again made the point that in this 
province the original Roman rules had by no means been abrogated: 
"In Frisia nostra pars haec Eunomiae Romanae adhuc nullo modo sublata est. Neque 
Magistratuum municipalium err ores, quales in hoc loco, inexcusabiles, mulctis & actionibus 
obnoxii esse desierunt. ,,283 
The position of Frisian law was thus identical with that of Roman law as it existed under 
Justinian and in the days of the Italian jurists. 
For the other provinces, Huber argued that liability ought to be for dolus and culpa lata. He 
did so despite the counter arguments of Groenewegen and others, namely the argument of lack 
of expertise as well as the possibility of appeal open to an injured party. That Huber knew 
about these arguments is clear from his comments in his Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt. At 
2.1.15.24, he refers to a judge who decides contrary to the laws; in this case, the injured party 
could lodge an appeal.284 And at 2.1.15.6, Huber demands a high level of ability on the part of 
judges. 
As a judge of the Hoge Raad van Friesland, it is more than likely that Huber was aware of the 
true situation in the courts. However, this obviously served only to moderate his views in 
regard to liability for imperitia. Huber does not provide much justification for his opinion in 
favour of comprehensive liability. Overall, one is tempted to believe that he was inspired 
mainly by his purist desire to keep the law as close to its Roman roots as possible. 
283 Ibid. at 2. 
284 "De plicht van een Rechter in't algemein is, alsoo recht te spreeken gelijk de welten en ordonnantien mede brengen, 
anders doende, indien het uitdruickelijk tegens de welten is, wort de sententie van aenbegin voer nietig .. . als 'er misverstant 
in de sake is... soo moeter appel ... angestelt worden." Interestingly enough, the views Huber expressed with regard to appeal 
procedures were not very different from Groenewegen 's observations in his Tractatus. Huber commented for instance in his 
Jurisprudence ofMy Time , 5.45.2 that: "The reasons for the introduction of appeals are principally three: Firstly, that the 
judgement of mankind may easily err, and second thoughts are wiser than first; to which one may add that the inferior 
judges' benches are not so well equipped with wise jurists as the superior tribunals and Courts ... ". 
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4 2 2 Dionysius Godefridus van der Keessel 
Since Van der Keessel witnessed at the end of his life the enactment of the Dutch Burgerlijk 
Wetboek, he is commonly regarded, together with Johannes van der Linden, as one of the two 
last great exponents of Roman-Dutch law.285 
Van der Keessel was born at Deventer in 1738 and studied in his mother-city as well as in 
Leiden, where he was a pupil of G Scheltinga. He graduated in 1761 and soon became 
professor of law at Groningen. For 45 years, from 1770 until shortly before his death in 1816, 
he lectured at the University of Leiden on Roman and Roman-Dutch law. Apart from his 
Theses Selectae, that is his lectures on contemporary Roman-Dutch law based on Grotius's 
Inleidinge, Van der Keessel's works were all published posthumously. Well known amongst 
these are his Praelectiones Iuris Hodierni, a fuller version of the above-mentioned lectures, 
his Dictata ad Justiniani Institutionum, the notes of his lectures on Justinian's Institutes; and 
finally his Praelectiones on criminal law, that is on books 47 and 48 of the Digest. Van der 
Keessel's importance is enhanced by the fact that his works provide a good overview of the 
final position of Roman-Dutch law at the dawn of a new era. 
Although Van der Keessel expressed a brief opinion on the liability of the judge in his Theses 
Selectae286, attention should be focused, rather, on his comments on the subject in the 
Praelectiones and the Dictata, which are more comprehensive and not essentially different. 
These comments are of particular importance for two very different reasons. Firstly, Van der 
Keessel appears to be the only author who tried to shed new light on the historical reasons in 
Roman-Dutch law for the restriction of judicial liability to cases of dolus . Secondly, Van der 
Keessel advocated a stricter control over the jUdiciary by means of a wider scope of liability in 
cases ofjudicial misjudgement. 
285 De Wet, Ou Skrywers, 162 paints a rather sombre picture of the achievements of Roman-Dutch law in what he called its 
last sixty years: "Die jare na van Bynkershoek was maer jare vir die Romeins-Hollandse reg. Met die uitsondering van Van 
der Keessel .. .{en] Van der Linden, was daar nie skrywers wat werklik groot genoem kan word nie, en selfs hierdie !wee 
was naklanke wat hulle verdienstelik gemaak het deur aanvulling van werke uit de bloeitydperk en nie deur werke van eie 
opset en ontwerp nie." For more biographical details see Feenstra, Van der Keessel, 343; Zimmermann, RHR, 47-48 and 
fn 192 with further references; Roberts, Bibliography , 172, De Wet, Ou Skrywers, 172-173 , De Wal, Biographic Sketch; 
Dekkers, Bibliotheca, 91 ; Van Heijnsbergen, Geschiedenis, 114; De Vos, Regsgeskiedenis, 21 J-213 ; Van ZyJ, Geskiedenis, 
392-394. 
286 Note Th.SOS. 
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In the first place, Vander Keessel does not attribute the restriction ofjudicialliabihty to cases 
involving dolus merely to Van Leeuwen's 'appeal argument'. He rather introduces into the 
discussion the different starting point of Groenewegen's forensic considerations such as the 
'ability argument'. In this respect, Vander Keessel pays attention to external historical 
influences including the specific procedural developments that rooted in France with regard to 
the so-called intimatio. In Dutch procedural law, it was generally held that every person in the 
judgement a quo, either as one of the parties or as judge of the inferior court, had to appear 
before the superior court hearing an appeal (intimatio).287 With reference to De Timmermann, 
Vander Keessel states that according to French customary law it was common practice to call 
in judges to defend their judgements personally in court when a party felt deprived of 
justice.288 When a judge was held to have denied justice, he was sentenced to payment of a 
fine and to reimbursement of the injured party. However, with the introduction of written law, 
that is Roman law, this practice came to a halt and applied only to those judgements that were 
still based on (ancient) customary law. 
It is evident that Vander Keessel was referring to developments touched upon here earlier in 
discussion of the medieval roots of the French prise apartie.289 He did not go as far as to 
accept the prise a partie in Roman-Dutch law, but he argued that this restriction of the 
concept of intimatio to cases not involving Roman law was closely related to the opinion of 
later Roman-Dutch authors in favour of a restricted scope of judicial liability for 
misjudgements. In both cases, the use of Roman law exempted the judge from certain strict 
consequences: in the first case, from having to appear in court at the appeal session; in the 
287 See De Damhouder, Practycke in Civiele Saeeken, 59.16: "In materie van Reformatie ofte appel doet den Erecuteur syn 
citatie of sijn commissie inde Raedthuysen of Vierscharen aan den persoon van den Maenderherre, Magistraten, 
Sehepenen of die Reehters van welekers sententie geappelleert werdt, om dat se haer ghewesen sententie moeten 
sustineren .. ". See further Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, 2.2.13 .21 and Rooms-Hollands Regt, 5.25.10: "Voorts wird in 
aile appellatien of reformatien onderhouden, dat den Regter die het vonnis of de senten tie heeft gewesen, beneven de 
Partyen wird geroupen en versorgt, dat hy me de saak komt verabtwoorde .. . vulgo inchimatie." For the reception of the 
intimatio in Flanders and its penetration into Roman-Dutch law see Monballyu, TR 61 (1993), 238-240 and 278. 
288 Praelectiones Iuris Hodierni, 3.37.9. De Timmermann, Costumen, 6.4. Little is known about De Timmermann. He 
appears to have lived in the 18th century. He graduated doctor iuris at the University of Utrecht in 1748 and was an 
advocate, later also pensionaris of the city of Middelburg. See the introduction of his work cited here. See also Dekkers, 
Bibliotheca, 171; Roberts , Bibliography, 304 without further biographic comment. With regard to the situation in France 
see Imbert, Institutions, 2.642 and De Damhouder, Practycke in Civiele Saecken, 59.18: "In Franckrykgebruykelyk " 
289 See above at 4 1 3 2. 
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second case, from the imposition of civil liability for misjudgements committed with 
imperitia. 
Thus, on historical grounds Vander Keessel came to the conclusion that in the eyes of some 
Dutch jurists the introduction of the comprehensive Roman law had rendered the task of the 
judiciary extremely difficult. Accordingly, writers strongly favoured the mitigating of negative 
consequences for a judge who applied Roman law on a large scale. This is certainly an 
interesting explanation of why in the early seventeenth century Roman-Dutch jurists 
abandoned the traditional Roman law approach to judicial liability. Van der Keessel was the 
first author on Roman-Dutch law to throw light on the neglected issue of the possible reasons 
for this sudden upheaval. 
There is, nevertheless, an additional nexus of intimatio and civil delictual liability for 
misjudgements which Vander Keessel did not draw on. The Dutch usus modernus 
apparently provided for a regulation whereby the judge a quo had to pay at least half of the 
costs of the appeal and a fine (which, according to Monballyu, came to 60 pounds in 
Flanders well until 1795) when he was subject to intimatio and the appellant's appeal was 
upheld.29o Further, Willem Schorer tells us in his Aanteekeningen291 , with reference to Pieter 
Stockmans, a writer from the southern provinces292, that inferior judges who had been called 
upon to defend their judgements had to recompense the appellant if, despite the success of 
the appeal, the latter remained disadvantaged; for instance, if the opposing party had 
disappeared or become insolvent.293 Apparently, the appellant was not, for a second time, to 
suffer a financial burden caused by an obvious misjudgement in the court a quo. 
The consequences of intimatio and appeal, hence, were twofold: It is evident that, in the eyes 
of the superior court, the reversal of the judgement implied a judicial mistake in that the 
290 TR 61 (1993), 273: "Af en toe verkJaarde de Raad van Vlanderen het appel ofhet reformatieberoep wei ontvankelijk en 
gegrond, en werden de gedaagde rechters in het ongelijk gesteld. In die gevallen weerd voorerst het vonnis a quo 
vernietigd en hervormd. De geintimeerde partij wird veroordeeld tot de processkosten in eertse aanleg. De proceskosten in 
hoger beroep werden verdeeld tussen de geintimeerde en de in het ongelijk gestelde rechters. Wegens het wijzen van een 
slecht vonnis liepen de lagere rechters bovendien een boete van zestlg ponden parisis op." 
291 At 3.37.9. 




293 Decisionum Curiae Brabantiae , 144.6. 
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judge a quo's findings of fact and/or law were not in accordance with the valid law. Thus, 
the judge had to mitigate the consequences of his mistake by paying a portion of the 
additional costs the appellant had suffered on appeal. Consequently it may be said that, if 
Stockman's and Monballyu's assertions reflect the practice of the courts, the legal 
consequences of a successful appeal amounted to a form of civil liability of the judge: There 
can be no doubt that under these circumstances intimatio and appeal procedures posed an 
additional threat (besides that of ordinary delictual action) to the Roman-Dutch inferior 
judge. 
However, leaving aside lofty theory, there are indications other than Van der Keessel's 
explanation of the growing comprehensiveness and difficulty of the law that intimatio ceased 
to be used as frequently during the seventeenth century as in late medieval times.294 Trotz, an 
eighteenth century professor at the University of Franeker295 indicates an alternative reason 
in the heavy workload of the inferior courts, to which appearances before the superior courts 
were an extra burden. He argues, further, that since court records had become more precise 
another reason for the strict application of the old rule had vanished.296 
What Van der Keessel omits to tell us is that the growing suspension of the intimatio did not 
necessarily apply in cases of serious error on the part of the judge a quo. From De 
Timmermann's Costumen, Ordonnantien en Statuten der Stadt Middelburg in Zeeland we 
learn that as late as 1772 the famous passage of Mary of Burgundy's Privilege from 1476 
remained in force, namely: 
"Het en sy dat hen beliefi ten ware oy yemandt wilde doen bliyken dat die voorsz. Eerste jugen by corruptie 
ofi openbaerlijk ende klarlijck tegen de Privilegien van der Plecken haer Vonnisse gegeven hadden, in dien 
ghevalle souden sy gehouden wesen haer Vonnisse alsoo gegheven te sustineeren,',297 
Evidently notorious (openbaerlijk ende klarlijck) misjudgements and/or misjudgements 
resulting from corruption still had to be defended by the judge a quo on appeal.298 Bearing in 
294 Merula, Manier van Procederen, 1.3.3.3: "Voor dezen is weI gebruikt geweest, dat de Rechters haare Vonnissen 
moesten sustineren ... dan 't zelve wordt nu niet meer geuseert." 
295 See Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 406; Van Heijnsbergen, Geschiedenis, 106; Dekkers, Bibliotheca, 172 and Roberts, 
Bibliography, 307 for details. 
296 Note Trotz' comments in his Commentarius Legum Fundamentalium, 10.16: "Valde etiam molesta haec erat defensio 
judici minori in tam foecunda appellationum mmesle, damnosa etiam propter novas expensas, immo supervanea plane, 
quia acta & probata simul transmillebantur." 
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mind on one side the opinion of Stockman and further what Monballyu has stated on the 
issue, and on the other taking account of the increasing tendency towards ignoring intimatio, 
a likely explanation of the overall situation is that the legal consequences of intimatio 
continued to exist until 1795 but were not put into practice except in extreme cases, as 
appears from De Timmermann's annotations. 
Meanwhile, the obvious resemblance between notorious wrong judgements and dolo wrong 
judgements is persuasive. As we know, the latter category for all practical purposes remained 
the only one in which judicial liability in delict arose in Roman-Dutch law. This connection 
between intimatio, appeal and civil liability for wrong judgements, hence, is an interesting 
alternative view, which Van der Keessel to some extent overlooks. 
As regards the second interesting aspect of Van der Keessel's commentary, namely his views 
on the scope of judicial liability, he held that a judge would be held civilly liable in the first 
instance for dolus. This is in accordance with the Dutch communis opinio. What deserves 
attention is the significant difference from the communis opinio of Vander Keessel' s view on 
the debated issue of liability for culpa. Van der Keessel accepts Huber's views on judicial 
liability outside Friesland and approves of additional civil liability for a judge even where the 
misjudgement is due to culpa lata (gross negligence).299 His opinion represents a marked 
extension of judicial liability. However, in comparison with the position of Roman law or of 
the Glossators and Commentators, or the position in Friesland according to Huber, his view of 
liability was still relatively restricted in that not all forms of culpa sufficed to establish 
liability, only dolus and culpa lata. 
In the time of Van der Keessel, thus, Roman-Dutch law faced two bodies of opinion on the 
exact scope of judicial liability. Acknowledging the eminence of the advocates for the culpa 
lata argument, Huber and Vander Keessel, the question arises as to why it was felt necessary 
to retain stricter control of the judiciary by the threat of liability for dolus and culpa lata. 
Nowhere, however, does Van der Keessel provide us with a detailed explanation as to the 
297 Groot Placaet-Boek, voLlI 662. 
298 De Timrnennann, Costumen, 6.4 
299 Praelectiones luris Hodierni, 3.37.9 adjine: " ... sed et si dolus ibi non plene probatus esse videatur. existimarem culpam 
ialiorem ibi ad condemnandum iudicem sufjicere ... ". See also Theses Selectae , Th.SOS. For the reception of the concepts of 
dolus and culpa in general in Roman-Dutch law see the text above at 3 fn 114 et seqq . 
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underlying reasons for his view, whether predominantly for legal-political or for dogmatical 
considerations. In the case of Huber, the reason appears to have been dogmatic or, rather, 
purist (Roman) tendencies. 
Vander Keessel might not have been sufficiently convinced to follow to its conclusion a far­
reaching qualification of judicial liability. Obviously, he was not willing to advocate judicial 
liability for every form of carelessness on the part of the judge that resulted in damage to a 
party. On the other hand, he was convinced that judges should be liable for culpa lata, making 
it necessary for them to fulfil their duties with at least some degree of care. An explanation is 
that Van der Keessel was influenced by Grotius, but he did not wish to go as far as Grotius. 
Hence he chose a middle way: liability for culpa lata but not for culpa levis or imprudentia. 
One aspect is certain, however. Huber's and Van der Keessel's view cannot be reconciled 
with the application of the actio de dolo. It appears from their wider notion ofjudicial liability 
that they favoured the use of the actio legis Aquiliae or the actio in factum in civil claims 
against judges for civil liability. Unlike Huber, Van der Keessel in his Theses Selectae and his 
Praelectiones Iuris Hodierni seemed to exclude the liability of judges from the group of 
quasi-delicts. In this regard, Van der Keessel again appears to have been inspired by Grotius, 
whose Inleidinge formed the basis of the two works. 
Since Vander Keessel did not fully support Grotius on the state of mind required for judicial 
liability, this appears to be the time to focus on the solution provided by Grotius. 
4 3 Liability for every kind of culpable conduct or omission: Hugo Grotius's view: 
Tpe only author besides Huber (however, only for Frisian law) to advocate liability for every 
kind of culpable conduct or omission by ajudge was Hugo Grotius. 
Hugo Grotius was born in 1583 and died at the age of 62 in 1645.300 His gemus was 
recognised from his earliest years. At the age of 11 he began his studies at Leiden; at 15 he 
300 The biographic literature on Grotius is immense. Only a selection can be included here. For a lengthy biography, see 
Knight, Hugo Grotius. For a bibliographic overview on works about Grotius, see Feenstra, Grotius, 260; Van Zyi, 
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graduated as Doctor luris from Orleans; at 16 he commenced practice as an advocate; and at 
24 he held the widely respected and sought after position of Advocate Fiscal. His career in the 
Low Countries seemed destined to fulfil the highest expectations, but experienced a severe 
blow when he became involved in the great religious controversy which then raged in the 
Calvinistic Netherlands. The upshot of this was that Grotius was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. However, he managed to escape from prison in Loevestein castle in 1621 and 
spent the rest of his life in exile, mainly in France. 
Grotius was the most eminent of all Dutch jurists. His great fame as a jurist is based especially 
on two works. 301 The first is his De lure Belli ac Pacis (1625) which made him one of the 
most famous jurist of the rationalist, natural law school. Some six years later, his lnleidinge 
tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleertheyd (1631) appeared. This work established Grotius as the 
father of Roman-Dutch law. It was written in Dutch rather than Latin and it was concerned 
with modem Dutch rather than Roman law. Thus, the legal material was at last made available 
to the ordinary practising lawyer. Of even more importance is what Professor Carey Miller has 
described as follows: 
" ... the primary factor must, surely, have been the original, clear and concise nature of the work and 
its departure from the complex and prolix Digest based type of work. The lnleidinge was almost 
like a code in that it introduced a fresh start and eliminated the dead wood of the past." 302 
Its influence has been immense. 303 The fact that other important Dutch jurists based a number 
of works and lectures on the lnleidinge has already been mentioned. 
Geskiedenis, 346-352 and fn367. See further the references in Zimmermann, RHR, 26 et seq, as well as the proceedings of 
an international colloquium organised by the Grotius committee under the title: The World ofHugo Grotius, Feenstra, R 
(ed) Amsterdam (1984). Further Kuns~, Historische Ontwi/ckeling, 106-108; Dekkers, Bibliotheca, 69; Roberts, 
c_ 
Bibliography, 139; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 550; Stein, Romisches Recht in Europa, 162-164, De Wet, Ou 
Sloywers, 128-132. 
30) Grotius wrote a number of other highly influential legal books. For example his Mare liberum (1609) is one of the most 
famous works ever written on maritime law. Noteworthy also is his De jure praedae (1868) or his Opinions which appeared 
mostly in the Hollandsche Consultatien (1646-66). 
302 Carey Miller, 1982 Acta Juridica, 99. 
303 Wessels, His/ory, 263 can be quoted as follows : "The influence of the Introduction on the subsequent development of 
Roman-Dutch law may be compared with that of the Institutes of Justinian upon the spread of Roman law." With regard to 
the emergence and importance of the Inleidinge, see Wellschmied, Hugo Grotius' Inleidinge. See also by the same author 






Of his works, only the lnleidinge provides us with infonnation about Grotius's position on 
the liability of the judge. As indicated earlier, Grotius discusses the various cases of quasi­
delictual liability in Chapter 38 of the third book of the lnleidinge. It is striking that he did 
not include the liability of the iudex, qui litem suamfecit, in this passage.304 Instead, we find 
the liability of the judge discussed in Chapter 37, which deals with wrongful acts against 
property. At 3.37.9 we read: 
"A judge who decides contrary to laws which it was his duty to know or grants an adjournment contrary to 
law ... though [he] may have acted in ignorance, [is] liable for any damage which anyone may incur in 
consequence. " 
According to Grotius's doctrine, the underlying principles of delictual liability, or more 
specifically wrongs against property (misdaed tegens goed), derive from the elements of the 
superior ius naturale which, in turn, influenced positive (civil) law. 305 
To recap: unlike cases of quasi-delictual liability which were attributed to delictual liability 
due to various wettelicke oorzaecken, genuine delicts required wilful conduct.306 By 
removing the liability of the judge from the sphere of the quasi-delicts and incorporating it in 
the category of true delicts, wilful and unlawful conduct was required before liability 
arose.307 According to 3.32.5, together with 3.32.3 and 3.32.14, ajudge who decides contrary 
to the laws fails to perfonn the duties of his office properly, which in Grotius's view 
constitutes an act that " .. .from its own nature [is} unlawful ... ".308 The emphasis laid on the 
duty aspect derived from Grotius's general focus on the injurer rather than the injured. 
Hence, a person could only be held liable when he had not done what he ought to have done, 
or ifhe had done what he ought not to have done.309 
Apart from the incorporation of judges' liability in the category of true delicts, a second 
important aspect needs to be noted. Judicial liability on the basis of Grotius's theory of a 
generalised fault requirement implied that liability existed for every kind of culpable conduct 
304 Hochstein, Obligationes Quasi ex Delicto is aware of this peculiarity, although his conclusion on page 104 at fu64 has 

to be relativated in so far as Grotius does not generally neglect the liability of the iudex but incorporates it under the 

delictual liability for wrongs against property in 3.37.9 ofhis Inleidinge . 

305 For more details see Feenstra, Inschuld. Schuld en Verbintenisse, 464 fu30 . 

306 See the text above at 3 following fu 142. 

307 See Grotius, lnleidinge (1939), 3.32.5, 6, 9, and also 11 and 20. 

308 Inleidinge (1 926) . 

309 Zimmermann, Law ofObligations, 1033-1034. 
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or omission. Even a misjudgement due to mere ignorance of law was sufficient if damage 
resulted: " ...alwaer het door onverstand ...".310 
Grotius thus introduced a wide scope ofjudicial liability in his system. Taking the above two 
aspects of Grotius's reasoning into account, it is clear that breach of duty was the central 
reason for the imposition of judicial liability. The introduction of an element of duty was 
revolutionary and puts Grotius ahead of his fellow writers. However, by way of criticism, it 
could be said that Grotius defined only a general standard of duty and not the exact scope of 
the duties of a judge. The counter argument to this is that these duties had already been 
defined elsewhere, for instance in the lnstructien van de Hove van Holland or by the oaths of 
the schepenen and magistraten.311 
Be that as it may, several questions remain. It has been said that Grotius's lnleidinge, to a 
large extent, provided a realistic overview of Roman-Dutch law in the first half of the 
seventeenth century.312 With regard to the liability of judges, however, Grotius appears 
hardly to have considered practical details. Grotius did not comment either on the important 
aspect of the availability of appeal or make any acknowledgement of the 'education 
argument'. It is regrettable that Grotius did not discuss these arguments in his lnleidinge 
since, after some years of practical experience as an advocate and court official, he must have 
been aware of the true state of affairs within the judiciary. One possible explanation is that 
Grotius, with respect to the question of liability, was determined to present a purely dogmatic 
solution. 
It has been suggested313 that to some extent Grotius's wide concept ofjudicial liability might 
have been inspired by a passage in De lustitia et lure, a work by the Spaniard Domenico 
Soto, which included a separate articulus titled: "Utrum iudici liceat contra veritatem quam 
310 Grotius, lnleidinge (1926), 3.37.9. On the other hand, Grotius in his De lure Belli ac Pacis, 2.20.43 favoured the 
possibility of excusing inevitabilis ignorantia legis naturae. It might be, however, that this applied only to legis naturae in 

a narrow sense. 

311 See the text above at 4 and fn 157 et seqq. 

312 ZimmelTIlann, RHR, 29-30 with further references. 













certo novit, iudicare, quando legitime probatur contrarium. ,,314 Another source of 
inspiration may have been Pro spero Farinaci (1554-1613), an Italian lawyer frequently 
quoted by Dutch jurists during the republican era.315 Farinaci, after discussing the views of 
other authors in his Praxis et Theoria Criminalium, offers the view that a judge is liable for a 
wrong judgement due to ignorance (imperitiam). However, Farinaci was not specifically 
cited by Grotius in his work.316 Moreover, it seems that Farinaci's view was influenced by 
the Italian school of judicial liability, which, as we know, favoured liability for both dolus 
and imprudentia. 
The most likely stimulus for Grotius's original ideas on the liability of the iudex appears to 
be the relevant passages by Donellus.317 The influence of Donellus, who himself wrote not 
on Roman-Dutch but on Roman and French law, appears to have been twofold: firstly, 
Donellus removed the liability of the iudex, qui litem suam fecit, from the group of quasi­
delicts. To Donellus, quasi-delictual liability was similar to ordinary delictual liability. It 
arose either where the damage had not yet occurred but was likely to occur or, secondly, 
where the damage was attributed to someone who did not cause the damage personally. The 
culpa of the iudex on the other hand amounted to a special culpa in faciendo. The judge who 
gave a wrong judgement clearly caused direct damage which, consequently, gave rise to 
delictual and not merely to mere quasi-delictual liability. Hence, judicial liability amounted 
to delictual liability and not to mere quasi-delictual liability. 
Secondly, Donellus considered that a judge could be held liable for mere imperitia: If the 
Aquilian rule imperitia culpae adnumeratur applied even to ordinary private persons, it 
should apply a fortiori to cases where honest and reliable men - as in the case of the iudex ­
were called to public office and caused damage due to ignorance of the law.318 
314 Soto, De Iustitia et lure, 5.4. II at 403 et seq. Soto's work was part of a consignment of legal literature used by Grotius 
for the writing of his Inleidinge, which was brought in the famous bookcase that was used by Grotius in his escape from 
Loevestein castle, see Feenstra, Quelques Remarques, 78 and fn70. 
315 See Roberts, Bibliography, 15 and 119. 
316 Farinaci's work includes much more detailed annotations than the one mentioned by Hartog. It is a typical commentary 
of the mos italicus . Altogether there seems to be not much reason for Hartog to conclude that Farinaci in particular 
influenced Grotius. 
317 Donellus, Commentariorum, 15.47. For an in-depth analysis of Donellus's influence on Dutch jurisprudence in general 
and Grotius in particular see Feenstra, Hugues Doneau, 231-243. 
318 Donellus, Commentariorum, 15.27: "Nam et haec ipsa imprudentia culpa est: injuria est. quae non minus vindicatur 
eadem ilia lege Aquilia; et cum vindicatur non minus dicitur actio ex malejicio ... Quod si imperitia in privatis culpa est. et 
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Although we can trace some influence to Donellus's work, it appears that Grotius's views on 
the nature of quasi-delicts and on the liability of judges are an advance on those of 
Donellus.319 Similarly, Grotius's approach to judicial liability is quite distinct from that of his 
fellow Roman-Dutch jurists, the slightest culpa that led a judge to a breach of duty being 
sufficient for liability. In the end, Grotius's view remains in accordance with the position of 
Roman law and the Glossators and the Conunentators, and also with Huber's view in respect 
of Friesland. His reasoning, however, is considerably different. 
44 Damages 
Having dealt in depth with the opinions of various writers with regard to the requirements for 
judicial liability under the actio legis Aquiliae and the actio de dolo, the question remains of 
the legal consequences of a judge being found liable for misjudgement. 
It was indicated earlier that, from the seventeenth century onwards, the actio legis Aquiliae 
gradually shed its penal characteristics and became a purely compensatory or reipersecutory 
action.32o Two questions are of relevance in this regard. First, what was the scope of 
compensation of the actio legis Aquiliae in Roman-Dutch law? Secondly, how were the 
damages measured? 
In a nutshell, Roman-Dutch law accepted to a large extent that, in specific circumstances, the 
Aquilian action lay for the recovery of purely economic loss, that is patrimonial loss without 
physical injury to the person or the property of the plaintiff. This was markedly different from 
Roman law. In Roman law, with regard to economic loss, the plaintiff could expect 
compensation only ifhe showed that a particular item of his property had been affected by the 
defendant's act. Obviously, this did not include pure economic loss as such. At the time of the 
Conunentators, however, there was a tendency to extend the application of the actio legis 
Aquiliae or at least its extension, the actio in factum, to instances where the plaintiff had 
cum per imperiliam quid ab his peccatur in res alienas, delictum: quantum maior est haec culpa, et gravius delictum in 

judice, quem ul virum bonum et adjus dicendum publice conslitulum minime omnium, iuriamjacere oportebat?" 





suffered patrimonial loss without loss or damage to a particular item of his property. This 
view was based upon a wide interpretation of Inst 4.3.16 where it was stated: 321 
"If, though, neither the damage be inflicted by a direct act nor the body be injured but loss be 
inflicted on someone in some other way .. .it became accepted that an action on the facts of the case 
is available.,,322 
Since Roman-Dutch lawyers generally agreed that in practice there was no longer any 
difference between the extended actio in factum and the actio legis Aquiliae, the Aqui1ian 
action was on a long but steady course towards becoming a general comprehensive remedy for 
the recovery of damages for every wrongdoing, including negligent or deliberate infliction of 
pure economic loss. Whether this development had already in the days of Voet and other 
writers progressed to the point where the 
" ... action in factum was no longer confined to cases of damage done to corporeal property, but was 
extended to every kind of loss sustained by a person in consequence of the wrongful acts of 
another. .. ,,323, 
as claimed by De Villiers CJ in Cape ofGood Hope Bank v Fischer, is a moot point.324 
How then did the Roman-Dutch authors measure the damage for misjudgements in particular? 
As in Roman law and in the Italian ius commune, the assessment depended in the first place 
on the fonn of fault. In other words, most authors adopted the notion that the amount of 
compensation depended on whether the judge had acted with dolus or with culpalimperitia. 
Those authors who favoured a rather traditional approach, namely judicial liability for culpa 
(lata) or even imperitia, considered that the judge was "... gebreukt nae goedtvinden van het 
Hoff, zelden meer als in de kosten van 't proces.,,325 
Those authors who argued in favour of liability merely for dolus naturally assessed damages 
according to the given formula veram aestimationem litis. Like the Glossators and 
Commentators, the Roman-Dutch lawyers were not precise in defining what they understood 
under veram aestimationem litis. However, from the absence of contrary opinion it may be 
320 See above 3 text at fn82 et seqq . 
321 Zimmennann, Law a/Obligations, 1023; Kaufmann, Actio Legis Aquiliae, 46 et seqq and 62 et seqq. 
322 Quoted from Thomas, institutes. 
323 (1886) 4 SC 368 at 376. 
324 See inter alia Pauw, De Jure 8 (1975), 23 and 25; Van der Walt, 1979 TSAR, 145 et seq; Administrateur, Natal v Trust 
Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) 830. Most recently Hutchison, Aquilian liability II, 609-610. 
325 Huber, Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt, 2.3.3.5. 
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said that this covered all patrimonial loss caused by the wrong judgement; including the costs 
of litigation, expenses and foregoing of prospective gains, in other words the totum 
interesse. 326 According to Groenewegen, the costs of the suit were determined by the court in 
accordance with the customs of the place on a good and equitable basis.327 
Christianaeus and Voet merely refer to litis aestimationem328 and, in his Beginselen des 
Rechts, Voet states: 
"Doch zoo wanneer een rechter door bedrog en ter quaeder trouwe qualyk zal hebben gevonnist ... tot 
schaedelooshouding des beledigde moet worden verweezen. ,,329 
Vinnius says merely that a judge who judged with dolus was obliged to make good the 
amount his injury caused.33o Huber adds that a judge: "... moet aile den hinder ende kosten 
boeten." 331 And, from an Advys by a group of advocates from The Hague in 1722, it appears 
that the erring judge was obliged to: " ... vergoeden, aile de schaden, en kosten, die hy [the 
plaintiff] wegens des Praesidents versoijelyk gedrag heeft geleeden ... ".332 
The formula veram aestimationem litis obviously applied under the actio legis Aquiliae. To 
see how this formula was reconciled with the measure of damages under the actio de dolo, 
the other action that found approval among some of the Roman-Dutch jurists, it is necessary 
to investigate how and what kind of damages were measured under the actio de dolo. It has 
been said above that in Roman law the actio de dolo always applied as a subsidiary action 
and that from its earliest days it was directed towards simple compensation (simplum) for all 
loss, including pure economic 10ss.333 Obviously, the Roman-Dutch jurists accepted the actio 
de dolo in much the fashion described by Van Leeuwen in his Censura Forensis: 
326 See above chapter IV 3 6 1. 
327 Groenewegen, Tractatus, C.3.1.15. 
328 Christianaeus, Decisiones Curiae Belgiae, 4.49.95.): "£t sic dicendum. iudicem dolo vel precibus ductum a recto 
iustitiae deuiantem tramite at que ita inustam proferente sententiam. parti in litis aestimationem condemnandum esse." 
Voet, Commentarius, 5.1.58. 
329 Beginselen des Rechts, 4.5.5 . 
330 Vinnius,.1d Institutionum, 4.5.pr.3: "Dolus judicis ut verum & in/ame delictum severius vindicatur: nam qui largitione. 




331 Huber, Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt, 2.3 .3.6: H .. ende moet aile den hinder ende kosten boeten." 

332 Nieuw Nederlands Advys-Boek, n.46 at 509. 
333 Kiefer, Aquilische Hafiung, 13; Nilf-Hofmann, Actio de Dolo, I J; Kaufmann , Actio Legis Aquiliae, 15 and 105 . 
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"The action for fraud is an equitable one, depending on the discretion of the judge, available to the person 
who has been cheated by the fraud , its subject the thing he has lost, and its object the fraudulent person 
himself ... The action is available to secure what has been lost through fraud, so that it must be restored in its 
full extent..".334 
Consequently, we can say that with regard to damages for dolo misjudgements the actio de 
dolo and the actio legis Aquiliae were identicaL 
Grotius's approach is, once again, different in that it is based on his general theory of 
delictual liability. Grotius in his Inleidinge states: 
"The duty of compensation attaches to all who have injured another by any wrongful act...so far as anyone 
has been injured thereby.,,335 
The duty to compensate is one of the foremost duties which the law of nature imposes on 
mankind.336 With regard to judicial liability, consequently, compensation covered every loss 
experienced by the injured party in consequence of the judge's misjudgement: 
"A judge who decides contrary to the laws ... [is] liable for any damage which anyone may incur in 
consequence. ,,337 
Finally, with respect to the question whether or not there existed an alternative opportunity to 
hold the state liable for the misconduct of officials, Cilliers and D'Oliveira have made the 
point that: 
"In Roman-Dutch law a limited notion of public liability is to be found in respect of the state as fisc 
in proprietary or money matters. It was not always certain, however, as a matter of form, whether 
the state as such or its officer personally was liable in damages. The latter was more probably the 
position. ,,338 
From what we have said above we can ascertain that judicial liability was clearly the personal 
liability of the judge.339 
334 Simon van Leeuwen's Roman-Dutch Law, 1.4.42.2 and 4. See also Huber, Heedendaegse Regtsgeleertheyt, 4.39 and 
Voet, Commentarius, 4.3. De Vos, Acta Juridica 7 (\964), 28-3\ rather focuses on the consequences for contractual 
obligations. 
335 Grotius, Inleidinge (1926), 3.32.12: "Tot weder-evening dan zijn gehouden aile die iemand door misdaed hebben 
verkort... voor soo veel iemand daer is verkort... ". 
336 Kiefer, Aquilische Haftung, 80. 
337 Grotius, Inleidinge(l926), 3.37.9: "£en rechler wijzendejegens wellen ..zijn gehouden in aile schade die iemand daer 
door kommt te lijden." 
338 Cilliers and D'Oliveira, State Liability, 221. 
339 Hartog, Onrechtmatige Overheidsdaden, \0,22 and 106-108; Cilliers and D'Oliveira, State Liability, 221. Note also the 
judgement by Connor CJ in Muirhead & Co v Ayliff 1875 NLR 3\ at 36: "Under Roman Law certain magistrates were 
liable to private individuals for negligence ...The Dutch jurists .. . say that this is no longer the law, except when there is 
dolus ... but they make no suggestion that the liability is transferred to the State." 
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4 5 Conclusions 
All but two of the Roman-Dutch jurists assessed in the preceding pages leave no doubt that 
liability of judges in cases of judicial mistakes was, under no circumstances, considered 
appropriate for every kind of culpability. This point of view is a manifestation of a 
development that first came to the fore in France in the early sixteenth century owing to 
specific French constitutional and institutional elements. It represents a clean break with the 
law as it stood and, in the end, made it almost impossible to sue a judge successfully for 
damages. None of the Dutch jurists saw this more clearly than Johannes Voet who made it 
plain that, due to difficulties in leading evidence, judicial liability was generally rare: 
"But in our customs and those of many other nations it is rather rare for the judge to make the suit 
'11' d' ,,340hiS own bY I JU gmg. 
Consequently, it may be said that two important tendencies had crystallised by the early 
seventeenth century. Firstly, judicial liability, understood in the sense of professional liability, 
disappeared. The judicial office was increasingly understood as an exceptional office within 
the hierarchy of government institutions. Secondly, the reform launched in France by the 
introduction of the prise apartie made it abundantly clear that the scope of judicial liability 
depended on the relationship between the judges and their ruler. Both ruler and judges 
considered judicial liability as a means of control and discipline which - depending on the 
point of view - had to be expanded or limited. 
The specific course of development in the Netherlands after the revolution is strong evidence 
of the truth of this argument: shortly after an end was made to Habsburgian near-absolute rule, 
Dutch writers took the baton from the French and became the pacemakers for the drastic 
limitation of judicial liability. This race, to sustain the metaphor, should be seen as the 
eliminating heat for the final race which began with the spread of the ideals of the 
Enlightenment and the consolidation of Montesquieu's theory of separation of powers as the 
basis of modem constitutional theory. The time was now ripe for the full expansion of the 
doctrine of judicial independence - a doctrine which entailed not only the wide field of the 
independence of the judiciary from the other branches of government (in terms of nomination, 
appointment, tenure of office, removal or transfer from office, remuneration, freedom of 
decision, disciplinary accountability, etc.) but, equally, a judge's independence from the 
340 Yoet, Commentary, 5.1.58. Affirmed by Yan Poelgeest's observations in Bijdragen 103 (1988),40. 
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parties before him in court. The argument of judicial independence, along with what the 
'appeal argument' (possibility of appeal procedures in both civil and criminal cases), led to 
the permanent qualification of judicial liability in nearly every legal system based on the civil 
law. 
That Roman-Dutch law did not quite reach this final point of development is evident from the 
important differences that emerged in the writings of the Dutch jurists. To start with, the 
absence of appeal procedures in criminal cases stunted at least one arm of the argument 
against a wider scope of judicial liability. Secondly, the diversity that Roman-Dutch law of 
judicial liability had reached - under an apparently smooth surface - is clearly visible in the 
fact that not all the authors who adhered to the approach that liability for judicial mistakes was 
only for dolus favoured the application of the actio legis Aquiliae. Groenewegen and Van 
Leeuwen, for instance, favoured the actio de dolo. In addition, those authors who dealt with 
the aspect of denial of justice - Groenewegen, Voet, Wassenaar - also considered the actio de 
dolo as appropriate. 
This difference in detail surfaces in the approach of the renowned jurists Huber and Van der 
Keessel. These writers held that judicial liability for judicial mistakes was for dolus and culpa 
lata. 341 Depending on one's point of view, this approach may be seen either as an extension of 
liability (compared with the opinion described above) or as a less drastic restriction of the 
Roman and Italian ius commune's scope ofjudicial liability. 
Finally, reference must be made to Hugo Grotius, who favoured the retention of a 
comprehensive judicial liability based on fault, that is for dolus and any form of culpa. This 
approach, not shared by any other writer342, derived from his novel natural law theory of 
delictual liability rather than from a simple adoption of the position taken by Roman law. 
From Grotius's comments in the Inleidinge at least, it appears that Grotius did not devote any 
attention to policy considerations with respect to judicial liability. He observed and analysed 
the question through 'dogmatic' or, to be more precise, through natural law lenses as liability 
merely for breach of duty. Neither the 'education argument' nor, interestingly enough, the 
341 This was Huber's view as to the practice outside Friesland. 

342 Except for Huber who held with respect to the law in force in Friesland that liability was for dolus and any culpa. 

However, Huber ' s findings were based on a puristic application of Roman law and were, consequently, dogmatically quite 

distinct from Grotius's approach. 
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'appeal argument' were recognised and discussed in his works. It is this lack of realism which 
is at the heart of the other writers' hesitation to accept Grotius's approach. This is particularly 
evident from the refusal of Van Leeuwen and Vander Keessel (who based at least some of 
their writings on the lnleidinge) to support Grotius's views. 
Leaving aside the legal-political aspects, another important consequence of the course of 
development in Roman-Dutch law becomes apparent. Unlike the prise apartie, which appears 
to have been more of a means sui generis; Roman-Dutch law was based on the liability of the 
iudex, qui litem suam fecit. However, the uniformity of the category of quasi-delicts was 
shattered by the Roman-Dutch jurists' restriction of judicial liability, for the reasons stated 
above, to cases of dolus or at the most of culpa lata. This implied that the placing of judicial 
liability under the category of quasi-delict was completely without foundation since the 
conditio sine qua non of quasi-delictual liability was, as we know, liability for imperitia. 
Thus, while legal-political considerations resulted, on the one hand, in the clearing of 
dogmatic vagueness, they led, on the other, to a further weakening of the category of quasi­
delicts. 
5 JUDICIAL LlABll.ITY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF PERSONALITY RIGHTS 
As has been indicated earlier, Roman-Dutch lawyers considered animus iniuriandi the 
essential aspect of liability under the actio iniuriarum.343 Intent was equated with dolus or 
344opzet. Thus, iniuria had to be committed deliberately. Gross negligence (culpa lata) 
undoubtedly was not considered sufficient to give rise to liability.345 It could be said that a 
number of justification grounds or, in modem parlance, defences, were available to a 
defendant, but the defences allowed in Roman-Dutch law were by no means systematised as 
they are in modem South African law. In particular, no distinction was drawn between 
343 Note again Van der Keessel, Praelectiones ad Jus Criminale , 47.10.1 omnefactum. 

344 Voet, Commentarius, 47.10.1 ; Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis , 1.5.25 .6; Van der Keessei , Praelectiones ad Jus 

Criminale, 47.1 O.I .pr; Huber, Jurisprudence of my Time , 6.8.2; Van der Linden, Regtsgeleerd Handboek , 1.16.4. 










defences directed against wrongfulness and defences directed against fault. 346 
5 1 Presumption of animus iniuriandi 
Frequently, the question of whether a defendant was not only aware of the wrongfulness of his 
conduct but, in addition, acted with intent to injure became irrelevant. This is because Roman­
Dutch law took over the concept, well established by the Glossators and Commentators, that 
in cases of a prima faCie injury animus iniuriandi was simply presumed to have been present 
(dolus praesumptus).347 As has been shown earlier, this concept had its roots in the 
consideration that it was generally very difficult, and sometimes even impossible, for the 
plaintiff to prove the existence of animus iniuriandi on the part of the defendant.348 Thus, 
Kersteman states in his Rechtsgeleert Woorden-Boek that: 
"De Atrociteit van lnjurie moet Geestimeert worden of uit de plaats, of uit de !yd, of uit de 
perzoon, en andere omstandheden.,,349 
In a number of exceptional cases, however, despite the presence of a prima facie injury, there 
was no presumption of animus iniuriandi. Again, this is similar to the position of the 
Glossators and Commentators. The two most important categories of these exceptional cases 
were, firstly, where the injury resulted from the giving of professional advice or the 
perfonnance of a professional service; and secondly, where the injury was caused by a person 
acting in a position of authority.350 Examples of the first category include the case of a doctor 
who wrongly diagnosed his patient as suffering from leprosy or the French pox; and the case 
of an exorcist or soothsayer who described a subject as a murderer.351 Examples of the second 
case include: teachers, schoolmasters and parents chastising a pupil or child352; injurious 
346 Besides Ranchod see Walter, Actio Iniuriarum, 98; Pauw, Persoonlikheidskrenking, 79; Davidtsz, Animus Iniuriandi, 
195. 





348 For more details see Walter, Actio Iniuriarum, 96; Ranchod, Foundations, 75 and 77; De Villiers, Law ofInjuries, 144 

et seq and 193 et seq; Zimmermann, Law ofObligations, 1067-1068. See also above at chapter IV 2 text at fu 124 et seqq 

and 4 text at fu229 et seqq. 

349 See under 'Injurie' . 

350 Schomaker, Selecta Cons ilia et Responsa Juris, voJ.V Cons.63.1 0 and II. 

351 Voet, Commentary, 47.10.20; Huber, Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleerheyt, 2.3.8.5. 

352 Voet, Commentary, 47.10.20; Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, \.5.25.1; Matthaeus, De Criminibus, 47.4.1.7; Van der 

Keessel , Praelectiones ad Jus Criminale , 47.10.1. 
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353comments made by a priest in the course of a sennon ; afiscaal (state attorney) who accused 
someone in court of a crime354 and, finally, of special importance for present purposes, a judge 
who injured someone before him by means of words or even acts.355 
5 2 The effect on judicial liability of rejection of the presumption of animus iniuriandi 
Undoubtedly judges in the Low Countries enjoyed a privileged status under the actio 
iniuriarum or, in other words, a presumption operated in favour of the members of the 
judiciary.356 Seen in the context of the course of development, this privileged status derived 
from the application of the principle we have encountered already in Roman law and in Italian 
ius commune: 
"Is qui jure publico utitur non videtur injuriae jaciendae causa hoc jacere: iuris enim executio 
non habet iniuriam.',357 
Moreover, it makes sense that ajudge should be protected while upholding the authority of the 
courts and ensuring that justice is administered efficiently. These considerations undoubtedly 
make it necessary to invest judges with powers that override the ordinary legitimate rights ofa 
person. Judges are allowed, and to a certain degree obliged, to infringe the rights of others. It 
is obvious that this squares well with the overall tendency in Roman-Dutch law to exempt the 
judiciary from too wide a scope of liability. 
However, as was the case with regard to wrong judgements in Roman-Dutch law, judicial 
privilege under the actio iniuriarum was not wholly unrestricted. It was subject to the correct 
exercise of the judicial power. Unfortunately, the Roman-Dutch jurists, like their 
predecessors, were not precise in defining the boundaries of judicial privilege. This is 
353 Matthaeus, De Criminibus, 47.4.7.1; Schomaker, Selecta Cons ilia et Responsa Juris , pars.v Cons.63 .II.See also De 
Villiers, Law ofInjuries, 201. 

354 Schomaker, Selecta Consilia et Responsa Juris , parsV Cons.63 .11 . 

355 Voet, Commentary, 47.10.20; Huber, Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt, 2.3.8.19; Van der Keessel, Praelectiones ad Jus 

Crimina/e , 47.10.1. 

356 See above at 5 I. De Vilhers, Law ofInjuries, 35,40 and 199; Walter, Actio Iniuriarum, 97; Ranchod, Foundations, 77 . 

357 D 47.10.13.1. Add to this D 47.10.32: "Quod reipublicae venerandae causa, secundum bonos mores fit, etiamsi ad 

contemeliam alicujus pertinent, quia tamen non ea mente magistratus fecit ut inuriam faciat, sed ad vind/catam majestatis 

publicae resp/ciat, actione injuriarum non tenetur." 
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particularly evident from the jurists' comments with regard to the liability of judges for 
defamation. 
5 2 1 Defamation 
Defamation is what most Roman-Dutch writers had in mind when discussing judicial liability 
under the actio iniuriarum. Understandably so, since in comparison with other instances of 
injury, defamation in court occurred relatively often. Many a person in court must have felt 
himself defamed by the judge's harsh comments or questions. Voet, for instance, refers to a 
judge who, while on the bench, took " .. . some rather forcible steps ..." against persons who 
disobeyed his orders or acted disrespectfully. He further mentions the use of "...somewhat 
sharp words ..." by a judge who took to task someone who was allegedly guilty of an offence. 
Voet leaves no doubt that in these cases the judge acted lawfully according to the duties of his 
office.358 Moreover, the judge was entitled to correct not only witnesses and litigants but also 
" ... advocates of causes, attorneys and others like them if any offence has been committed by 
such persons.,,359 Huber refers to judges who lawfully have to " ... constrain refractory 
persons ... ".360 Meanwhile, a judgement as a written docwnent could also infringe personality 
rights. Since in those days no reasons were given for the judgement, it was the verdict as such 
rather than written comments justifying the verdict that could injure the reputation of the 
defendant or accused.361 
These examples indicate what judges were allowed to do without facing liability. There is no 
suggestion, however, of the criteria for determining when a judge was considered to have 
exceeded the limits of his judicial authority.362 The only jurist who provides us with some 
information is Voet. In his commentary, at 47.10.2, he states: 
358 Voet, Commentary, 47.10.20.2. 

359 Voet, Commentary, 47.10.20.2. 

360 Jurisprudence ofmy Time, 6.8.19. 

361 See Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 280 and 544. See also Dolezalek, Stare Decisis, 88 and particularly the in-depth 

treatment of the subject by Godding, Jurisprudence et Motivation des Sentences, 140-152. 

362 Van der Keessel, Prae/ectiones ad Jus Criminate, 47. I O. I refers merely to: " ...wrongfully pronouncesjudgement..."; and 

Huber, Jurisprudence of my Time , 6.8.19 states that if the judge: " ... has gone ... too far in the ... punishing of refractory 

persons, cannot lightly be sued for injury; but only when , confident in the power of his office, he misuses persons beyond 
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"Anyone besides can wreak a wrong, not only when he is engaged on an entirely tmlawful affair, 
but also when he is taken up with a thing that is lawful or with the carrying out of a duty entrusted 
to himself, so often as he insultingly oversteps the prescribed bounds of his duty, and misuses his 
power in contempt of another. It is open to the magistracy and to judges by lawful right and in the 
right of the office they uphold to chide and correct litigants, advocates of causes, attorneys and 
others like them, if any offence has been committed by such persons ... Nevertheless it is in defiance 
of good morals if such persons have loaded someone with insulting words, or chastised him 
without reason or beyond the limit, not with a view of upholding the sovereignty of the people ... but 
with a view to the stirring up of ill will and evil report ... ". 363 
According to Voet, thus, a judge overstepped the boundaries of his duties whenever he acted 
with the purpose of stirring up ill will and evil report (sed ad concitandam invidiam atque 
infamiam). The presumption of animus iniuriandi, which generally did not apply to judges, 
applied in such cases. In other words, the judge was presumed to have been actuated by 
animus iniuriandi.364 An example of this kind of overstepping is that of Lambertus Goris: a 
judge who verbally abused the appellant in court because the appellant's notice of appeal 
included the statement that the decision a quo was considered void.365 
5 2 2 Wrongs against the body {torture} 
One might well ask whether it is at all possible that a judge could injure another person's body 
while acting in a judicial capacity. The few cases discussed in the Dutch legal literature 
include those where judges unlawfully and intentionally decreed that a person be tortured. Van 
der Keessel confirms the view that in such a case the actio iniuriarum could be instituted on 
the basis of D 47.l0.32 as well as D 47.10.15.34 and 41. This action would have to be 
instituted along with another criminal action, namely an action under the lex Cornelia de 
sicariis. Van der Keessel's doubts extend only as to whether the remedies would run 
cumulatively.366 
However, Van der Keessel does not go as far as writers who would allow the actio iniuriarum 
even if a judge had ordered torture from ignorance and without intent. Vander Keessel makes 
363 In quoting from Gane's translation of Voet's Commenlarius I omitted the sub-titles as it has been - rightly - suggested 
by Joubert JA in May v Udwin 1981 SA (1) 1 (A) 16. 

364 Voet, Commentary, 47.10.2. See also De ViJJiers, Law ofinjuries, 39-40. 

365 Goris, Adversariorum iuris Subcisivorum, 3.2.14.12 e/ seq. On Goris see also De Wet, Ou Sloywers, 141; Van Zyl, 
Geskiedenis, 378; De Vas, Regsgeskiedenis, 197-198. 
366 See Pra/ecliones ad Jus Crimina/e, 48.18.13. 
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it plain that the actio iniuriarum requires intent for its application367, but he leaves a little 
window open in that if the judge is proved to have acted unlawfully a presumption of dolus or 
rather of animus iniuriandi would once again arise.368 Consequently, it may be said that in 
cases of torture the criterion for the determination of abuse of judicial authority was a 
wrongful (unlawful) misjudgement.369 
5 2 3 Wrongs against personal liberty (false imprisonment) 
Infliction of unlawful bodily restraint was also considered a wrong against personal liberty. 
Within the judicial sphere, the most important example in this regard is undoubtedly false 
imprisonment. Somewhat surprisingly, the question of false imprisonment by a judge is 
scarcely ever discussed in the Roman-Dutch legal sources.370 The reason for this omission 
appears to be that in most such cases the actio iniuriarum was instituted against the officers of 
the court who performed the arrest rather than against the judge.371 Nevertheless, in practically 
all cases it was the judge who would have ordered the arrest. Moreover, a judge could, as we 
have seen, be liable for ordering torture even though he did not administer it himself. Why 
should the same principle not apply to a judge for wrongful arrest? Some support for this view 
is to be found in D 47.10.13.2 which, although dealing with lawful arrest, does not distinguish 
between judges and their officers. 
Even if the works of the jurists assessed do not elaborate on cases of arrest ordered wrongfully 
by a judge, it appears that in practice this occurred not infrequently. In the year 1670, for 
instance, it is reported that two plaintiffs sued for wrongful arrest under the actio iniuriarum a 
local judge who, contrary to a mandate of the Hoofdmannenkamer van Stad en Lande of 
367 Ibid. at 48.18.14. 

368 His argument is C.9 .3S .S. For an interpretation of this passage see Van der Keessel , Praelectiones ad Jus Criminale , 

47.10.6 ad primo dissentientes . 

369 In Germany Art 20 of the Peinliche Gerichtsordnung of Charles V provided for civil liability of judges in cases of 

unlawful application of torture. 

370 See for instance Voet, Cornmentarius, 47.10.7.1.11 . He is referring more to malicious prosecution here. Further Van der 

Keessel, Praelectiones ad Jus Criminale, 47.10.2 ad libertatem. 

371 Voet, Commenlarius, 48 .3.6. On the officers of the court see also 5.1.60 and 62. De Villiers, Law of Injury, 40; 

Dolezalek, Zivilprozessrecht, 73. 
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Groningen, had continued to detain them for eighteen weeks. The Hoo/dmannenkamer 
decided inter alia that a case of contumacia had to be approved, and granted an amende 
honorable (vragen om vergiffenis met knieval) as well as an amende profitable.372 In 1700, a 
plaintiff unsuccessfully sued the judge from Baflo for amende honorable and profitable for 
wrongful arrest in a pub at three o'clock in the morning.373 Another example is a case reported 
in the Hollandsche Consultatien, where a former schout had been arrested wrongfully by the 
local college of schepenen.374 The schout sued the college of schepenen before the Ho/van 
Holland for compensation for iniuria (in cas van injurie). 
On the basis of these examples, it may reasonably be stated that a judge could be liable under 
the actio iniuriarum in Roman-Dutch law if he intentionally and unlawfully ordered a 
person's detention. 
53 Damages 
As far as the legal consequences of the actio iniuriarum are concerned, Roman-Dutch law was 
considerably different from Roman law, which focused merely on the payment of pecuniary 
damages. In the place of the Roman actio iniuriarum aestimatoria, Roman-Dutch law 
provided both the so-called amende profitable and the amende honorable. To both we have 
referred in the preceding paragraphs. 
The amende honorable restored a plaintiffs honour. The amende honorable entailed three 
aspects, each with its own historical roots. First, there was the so-called declaratio honoris, 
which had its roots in Germanic law.375 The defendant would have to declare: " ...that he 
considers the injured person a man of honour, against whose character he has nothing to 
say.,,376 Secondly, there was the deprecatio, which required the defendant to admit that he had 
372 Reported by De Blt~court in TR 14 (1935),308-309 n252. 
m Ibid. at 313-315 n256. 

374 See at 2.192. 

375 Walter, Actio Iniuriarum, 107 and Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 1072 with reference to von WalJenrodt, ZjRG 3 

(1864), 243 et seqq. 

316 Van der Linden, Regsgeleerd Handboek, 1.16.4.1; Grotius, Inleidinge (1926), 3.36.3. 
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done wrong and therefore to beg the plaintiff for forgiveness. 377 The deprecatio is a good 
example of the influence which canon law and Christian doctrines had on the actio 
iniuriarum.378 We are bound to forgive others just as God forgives us our sins. However, an 
offender must first ask for forgiveness. 379 If some kind of additional humiliation was imposed, 
as in the case of the schout referred to above (where the judge was obliged to pray on his 
knees for deprecatio) this obviously was more than we1come.380 
The third and most important aspect of the amende honorable was recantation (palinodia or 
revocatio).381 The defendant was obliged to retract his words and declare that what he had 
said was untrue. The aim was to restore the victim's honour. Like the deprecatio, the actio ad 
palinodiam had its roots in canon law.382 As Ranchod states, it is likely that Grotius, who was 
one of the first Roman-Dutch authors to make use of the amende honorable, once more was 
inspired by Domenicus Soto who, in turn, reviewed the law of compensation as it was passed 
on by the canonists and moral theologians of the Middle Ages.383 
The amende profitable, on the other hand, is similar to the Roman actio iniuriarum 
aestimatoria. 384 This is evident from the fact that the plaintiffhad to specify his own damages. 
However, the court was not bound to award this amount. VanLeeuwen states: "The 
penalty.. .is discretionary, prescribed by considerations of place, time and quality of person.,,385 
A plaintiff had to be careful not to ask for too much since this could in turn lead to an actio 
iniuriarum being instituted by the other party.386 Consequently, a judge sued for pecuniary 
377 See Voet, Commentarius , 47.10.17; Grotius, Inleidinge (1926) , 3.35.2; Van Leeuwen, Rooms-Hollands Regt, 4.37.1. 

378 See for further examples Van der Keessel, Praelectiones ad Jus Criminale , 47.10.8 ad quanquam Christianum. 

379 See Zimmermann, Law ofObligations, 1072. See also De Villiers, Law ofInjury, 177-178. 

380 See Ranchod, Foundations, 90 for more details. De Villiers, Law of Injuries, 178. An example that deprecatio was also 

in practice in the Dutch Cape colonial settlement is evident from Leibrandt, Requesten, 317: "..the burgher, Hendrik 

Hermanus Bos ... after the trial had been sentenced ... on bare knees, to pray to God and Justice for forgiveness .. . ". 

38 1 See Van der Keessel, Praelectiones ad Jus Criminale , 47.10.12 ad ceterum and Praelectiones Iuris Hodierni, 3.36.3; 

Van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis, 1.5.25 .8; Voet, Commentarius, 47.10.17; Grotius, Inleidinge (1926), 3.35 .2; 

Groenewegen, Tractatus , InstAA.I 0.1. 

382 Burchell, Law ofDefamation, II; De Villiers, Law ofInjuries, 177. 

383 See his Foundations, 65 with further references. See also Zimmermann, Law ofObligations, 1072 particularly fn 176. 

384 Professor Feenstra as quoted by Ranchod, Foundations, 66-67, on the other hand, makes the point that it may also have 

originated in Germanic customary law. See also Waiter, Actio Iniuriarum, 104-105; Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 
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damages had to pay a sum initially estimated by his opponent but assessed by the (second) 
judge. 
Controversy arose over the question of whether amende honorable and amende profitable 
could be cumulative. According to the general rules, this was at issue only where both 
amendes were granted to remedy a crime. Cumulation was out of the question if it led to a 
387double penal sentence. In this case, a regime of elective concurrence applied. 388 The 
amende profitable was undoubtedly classified as a penal action. The answer, thus, depended 
on whether the amende honorable was chiefly reipersecutory or not. The majority of Roman­
Dutch lawyers favoured the view that the amende honorable was merely reipersecutory since 
it was aimed primarily at restoration of the honour of the victim.389 The prescription period 
was one year. 390 
5 4 Conclusions 
In Roman-Dutch law, a judge could be held liable under the actio iniuriarum for infringing 
the personality rights of a party to a case. However, as in cases of liability for wrong 
judgements, it was not common for a judge to be sued for damages. Judges were privileged in 
the sense that judicial acts, even ifprima facie injurious, were generally presumed not to have 
been committed with animus iniuriandi. The reason for this privileged status, once again, is to 
be found in considerations of legal policy: for the sake of efficiency, credibility and the 
authority of the courts. Judges were permitted, indeed were to a certain degree obliged, to 
interfere with other persons' personality rights. 
387 Coing, Europtiisches Privatrecht, 515; Zimmennann, Law ofObligations, 1073; De Villiers, Law ofInjury, 179. 
388 Zimmennann, Law ofObligations, 1073. 
389 De Villiers, Law of Injury, 179; Ranchod, Foundations, 66. Walter, Actio Iniuriarum , 107 remarks that another view 
also prevailed, namely that the somewhat humiliating consequences of the amende honorable were interpreted as penal 
rather than simply reipersecutory. He refers to Matthaeus, De Criminibus, 47.4.4 .1. To this may be added Voet's statement 
in his Commentary at 47.10.17 that the actio ad palinodiam in itself carried a considerable degree of punishment. That this 
opinion did indeed have some proponents in Roman-Dutch law is further evident from Zimmennann, Law ofObligations, 
1074. 
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This view, which had already been adopted in Roman law and by the Glossators and 
Commentators, is consistent with the general tendency in Roman-Dutch law to exempt 
members of the judiciary from liability. However, this privileged status was limited by a 
requirement of reasonable and lawful exercise of the assigned duties and inherent obligations 
of the specific judicial office. Unfortunately, Roman-Dutch jurists were not very precise in 
defining the exact limits of abuse of authority. 
6 CONCURRENCE AND CUMULATION OF ACTIONS 
It is clear from what has been said so far that parties had various remedies for infringements of 
their rights by the judiciary. What remains to be considered is the relationship between these 
actions. In other words, was there any concurrence of actions and could they be cumulative? 
Since the actio legis Aquiliae and the actio de dolo had become merely reipersecutory in 
Roman-Dutch law, it was widely accepted that these actions could run together. Concurrence 
of actions, therefore, was only relevant for criminal actions, that is with regard to the actio 
iniuriarum and other penal actions under such leges as the lex Cornelia de sicariis, the Lex 
Cornelia de falsis or the Lex Julia repetundarum. Suffice it to say that these criminal actions 
stood in elective concurrence to each other.391 
A second aspect is that of cumulation. Roman-Dutch law allowed the cumulation of distinct 
actions.392 Cumulation is an aspect of procedural law according to which a plaintiff may 
concurrently institute different actions in the same legal suit. Since Roman law did not have 
any clearly worked out system of cumulation, this was a novel concept. Its origins appear to 
have been in canon law, where it was developed to prevent delays in the administration of 
justice that resulted from increased numbers of separate actions related to the same incident. 
Obviously, actions which had the same content, which were directed at the same remedy and 
which originated from the same cause of action, could not be cumulative. However, 
391 Van der Keessel, Pralectiones ad Jus Criminale , 47.10.16 and 48 .18.13 . 
392 For more details see Van Aswegen, Sameloop, 62 et seq. 
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cumulation was possible in a case where one injurious act, that is the cause of action, led to 
two different actions. This is the case Voet had in mind when he stated: 
"According to our present day usage ... a person that suffered an injury has no other. ..remedy ... than 
the action for honourable and profitable amends, except that, if such injury happens also to have 
occasioned him any patrimonial loss, he has a private suit for indemnification under the Lex 
Aquilia." 393 
Van Leeuwen and Van der Keessel agreed with this view.394 
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL LIABILITY 
In an earlier chapter it was said that in classical Roman law a distinction was drawn between 
magistrates and ordinary iudices. Only the former enjoyed a privilege in that, during their term 
of office, they could not be summoned to court except for offences committed during their 
period of office and relating to it.395 In all other cases, litigants were obliged to wait until the 
end of the period of office of the official. Judges, generally, were not exempt from summons 
to court, except for periods when they were hearing a case. Magisterial privilege seems to 
have been based on the same ideas as the so-called venia agendi, which had to be obtained by 
minors or wives in order to sue their parents or spouses. Both rules were intended simply to 
prevent vexatious or unreasonable actions which could result in possible loss of reputation or 
loss of efficiency. Later, in the days of the empire, imperial officers performed both 
magisterial and judicial functions and the magistrates' privilege, thus, applied to any action 
brought in respect of a judicial wrong. 
The rechters in the Low Countries were public officers. Administration of justice was 
administration in the name of the Overigheid. In his Manier van Procederen, Merula refers to 
public persoonen who are in the service of the provinces and the cities.396 Dutch judges found 
themselves, thus, on the same level as any other state official.397 Hence, it is worth asking 
whether Roman-Dutch judges enjoyed any procedural privilege. 
393 Commentarius, 47.10.18 as translated by De Villiers in his Law ofJnjury, 181. 
394 Rooms-Hollands Regt, 5.15.9 and Pralectiones ad Jus Criminale, 47.10.16 further at 48.18.13 and 14. 
395 D 2.4.2. See above chapter II 4. 
396 At 4.24.12.1. and note also Groenewegen, Treatise, C.3.1.5 . Further Huussen, Bljdragen 93 (\978),242. 
397 Sceptical is Vries, TVG 90 (1977), 335-336. 
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The Roman-Dutch authorities were of the unanimous opinion that magistrates of all grades 
could be summoned to court. 398 No privilege as regards summons prevailed in the Low 
Countries for the jUdiciary. Voet confirms this view and states that he could see no reason to 
differentiate between private persons and dignitaries or officers of the state. He denied the 
latter any privilege simply on the basis of the dignity of their office.399 This view was also 
adopted by Vinnius in his commentary.400 Undoubtedly, he included all judicial officers, from 
the highest judges of the Hoge Raad to the simple baljuw or schepenen.401 Roman law had 
clearly been abrogated. As Merula stated, summons of all publyke persoonen clearly was 
" ... contra [the Roman] Edictum Praetoris.'>402 
That no procedural privilege prevailed in Roman-Dutch law is further evident from Art 8 of 
the Instruction of the Court of Holland, according to which this court had first instance 
jurisdiction in all criminal and disciplinary actions against officials; and, more partiCUlarly, 
Art 12, which gave the Court jurisdiction over any Baljuws, Schepenen or other high official 
for faulty decisions, carelessness and favours.403 It appears however that some technical 
peCUliarities might have existed in Roman-Dutch law with regard to the form of summons of 
judges. It is argued here that in cases which " ...betreJt haaren [the judges'] dienst en 
0fficie ...", judges, like any other publyke persoon, were supposed to be sununoned in a 
manner different from when a judge was sued in his personal or private capacity - regardless 
of the fact that, if the judge lost the case, he was held personally liable.404 According to Art 38 
of the Instruction of the Hoivan Holland, an official who was sued in his official capacity had 
398 Yoet, Commentary, 2.4.5; Groenewegen, Treatise, D.2.4.1 and C.1 .53.1.4; Merula, Manier van Proced.eren, 4.24.12.1. 
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to be summoned by means of so-called besloten brieven, instead of the usual open writ.405 A 
sealed letter was delivered in which the official was kindly requested to appear on a certain 
day in COurt.406 Further differences are evident from the fact that officials who had been 
summoned were addressed not as Gedagvaarder but as the somewhat better Beschrevenen.407 
At first sight, thus, one can detect hardly any difference between the situation in the 
Netherlands and the law of the Italian city states. However, in the Italian city states the 
motivation for the rejection of procedural privilege was entirely different. As discussed 
earlier, in Italy W1Iestricted summons of judicial officers was absolutely essential for the 
enforcement of syndication, a practice that at no point applied in the Netherlands. On the 
contrary, it appears, at least from the comments of Voet, as if some notion of equality before 
the law might have been the underlying reason for Dutch jurists to hold the view that the 
procedurally privileged status ofjudges was misplaced. 
But lofty theory is often not reflected in practice. From the historians we learn that different 
practice did prevail in everyday Dutch city life where it certainly caused quite a scandal when 
a burgher tried to sue a member of a local regent-patriciate family.408 This was not much 
different from the situation in the post-classical Roman empire. At the same time, it once 
again exemplifies the contrast with the conditions in Italy during the thirteenth to the fifteenth 
centuries. As may be remembered, near the end of the term of office of the podesta and his 
judges, burghers of all ranks were urged by messengers to come forward with their claims. 
To return to the situation in the Netherlands, we must recognise the deep-rooted psychological 
hurdle for a prospective litigant, which proved an effective substitute for any formal 
procedural privilege. Professor Van Deursen quotes the seventeenth century priest Becius as 
saying that the judgement of God will not be like the earthly courts which were " ...but spiders' 
webs, which great flies that sting most fiercely can fly through, while the small mosquitoes 
405 Further Van der Linden, ludicieele Practijcq, 2.1.12. 

406 ibid. at 2.1.8. 

407 ibid. at 2.1.14 . 

408 Van Deursen, Het Koppergeld, 166-168; Lademacher, Niederlande, 210: "Aber wie die Forderungen, den Privilegien 
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stick fast.,,409 The tendency of the ruling regent-patriciate to protect themselves as members of 
a class was not a mere chimera but common practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
This observation is reinforced by accounts of the regent leaders of the Dutch colonial societies 
overseas. For instance in Batavia (today Djakarta) in Indonesia or at the Cape, 
notwithstanding the psychological barriers to actions against judges, written rules with regard 
to procedural privilege for all members of the Overigheid, including of course the judiciary, 
were eagerly legislated, owing possibly to the enormous distance from the motherland. It is a 
fascinating detail of legal history that these local abrogations at the Cape to some extent still 
have relevance in modem South African law. 
409 Van Deursen, He! Kopperge/d, 167. 
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[each judge should be able to] do his work in 
complete independence and free from fear. He 
should not have to turn the pages of his books 
with trembling fingers , asking himself: 'If I do 
this, shall I be liable in damages?''' 
(Lord Denning) I 
VI ENGLISH LAW 
1 	 THE POSITION AND STATUS OF JUDGES WITHIN THE ENGLISH 
ADMINISTRATION OF mSTICE 
1 1 	 Historical development 
Like most medieval states in Europe, England in the tenth century was divided into feudal and 
local units. A feudal unit was a manor, usually headed by a feudal lord who, in turn, was 
subject to a higher lord; the latter, in tum, was subject to the king. The structure of local units 
was more complex, being divided into so-called vilIs (villages) and shires (counties) as well as 
boroughs (cities). The inhabitants of a vill were subject to the so-called hundreds, local folk 
courts which under the authority of a hundredman assembled once about a month from about 
the tenth century onwards. The largest borough of a shire became the seat of a royal provincial 
commander, the so-called ealdorman. Twice a year, a shire assembly, the shire moot, met 
under the leadership of the local ealdorman to deal with more significant matters of communal 
justice. Such moots were found in the various boroughs of the shire. 
At the manors, generally, the feudal lords were engaged in the jurisdiction of so-called manor 
courts. The lords themselves were subject to their superior lord's seigniorial court. All these 
early courts were not staffed by professional jurists or lawyers. Hundredmen, ealdormen or 
other 'judges' were laymen who administered justice according to local customs. Further, it is 
inaccurate to refer to these bodies as courts since purely administrative and judicial tasks were 
hardly kept apart. Apparently the Anglo-Saxon kings tried to retain some control of the local 
I In Sirros v Moore [1974] 3 WLR 459 at 470. 
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moots by either depriving the feudal lords subordinate to them of their jurisdiction in cases of 
abuse or by vesting so-called shire-reeves or sheriffs with power of control in respect of the 
shires. Finally, the kings themselves dealt with legal matters when unsatisfied litigants turned 
to the Crown for assistance.2 It can therefore be said that by the time of the Norman conquest: 
" ... the constitutional notion that justice is a prerogative of the Crown was beginning to have 
some foundation in fact, though it was not yet expressed in words.,,3 
During the first two hundred years of Norman rule, the rudimentary court of the Anglo-Saxon 
kings grew to a more powerful administrative and judicial instrument in the hands of the 
kings. Chancery and the Exchequer emerged as important agencies of royal administration 
and, by the late twelfth century, Henry II established a central royal court called 'the Bench' to 
sit continuously (in banco residentes) at Westminster.4 This was quite a large departure from 
the common practice of itinerant royal judges who toured the realm on an ad hoc basis 
Gustices in eyre).5 
What has been said in the previous chapter with regard to the emergence of the central courts 
in France and the Netherlands to a large extent also applies to England, albeit at a remarkably 
early stage.6 The emergence of royal courts from the curia regis, the kings' general advisory 
council, as well as their growing professionalisation, especially with regard to the increasing 
technicalities of the developing common law, combined with permanent settlement at 
Westminster, are considered the main reasons for the emergence of the three earliest common 
law courts, namely the Exchequer, the Court of Common Pleas and the King's Bench. Even 
though the kings continued to judge in person as they travelled, the task of jUdging before the 
king was generally allocated to justices in eyre who now toured the country in six circuits, as 
well as to the permanent courts at Westminster.7 These royal judges had civil as well as 
criminal jurisdiction. All cases brought under a royal writ were heard as long as they met a 




3 Baker, Introduction, 9. 

4 For the following see Blackstone, Commentaries, vol.III 37-50; Plucknett, History, 146-150; Baker, Introduction, 16-17; 
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certain jurisdictional limit (40 shillings). By the early fourteenth century, the King's Bench 
restricted its jurisdiction to criminal cases as well as to felonies, actions of trespass, suits to 
correct errors in the Court of Common Pleas and boroughs' courts of record and pleas that 
affected the king himself, while all other civil matters - common pleas - were dealt with by 
the Court of Common Pleas. The Court of Exchequer retained jurisdiction in fiscal matters. 
Yet another important court emerged from the kings' Chancery, the body that co-ordinated the 
kings' administrative tasks. This duty implied the chancellors' right to issue orders in the 
name of the king. In other words, Chancery had the power of the royal seal. The origins of the 
Court of Chancery are twofold. On the one hand - its so-called Latin side - Chancery was 
engaged in questions of the feudal rights of the crown, which generally entailed matters 
regarding land. Records of proceedings of this kind were kept in Latin. On the other (English) 
side, Chancery served to mitigate the harshness and rigidity of literal interpretations of the 
common law: the Court of Chancery gave relief where a process before one of the common 
law courts was simply not available, where litigation before a common law court had been 
fraudulent, and in cases concerning forgery and duress. 
Essentially, therefore, Chancery's jurisdiction was an equity jurisdiction which was based on 
the traditional notion of last resort, namely petitioning the king for redress. Soon the kings 
referred petions of right directly to Chancery and it was the chancellors who granted relief in 
their own court - the Court of Chancery - as they thought 'fit in equity and good conscience' . 
For all practical purposes, the most notable difference from the ordinary common law courts, 
besides jurisdiction, was the Court's procedure which at the outset provided for speed and 
simplicity. Unlike the procedure at the common law courts which was characterised by deep­
rooted formalism, no formal writ was necessary and actions began with an informal bill or 
complaint, generally in English since all legal business was performed and all records were 
kept in English. 8 
By the end of the sixteenth century, the twofold structure of courts of common law and equity 
had been supplemented9 by courts commonly referred to as conciliar courts or prerogative 
courts since they grew largely out of the kings' efforts to reassert royal authority after the 
8 Yeall, Law Reform 1640-1660, 32-33; Baker, Introduction, 84-89 ; Plucknett, History , 163-165 . 
9 For the following see Holmes, Legal Instruments , 279-281 ; Baker, Introduction , 101-106. 
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political breakdowns of the fifteenth century. The king's private council, the Privy Council, 
met at the so-called Star Chamber when it exercised jurisdiction. The Star Chamber's 
jurisdiction included jurisdiction over the corruption of justice in local courts as well as over 
offences such as libel, riot and unlawful assembly, which once again were not fully actionable 
before the common law courts. In addition, there emerged the Court of Requests which gave 
relief when poverty kept parties from pursuing their claims before the common law courts. 
The early Tudor kings also established a set of new provincial courts, namely the Councils of 
the North, the Marshes and the West, areas which were distant from Westminster and were 
notorious for disorder. These courts exercised a supervisory jurisdiction modelled on the 
jurisdiction of Star Chamber, supplemented by a localised competence in civil and criminal 
matters. The procedures of all these prerogative courts were similar to those of the Court of 
Chancery and were favourably received by litigants. 
In due course, common law judges responded to the challenges of the prerogative courts. 
Initially, they revised the procedures of the common law courts to counter the advantages of 
the prerogative courts. IO After they had succeeded in this, they developed a more aggressive 
attitude against the 'intrusions' of the conciliar courts. The chief protagonists of this confliot 
were Sir Edward Coke, subsequently Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas and the 
King's Bench, and Lord Ellesmere, who was Chancellor from 1596-1617. Ellesmere, like his 
one time predecessor Cardinal Wolsey, encouraged actions in Chancery after the common law 
courts had given judgement. In consequence, a backlog of thousands of cases hampered the 
proper administration ofjustice. Coke responded to this threat by exalting the common law on 
the basis of its immemorial antiquity and, thus, the superiority of those courts that dealt with 
it. Consequently, Coke argued, judgements of common law courts were always binding on all 
other courts. 
The emergence of the conciliar courts and their considerable strength by the early seventeenth 
century has to be seen not merely in the light of obnoxious jurisdictional rivalries. They were 
harbingers of the greater conflict that overcame England during the seventeenth century, the 
conflict between the kings, who were increasingly pressing for absolutism including the king's 
10 For more details on the relationship between Chancery and common law courts in the seventeenth century see Baker, 
Introduction, 89-93 and his Common Lawyers, 205-229; Holmes, Legal Instruments , 280-285; Kiralfy, Historical 
Introduction, 152-160. 
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legal supremacy, and Parliament and the common law courts, who favoured restriction of 
royal authority. The latter considered the kings' practice of creating new prerogative courts an 
unwarranted limitation of the jurisdiction of the common law courts and an iH-considered 
exercise of royal power. 
Initially, Coke's views did not succeed and James I accepted the argument of his Chancellor, 
Lord Ellesmere, which for obvious reasons, was the more appealing. Ellesmere considered the 
king as the fountain of justice and thus affirmed his power to establish new courts as well as 
to assign to or to take away from certain courts specific jurisdictions. James 1's successor, 
Charles I, attempted to further extend royal legal authority, but his experiment collapsed in 
1640. Parliament had to be assembled and all prerogative courts except Chancery were 
abolished. The decline of monarchy from the middle of the seventeenth century provided the 
space which Parliament eagerly filled and, by the second half of the eighteenth century, the 
famous Westminster system had appeared and made Parliament the true sovereign of England 
and later of Great Britain, to which the kings and the courts, in the end, had to yield. II 
With the retention of the Court of Chancery, however, one evil continued: the constant 
overlapping of jurisdictions of the superior courts as well as the notorious lack of judicial 
manpower in Chancery, where practically all the legal business was still performed by the 
Chancellor personally assisted by the Master of the Rolls.12 These problems produced a great 
deal of delay as well as confusion. 
By the nineteenth century, lawyers accepted the pressing need for reform. By 1854, three vice­
chancellors sat as single judges with the Master of the Rolls, and a Court of Appeal in 
Chancery was established, staffed by the Master of the Rolls and two additional Lords 
Justices. A further cure was provided by empowering Chancery to hear questions of law and 
not only of equity, to try issues of fact by jury and to award damages. In turn, courts of 
common law were assigned the right to grant injunctions and to hear equitable defences. In 
other words, the typical business of courts of equity and courts of law were assimilated. 13 The 
.' 1 It will become apparent in the following chapter that it was this specific subordination of the judiciary within the 
Westminster system that is considered one of the prime miscreants in the failure of South Africa's judiciary to take a firm 
stand against the National Party government's onslaught against human rights. For details see below at chapter VII 1 22 1 
12 Manchester, Modern Legal His/ory, 136-138; Plucknett, His/ory , 209-210. 





Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 saw the abolition of the division between Chancery and the 
common law courts. All became divisions of a new High Court of Justice (consisting of 
Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, Chancery, Probate, Divorce and Admiralty) 
added to by a court of appellate jurisdiction and the House of Lords. 14 
The Supreme Court Act of 1981 and the Courts Act of 1971 as amended are the most recent 
reforms. I5 Appellate jurisdiction nowadays is performed by the House of Lords sitting with 
nine Lords of Appeal in Ordinary and the Court of Appeal staffed by 29 Lord Justices of 
Appeal. The Court of Appeal is divided into civil and criminal divisions. The Probate, 
Divorce and Admiralty divisions were fused in the so-called Family Division, the High Court 
now consisting merely of three divisions staffed by 84 judges. A Crown Court was set up as 
mediatory (superior) criminal court between the Court of Appeal and the inferior courts, 
namely the magistrates' courts. The country is divided into circuits, and circuit administrators 
with a permanent staff make arrangements for sittings of the Crown Court under the general 
direction of a High Court judge. The Crown Court has three kinds of judges, High Court 
judges, Circuit judges (full-time judges) and Recorders (part-time judges) who sit depending 
on the gravity of the offence involved. 
On a local level, at least in theory, the hundreds and other local courts continued to function 
until 1867, when their civil jurisdiction was abolished. 16 However, as early as from the 
Norman conquest, about half of the hundreds had been taken over by local lords and were 
converted into manorial courts. From about the fifteenth century until 1846 there existed no 
national system of civil courts for minor cases. But in that year the County Courts Act of 1846 
introduced a system of county courts that to some extent still is in operation today. For all 
practical purposes today England and Wales are divided into districts and judges' circuits. 
These courts nowadays are staffed by Circuit judges who, as has been seen, may also sit in the 
Crown Court, as well as by Recorders. 
\4 The first three divisions were merged into the Queen's Bench Division as early as 1881 . For details on the nineteenth 

century law reforms see Plucknett, History, 211·212; Manchester, Modern Legal History, 147-149; Baker, Introduction , 

98-99; Kiralfy, His/oricallntroduction, 232·235; BlumenwilZ, Einfuhrung, 11-12 and 24-26. 

I S For details see James, Introduction, 35-44 and Shetreet, Judges on Trial , 19-28. 

16 Manchester, Modern Legal History, 124. 

253 
Historically, another rival of the traditional local courts emerged in the Justice of the Peace, at 
least with regard to criminal jurisdiction. 17 The office of the Justice of the Peace derived from 
the common practice of appointing local knights as keepers of the peace who were supposed 
to co-operate with the local sheriffs. Initially, therefore, the keepers' prime tasks were of 
administrative rather than judicial provenance. However, for various reasons, the keepers' 
power to hold prisoners and deliver them to other officials was enlarged to the right to try 
pnsoners. 
From 1368 onwards, Justices of the Peace, as they came to be called, became responsible for 
most criminal business on the local level, largely at the expense of the ancient local courts 
from which they increasingly drew jurisdictions. The underlying reasons for this development 
are somewhat hazy. However, there is some strength in the argument that the Justices of the 
Peace were closely monitored by the kings' council. Taking this into account it is fair to say 
that the Justices of the Peace " ...became not merely the local representatives of the royal 
jurisdiction, but also to a large extent the administrative and political agents of the King and 
Council.,,18 From the time of the Black Death Justices of the Peace were given the right to 
enforce laws governing ·labour relations. 19 Subsequently, there were innumerable 
administrative duties added, such as the upkeep of highways, rates, licensing and 
administration of the poor law. When, in 1641, the Star Chamber was abolished and thus 
general supervision of the Justices of the Peace faded into non-existence, the great age of the 
Justices on local level began.2o For all practical purposes, they were the little kings of the 
countryside until the days of the industrial revolution, when local authorities took over many 
of the Justices' duties. 
In criminal matters, until 1971, six Justices and one Justice of Assize administered the law in 
so-called courts of quarter sessions which held court four times a year in every county. From 
the sixteenth century, it was also provided for two Justices to sit and inflict summarily 
(without a jury) small penalties for petty offences. Finally, from 1554, Justices of the Peace 
17 Generally with regard to the Justices of the Peace see Plucknett, History, 167-169; Carter, History of English Legal 
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18 Plucknett, History, 169. 

19 Brand, Formation , 114. 
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were empowered to conduct preliminary examinations of people charged with indictable 
offences to determine whether there was a strong enough prima facie case for trial before a 
court of quarter session, the Royal Justices of Assize (itinerant judges) or even the King's 
Bench, the country's highest court of criminal jurisdiction until 1845. According to the 
Justices of the Peace Act of 1979, Justices or Magistrates, as they are also referred to, 
continue to enjoy summary jurisdiction and the right of preliminary examinations. They, 
further, have limited civil jurisdiction and they can hear claims by parents under the 
Guardianship of Minors Act of 1971. In urban areas, Magistrates are full-time paid 
Stipendiary Magistrates. Stipendiary Magistrates are not laymen as are ordinary Magistrates, 
but solicitors or barristers of a certain standing. Generally Magistrates are assisted by a clerk, 
usually a solicitor by training. Magistrates try about 98 % of all criminal proceedings?! 
For centuries, from the days of the Reformation until 1845, there existed no national system of 
inferior courts of civil jurisdiction. Owing to antiquated procedure, litigants soon began to 
consider local courts as inadequate to cope with the growing technicalities of the law. 
Practically no appeals could be made from the local courts, and judgements could not be 
enforced against defendants who removed themselves or their property outside the boundaries 
of the respective court. Consequently, litigants rarely used the local courts and turned to the 
superior courts, which resulted in huge backlogs. This was aggravated by the fact that the 
traditionallirnitation of general jurisdiction of the local courts at 40 shillings, which once was 
considered a considerable amount, was made increasingly trivial by inflation. Furthermore, 
litigants could remove actions from the local courts to a superior court without giving 
security?2 
The County Court Act of 1845, however, provided for a system of civil inferior courts which 
is still in effect. The Courts Act of 1971 replaced the county court judges by circuit judges, 
who can also sit in the Crown Court. For the purpose of the county court system, the country 
has been divided into judges' circuits to ensure that local courts are easily available to 
litigants. County Courts have a wide civil jurisdiction in most actions in contract, tort or 
21 Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 22 and 26. 
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money recoverable by statute, recovery of land and equity. Over and above, various statutes to 
date have conferred further duties on the county COurtS.23 
1 2 Institutional aspects 
121 Independence of the judiciary 
It has been said that in medieval days no clear distinction existed between the executive, 
legislative and judicial functions of the state?4 The judges were considered servants of the 
kings. Bacon is said to have described judges as lions, " ... but yet lions under the throne, being 
circumspect that they do not check or oppose any points of sovereignty.,,25 Nonetheless, from 
about the fourteenth century, the idea emerges that judges' personal loyalty to the king was 
more an impersonal loyalty to the crown. From as early as the fifteenth century, there were a 
number of Chief Justices who took a firm stand against the king. Chief Justice Ruse, for 
instance, resisted Henry V's desire to give preliminary opinions in a treason case with the 
words: " ... [the case] would come before the King's Bench judicially, and then they would do 
what by right they ought to do.,,26 
The first quarter of the seventeenth century saw parts of the judiciary involved in a furious 
fight with the king, at this time James I, inclined as he was to lead England's monarchy on an 
absolutist path. The clashes of Coke and Ellesmere on the issue of the jurisdiction of 
Chancery and other prerogative courts were matched by Coke's head-on collision with the 
Crown in 1616 when common law judges of the King's Bench were brought before James I 
and asked whether the king had the right to interfere with pending cases. Once again it was 
Coke who responded to that threat with the words resembling those of Huse: " ... when that 
case should be, he would do that should be fit for a judge to do." A few months later Coke 
was dismissed without reason by the king.27 
23 James, Introduction, 44-46. 

24 For the following see Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 2-15 ; Holmes, Legal Instruments, 280-284; Baker, Introduction, 143­
146 and Common Lawyers, 205-229; Plucknett, History, 231-251. 

25 Bacon, Essays, 510 . 

26 Quoted at Baker, Introduction, 144-145. 
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This opened the door to radical changes. In the following decades, James I, Charles I, James IT 
and Charles II did not necessarily feel restrained in appointing and dismissing judges at their 
discretion. By the late 1630s, Charles I had assembled a compliant bench which became an 
instrument of prerogative rule with judges' acceptance and application of the 'doctrine of 
necessity' whereby, in cases involving the safety and the well-being of the kingdom, the king 
was allowed to abrogate the rules and procedure of the courts. Even though things improved 
during the revolution, Charles II again engaged in the practice of forcible retiring politically 
undesirable judges and replacing them with partisans, all men with dubious qualifications. 
James II made history by dismissing 12 judges in four years, calling those judges who resisted 
following the king's line 'snivelling trimmers' .28 These enduring attempts to undermine the 
independence of the judges came to a halt during the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689 and 
afterwards under the reign of William III when all judges were appointed during good 
behaviour (durante bene placito), and the independence ofjudges, at least from the sovereign, 
was promoted. 
1 22 Appointment, tenure and removal 
The Act of Settlement of 1701 proved to be the essential tool whereby the tenure of superior 
court judges was secured by statute against the influence of the Crown.29 By 1760, the last 
loop-hole was closed when continuity in office was guaranteed and terms of office retained 
validity even when judicial proceedings ceased upon a king's death and judicial authority was 
returned to the new king. The latter advised the Chancellor on the re-appointing ofjudges, and 
former appointments did not necessarily have to be renewed.3o Until today, judges of the High 
Court and other leading judges hold office durante bene placito until they turn 75 years of 
age.3! Circuit judges are retired at the age of 72.32 
28 Quoted at Holmes, Legallnstrumerns, 284. Note also Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 8-9 . 

29 Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 10-11. For the earlier period see also Brand Formation, 116. 

30 Baker, Introduction, 146; Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 10. A number of original writs of appointment of superior court 

judges are included in Sainty, Judges ofEngland, 243-268 . 

3 1 Section II (2) Supreme Court Act of 198 1 and s 2 (I) Judicial Pensions Act of 1959. 

32 Section 17 Courts Act of 1971 . 
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Whereas tenure of office as an essential feature of judicial independence is statutorily 
protected, to the present day there are no provisions for reviewing judicial appointments to the 
benches of the superior courts to ensure that decisions are made on the basis of adequate 
information and criteria. In 1706, for the last time, barristers appearing at Chancery who 
aspired to the Bench were supposed to bring to the traditional New Year's Day breakfast with 
the Lord Chancellor a pecuniary offering in support of their ambitions. Meanwhile, mystery 
continues to veil the aspect of appointment. To some extent, the royal right of appointment is 
still held to flow from the notion that the monarch is considered the fountain ofjustice. 
Today, the Queen appoints Circuit and High Court judges on the recommendation of the Lord 
Chancellor. The Queen appoints Law Lords, Lords Justices of Appeal, the Lord Chief Justice, 
the Master of the Rolls, the President of the Family Division, and the Vice-Chancellor on the 
advice of the Prime Minister who, in turn, relies to a considerable extent on the Lord 
Chancellor. David Pannick once described the selection process as resembling a papal 
conclave rather than the choice of law-makers in a modern democracy, and added, not 
unconvincingly, that the methods adopted continue to suffer from major defects to the 
detriment of the public interest.33 Alternatively an ~ppointment committee which represents 
the Law Society, the Bar, academic lawyers, the judiciary and lay members were suggested 
without success in 1972 by the Justice Sub-Committee.34 The only ascertainable criterion for 
selection, nomination and appointment is that the nominee to the High Court must be a senior 
member of the Bar, that is he must have been a barrister of at least ten years' standing. A 
Court of Appeal Judge is required to have been a puisne judge or a barrister of at least fifteen 
years' standing.35 Recorders, Justices of the Peace, solicitors or academics are not 
appointed.36 Superior judges are subject to removal only upon an address of both Houses of 
Parliament. 37 
33 Pannick, Judges, 65-66; Manchester, Modern Legal His/ory, 79-81. Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 46-54. For purchase of 
office in the seventeenth century see also YeaH, Law Reform 1640-1660, 40-42. 
34 Pannick, Judges, 67-68. Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 83-84. 
35 Section 10 (3) Supreme Court Act of 1981. Partly outdated in this regard Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 54-55. 
36 Manchester, Modern Legal His/ory, 80; Pannick, Judges, 58-59; Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 55-59. 
37 Shetreet, Judges On Trial, 87- J J 4 and 129-15 J provides for a most detailed account. 
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Judges of the inferior courts, particularly Justices of the Peace, used to be appointed by a 
special commission under the great sea1. 38 In practice, however, the Lord-Lieutenant of the 
respective county made nominations, which required the approval by the Lord Chancellor. 
During the eighteenth century particularly, a large number of appointments were made purely 
on a political basis, and even in this century liberals have contended that appointees were 
predominantly from a conservative background. In 1910, advisory committees were created 
for every county and borough. The Lord Chancellor appointed ad hoc the members of the 
committees who were then in charge of the appointment process but there was no guarantee of 
a judge's continuing in office from one advisory committee to another. In 1973, the advisory 
committees ceased to exist and since then Justices of the Peace have been appointed by the 
Lord Chancellor on behalf and in the name of the Queen with the proviso that " ... a Justice so 
appointed may be removed from office in like manner.,,39 Considering the fact that inferior 
court judges outnumber the judges of the superior courts by far, one could say - with some 
exaggeration - that the majority of English judges hold office subject to the good will of the 
executive, since the Lord Chancellor is also a member of the government.40 Undoubtedly this 
practice does not favour the principle of separation of powers and thus of judicial 
. d d 41m epen ence. 
Practically the same applies to the development of the conditions under which other inferior 
judges were appointed and held office, i.e., County Court judges as well as Recorders. Today 
Circuit judges are appointed by a royal warrant. They also hold office at the pleasure of the 
Lord Chancellor who can remove ajudge on grounds of incapacity and misbehaviour.42 
38 For the following see Baker, Introduction, 146; Manchester, Modern Legal History, 74-79; Pannick, Judges, 91-92 and 

101-102, Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 27. 

39 S 6 (1) Justice of the Peace Act of 1979 as amended by s 65 Administration Act of 1982. 

40 For details see Manchester, Modern Legal History, 105-106; James, Introduction , 30-31 ; Shetreet, Judges on Trial, 114­
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1 3 Social background, professionality and legal education of judges 
Initially, judges of the superior courts were drawn from the ranks of the clergy. Later, a pool 
of appointees was fonned by the so-called order of the coif, which assembled the serjeants-at­
law, pleaders who had been appointed especially by the kings to perfonn litigation in regard to 
the Crown.43 From about the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, we witness the 
emergence of the Bar and the Crown's growing practice of choosing judges from this limited 
group of professionals.44 Until the second half of the eighteenth century, landed families 
contributed quite substantially to the superior court benches. By the 1850's, a considerable 
restructuring had taken place and it was mainly members of families of so-called professional 
provenance who now occupied the benches. Social homogeneity among the members of the 
superior courts always existed. It is fair to say that about three quarters of today's superior 
court judges have had a public school and Oxbridge education before entering the Bar.45 
David Pannick makes the fitting comment that " .. .it is disturbing that our judges corne from so 
narrow a range of the community.,,46 This statement undoubtedly also applies to the fact that, 
with the apparent predominance of white males in the ranks of barristers, the English judiciary 
today includes only a few women and even fewer non-White judges.47 
Furthennore judges of the superior courts do not appear to enjoy specific education or 
preparation for their judicial office apart from the vast legal experience they accumulated at 
the Bar before being called to the Bench. In addition, English judges, unlike American judges, 
do not have legally trained clerks upon whom they can rely for research. The issue of judicial 
training appears to be a delicate one. Pannick quotes Lord Devlin who admitted quite frankly 
the defects of the English system and once described himself at the time when he was 
appointed to the Bench in 1948, as follows: 
43 Brand, Formation, 115-116. 

44 For details see especially Dawson, Oracles, 1-50; Baker, Introduction, 133-143 as well as Baker, eLf 28 (1969), 205­
229; Plucknett, History, 235-241 . See also Holmes, Legal History, 273-274 with further references. 

45 See Manchester, Modern Legal History, 81; Pannick, Judges, 53. 

46 Pannick, Judges, 59. 

47 Ibid. at 50 and 59-60. In this context it is worth including a story Pannick tells of the American President Lyndon B 
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See also the overview provided by Manchester, Modern Legal History, 70-71 with respect to the pains the profession 





"1 had never exercised any criminal jurisdiction and not since my earliest days at the Bar had 1 
appeared in a criminal court. Two days after 1 had been sworn in, 1 was trying crime at Newcastle 
Assizes .. .".48 
While most present day judges have at least a bachelor's degree in law or have undergone 
some compulsory training at the Bar, during the whole of the eighteenth and most of the 
nineteenth centuries there existed practically no legal education upon which future judges 
could draw, either at the universities or at the Inns of Court. Lord Campbell told the select 
committee of 1846 on English legal education that with regard to barristers all that 
".. . has been required has been that the candidate to be called to the Bar should be of fair character; 
that he should have kept a certain nwnber of years upon the books of the Society: that he should 
have kept a certain nwnber of terms by eating a certain nwnber of dinners in the Hall each term, 
and have gone through the fonn of performing what are still called exercises, but which consist of a 
mere farce of a case being stated, and a debate on each side ... ". 49 
In its report, the committee drew heavily on the contemporary situation at German 
universities, which offered a range of preparatory studies before a student was admitted to the 
law faculty of a university; where, furthermore, a large staff was engaged in the teaching of 
law; and where attendance at lectures and examinations was compulsory. It should not he 
forgotten that although in the middle of the nineteenth century Germany's (historical) legal 
science and its deep-rooted foundation at the universities probably provided one of the most 
advanced and innovative educational systems of the age, the differences from the situation in 
England particularly were immense. This is also true if one compares the situation in England 
with the legal training during the last century in the Netherlands, France or even the United 
States, but not, however, from that in South Africa. so 
Several committees forwarded proposals and alternatives over the second half of the century 
without apparent success.S ! Only in the period between the First and the Second World Wars 
were the law faculties, which by then were fairly well equipped and staffed, flooded by masses 
of law students. Junior barristers now were usually in possession of a university degree. In 
1958, pupillage for barristers was made compulsory and in 1970 obligatory learning exercises, 
48 Pannick, Judges , 69 . 
49 Quoted from Manchester, Modern Legal History, 55. 
50 For the situation in the USA see Reimann, Historische Schule und Common Law. For the developments in South Africa 
see below at chapter VII 1 1 3 and I 3. 






abandoned as long ago as 1642, were reintroduced. 52 The Inns of Court' School of Law and 
the Council of Legal Education exist for the continued education of barristers and thus of 
prospective judges, but until today the practical skills and experience acquired during private 
practice make up the most important components of judges' training. Whether or not that 
makes them more suited for a judgeship remains a moot point. 53 
Whereas superior court judges have always had at least the advantage of years of standing as a 
barrister as preparation for their high office, inferior judges, notably Justices of the Peace, 
were for centuries lay judges. Only in 1949 did the Justices of the Peace Act provided a 
statutory basis for the training of justices. The only professional assistance offered to the 
justices were the so-called Clerks of the Peace, usually lawyers by training. By the 1830's, 
Justices of the Peace were subject to stringent public criticism because of their lack of formal 
training, corruption and over-enthusiastic enforcement of laws, and also because of partiality 
on class lines. This development had in a sense been foreseen as early as the fourteenth 
century by the then Lord Chief Justice Scrope, who opposed the commission of local gentry to 
the office of Justice of the Peace with the argument that they would only use the law for the 
pursuit of factional rivalries.54 
It is interesting that to some extent the social class to which English Justices of the Peace 
belonged bears some resemblance to the social class from which Dutch local judges were 
drawn. English justices were drawn from among the most worthy men in the county who had 
an excellent reputation. Moreover, it was provided by statute that no one was to be appointed 
justice who did not have a rental income from his land of £ 20 p.a. A subsequent statute 
provided for a total of £ 100 p.a. clear of all deductions. Men of lesser wealth were considered 
" ...both covetous and contemptible ... ,,55, an argument encountered earlier in connection with 
the influence of the Dutch regent-patriciate on the composition of the benches of the local 
lower courts in the Netherlands. 56 Similarly, an historian has pointed to the 'loose governing 
52 Baker, InJroduction, 148-149; Manchester, Modern Legal History, 64-65. For recent developments and criticism of the 

present practice of appointing judges merely from the ranks of the senior barristers see Pannick, Judges, 49-56. 

53 Pannick, Judges, 52-53 . 

54 Holmes, Legal Instruments, 274. 

55 Blackstone, Commemaries, voL I 352-353 . 

56 See above chapter V I and 4 I 3 3 at the end. For further details Manchester, Modern Legal History, 78; Sharpe, 

Enforcing the Law, 100-102. 
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oligarchy' ofjustices and other respectable members of society who ruled the local cosmos.57 
Thus, until well into the first half of this century, we find practically no members of the 
working class on the benches of the inferior courts, which were composed almost exclusively 
of members of the gentry and, later, the middle class. 
Even though the government acknowledged the apparent deficiencies of the system, there was 
no serious attempt to reform the system of Justices of the Peace at its roots, for instance by 
establishing a salaried local professional judiciary.58 All that was done was to push for a 
tighter supervision of the justices by the superior courts. In this regard, reference must be 
made to a direct and an indirect approach. The latter, judicial liability, appeared first owing to 
a lack of proper means of appeal or review in early English law, again not dissimilar to the 
development of Roman law. The direct approach, which emerged somewhat later, was 
through writs of error, mandamus and particularly certiorari. We will return to this point in 
due course. 
2 GENERAL PRlNCIPLES OF JUDICIAL LIABILITy59 
The liability of judicial officers is exclusively a personal liability because the plaintiff has no 
right of action against the Crown.60 There is no public liability on behalf of the judiciary for 
57 Ibid. at 101. 

58 For reasons to refuse these modifications see Manchester, Modern Legal History, 77-78. 

59 The leading articles and treatises on the English (and American) law of judicial liability can be found in the following 
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tortious acts. Accordingly, English law accepts neither a type of vicarious liability for judicial 
officers nor the primary liability of the Crown for wrongful exercise of its sovereign powers 
by the jUdiciary. The reasons for this are that, firstly, in English law, as in many other common 
law systems, the essential requirement for vicarious liability of the Crown, namely that a 
judicial officer is a servant of the state, is rejected. On the contrary, judicial officers are 
regarded as members of an independent power, the judiciary.61 Secondly, there is no 
acceptance of the notion of primary liability of the Crown, based on the presumption that the 
judiciary is part of the Crown's government and that thus the wrongful exercise of judicial 
power is a wrongful exercise of sovereign power. On the contrary, according to s 2 (5) of the 
Crown Proceedings Act of 1947 the Crown shall not be liable in: 
" .. . respect of anything done or omitted to be done by any person while discharging or purporting to 
discharge any responsibilities of a judicial nature vested in him, or any responsibilities which he 
has in connection with the execution of the judicial process." 
However, under the Act the Crown can be held liable for the acts of other officers and civil 
servants. This liability is often referred to as State liability or ministerial liability as opposed 
to judicial liability. The only exception to this general rule with regard to judicial officers is 
the magistrates' indemnity based on s 53 of the Justices of the Peace Act of 1979, which will 
be discussed later. 
Liability of judicial officers is the consequence of the tortious act of a judicial officer. 62 Most 
likely, a judicial officer will be answerable for trespass to property, for trespass to the person, 
for false imprisonment or for defamation. 
Judicial liability can arise only if no justification ground for the act in question can be raised 
by the judge. In English law, justification of an act is commonly discussed under defences. 
There are various types of defences to an action in tort. Generally speaking, one must 
distinguish between particular and general defences.63 The former are peculiar to a particular 
based his arguments inter alia on the decision of the Privy Council in Mahara} v AG 0/ Trinidad and Tobago (No.2) 

[1979] AC 385 PC which he considers a landmark decision. In this case it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to redress 

from the State for wrong imprisonment under s 6 of the Trinidad and Tobagoian Constitution. This section provided for 

damages irrespective of whether the wrongful act was committed by ajudicial or non-judicial servant of the State. 

61 See Atijah, Vicarious Liability, 77 fn14. 

62 For an overview on the distinctions of the common law concept of torts compared to the civilian law of delict see 
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tort; the latter apply to nearly all torts. The specific defence available to judicial officers is of a 
general nature and is widely regarded not only as a defence but as extended somewhat into 
personal immunity. This immunity must be distinguished from other defences such as 
necessity or mistake since it is not concerned with the nature of the tortious liability or a 
particular tort, but exclusively with particular persons, i.e., judicial officers, and with the fact 
that judicial officers for policy reasons need to be protected more extensively from actions 
than ordinary individuals. Although, for centuries there existed a strong tendency in English 
law towards total immunity of judicial officers, it is important to note that today the judicial 
officer's personal immunity is not absolute. Under certain, albeit limited, circumstances no 
defence will be available for a judicial officer and liability can arise. 
Within this personal immunity, two particular defences must be distinguished. One is 
'immunity from suit' which is a defence of the sued judge against actions of trespass or false 
imprisonment. The other is the defence of 'absolute privilege in judicial proceedings', which 
has been developed in the law of defamation. The rationale of the two concepts needs to be 
distinguished. It seems that some confusion has arisen since the various authorities have not 
always drawn this distinction and have borrowed arguments in cases of absolute privilege 
from cases of immunity from suit, and vice versa. 
The concept of immunity from suit focuses on the protection ofjudicial independence, thereby 
encouraging fearless and principled decision making, as well as recognising and protecting the 
finality of a court's decision. Absolute privilege on the other hand is focused on freedom of 
communication in court, where the necessity arises of protecting participants in legal 
proceedings from fear of consequent legal claims against them. While both defences address 
distinct persons, immunity from suit is confined to judicial and quasi-judicial officers. 
Absolute privilege, however, covers everyone involved in judicial proceedings. Such persons 
are judges, jurors, counsel, parties, witnesses, clerks, etc. The scope of absolute privilege is 
thus much wider than that of immunity from suit. 
Many seemingly arbitrary divisions and peculiarities of modern English law of judicial 
liability can be explained only by reference to the historical development of judicial liability. 




















sources of English law of judicial liability are found primarily in the common law.64 It will 
therefore be necessary to make frequent references to case law. 
3 	 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL LIABILITY FOR WRONG 
JUDGEMENTS AND DEF AMA nON 
3 1 	 Historical development before 1600 
311 Immunity from suit 
As in Roman law, judicial immunity was not provided for in early English law. Relatively 
precise regulations relating to judicial liability can be found as early as the eleventh century in 
some of the ordinances of William I. Under these ordinances the judges were accountable to 
the king, not to the litigants. Judges had to pay a fine in cases of either deliberate or mistaken 
false judgement.65 
From the twelfth until the seventeenth century, English common law witnessed the emergence 
of the first of the two roots of the present law of judges' liability: the distinction between 
courts of record and not ofrecord.66 
Medieval English law drew no distinction between the correctness of a judge's decision and 
the rectitude of his conduct.67 Judges continued to have no special immunity. There existed 
neither a system of appeals nor any such thing as prerogative orders, i.e., the writs of 
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which one day were to become a fashionable means of 
redress against the conduct of inferior courtjudges.68 In those days, parties were limited to the 
64 It is important to note that the liability of Justices of the Peace is regulated by s 44-52 of the Justices of the Peace Act of 
1979 which replaced the Justices Protection Act of 1848. 

65 See Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges, 9- I 0 for details. 

66 For a detailed survey of the development of the judicial record see Holdsworth, History, vol.V 157-160; Plucknett, 
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67 Holdsworth, History, vol I 214. 

68 Ibid at 213-214. 
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so-called complaint of false judgement,jaussement de jugement or Schelte, a feature common 
to the legal systems of Europe in the Middle Ages as we have seen in the previous chapters.69 
As was the case in France, the Netherlands and in Germany, complaint of false judgement 
took the form of semi-criminal proceedings against the judge.7o It was only an indirect attack 
against a decision since it was directed against the judge personally rather than against the 
decision. The annulment of a judge's decision could lead to the payment of damages to the 
litigants, to a fine payable to the king and to the permanent loss of the right to hold a COurt.7l 
Complaint of false judgement could only be urged in the king's court and thus became a royal 
plea.72 In the thirteenth century, the complaint of false judgement was treated increasingly by 
the king's court as an efficient means of correcting judicial decisions of inferior courts and, by 
the fourteenth century, a distinction between the two components of the complaint, namely 
complaints against a judgement and complaints against a judge, had become apparent.73 
From the fourteenth century onwards, there appears the distinction between courts of record 
and those not of record. A principle which was to become known as the so-called sanctity of 
the record was applied, which not only changed the procedures as to complaint of false 
judgement but, as we will see, provided for the first time for the concept ofjudicial inununity 
from liability. 
In the early Middle Ages, a record was the protocol of the court proceedings, written in Latin. 
Only the conunon law courts kept a Latin record. 74 Inferior courts kept no record.75 The kings 
enjoyed a privilege in that their judgements on events that had taken place in their presence 
were simply not contestable: 'the king can do no wrong'. In time, the royal privilege was 
conferred on the court in the absence of the king, which, as shown earlier, was increasingly 
the case from the thirteenth century onwards.76 It was the conunon law courts to which this 
privilege was first extended. Thereafter, parties could not find fault with a decision of the 
69 See above at chapter III 5 and chapter V 4 I 3 2. 
70 Holdsworth, History, voU 213. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Maitland and Pollock, History, vol.1I 663 et seq; Palmer, County Courts , 151-159; Brand, Formation, 110. 
73 Holdsworth, History, vol.! 213-215. 
74 The other courts which emerged later, namely Chancery, Star Chamber, Requests as well as Admiralty also kept a record 
but notably this was not a Latin record. 
75 Holdsworth, History, vol.V 159; Maitland and Pollock, History, vol.lI 669. 
76 See above at fn3 et seqq . 
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common law courts. Findings of these courts included in the record were generally considered 
final and incontestable. The only exception applied where a formal error appeared openly on 
the courts' record.77 The only way of questioning a decision of a court of record henceforth 
was the so-called writ of error. Consequently, the complaint of false judgement was no longer 
available, or rather, being restricted now to courts not of record:78 "The writ of error lies for 
some supposed mistake in proceedings of a court of record; for, to amend errors in a base 
court, not of record, a writ of false judgement lies.,,79 
Evidently the concept of the sanctity of record resulted in the immunity of the judges of the 
common law courts. The emergence ofjudicial immunity was necessary to protect the concept 
of sanctity of record: this concept would have been severely undermined if a litigant could 
have gone 'behind the record' with a claim against a judge based on facts which were not on 
the record.8o The immunity of the judges of the common law courts was, however, restricted 
to cases where a judge gave judgement within his jurisdiction. If a judge acted outside his 
jurisdiction he was not protected by this privilege since the matter was coram non judice and 
hence the record could be traversed.8l The judge was then personally liable to the aggrieved 
party.82 
The position as to judicial immunity from liability in England before the seventeenth century 
can thus be summarised as follows: Judges of courts of record enjoyed immunity from suit as 
long as they acted within their jurisdiction. Judges of courts not of record were however 
personally liable for any misapplication of the law. Courts of record in those days were solely 
77 Holdsworth, History, voLl 214. 

78 Thome, Courts ofRecord, 256; Plucknett, History, 104 and 387-388 with regard to writ of error: "The proper expression 
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the courts of the sovereign which exclusively held the right to imprison and fine.83 Thus 
limited immunity was provided for a limited group ofjudges. 84 
3 1 2 Absolute privilege 
A judge can raise the defence of absolute privilege exclusively in an action in defamation. 
Certain occasions are deemed to be so important that those making statements are not liable 
even though their statements might be untrue or even malicious. These instances all have in 
common that freedom of communication is paramount. 
Generally speaking defences developed late in the history of the law of defamation. Only by 
the middle of the eighteenth century was the defence ofjustification established. This defence, 
however, had a wide scope and covered categories such as truth, absolute and qualified 
privilege and fair comment. Of these the plea of truth was the initial defence85, the defence of 
privilege appearing only from the fifteenth century onwards.86 Although the term privilege 
was not common until the nineteenth century and consequently no distinction was drawn 
between absolute and qualified privilege, it is obvious that English law accepted the 
justification ground that the making of a defamatory statement was rendered lawful by certain 
circumstances.87 As early as 1585 it was adjudged: 
" ... that if one exhibits articles to justices of the peace against a certain person, containing divers 
great abuses and misdemeanours .. . in this case the party accused shaH not have for any matter 
contained in such articles any action upon the case, for they have pursued the ordinary course of 
justice in such case."gg 
In a case before Star Chamber in 1591, it was held that no action lay for any of the contents of 
a bill exhibited in court, however false the matter, since the exhibition took place in the course 
83 Blackstone, Commentaries, vol.II1 23-24. For more detailed information as to the roots of the essential requirements of 
imprisonment and fine see Thome, Courts ofRecord, 256-266; Pollock and Maitland, History, vol.1I 517-518; Holdsworth, 
History, vol.V 158-160. 
84 Feinman and Cohen, SCLR 3) (1980),206. 
85 Holdsworth, History, vol. V 207. 
86 Ibid. at vo!.VIII 376. 
87 Ranchod, Foundations, 115 . 
88 Cutler v Dixon (1585) 4 Co. Rep. l4b. 
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of justice.89 By the first quarter of the seventeenth century, it was well established that no 
action lay against judges, witnesses, or counsel for defamatory statements made during court 
proceedings.9o It is of the utmost importance, however, that at this stage privilege did not 
cover words spoken maliciously. From a case in 1606, it is clear that a statement prima facie 
privileged would lose its privileged status if it were spoken with malice.9! 
The early cases leave much open to speculation as to which definite policy considerations 
paved the way for the introduction of such privilege. However, it can be deduced from the 
judgement in the case of Cutler v Dixon that one reason was "...fear of infinite vexation ... ", 
fear of an endless stream of actions and counter-actions in defamation.92 
32 Historical development after 1600 
3 2 1 Immunity from suit 
3211 The two leading cases: Floyd v Barker and The Case of the Marshalsea 
The growing conflict between common law courts and the prerogative courts from the late 
sixteenth century onwards, set the stage for further developments in the area of judicial 
immunity. Two cases, Floyd v Barker and The Case ofthe Marshalsea, undoubtedly laid the 
foundations of modern English law in relation to judicial liability. The former stressed the 
importance ofjudges , immunity; the latter defined the exceptions to this concept. 
The conflict between English common law courts and their prerogative rivals has already been 
described. By 1610, the dispute culminated in the crucial question of whether the Court of 
Chancery was empowered to undermine decisions of the common law courts by arrest of 
execution of these decisions while a new hearing - at the Chancery Courts - was scheduled. 
Obviously these new hearings could result in a different verdict. The status of the courts of 
89 Buckley v Wood (1591) 4 Co. Rep. 14. 
90 Holdsworth, History, vol.VIII 376. 
91 Brook v Montague Cro Jac 90. 
92 Cutler v Dixon (1585) 4 Co. Rep 14 b. 
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record now served well as a teclmical argument for lawyers at the common law courts to 
protect their position and to cripple their rival COurtS.93 Floyd v Barker was one of the leading 
cases in this regard.94 In this case a judge of assize, Barker, presided at the trial of one 
William Price who was sued for murder. Upon a verdict of guilty Barker gave judgement and 
Price was sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Subsequently, Barker was charged in the 
Court of Star Chamber (a prerogative court) with conspiracy. 
Two arguments were raised by the Lord Chief Justice Coke with regard to this charge, both of 
which were aimed at restraining the growing influence of the Court of Chancery.95 On the 
basis of some dicta he had found in the Year Books, Coke argued that only courts of record 
could fine and imprison.96 Since all courts except the common law courts were technically not 
courts of record, these courts lacked the legal right to exercise similar powers and thus all 
judgements of the prerogative courts which had put people in jail had to be considered invalid. 
In fact, Coke in his function as Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench in those years 
released numerous prisoners on petitions ofhabeas corpus.97 
Coke's second argument is of particular relevance to our topic. He concluded from the 
common law courts' status as courts of record that the judges of these courts were immune 
from prosecution and could not be held responsible before any other COurt.98 Again, the latter 
point was substantiated by two arguments. One argument was that if judicial matters of record 
were in question, there would never be an end of causes, and controversies would last 
93 Holdsworth, History, vol.V 159 and 1924 JOSPTOL, 17-21; Weber, Legal History 9 (1988), 189-90. Thome, too, makes 
it plain that Coke's approach was mainly directed against the Court of Chancery. See Courts ofRecord, 266. 
94 77 ER 1305 (1608). 
95 Weber, Legal History 9 (1988), 187. 
96 Beecher's Case (1609) 8 Co. Rep. at 60 quoted at Holdsworth, History, vol.V 159. Coke inter alia relied on YB (1422­
1461), Hi!. 9 Hen. VI f. 60. Further note Thome's detailed (and critical) discussion of Coke's approach in Courts of 
Record 256-266. At 256 Thome states that Coke " ... is responsible in large measure for the curious modern definition of a 
court of record as one that can fine and imprison, and in reaching this definition there is every reason to believe that he used 
cases to give, ifnot a wholly new meaning to the distinction, at least a new emphasis to it." 
97 Baker, Introduction, 92. 
98 "Inasmuch as the judges of the realm have the administration of justice under the king to all his subjects, they ought not 
to be drawn into question for any supposed corruption which extends to the annihilating of a record or of any judicial 





indefinitely.99 The second point raised by Coke was that it was essential to the administration 
ofjustice that judges were not in fear as to the consequences of their decisions. 100 
"The judges of the realm ...ought not to be drawn into question ... for they are only to make an 
account to God and the King, and not to answer to any suggestion in the Star-Chamber; for this 
would tend to scandal and subversion of alljustice ."IOI 
Coke's arguments, for the first time, introduced full scale legal policy considerations in the 
doctrine of immunity from suit, considerations which still prevail. 102 A further important 
consequence of Floyd v Barker was the definition of the limits of the judges' immunity. All 
'extra-judicial' acts by the judiciary would henceforth fall outside the scope of judges' 
privilege. Extra-judicial acts were, for instance, false and malicious prosecutions and 
conspiracies ofjudges outside of court. 103 
The designation of specific acts in Floyd v Barker as extra-judicial indicates how closely this 
issue was related to the question of defining the limits of the courts' jurisdiction. Only five 
years later, in The Case of the Marshalsea, was Coke able to define these limits more 
precisely.l04 In this case, actions of trespass and libel and slander were brought against the 
officers of the Marshalsea's Court, a court which had jurisdiction over the king's 
household. lOS The Court's officers defended themselves with the argument that they had acted 
upon order of the Court. The plaintiff responded that the Court had no jurisdiction as to either 
the respective persons, since they were not of the king's household, or as to the matter, since 
none of the king's household was affected. Coke decided that: 
"When a court has jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds inverso ordine or erroneously there ...no 
action lies ... but when the court has not jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is 
coram non judice, and (an) action will lie ... ". 106 
Subsequent cases confirmed this rule. 107 Thus a concept of 'want of jurisdiction' was 
formulated to define finally and clearly the limits of the immunity ofjudges. 
99 Ibid. at 1306 and Holdsworth, History, vol.V1 237. 
100 Ibid. 
10 1 Floyd v Barker 77 ER 1305 (1608) at 1306. 
102 Feinman and Cohen, SCLR 31 (1980), 207-209. 
103 Floyd v Barker 77 ER 1306 (1608) at 1306. 
104 77 ER 1027 (1613). 
lOS For details see Blackstone, Commentaries, vol.IV 273-274. 
106 77 ER 1027 (161 3) at 1038. 
107 For details see the passage right below. 
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3 2 1 2 Disappearance ofthe distinction between courts ofrecord and not ofrecord 
The decisions that elaborated on the distinction between courts of record and not of record 
undoubtedly laid the foundations for the modem English law of judicial liability. However, 
this distinction ceased to have importance from the late seventeenth century onwards. 108 The 
reasons for this were twofold. 
On the one hand, it became obvious that Coke's distinction between the two types of court 
was too fonnalistic. Although a technical distinction did in fact still exist, practically all other 
non-Latin records had assumed the same degree of binding force as those of the common law 
courts, and above that " ... the power to fine and imprison was habitually exercised by the 
council, star chamber, chancery, admiralty, and high Commission ... ".109 On the other hand, 
the idea of protection of judicial immunity had extended even to courts not of record. The 
earliest example is provided by Terry v Huntington where commissioners of excise, obviously 
not a court of record, were sued in conversion. 110 It was held that they were liable on the 
grounds that they had exceeded their jurisdiction and consequently had acted coram non 
judice. In 1703 the House of Lords reversed this decision in Ashby v White, where a returning 
officer had refused to accept the plaintiffs vote at an election. In the House of Lords a 
majority decided that the officer's act was privileged since he had acted as a 'quasi-judge,.lll 
This principle was affinned by Lord Tenterden CJ in Garnett v Ferrand where he stated 
clearly that: "Even ... justices ... not of record cannot be called in question for an error in 
judgement, so long as they act within the bounds of their jurisdiction.,,112 The eighteenth and 
the early nineteenth centuries thus witnessed a considerable expansion in the scope of judicial 
immunity. 
3 2 1 3 Superior courts and inferior courts 
After the importance of distinguishing courts of record and not of record vanished, another 
principle increasingly became essential: the differentiation between the immunity accorded to 
108 Feinman and Cohen, SCLR 3 I (1980), 21 I. 
109 Thome, Courts ofRecord, 267. 
110 145 ER 557 (1668). 











judges of superior and judges of inferior courts. I 13 This development fonned the second root 
of the modem English law of judicial liability, and led finally to the comprehensive immunity 
of judges of superior courts and to the somewhat lesser immunity of inferior court judges. 
How was this distinction established? 
The first aspect was one ofjurisdiction. The inferior courts' jurisdiction was limited by issues 
of subject matter, place or persons. Superior courts enjoyed general jurisdiction. This 
principle, for example, was stated in the case ofPeacock v Bell: 
''Nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior court but that which specially 
appears to be so; and ...nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an inferior court, 
but that which is so expressly alleged." 114 
Consequently it was held that an inferior court can exceed its jurisdiction whereas a superior 
court basically cannot because it has the jurisdiction to detennine its own jurisdiction. Thus, 
an erroneous conclusion as to the extent of the jurisdiction was not considered an act outside 
the superior courts' jurisdiction but merely an abuse of jurisdiction. 1 IS As a result it is clear 
that while theoretically all judges were liable for acts outside their jurisdiction, practically this 
was irrelevant to superior court judges because they could never act coram non judice. 
The second aspect was one of control of the respective courts. Inferior courts were controlled 
by the superior courts by means of prerogative orders, but superior court judges were 
answerable only to God and the king. There existed simply no legal tribunal for a party to 
enforce that liability. 116 As early as 1677, it was declared in Hammond v Howell that: 
"Ifhe [the judge] doth anything unjustly or corruptly, complaint may be made to the king, in whose 
name judgements are given, and the judges are by him delegated to justice.,,1l7 
Thus superior court judges were immune from suit in another court whereas inferior court 
judges were answerable to their superior brethren. 
112 6 8 & C 611 at 626. 

113 Holdsworth , History, vol. VI 238. 

114 85 ER 84 (1666). 

115 Holdsworth, History, vol. VI 239. 

11 6 Ibid. 

117 86 ER 1035 (1677). See also Sirros v Moore (1974]3 WLR 459 at 468-469. 
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The third aspect, the superior court judges' immunity was extended to allegations of malice, 
corruption, or oppression: 
"It is a principle of our law that no action will lie against a judge of one of the superior courts for a 
judicial act, though it be alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly." I 18 
And Lord Esher stated in Anderson v Gorie that " .. . no action lies for acts done ...by a judge in 
the exercise of his office, although his motive is malicious ...".119 
Inferior court judges on the other hand remained liable not only for acts done outside their 
jurisdiction but also for acts within their jurisdiction which were done maliciously and 
without reasonable and probable cause. 120 This basic principle was summarised by ErIe J in 
Taylor v Nesfield: 
"If the act of a magistrate is done without jurisdiction, it is a trespass; if within the jurisdiction, the 
action rests upon the corruptness of the motive; and, to establish this, the act must be shewn to be 
maiicious.,,121 
The rules with regard to malice originated from two different sources. First, the notion 
developed that a malicious act by an inferior court judge was an act outside his jurisdiction 
and thus could be identified as coram non judice. The second source is the dissenting decision 
of Holt CJ in the King's Bench decision in Ashby v White, which was accepted as valid law by 
the House of Lords in the reversal, where it was held that according to the doctrine of ubi jus, 
ibi remedium malice on the part of an inferior court judge must have the consequence of 
liability.122 De Grey CJ in Miller v Seare made the point clear when he said: "The protection, 
in regard to the superior courts, is absolute and universal ... ".123 The position of judges of 
inferior courts was somewhat less privileged. 
11 8 Crompton J in Fray v Blackburn (1863) 3 B & S 576 at 578. 
119 Anderson v Gorie [1895] J QB 668 at 670; see also Taale v Downes 13 ER 15 and Hammond v Howell 86 ER J 035 (CP 
J677). 
120 See s I Justices Protection Act of 1848. 
121 118ER 1312(KB 1854). 
122 Ashby v White 92 ER 126 (KB 1703); reversed by the House of Lords J ER 417 (HL 1703). 

















3 2 1 4 Considerations ojlegal policy 
Undoubtedly, personal liability of the inferior court judges became a means of discipline in 
the hands of the superior courts. As indicated in the first part of this chapter, a considerable 
share of local government from the sixteenth until the nineteenth centuries, including the 
dispensation of justice, was carried out by Justices of the Peace. The justices' incompetence, 
their frequent trespass of jurisdiction, as well as grossly incorrect decisions resulted in the 
growing control of the inferior courts by the superior courts. Supreme Court judges were very 
strict with the courts below them l24, and, according to one contemporary observer, the 
superior courts did " ... now and then correct the dulnesse of these justices, with some strokes 
of the roddIe, or spur.,,125 Not only was the threat ofliability available to the superior courts as 
a roddIe, but also the so-called prerogative writs of mandamus and certiorari to which we 
have referred already. 
Only from the seventeenth century onwards, it was the King's Bench that claimed the 
authority to review decisions of the Justices of the Peace and accordingly developed a number 
of devices to exercise this jurisdiction. By means of the writ of mandamus, the Court insisted 
that it had the power to require an inferior tribunal to perform its statutory duties. The writ of 
certiorari was developed in order to review decisions of the justices on the ground either that 
their courts lacked jurisdiction or that although within their jurisdiction they had based their 
decisions on inadequate assessment of facts. 126 Consequently, it must be said that the 
historical development in particular was responsible for the remarkable fact that in English 
law for quite some time the indirect control device in the form of judicial liability preceded 
the direct device of prerogative orders. 
There is an interesting analogy with the state of republican Roman law where, owing to the 
similar absence of a worked out system of appeal or review, judicial liability appeared as the 
only solution to the problem of providing a litigant with a remedy. When a system for review 
and appeal was established, as in Roman law, the question was raised as to what purpose 
judicial liability could now serve? With respect to inferior courts the answer was simple. 
124 Sirros v Moore 3 WLR [1974] CA 459 at 468. 

125 Cited by Lord Denning MR at ibid. 

126 Kniffka, Hajiungsrechtliche Privilegierung, 39; Baker, Introduction, 128-130; Holmes, Legal Instruments, 277-278; 

Holdsworth, History, vol. IX \04-125; De Srrtith, eLl II (1951),40-56. 
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Judicial liability once again was retained as a useful tool for disciplining the numerous inferior 
court judges. However, as Orrnrod LJ observed in Sirros v Moore, the right of the Supreme 
Courts to control the lower courts was frequently misused since: 
"In many situations the law provided no other form of remedy, and the courts used this one (civil 
liability) so vigorously that Parliament had to intervene on several occasions to temper the wind to 
the shorn Jamb.,,127 
The response of Parliament referred to by Orrnrod LJ, was a series of acts regulating the 
liability of Justices of the Peace.128 From the preamble of the Justices Protection Act of 1751, 
it is evident that Parliament was well aware of the duality of the problem of protecting both 
the justices' independence and the peoples' interests: 
"Whereas Justices of the Peace are discouraged in the Execution of their Office by vexatious 
Actions brought against them for or by reason of small and involuntary errors in the Proceedings: 
And whereas it is necessary that they should be (as far as is consistent with Justice, and the Safety 
and Liberty of the Subjects over whom their authority extends) rendered safe in the Execution of 
the said office and trust: and whereas it is also necessary that the Subjects should be protected from 
wilful and aggressive abuse of the several Laws and Statutes committed to the Care and Execution 
of the said Justices of the Peace ... ".129 
Notwithstanding these comments, the wide scope of judicial liability was not essentially 
modified by this Act or by its successors. Justices of the Peace remained liable for malicious 
acts done within their jurisdiction and any act outside the same. 
In view of the strong influence of policy considerations, it is not surprising that they also 
account for the establishment of the total immunity of superior court judges. But here, 
ironically, judicial independence was accepted as an essentially convincing argument in 
favour, not only of qualified but of total immunity from liability. According to Crampton J in 
Fray v Blackburn: 
" ... [The] public are deeply interested in this rule, which indeed exists for their benefit, and was 
established in order to secure the independence of the judges, and prevent their being harassed by 
vexatious actions. ,,130 
Judicial independence was also stressed in the well known words of Lord Tenterden CJ in 
Garnett v Ferrand: 
127 Sirros v Moore 3 WLR [1974) CA 459 at 482 per Ormrod U. 

128 As early as 1609 a Justices Protection Act was legislated which was consolidated and amended by the Justices 

Protection Acts of 1751, 1803 and 1848. 

129 Justices Protection Act of 1751 quoted by Feinman and Cohen, SCLR 31 (1980), 220. 



















"This freedom from action and suit...is given by the law to the Judges, not so much for their own 
sake as for the sake of the public, and for the advancement of justice, that being free from actions 
they may be free in thought and independent in judgement...".131 
In the light of this development Lord Denning's MR observation in Sirros v Moore appears as 
perfectly sound, namely that: " ... the superior courts were never so strict against one of 
themselves.,,132 
3 2 2 Absolute privilege 
Most of the foundations of the modern law of defamation emerged as late as the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, and it was probably uncertainty as to the significance of malice in this 
field that hindered the distinction between absolute and qualified privilege until well into the 
second half of the eighteenth century. Only from 1769 onwards can one talk about a 
distinction between these two concepts. That year saw an obiter dictum 133 by Lord Mansfield 
which was adopted some 17 years later as the ratio decidendi in the case of Weatherston v 
Hawkins, where it was held that: '~o action lies for giving the true character of a 
servant.. .unless there should be extraordinary circumstances of express malice.,,134 
With the introduction of the concept of malice in the law of defamation as a means of 
destroying a defendant's defence, the question arose as to which occasions would fall under 
qualified and which under absolute privilege. With the answer to this question, finally, the 
distinction between absolute and qualified privilege emerged. Undoubtedly, absolute privilege 
had to be confined to circumstances where a special defence of an individual was not deemed 
necessary, but further specific occasions were identified where it was in the interest of the 
public that people should be able to speak and write without fear that they might have to 
answer for what they said. Here again the public interest became the crucial point. It is fair to 
say that the distinction between absolute and qualified privilege arose from a gradation of 
statements that public policy required to remain as absolutely privileged and those prima facie 
privileged statements that were undermined by malice. By the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, this distinction was well established. 
1316B&C611 at 625. 
13 2 [1974] 3 WLR 459 at 468. 
133 In Hargrave v Le Breton (1769) 4 Burr 2422. 
134 (\786) I TR 110. 
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Nevertheless, these policy considerations still had to be applied specifically in cases of 
judicial defamation. The first such was R v Skinner. 135 In this case, Skinner, a Justice of the 
Peace, was alleged to have said to a grand jury: " ... you have disobeyed my commands; you are 
a seditious, scandalous, corrupt and perjured jury." Again, it was Lord Mansfield who gave 
the judgement of the court and who clarified the position of the law: " ... neither party, witness, 
counsel, jury, or judge can be put to answer civilly or criminally for words spoken in 
office.,,136 
Thus, for the first time, the scope of privilege and - very important for the future - the groups 
of persons covered was specified. It became obvious that freedom of speech of all persons 
involved in court proceedings was paramount in order to secure an objective basis for the 
decision-making process. 
323 Habeas corpus 
The only general exception to the immunity of judges, in which there was no differentiation 
between judges of courts of record or not of record or between superior or inferior court 
judges, was ofa statutory nature. According to s 9 of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, ajudge 
had to pay £ 500 ifhe refused to hear the person detained and to grant a writ of habeas corpus 
in vacation time. 137 This provision clearly derives from the importance attached to the right of 
personal liberty from Edward I's reign onwards. However, it was never seen in the immediate 
context of judicial immunity. The majority of cases involving judges' liability related to false 
imprisonment. Although there is a rich flow of reports in regard to habeas corpus, liability 
under s 9 of the Act of 1679 has never been considered by an English court. 138 
135 98 ER (1772) 529. 

136 Ibid. at 530. 

137 For more details as to the development of the writ of habeas corpus see Blackstone, Commentaries, vol.lII 129- J38; 

Holdsworth, History, vo\.lX 108-125. For a discussion of mainly the American law in that regard see Olowofoyeku, Suing 

Judges, 60-63 . 

138 Ibid. at 60 and Pollock on Torts , 84. As far as ascertained . 
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4 JUDICIAL LIABllJTY IN MODERN ENGLISH LA W 
4 1 Immunity from suit 
Modern English law continues to grant judicial immunity from suit. A modern textbook states 
the general rule in the following bland terms: 
"No action in tort lies against a judge or a magistrate for any judicial act done within his 
jurisdiction even though there may be evidence that he acted in bad faith. ,,139 
An examination of the modern defence of judicial immunity from suit thus needs to answer 
two questions: which acts fall within the scope of this immunity and what, if any, are the 
boundaries of immunity? First, however, it is essential to assess the scope of both the judicial 
act and judges' jurisdiction. Both the question as to what constitutes a judicial act and the 
judges' jurisdiction undoubtedly are those aspects most frequently referred to in modern 
English law ofjudicial liability. 
4 1 1 The judicial act 
English courts demarcated judicial and non-judicial acts by applying various parameters of 
definition. It is undoubtedly this use of different parameters for similar and related cases that 
has caused considerable confusion with regard to the content and extent of modern English 
law ofjudicial immunity from suit. Four main parameters, however, can be distinguished. 
One classification of the actions of judicial officers has been to qualify them as simply non­
judicial. This was the initial criterion of demarcation. As said elsewhere, Justices of the Peace 
were for centuries both judges and administrative officers and therefore it became increasingly 
important to differentiate between their administrative and judicial acts. It was thought 
desirable that the rules of immunity from suit be limited to cases which were clearly of 
judicial provenance since the liability of administrative officers is wider in scope than the 
liability ofjudicial officers. 
13 9 Street on Torts, 102. My italics. 
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A second classification is based on the distinguishing of judicial acts as judicial 
(discretionary) or as ministerial. A judicial act is one that involves the exercise of a discretion, 
in which something has to be heard and decided. Judicial acts therefore can also be defined as 
discretionary acts. A ministerial act is one which the law points out as necessary under the 
circumstances, without leaving any choice of alternative courses. Every purely formal step in a 
legal process is ministerial. I4o Ministerial acts are not covered by judicial immunity and thus 
liability can arise more easily. 
A third classification draws on the elements of procedure within an act, be it judicial or non­
judicial. While the first category referred to distinguishes between judicial and administrative 
acts, this one is commonly used to divide a single act into judicial or non-judicial segments. 
Scrutinising the various elements of proceedings reveals that by no means can all procedural 
elements of a single act be automatically identified as judicial. Some elements have merely a 
ministerial character. Theoretically, this observation should lead to a limitation of judicial 
immunity since only purely judicial acts are covered by immunity. 
Finally, there is the classification of omission of office and acts outside judicial proceedings 
as non-judicial. This classification distinguishes between acts of judicial officers outside the 
scope of the judicial act as such. It also includes judicial acts which amount to omission of 
exercise of office. The above-mentioned classifications should be investigated in more detail: 
4 1 1 1 Non-judicial acts ofjudicial officers 
Generally speaking all judicial officers perform exclusively judicial acts. Thus no difficulties 
arise in determining whether a judge acted judicially or not. There are no cases reported in 
which superior court judges were held liable for ministerial acts done in their capacity as 
judges. This was not always so for judges of the lower courts. Numerous cases, particularly 
from the nineteenth century, show that Justices of the Peace were held liable for both judicial 
and ministerial acts. Today, however the situation is different. The few administrative 
functions performed by Justices of the Peace are well defined in the Justices of the Peace Act 
\40 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 1475. 
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of 1979. Therefore it is not problematic to characterise their actions either as judicial or 
administrati ve. 
4 1 1 2 Ministerial acts within judicial proceedings141 
Even though it seems fairly easy to distinguish between judicial and administrative actions, it 
is necessary to draw a more refined distinction between the judicial and the ministerial 
elements of judicial actions. The definition in Clerk and Lindsell, namely that a judicial act is 
one that involves the exercise of a discretion whereas ministerial acts are those necessitated by 
law without choice of alternative courses, has been stated above. 142 Examining the various 
stages of proceedings that one would generally describe as judicial, it becomes apparent that 
some significant aspects of judicial proceedings are in fact of a ministerial character. 
Consequently they would have to be identified as non-judicial acts and thus immunity from 
suit could not be conferred upon an officer for any misapplication of law in such cases. 
Rubinstein provides us with a striking example: 
After an application for an order for execution has been made, a magistrate has the following 
tasks to perform: He has to a) issue a summons to appear (ministerial); b) conduct a hearing of 
the debtor and make decisions as to preliminary questions, i.e., as to the validity of the title for 
execution (judicial); c) after concluding that the title is valid, he has to issue the order of 
execution (ministerial); d) he has to take evidence and apportion costs (judicial). 143 
Consequently, only misapplication of law with regard to b) and d) would be covered by 
judicial immunity. 
This observation, however, has received scant recognition in the decisions of the English 
courts as to the scope of judicial immunity. Either this attention to detail is not paid, or 
ministerial acts are treated as being supportive of the judicial action as such, making the 
whole proceedings judicial. 144 With this in mind, it is obvious that the definition of a judicial 
act in English law is an extensive one. 
141 The following passage combines aspects of both the second and third category referred to above. 
142 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 476. 
143 Rubinstein, Jurisdiction, 19-20. 
144 Rubinstein, Jurisdiction, 154. 
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4 1 1 3 Judicial acts outside judicial proceedings 
Judges of superior and inferior courts are protected as long as they act judicially. Failure to 
exercise an office is not considered a judicial act but a breach of ministerial duty. In the case 
of Green v Hundred ofBuccle Churches. it was stated obiter that a Justice of the Peace acted 
in breach of his duty, however a ministerial and not a judicial duty, when he dealt idly with a 
request for relief l45 The decision in Ferguson v Kinnoull, the only English case where a 
superior judge was ever held liable, went beyond even this. Not only inactivity but non­
execution of a procedure required by statute, in this case to summon for trial, was considered a 
breach of a ministerial duty of the superior court jUdge. 146 Furthermore, judicial acts that are 
performed in advance or after or beyond the scope of proceedings and which have no 
reasonable connection with these are likewise not covered by judicial immunity from SUit. 147 
412 Want of jurisdiction 
Once it has been established that a judge acted judicially, the only ground for a denial of 
immunity is want ofjurisdiction. 148 The question of want of jurisdiction is, after all, essential 
to the determination of the boundaries of the immunity enjoyed by judges. 
If want of jurisdiction can be proved by the plaintiff, the judge loses the cloak of authority. 
He is no longer a privileged official organ and can be held liable like any other citizen. This is 
in accordance with the rule of English law that: 
"Every official, from the Prime Minister down to the a constable or a collector of taxes, is under 
the same responsibility for every act done without legal Justification as any other citizen.,,149 
Such acts are coram non judice and thus non-judicial and void. On the other hand we must 
take notice of Lord Bridge's comments in Re McC, where he stated that: 
" ... [there] are many words in common usage in the law which have no precise or constant meaning. 
But few ... have been used with so many different shades of meaning in different contexts or have so 
freely acquired new meanings with the development of the law as the word jurisdiction ... ". 150 
145 74 ER 294 (1589). 

146 (1842) 9 CI & F 251 

147 Law v Llewellyn [1906] I KB 487; Willis v Maclachlan (1876) I Exch Div 376. 

148 Olowofoyeku. Suing Judges , 52 . 
149 Rubinstein, Jurisdiction , 121 . My italics. 

















Nonetheless, one might try to shed some light on the matter if one is to accept that want of 
jurisdiction can be divided into two sub-aspects: absence of jurisdiction and excess of 
jurisdiction. The latter category again can be divided into another two sub-divisions: namely 
irregularities of procedure and misapplication of substantive law. Absence of jurisdiction 
applies when the act in question is not a judicial act at all, but a pure tort committed under the 
cloak of judicial authority. Excess of jurisdiction is not an honest exercise of judicial 
authority, although it remains within the authority given by the law. 151 
Thus, for anyone coming from a civil law background it is absolutely essential to understand 
that want of jurisdiction is nothing but a synonym for extreme error on the part of judges. 
Generally the meaning ofjurisdiction is defined as follows: 
"In the narrow and strict sense, the 'jurisdiction' of a ...court connotes the limits ... imposed ... to 
hear and detennine issues ...by reference (i) to the subject-matter of the issue, or (ii) to the 
persons between whom the issue is joined, or (iii) to the kind of relief sought, or any combination 
of the these factors.,,152 
Notwithstanding this definition, it is important to bear in mind that jurisdiction in the context 
of judicial immunity is much wider than this definition. In this context, jurisdiction is not 
confined to questions of competence of the respective court, but includes all irregularities of 
procedure and even mistakes as to application of substantive law. 153 
4121 Absence o/jurisdiction 
Absence of jurisdiction can be assumed if the judicial officer acted without legitimacy from 
any source. These acts are null and ex tunc void. A void act needs to be distinguished from a 
voidable act. Voidable acts are also incorrect acts, but remain valid until they have been 
repealed by a higher court on appeal. Examples of absence of jurisdiction are a writ of 
execution issued by a clerk to whom authority was not delegated by the COurt154; a testimony 
151 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts , 1476-1477. 

152 Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges , 53. 

153 This crucial point is rightly stressed by Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law, 798; Kniflka, Hafiungsrechtliche 

Privilegierung, 94-96. For details and reference to relevant case law see the sections right below. 





under oath before a clerk without participation of a judgel55 ; or actions of a court unknown to 

English law or actions of usurpers of office. 156 
On the other hand, deficiencies in the appointment procedure of judges no longer amount to 
absence of jurisdiction. A judge who acted judicially, although he was not appointed in a 
fonnally correct manner, becomes a de facto judge: "An officer de facto is one who has the 
reputation of being an officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of 
law.,,157 Such ajudge's decisions are accorded equal validity to those of a de iure judge. 158 
Furthennore, bias on the part of a judge does not render his decision void and outside his 
jurisdiction but only subject to appeal. This seems to be the law since the decision in Dimes v 
Grand Junction Canal where the question arose whether a decree made by the Lord 
Chancellor himself could be set aside since it was alleged that he had a pecuniary interest in 
the case as a shareholder of the Grand Junction Canal InC.159 Consequently, no liability lies in 
the case of bias. This is affinned by the decision in Philipps v Eyre where it was held by 
Willes J that: 
" ... as a rule, the judgement of an interested judge is voidable and liable to be set aside ... but it is not 
absolutely void, and persons acting under such authority ...would not be liable to be treated as 
trespassers." 160 
This result is subject to criticism since it clearly breaches a tenet ofnatural justice. And in fact 
for many years the courts held that bias negated jurisdiction. 161 The law was changed when it 
was accepted that waiver or consent could cure bias on the part of a judge and thus a remedy 
in fonn of appeal was believed to be sufficient. 
4 J 2 2 Excess ofjurisdiction 
Excess of jurisdiction entails a somewhat reduced degree of faultiness. Irregularities of 
procedure can amount to excess ofjurisdiction. 
155 Candle v Seymour (1841) 1 QB 889. 
156 Rogers v Wood (1831) 2 B & Ad 245. 
157 R v Bedford Level Corporation (1805) 6 East 356 at 369 per Lord Ellenborogh CJ. 
158 However, early cases still identified this as outside jurisdiction, see Hill v Barnes (1777) 2 Black 1135; Penney v Slade 
(1839) 5 Bing NC 319; Scadding v Lorant (1851) 3 HLC 418; see for more details Rubinstein, Jurisdiction, 205 et seqq. 
159 (1852) 3 HLC 329 at 341-344. 
160 Philipps v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB I at 22. 
161 "The law is wisely jealous on this head; and the slightest real interest in the issue of a suit incapacitates anyone from 
acting as Judge in it." Ex parte Medwin (1853) 1 E & B at 609 per Lord Campbell. 
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It is of utmost importance, however, that irregularities alone are not sufficient for this purpose. 
Again, these irregular acts are mostly subject to judicial review but they are not necessarily 
void. Only gross irregularities render proceedings void and remove judicial immunity. Such 
irregularities include: defective composition of the Bench; certain defects as to jurisdiction of 
place, persons and subject-matter; and failure to observe the principles of a fair trial, notably 
public trial and breach of the audi alteram partem and ne bis in idem rules. 
Defective composition of the Bench renders a decision null and void, the judges having acted 
outside their jurisdiction. According to Rubinstein, the law that laid down the rules as to the 
necessary quorum of a court was always strictly interpreted. 162 The decision of a single 
magistrate where in fact a quorum of two was required was considered void. 163 In addition, a 
judge excluded by statute may also not sit in a case. l64 However, decisions made by an 
excessive number of members do not affect the reSUlting act: "If two may do it, II multo 
fortiori , four may do SO.,,165 
Generally, deficiencies related to jurisdiction of the cause render a decision outside 
jurisdiction. As early as The Case ofthe Marshalsea, it was held that jurisdiction of the cause 
166includes jurisdiction as to place, person and subject matter. No problems arise in 
determining whether a judge acted within his jurisdiction in regard to place or person.167 But 
problems may arise with regard to subject matter, since this jurisdiction is determined by the 
facts of the case. The questions raised are most perplexing since a balance must be struck 
between the need to contain certain tribunals within their limited jurisdiction and the postulate 
of power to decide and bind despite error. 168 The reason for the former is to prevent " ...total 
162 Rubinstein, Jurisdiction, 201 . 
163 Billings v Prinn ( 1776) 2 Black 1017 and other cases cited at Rubinstein, Jurisdiction , 201. Note especially the South 
African decision of R v Pillay 1958 (4) SA 141 (T) where an order of a town council was void since one councillor had 
been absent from one of four meetings. 
164 Serjant v Dale (1877) 2 QB 558. 
165 Creswick v Rooksby (1613) 2 BuIst 47 at 49 per Flemming CJ . 
166 77 ER 1027 (1613) at 1038. 
167 See the cases cited at Rubinstein, Jurisdiction, 208-211 and Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 1483 fu58 . 




usurpations of powers by limited jurisdictions (inferior cOurtS)."l69 On the other hand, if 
jurisdiction were to depend solely on the: "...correctness of his [the judge's] inferences, the 
result would be that in all cases he would be liable for a mere erroneous exercise of his 
judgement."l7o 
Since the scope of this work prohibits a more detailed account, it must suffice to state that the 
decision of an inferior court regarding the jurisdiction assigned to it by the law is conclusive, 
except in so far as an appeal may lie. The test is whether the case at issue relates to the 
" ... general category of the subject-matter assigned by law to the COurt."l71 Only gross 
irregularities may render the decision void and thus give rise to an action against the judge. 172 
A relatively recent case of excess of jurisdiction due to gross procedural irregularities is R v 
Waltham JJ, ex parte Solanke where the plaintiff was sent to jail by order of a magistrates' 
court for continued failure to comply with a High Court order to make weekly payments for 
child support. The decision overlooked the crucial fact that the High Court's order had never 
been registered at the magistrates' court.173 The justices were held liable for false 
imprisonment. 174 
Furthermore, jurisdiction, although initially existent, may be lost through errors and 
irregularities in the course of proceedings. One would expect that failure to provide for a 
public hearing creates an abuse of jurisdiction. In fact this is not so. Again the distinction 
between voidable and void acts needs to be drawn. According to two decisions of the Privy 
Council, a breach of the open-court rule is solely voidable. 175 The Privy Council overruled an 
earlier case in which it was held that a judge breaking the open-court rule: "...demits his 
169 Ibid. at 211. 

170 Clerk and Lindse// on Torts, 1483. 

171 Rubinstein, Jurisdiction, 218 and the leading cases quoted at 219. 

172 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts , 1483 and the cases quoted at fn 60-62. For references to recent cases in this field; 
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capacity as a judge.,,176 As to breach of the audi alteram partem rule, the position of English 
courts since Ferguson v Kinnoull is such that this defect amounts to a breach of a ministerial 
duty.I77 Thus, judicial immunity is effectively removed or, rather, does not arise since it was 
not a judicial but a ministerial duty that was broken. Deficiencies as to the ne bis in idem rule 
will also remove ajudge's immunity. This was decided in Creeps v Durden. 178 
Finally, jurisdiction may be wrongly assumed through error of law. This wrong assumption 
amounts to excess ofjurisdiction if a court, albeit with jurisdiction to hear the case, deals with 
it inadequately. 179 For instance, if a magistrate applies a statute which has been repealedI8o, or 
if costs are imposed without a legal basis l81 , or if a person is convicted in one case and 
punished in another. 182 However, it seems that the courts are reluctant to spell out clearly what 
is mere irregularity and what amounts to excess ofjurisdiction. In Re McC Lord Bridge stated: 
"...once justices have duly entered upon summary trial of a matter within their jurisdiction, only 
something quite exceptional occurring in the course of their proceeding ... can oust their 
jurisdiction ... ". 183 
According to legal authorities, a distinction has to be drawn between the jurisdiction of a 
judge dependent on a precedent condition and that which is not. If a judge is required to 
establish a certain condition before imposing a sentence, non-compliance will amount to an 
excess of jurisdiction. Thus it was held in two fairly recent decisions that liability for false 
imprisonment lay when the respective magistrates failed to meet required conditions. A panel 
had the jurisdiction to impose a prison sentence on the sixteen year old plaintiff, but when the 
magistrate ignored the specific condition in Art 15 (1) of the Treatment of Offenders 
(Northern Ireland) Order of 1976 that the juvenile be informed of his right to legal aid, it was 
held that he stepped outside his jurisdiction. 184 In another case heard in 1988, the Manchester 
City Magistrates' Court sent the plaintiff to jail after he defaulted on the rates for his business 
premises. According to s 103 of the General Rate Act of 1967, the court had to determine 
176 Scott v Scott [19 17] AC 417 at 436 per Viscount Haldane LC. 

177 (1842) 9 CI & F 251. 

178 (1777) 2 Cowp 240. 

179 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 1480. 

180 Ward v Stevenson (1844) I New Sess Cases 162. 

lSI George v Chambers (1843) II M & W 149. 

IS2 R v Brickhall (1864) 33 LJMC 156; as well as Willis v Maclachlan (1876) I Exch Div 376; Rogers v Jones (1824) 3 B 

& C 409; and the cases referred to at Kniffka, Haftungsrechlliche Privilegierung, 106; Clerk and Lindsel/ on Torts, 1480. 

183 [1984]3 WLR 1227 at 1242 and Kniffka, Haftungsrechlliche Privilegierung, 109. 
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whether the failure to pay was due to wilful refusal or culpable neglect. When the magistrates 
failed to do so, they rendered themselves outside jurisdiction. 18s 
If the judge does comply with any such precedent condition, it is argued that " ...even 
'hopeless' irregularity ... " will not render the act outside jurisdiction. 186 It is doubtful whether 
gross and fundamental irregularities have to be assumed here. To an observer the 
differentiations seem almost arbitrary, despite the efforts of Lord Bridge to give an exact 
definition in Re McC: gross irregularities, said the judge, may be assumed if a magistrate 
absents himself from the hearing and gives judgement merely relying on hearsay from his 
colleague, or - similar to the above - if a judge breaks the rules of natural justice. Likewise if 
the irregularity is " ... such as to strike at the very root of the judicial process rendering the trial 
little more than a 'sham,.,,187 
4 1 3 Statutory protection of Justices of the Peace 
4 1 3 1 Liability 
For historical reasons indicated above, the liability of Justices of the Peace was specifically 
regulated from as early as 1609 by statute, the Justices Protection Act, which was amended in 
1751, 1803 and 1848. The 1609 Act has been repealed and replaced by the Justices of the 
Peace Act 1979. 
Sections 44 to 52 of the Act preserved the distinction between magistrates and other judges by 
denying immunity to a magistrate in cases of malicious acts inside his jurisdiction and any 
acts outside his jurisdiction. Prior amendment by s 108 (2) Courts and Legal Services Act of 
1990 (which will be discussed below) s 44 stated: 
"If apart from this section any action lies against a justice of the peace for an act done by him in the 
execution of his duty as such a justice, with respect to any matter within his jurisdiction as such a 
184 Re McC [1984] 3 WLR 1227 at 1230 et seqq. 

18 5 R v Manchester City Magistrates' Court ex parte Davies [1988] 3 WLR 1357. 

186 Clerk and Uncisell on Torts, 1482. 














justice ... (a) in the statement or particulars of claim it shall be expressly alleged that the act in 
question was done by a justice maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause ... ". 188 
For acts outside jurisdiction s 45 stated: 
H( 1) This section applies - (a) to any act done by a justice of the peace in a matter in respect of 
which by law he does not have jurisdiction or in which he bas exceeded his jurisdiction ... 
(2) Any person injured by an act to which this section applies may maintain an action against the 
justice without making any allegation in his statement or particulars of claim that the act 
complained of was done maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause.,,189 
The magistrates in the above mentioned cases of Re McC and R v Manchester Magistrates' 
Court ex parte Davies were all held liable under s 45 of the 1979 Act or under s 15 of the 
Magistrates' Courts (Northern Ireland) Act of 1964 which in its effect resembled that of the 
1979 Act. 190 
According to s 47 of the 1979 Act, where a statute grants discretionary power to a justice, no 
action may be brought against a justice by reason of the manner in which he exercises his 
discretion in the execution of his office. However, the Act will not protect a justice whose 
exercise of discretionary power is ultra vires or if he misused his discretion. Section 48 (2) of 
the Act provides that there shall be no action against any justice even if the order or the 
conviction was defective, as long as this order or conviction is affirmed on appeal. 191 
4 1 3 2 Limitation on damages recoverable 
According to s 52, the damages recoverable by a plaintiff against a justice are limited in 
certain circumstances. These are: where the plaintiff was actually guilty of the offence of 
which he was convicted; or was liable at law to pay the sum he was ordered by the justice to 
pay; or was imprisoned and this imprisonment served as no greater punishment than that 
assigned by law for the offence. 
188 My italics. 

189 My italics. 

190 As has been affinned by Lord Bridge in Re McC [1984] 3 WLR 1227 at 1237. 





4 1 3 3 Indemnity 
A distinctive feature of the liability ofjustices of the peace can be found in s 53. This section 
regulates the possibility of indemnity of a justice with regard to damages awarded against him 
in respect of anything done or omitted in the intended exercise of duty. A justice is entitled to 
indemnity if he acted reasonably and in good faith. This section deserves particular attention 
since it is the only regulation in the entire English law ofjudicial liability where the principle 
of personal liability of judicial officers is contravened. Lord Bridge in Re McC referred to this 
section as a provision ".. . transferring the financial burden of civil liability, in appropriate 
cases, from justices to the public purse:,I92 The burden is transferred to a local fund. 
Any question as to whether a justice falls under the provisions of s 53 is determined by the 
magistrates' committee of the particular area. This concept of transferability of damages 
which had already been introduced to English law by the Administration of Justice Act of 
1964 is of particular interest since this concept was unknown to common law. Yet common 
law is a system of law where solely personal liability of judicial officers was deemed an 
effective means of control against potential abuse on the part of judicial officers. In 
implementing this concept of indemnity, English law resembles the pertinent regulations of 
some continental civil law legal systems. 193 
414 The application of want of jurisdiction by English courts during this century 
How and whether the concept of want of jurisdiction has been applied by the English courts 
bears investigation, particularly in the second half of this century. As this division suggests, 
there have been quite different approaches over the past twenty-five years. 
4 1 4 1 A new age: Sirros v Moore 
Historically, the result of The Case of the Marshalsea was that want of jurisdiction was the 
only means of overcoming the immunity conferred on judges. Since it was held in Fray v 
192 3 WLR [1984] 1227 at 1236. 


















Blackburn and Ferrand v Garnett that superior court judges always had the power to 
determine their own jurisdiction, superior court judges were exempt from any liability with 
regard to judicial acts. As indicated above, inferior court judges could act outside their 
jurisdiction and hence could be held liable. Want of jurisdiction, therefore, had particular 
relevance to the inferior courts. 
Whatever the merits of this historical distinction, in 1974 a majority in the Court of Appeal 
took the opportunity in Sirros v Moore to revamp the doctrine of judicial immunity and to 
expound the law in simpler terms.194 Before the early 1970's, criticism of the law of judges , 
liability had increasingly been expressed by a number of authors. Their criticism focused on 
four particular aspects: 
Firstly, that the distinction between courts of record and not of record has relevance nowadays 
only for the question of which courts can punish for contempt of court and which courts 
cannot. 195 
Secondly, that the distinction between superior and inferior courts had become unclear and 
was, from a functional point of view, unnecessary since both kinds of courts performed 
similar functions. Since 1970, the Crown Court had been regarded as a superior court of 
record, though for practical purposes it was an inferior court for some types of jurisdiction; 
furthermore, its judicial personnel covered the whole range from puisne judges to lay 
justices. 196 
Thirdly, that in a fully developed system of appeal procedures, including prerogative orders 
and orders of habeas corpus, the concept of personal liability of judges as an indirect means 
of redress is no longer as important as it was when judicial liability was practically the only 
remedy available to the parties. 
Finally, in the light of the dogmatical development it was argued that: 
194 [1974]3 WLR 459; Sadler, MULR 13 (1981-2), 514. 

195 Rubinstein, TLf IS (1964), 330; Clerk and Lindsell on Torts , 1463. 





"As the law stands, liability is still founded on the nullity theory and hopelessly entangled with the 
vague distinction between 'ministerial' and 'judicial', 'void' and 'voidable', 'want of jurisdiction' 
and 'wrong exercise of jurisdiction' .,, 197 
In Sirros v Moore, Lord Denning MR attempted to adjust the differences in respect of the 
scope of the immunity afforded to judges of the supreme court and to judges of the inferior 
198 H ·dcourts. e sal : 
"Whatever may have been the reason for this distinction, it is no longer valid .. .ln this new age I 
would take my stand on this: as a matter of principle the judges of superior courts have no greater 
claim to immunity than the judges of the lower courts. Every judge of the courts of this 
land ... should be protected to the same degree.,,'99 
The distinction was held to be superfluous. Lord Denning was particularly critical of the fact 
that judges of superior courts were rendered totally immune as arbiters of their own 
jurisdiction. According to his judgement, it was incorrect to base immunity on this argument, 
which was relevant only to the internal relationship between the two groups of courts but 
should not impact on the question of judicial liability. For liability, the only relevant question 
was, first, whether a judge's action was unlawful and, second, whether the judge knowingly 
acted unlawfully.2oo 
Their Lordships applied this bona fide test to all judges including magistrates. Thus, the result 
of Sirros v Moore was twofold. On the one hand, superior court judges were deprived of total 
irrununity. They became answerable under the condition of knowingly, that is consciously, 
acting outside their jurisdiction. On the other hand, the position of inferior court judges 
improved in that neither malicious acts within their jurisdiction nor bona fide acts outside 
their jurisdiction automatically destroyed their immunity. Notwithstanding these shifts, the 
question of whether a judge acted within or outside his jurisdiction remained important in 
determining the unlawfulness of the judicial act in question. However, emphasis now was 
added to a third element: even if the judge's jurisdiction was wanting where he acted 
unlawfully, a plaintiff had to show that the judge has acted deliberately, that is intentionally.201 
197 Rubinstein, Jurisdiction, 149. 
198 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 1478. 
199 Sirros v Moore 3 W.L.R. [1974J 459 at 470 (G). 
200 ibid. at (E). 
201 Ibid. at 471 (A): " ... that he was not acting judicially, knowing that he had no jurisdiction to do it." See further Kniffka, 
Hafiungsrechtliche Privi/egierung, 122 and Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law, 797. 
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Consequently, English law came to rely on intentional conduct to destroy judicial immunity, 
albeit connected to the concept ofwant ofjurisdiction. 202 
4142 The response: Re McC 
But the last word had not been spoken. Eleven years later, the House of Lords had the 
opportunity in Re McC to examine again the liability of inferior court judges, especially 
Justices of the Peace. 
Their Lordships held that the sweeping judgement of Lord Denning and Ormrod LJ "... in 
favour of abolishing the distinction between superior and inferior courts in this respect cannot 
possibly be supported in relation to justices.,,203 To their eyes it was clear that whatever the 
juridical base of this distinction, and however anachronistic it seemed to some, the language 
of the relevant statutes was clear. Sections 44 and 45 of the Justices of Peace Act of 1979 
regulated beyond doubt that magistrates continued to be held liable for acts outside their 
jurisdiction.204 The judgement in Sirros v Moore, in so far as it related to judges of inferior 
courts other than Justices of the Peace was not expressly overruled by the House of Lords. 
However, considerable confusion arises from the fact that their Lordships by no means 
concurred as to the general expediency of the rule that magistrates acting maliciously within 
their jurisdiction lost their immunity. As was conceded earlier by some critics, Lord 
Templeman and Lord Bridge indicated obiter that there was no need any longer in England to 
entertain the view of the justice "...reflected in Shakespeare's plays, as an ignorant 
buffoon.,,205 In the words of Lord Templeman: "Magistrates were better selected, better 
trained and better advised ...,,206 and thus "...the former cause of action against a magistrate 
acting within his jurisdiction is obsolete or obsolescent.,,207 And Lord Bridge remarked that, in 
202 For critical remarks see Street on Torts, 103: "But is it justifiable to grant any judge immunity from the consequences of 

his mistakes - an immunity not shared by other professionals?" 

203 3 WLR [J984] 1227 at 1245 (H). 

204 Ibid. at 1237 (G). Furthermore Wade and Forsyth , Administrative Law, 797. 

205 3 WLR [1984] 1227 at 1237 (A). 

206 Ibid. at 1254 (B). 

207 Ibid. at 1254 (A). 

his opinion, the " .. . old common law 'action in the case, as for a tort' against justices acting 
within their jurisdiction maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause no longer 
lies.,,208 
On the other hand, it is obvious from the judgement that their Lordships were at great pains to 
revamp the law, as is evident from Lord Bridge's judgement, i.e., where he stated obiter with 
regard to the situation of inferior courts other than magistrates' cOurtS:209 
"The narrower question whether other courts of limited jurisdiction can ...be given the same 
immunity from suit..is one which I express no concluded opinion, though my inclination is to think 
that this distinction is so deeply rooted in our law that it certainly cannot be eradicated by the Court 
of Appeal and probably not by your Lordships' House .. . So fundamental a change would, in my 
present view, require appropriate legislation. ,,210 
Similarly, Lord Templeman suggested obiter that the time was ripe for parliamentary review 
of the continued liability ofmagistrates.211 Opposing, Lord Keith and Lord Brandon expressed 
their doubts as to whether the old common law action against magistrates had in fact become 
obsolete. Their Lordships reserved their opinion on the issue.212 
Since Re McC, only two decisions concerning judicial liability have been reported. These are 
the decisions in R v Waltham Forest JJ, ex parte Solanke213 and in R v Manchester City 
Magistrates' Court, ex parte Davies?14 In these cases, the law as stated by the House of Lords 
in Re McC was applied. 
The considerable degree of uncertainty about the civil liability of Justices of the Peace 
subsequent to the opinion expressed in Sirros v Moore and further (though obiter) in Re McC 
was removed in 1990 when Parliament took the matter to heart and legislated s 108 of the 
Courts and Legal Services Act. The said Act amended the relevant ss 44 and 45 Justices of the 
Peace Act of 1979 in that now no action lies for the acts of a justice/magistrate or his clerk 
while acting within his jurisdiction. In consequence, the way is now barred to a prospective 
208 Ibid. at 1237 (D). 

209 Ibid. at 1236 (E). 

210 Ibid. at 1246 (A). Furthermore ibid. at 1246 (B) and (G) per Lord Bridge and ibid. at 1253 (H) per Lord Templeman. 

211 Ibid. at 1253 (F). 

212 Ibid. at 1229 (H) per Lord Keith and ibid. at 1247 (H) per Lord Brandon. 
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litigant in initiating an action against a magistrate on grounds of malicious behaviour while 
the magistrate is within his jurisdiction. Section 44 now reads:215 
"No action shall lie against any justice of the peace or justice's clerk in respect of any act or 
omission of his ... 
(a) in the execution of his duty ... 
(i) as such a justice; or 
(ii) 	 as such a clerk exercising, by virtue of any statutory provision, any of the functions 
of a single justice; and 
(b) with respect to any matter within his jurisdiction." 
Similarly, the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990 amended s 45 of the Justices of the 
Peace Act of 1979 with respect to acts outside the magistrate's (or his clerk's) jurisdiction. As 
distinct from the law in its former state, the magistrate (or clerk) must not only be acting 
outside jurisdiction to evoke liability, but it must be proved that the magistrate (or clerk) acted 
with bad faith, i.e., maliciously. Section 45 now reads: 216 
"An action shall lie against any justice of the peace or justice's clerk in respect of any act or 
omission of his ... 
(a) in the purported execution of his duty ... 
(i) as such a justice; or 
(ii) as such a clerk, exercising, by virtue of any statutory provision, any of the functions 
of a single justice; but 
(b) with respect to a matter which is not within his jurisdiction, if, but only if, it is proved that he 
acted in bad/aith." 
The requirement of malicious conduct and hence the harsh distinction between inferior and 
superior court judges that continuously governed the liability of inferior judges and more 
particularly of magistrates in the past appears to have faded away.217 In fact, the law as it now 
stands represents precisely the situation envisaged by Lord Denning MR in 1974 in Sirros v 
Moore. With good reason, Sirros may thus be considered another of Lord Denning's 
innovative judgements that created new law. Whether the solution he found should meet with 
unreserved approval, however, is an entirely different matter.2lS 
215 Amended by s 108 (2) Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990. My italics. 

216 Subsequent amendment by s 108 (3) Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990. My italics. 

217 Accordingly the introduction of s 108 of the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990 reverses the effect of the judgement 
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4 2 Absolute privilege 
The general rule as to the defence of absolute privilege in judicial proceedings in modem 
la~19 was stated by Lopes LJ in Royal Aquarium v Perkinson. 
"The authorities establish beyond all question this: .. . that no action of libel or slander lies, whether 
against judges, counsel, witnesses, or parties, for words written or spoken in the course of any 
proceeding before any Court recognised by law, and this though the words written or spoken were 
written or spoken maliciously, without any justification or excuse, and from personal ill-will and 
anger against the person defamed. ,,220 
Ifno significant exceptions to this general rule exist, it may be said to render judges absolutely 
immune in the true sense of the word. As has been indicated above, the scope of protection of 
absolute privilege in judicial proceedings is to be distinguished from the protection provided 
by immunity from suit. However, a number of decisions as well as statements by legal authors 
support what Olowofoyeku described as the 'no distinction approach'. According to this 
approach there is no reason to distinguish between the two defences. Words uttered by a judge 
during proceedings, it is argued, must enjoy the same kind of privilege in English law as any 
other judicial act, and vice versa.221 For the reasons that follow, this proposition appears to be 
incorrect. Four arguments may be raised against it. 
4 2 1 The rationales of the defences 
First of all the reasons for the protection offered by the two defences need to be distinguished. 
As already stated, freedom of communication in court is paramount with regard to absolute 
privilege, whereas immunity of suit focuses on the protection of judicial independence, 
thereby encouraging fearless and principled decision making, as well as recognising and 
protecting the finality of a court's decision. 
219 Besides the cases that will be referred to in the text, the leading treatises with regard to absolute privilege in judicial 
proceedings are Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges, 125-141 ; Gatley on Libel and Slander, 158 et seqq; Carter-Ruck, Libel and 
Slander, 130 et seqq; Salmond and Heuston on the Law o/Torts, 164 et seqq. 
220 [1892] I QB 431 at 451. 
221 Furthermore see Anderson v Gorie [1895) I QB 668; Scott v Stansfield (1868) LR 3 Exch 220; Haggart's Trustees v 
Lord President (1824) 2 Shaw' s Report 122 at 143; Sheridan, MLR 14 (1951), 276; Kniflka, Hafiungsrechtliche 
Privilegierung, 25; Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges , 125. 
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Judicial proceedings and the decision-making processes aim to achieve an equitable and 
correct judgement, based on the facts and the statements of the parties, which result from 
intense interchange between judge, jurors, counsel, witnesses, etc. It is essential to assure 
freedom of communication in judicial proceedings so that the court can function 
"...uninfluenced by the fear of an action for defamation or a prosecution oflibel.,,222 Or, as has 
been held by Channel J in Bottomley v Brougham: 
"It is desirable that persons who occupy certain position as judges, as advocates, or as litigants 
should be perfectly free and independent, and to secure their independence, that their acts and 
words should not be brought before tribunals for inquiry ... " . 223 
422 Wider scope of absolute privilege 
Absolute privilege protects not only judges but all parties involved in judicial proceedings. It 
covers parties224, witnesses225, counset226 and solicitors.227 Thus, the ambit of the protection 
offered by the defence of absolute privilege is much wider than the protection of immunity 
from suit, which is confined to judicial and to some extent to quasi-judicial officers.228 
4 2 3 No differentiation between superior and inferior courts of justice 
A third reason why the 'no distinction approach' cannot be supported is that absolute privilege 
is enjoyed by inferior court and superior court judges alike. None of the peculiar differences in 
court hierarchies that we have had to dwell on so extensively under immunity from suit (and 
which to some, albeit limited, degree persist) has relevance for absolute privilege.229 
Defamatory statements made in proceedings before any court are privileged, be it the House of 
222 Kennedy v Hilliard (1891) 10 Ir CLR 209 per Pigot CB; Munster v Lamb (1883) 11 QB 588 at 604-5 CA. 
223 Bottomley v Brougham [1908] 1 KB 584 at 587. 
224 Gatley on Libel and Slander, 167. 
225 Seaman v Netherclifi (I 876) 2 CPD at 53 CA and Gatley on Libel and Slander, 164 et seqq . 
225 Munster v Lamb (1883) 11 QB 588 CA and the cases cited at Gatley on Libel and Slander, 166-167. 
227 MacKay v Ford (1860) 5 H & N 792. 
m Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges , 127. 
229 For a different view see Gatley on Libel and Slander, 162-164 where it is submitted that the decision of Sirros v Moore 
has influenced not only the law on immunity from suit but also the position of absolute privilege; referred to also in Street 
on Torts , 448 fn4. 
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Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Court of Appeal, the High Court of 
Justice, the Crown Court, county courts, courts of summary jurisdiction23o, courts-martiae31 
or a coroner's COurt?32 In Law v Llewellyn it was expressly held that the Scottish law which in 
this respect provides for a distinction between superior and inferior courts has no validity in 
England.233 
4 2 4 Irrelevance of motive 
Finally, the extremity of absolute privilege is evident from the fact that, in opposition to the 
concept of immunity from suit, any distinctions as to deliberate or unconscious want of 
jurisdiction can be ignored. In Munster v Lamb, the Court of Appeal dissented from the view 
expressed by Lord Denman CJ in Kendillon v Alaltby that: "...for words uttered in the course 
of his duty no magistrate is answerable ... unless express malice and the absence of reasonable 
or probable cause is established.,,234 
That this was the law was affirmed some nine years later by Lopes LJ who stated beyond 
doubt in Royal Aquarium v Parkinson that neither ill-will, anger, nor malice on the part of a 
judge making a defamatory statement would destroy his immunity.235 The reasons for this 
unequivocal position in law were summarised by Channel J in Bottomley v Broughham:236 
"The real doctrine of what is called 'absolute privilege' is that in the public interest it is not 
desirable to inquire whether the words or acts of certain persons are malicious or not. It is not that 
there is any privilege to be malicious, but that, so far as it is a privilege of the individual - I should 
rather call it a right for the public - the privilege is to be exempt from all inquiry as to malice; that 
he should not be liable to have his conduct inquired into to see whether it is malicious or DOt...". 
230 Street on Torts , 447 and Carter-Ruck, Libel and Slander, 131. 
231 Dawkins v Lord Rokeby (1874) LR 8 QB 255, affirmed (1875) LR 7 HL 744. 
232 Thomas v Churton (1862) 2 B & S 475. 
233 [1906] 1 KB 487. 

234 174 ER 562 at 566 per Lord Denman CJ. 

235 Royal Aquarium v Parkinson (1892) 1 QB 431 at 451; see also Anderson v Gorie [1895] 1 QB at 668; Scott v Stansfield 
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4 2 5 Exceptions: statements made outside the course of judicial proceedings 
The only exception to absolute privilege emerges from the requirement that defamatory 
statements must have been uttered in the course of the administration of the law. The 
statements must be relevant to the case at hand. Statements on matters entirely unrelated to the 
case do not fall under this privilege.237 This exception is well in accord with the policy 
considerations underlying the defence: the protection of absolute privilege is lost if the 
specific circumstances of this privilege are non-existent. 
5 CONCLUSION 
Civil liability of judicial officers in English law can arise with regard to trespass to person, 
trespass to property and defamation. It is rightly therefore considered a liability in torts. 
Judicial officers' liability is, apart from one minor exception, personal liability. There exists 
neither vicarious nor primary liability of the Crown for wrongful acts committed by judicial 
officers. 
Although no doubt exists as to the theoretical availability and necessity of civil judicial 
liability, in practice English law acknowledges an immunity from liability for judicial officers. 
Judicial officers' protection from suit is embedded in the law of torts by recognising the 
judicial context as a distinctive situation which needs to be covered by a peculiar privilege. It 
can be raised by a judicial officer against the other party's claim for damages. Two distinct 
defences are available to judicial officers: immunity from suit and absolute privilege III 
defamation. The degree of immunity afforded by the two defences varies slightly. 
Within the general historical context of judicial liability, at least with respect to liability for 
wrong judgements, it is interesting to note that English law for many centuries entertained a 
number of absolutely distinct approaches. 
m Munster v Lamb (1883) 11 QB 588 at 605 ; Hodgson v Scarlett 106 ER 86 (1818) per Lord Ellenborough CJ and per 
Abbot J 89; Kendillon v Maltby 174 ER 562 at 566 per Lord Denman CJ. 
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On the one hand, English law provided the judges of the superior courts for all practical 
purposes with de facto total immunity from liability. The declared aim of this rigid immunity 
was to protect the dignity and the independence of the judiciary: 
"If one judge in a thousand acts dishonestly within his jurisdiction to the detriment of a party 
before him, it is less hannful to the health of society to leave that party without a remedy than that 
nine hundred and nine honest judges should be harassed by vexatious litigation alleging malice in 
the exercise of their proper jurisdiction.,,238 
In this respect, English law exceeded considerably the development ofjudicial immunity from 
suit in France or in the Netherlands during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
At the same time, however, judges in the English inferior courts, from the seventeenth century 
until 1974, were subject to rigid liability, a liability that bore comparison with the liability of 
judges in late Roman or medieval law. In cases of acts outside jurisdiction, English inferior 
court judges were held liable for any damage on grounds of the slightest negligence, that is 
imprudentia. The development of the liability of (local) inferior judges, therefore, stands in 
contrast to those developments, for instance in the Netherlands, where it was the condition of 
the lower judiciary that supplied the pressure for restricting the scope of liability. Whereas in 
the Netherlands the non-professionality of the local judges provoked the introduction of 
extended immunity, English law recognised a rigid fonn of liability as a necessary means to 
discipline the inferior judges especially because of their non-professionality. It is apparent that 
through the centuries English superior court judges knew in masterly fashion how to play, 
depending on the addressee, on the flute of protection of judicial independence or on the bass 
drum of the disciplining of their inferior brethren. 
In modem English law of judicial immunity from suit, this discrepancy has ceased with the 
decision in Sirros v Moore .239 Today, judicial officers of all courts enjoy immunity from civil 
liability as long as they do not knowingly and deliberately overstep their jurisdiction. In this 
respect, the immunity of inferior court judges has been considerably extended. Due to the 
statutory provision of s 45 of the Justices of the Peace Act 1979 as amended by s 108 (3) 
Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990 this general rule now equally applies to magistrates 
acting outside their jurisdiction. 
238 Re McC [1984] 3 WLR 1227 al 1236 per Lord Bridge. 



























Consequently it may be said that since 1974 even in modem English law the notion of 
intentional conduct has made its appearance. In this respect, English law and modem 
continental legal systems have grown closer together than one would expect. Particularly in 
view of the development of South African law ofjudicial liability, it is interesting to note that 
with the enactment of s 108 (2) Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990, finally English law 
has abolished malice in this regard as a decisive means of determining the border between 
immunity and liability.24o 
The concept of want of jurisdiction thus remains the most important distinction between 
English law of judicial liability and other legal systems. Want of jurisdiction must be 
considered unique although, when one studies it in detail, it becomes apparent that want of 
jurisdiction is nothing but the typically English answer to the essential question of defining the 
scope of judicial wrongdoing. The fact that the landmark decision in Sirros v Moore reduces, 
albeit marginally, the immunity of superior court judges may tempt us to believe erroneously 
that plaintiffs now have an easy route to sue for damages. Very rarely will a plaintiff be able to 
prove intention on the part of the judge. As in many other legal systems, judicial liability has 
become a question of leading sufficient evidence. 
The historical analysis of the development of the English law of judicial liability outlined on 
the previous pages also provides some enlighterunent as to the English influence on judicial 
liability in South African law. For reasons which will be elaborated on in more detail in the 
following chapter - reference is to the so-called bellum juridicum - it is obvious that ifthere is 
some common law influence it must have come exclusively from the course of development 
in England from the early nineteenth century until the 1920's or 1930's. However, the next 
chapter will show that the then existent (common law) concept of total immunity only rarely 
found its way into decisions in South African courts. English influences must, rather, be 
sought with regard to more general dogmatical concepts, for instance the concept of defences 
or the doctrine of malice, which both had enormous impact on South African law in general as 
well as on judicial liability in particular. 
240 To speak with Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges, 58-59 " ... malice may be relevant, not to establish liability by itself, but 
rather to rebut a claim of bona fide belief in jurisdiction, showing either a deliberate or reckless excess ofjurisdiction." See 
also Salmond and Heuston on Torts, 20-21 on the distinction between intention and malice in the English law of torts. 
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Be that as it may, immunity from suit is not the only device available to a judge to defend 
himself in an action for civil liability. The defence of absolute privilege which can be raised 
by a judge in any action in defamation is intended to protect freedom of communication 
during court proceedings. This defence is much wider in scope than immunity from suit and 
covers not only all judges, regardless of whether they are inferior or superior court judges, but 
every one else involved in judicial proceedings. Unlike immunity from suit, any subjective 
questions as to knowledge of want of jurisdiction are of no relevance to the defence of 
absolute privilege. 
Finally, it should be noted that in English law a plaintiff always could and still can institute 
any action against a judicial officer in tort without the need to obtain preliminary leave to sue 
from the court to which the judicial officer belongs or from any other court. Thus, English law 
does not recognise the need for a preliminary procedural safeguard, as in other countries, to 
prohibit misconceived and vexatious actions against judicial officers.241 
In the general context of judicial control and accountability, however, it appears that, by and 
large, modem English law does not recognise judicial liability as a powerful weapon in this 
regard. The control of inferior court judges today is, to a large extent, secured by appeal and 
prerogative orders, publicity of proceedings, the influence of the press, public opinion, and 
social and professional pressure of the Bar.242 Shetreet in his excellent work Judges on Trial 
provides an abundant amount of material to show that both the Court of Appeal and the 
Queen's Bench Division play an important role in fulfilling a disciplinary function with regard 
to judicial misconduct particularly in the inferior COurtS.243 English jurists appear to accept 
more readily the notion of judicial control of this nature than they would call for the (more 
drastic) tool ofjudicialliability.244 
241 For example in South African law. See below at chapter VII 4 . 

242 Shetreet provides for an extensive analysis of the pros and cons of the respective mechanisms in English law at ibid. at 

161-267. See also Olowofoyeku, Suing Judges , at 142-145. 

243 Shetreet, Judges on Trial , 201-224. 

244 Although occasionally there is evidence of some kind of re-consideration particularl y in fields which (admittedl y only 

very superficially) appear to be not directly on the issue, i.e., with respect to costs of a new trial evoked by improper 


















"Are judges sufficiently accountable for their actions~ 
... Is the ultimate remedy of impeachment a sufficient 
practical and enforceable remedy to protect the public 
against an incompetentjudge~ 
... How is the public to be protected from judges whose 
conduct does not justify impeachment but which is 
nevertheless rude, insensitive, sour, or otherwise 
sufficiently objectionable to leave the litigant gravely 
unhappy about his or her treatment?" 
(The Hon I Mahomed Chief Justice of the 

Supreme Court of Appeal of the Republic of 

South A/rica l ) 

f 
VII SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
THE POSITION AND STATUS OF JUDGES WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
11 Developments from 1652 to 1910 
1 lIThe courts system 
After the Dutch Vereenigde Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) took possession 
of the Cape in 1652 2, the administration of justice and all executive and legislative functions 
were initially vested in the Council ofPolicy.3 In 1656, however, the Council decided to sit as 
a separate court of justice, which was to become the Raad van Justitie. In addition, a number 
of lower courts were introduced in the Cape, notably the Collegie van Commissarissen van 
Kleine Zaken (Court of Petty Cases) and, with the expansion of settlement from the 1680s 
onwards, the landdroshowe (colleges of landdrosten en heemraden) in the administrative 
I Address at the first orientation course for new judges included in SAU 115 (1998), 112. 

2 For detailed infonnation on Dutch overseas settlements and the VOC see Devenish, Cape ofGood Hope, 33; Hosten et aI, 

Introduction, 339; Fisch, Sudafrika, 53-89. See also Lademacher, Niederlande, 284-305. 

J The Council of Policy was in essence the same council vested by the so-called artyckelbrief with judicial and disciplinary 

authority at sea during the long voyages of the VOC's ships. For the early development of the administration ofjustice see 

Visagie, Regspleging, 40-41; Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 200·203; Devenish, Cape of Good Hope, 33-39; Van Zyl, 

Geskiedenis, 423-432; Sachs, Justice in SA, 17-31; Hosten et aI, Introduction, 337-340. 
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districts.4 These local courts of first instance were modelled on the Dutch local courts of 
baljuws, schepenen and mannen.5 
Apart from its inherent criminal jurisdiction, the Raad van Justitie functioned as a court of 
appeal for the inferior courts. Further appeal was not to the motherland, but first to the 
Council of Justice at Batavia and then to the Netherlands. Generally, the court's procedure 
was guided by the 1580 Instruction of Philip II on civil and criminallaw.6 Reference was also 
made to the works on common procedural law in use in the Low Countries.7 Later, the so­
called Statutes of India provided further detailed guidance.8 Proceedings were inter alia 
characterised by a prosecuting and co-judging jiscaal, the conducting of trials behind closed 
doors, the use of torture for confessions, the lack of precise rules of procedure, decisions 
without justification and publication, and judges of admitted partiality since corruption was 
endemic - a hair-raising legal scenario.9 
With the seizure of the Cape by British troops to secure the shipping routes to India in 1795, 
at the height of the Napoleonic wars in Europe, the Council of Justice was reduced from 13 to 
7 members.!O An additional local court of appeal consisting of the Governor and Lieutenant­
Governor was established, from which further appeal lay to the Privy Council.!! 
In 1802, in terms of Art 6 of the Treaty of Amiens, the Batavian Republic was restored, with 
full authority over the Dutch colonies. 12 The enlightened and idealistic lawyer J A De Mist 
(1749-1823) was appointed as Commissioner-General. He introduced reforms long overdue in 
the colony, since it was obvious " .. .in which sorry state justice and its administration had 
4 For a detailed analysis of the early development of the lower courts see Botha, Inferior Courts, 101-117; Hahlo and Kahn, 

Union, 201; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 430. 

5 See Venter, Year Bookfor South African History 3 (1940), 14 and 18. 

6 We know that in 1734 a copy of the Instructien van den Hofe van Holland existed in the library of the Court of Justice. 

Botha, Law Library, 168; Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 202; Erasmus, Interaction, 147. 

7 Writers such as J de Damhouder, P Merula, G van Wassenaar, S van Leeuwen and Gail. See Erasmus, Interaction at 145. 

8 For more details on to the acceptance of the Statutes oflndia at the Cape see below at 4 2 2. 

9 For critique see Theal, Records ofthe Cape Colony, vol.XXVIII 6 and Dolezalek, Zivilprozessrecht, 103. Further Fagan, 

Historical Context, 46; Hosten et ai, Introduction, 346; Visagie, Regspleging, 41-55; Van Zyl , Geskiedenis, 432; Botha, 

Punishment, 284-291 and Criminal Procedure, 129-136. 
\0 Ibid. at 125. 
II Hosten et ai, Introduction , 347; Devenish, Cape of Good Hope, 51; Botha, Criminal Procedure , 125; Fine, Cape 
Supreme Court, I; Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 201; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 445. 
12 For the following Batavian period see Hahlo and Kahn , Union, 203-4; Devenish , Cape ofGood Hope , 51-52; Van Zyl, 
Geskiedenis, 446-448. 
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fallen...".13 In 1804, De Mist issued his Provisioneele Instructie voor den Raad van Justitie 
aan de Kaap de Goede Hoop, whereby the courts, with the exception of the Governor's Court 
of Appeal, continued in their function but were declared independent of the executive. 14 For 
the first time, binding procedural rules were drawn up. Appeal from the lower courts lay to the 
Council of Justice and from there to the Hoog Nationaal Gerechtshof at The Hague. 15 
Unfortunately, De Mist's reforms were destined to be of short duration since the British 
repossessed the Cape in 1806. 
Under the British, the structure of the colony's judiciary was not much changed until the 
introduction of the Charters of Justice in 1827 and 1832. 16 The colony's highest court was 
again made the Governor's Court of Appeal. 17 The Council of Justice consisted of seven 
members under a president, who became Chief Justice in 1812. 18 Only in 1811 was a circuit 
court introduced. Civil procedure until 1827 remained essentially Roman-Dutch. 19 Until 
1813, proceedings continued to be carried out in foribus clausis.2o The British government 
abandoned its policy of laissez-faire when the Cape was formally ceded to Britain in 1814, 
and a considerable stream of British settlers flowed into the colony from the 1820s. In 1823, a 
commission into the affairs of the colony was appointed. Amongst other things, the legal 
system at the Cape was investigated, and the commission's recommendations were largely 
implemented in a Charter ofJustice which was issued in 1827 and modified in 1834.21 
The Charters of Justice provided for truly fundamental changes in the administration ofjustice 
at the Cape and throughout South Africa that endure until today. Although Art 31 of the First 
Charter established unequivocally that Roman-Dutch law was to be retained as the law of the 
13 See Memorandum ofCommissaryJA de Mist. Also Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 203 . 





15 Devenish, Cape ofGood Hope,S\. 

16 Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 203-204 and for the post-Charter period 208 et seqq; Devenish, Cape of Good Hope, 52 and 





17 Farlam, 1988 Consultus, 36. 

18 Johnstone, 1823 Commission, II. 

19 Erasmus, Interaction, 145. 

20 Botha, Influence ofEnglish Law, 119-120. 

21 For details on the Commission see generally the thesis by Johnstone, 1823 Commission ; Fine, Cape Supreme Court, 12­
28; Taitz, SALJ 96 (1979),470; Girvin, Influence, 186-194. 

306 
Colonl2, the Charter of 1827 undoubtedly laid the foundation for the lasting and constantly 
growing influence of English common law. The old Council of Justice was replaced by a 
unitary Supreme Court. However, due to the general adoption of Roman-Dutch law, neither a 
Court of Chancery nor Chancery jurisdiction were established at the Cape. Roman-Dutch law, 
unlike English common law, has never recognised the existence of the two separate judicial 
systems. 
The organisation, hierarchy and staffing of the courts, as well as the recruitment of the future 
Bar and Side-Bar, in other words the whole administration of justice, was revamped on 
English lines. Fundamental features of common law proceedings were introduced, particularly 
the central role of the litigating parties during the trial, the neutrality of the court, the 
adversarial character of the system, public hearings, orality, immediacy of the proceedings 
and, finally, publication of sentence and the reasons for it. 23 The doctrine of stare decisis was 
established.24 The style of appeal proceedings was changed. Judgements tended to be 
individualistic; dissenting opinions became a common feature of court decisions. On all 
counts, there was a dramatic break with the fonner Roman-Dutch (Roman-canonical) 
procedure, which had become totally anachronistic.25 
The Supreme Court consisted of a Chief Justice and three puisne judges. A new feature was 
the introduction of juries in criminae6 and civil27 cases, as well as a circuit court which was 
held twice a year. The landdrost was abolished, and resident magistrates as courts of first 
instance were installed instead. The rapid expansion of the Cape Colony in the nineteenth 
century resulted in the founding of two superior courts in more remote areas.28 In 1864, the 
22 Foster and Tennant, Statutes, I et seqq. This was a political decision by the English government. See Theal, Records of 
the Cape Colony, vol.XXXn 255 et seqq; Zimmennann, Romisch-hollandisches Recht in Siidafrika, II; De Vos, 
Regsgeskiedenis, 247. Since Campbell v Hall (1774) 98 ER 1045 at 1047 it was held that " ... the laws of a conquered 
country continue in force, until they are altered by the conqueror." per Lord Mansfield. See also Art 7 of the Capitulation 
signed at Rustenburg in September 1795 which stated that colonists were to "... retain all the privileges which they now 
enjoy ... ". 
23 Erasmus, SAU 108 (1991) I, 265; Jacob, Civil Procedure since J800, 205. On the history of law reporting see Hah 10 and 
Kahn, Legal System , 240 and 282-30 I; Fine, Cape Supreme Court, 99-100, 299-302 and 344-346. 
24 Erasmus, interaction, 150 fu68 with further references. 
25 Erasmus, SAU 108 (1991) I, 275. For the Roman-Dutch law of procedure see generally Dolezalek, Zivilprozessrecht, 59­
104. For an introduction to Roman-canonical procedural law see Engelmann, Continental Civil Procedure, 455 el seqq . 

26 See Fine, Cape Supreme Court, 33-41. 

27 Act No 7 of 1854. 

28 For details see Fine, Cape Supreme Courl , 223-60 and 305-325 . 
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Eastern Districts Court (EDC) was inaugurated at Grahamstown and, in 1880, the High Court 
of Griqualand (RCG) was established at Kimberley.29 From 1879, even a separate Court of 
Appeal was created for the colony, but this proved too expensive and was abolished in 1886.30 
It must be noted in passing that, besides the considerable changes in the administration of 
justice, legislation was passed that profoundly changed the law of evidence3!, inheritance and 
succession32 and marriage.33 Furthermore, growing trade relations with the (new) motherland 
brought new enactments in company la~4, mercantile law35 and insolvency law.36 Most of 
these statutes were enacted at the Cape in virtually identical form to their English predecessors 
and are evidence of the British policy ofgradualism in reforming the legal sphere.37 
In Natal, although the area is said to be " ... in sentiment and composition the most English of 
the provinces up to this day ... ,,38, the first courts were introduced in 1838 by the 
Voortrekkers.39 This interlude came to an end in 1843 when the British annexed Natal and 
incorporated it into the Cape as a separate district. A District Court was created4o, consisting, 
in civil cases, of a recorder; criminal cases were tried by a jury of nine. In 1857, after 
representative government was conferred on Natal, the District Court was replaced by a 
Supreme Court.4! This court was composed of the Chief Justice and two puisne judges. 
Furthermore, a circuit court and inferior magistrates courts based on the Cape model were 
introduced. Distinct from the Cape, however, was the separate court system for disputes solely 
29 Fine, Cape Supreme Court, 223 et seqq. and 321 et seqq; Girvin, Architects, 96. 

30 Ibid. as well as Fine, Cape Supreme Court , 332-337. 

31 Ordinance No 72 of 1830. 





33 Cape Marriage Order in Council 7 Sept 1838. 

34 Joint Stock Companies Limited Act No 23 of 1861 and Companies Act No 25 of 1892. 

35 Merchant Shipping Act No 13 of 1855 and General Law Amendment Act No 8 of 1879. 

36 Ordinance No 64 of 1829 and Ordinance No 6 of 1843. 

37 Generally Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 8-20; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 455-457; Devenish, Cape ofGood Hope, 56 refers to an 

osmosis which offered the greatest threat to Roman-Dutch law. 

38 Hahl0 and Kahn, Union, 24. 

39 On the Great Trek see Wilson, History of South Africa, vol.l 302-310; Thompson, History, 87-96; Davenport, South 

Africa, 38-40 and 57-60. 

40 On the administration of justice in Natal see at Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 220-226; Roberts, Natal, 79-90; Spiller, District 

and Supreme Courts ofNalal, as well as his Nalal Supreme Court. 

41 Law No 10 of 1857. See at Cadiz and Lyon, Natal Ordinances. 
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between Africans.42 Ordinance 12 of 1845 established Roman-Dutch law as the law of the 
Colony ofNatal. Procedural rules, too, were initially taken over from the Cape.43 However, in 
later years, amendments to procedural rules were drawn predominantly from England.44 
Prior to independence in 1854, the judiciary in the area that is known today as the Free State 
was that of an undeveloped community.45 In 1854, a circuit high court of three landdrosten 
became the highest court of the new Republic. Courts of first instance were the landdrosten 
for minor cases and the courts of the landdrost and two heemraden for more important 
cases.46 From 1875 to the end of the Anglo-Boer War, criminal and civil appeals from the 
lower courts were heard by a Supreme Court consisting of a Chief Justice and two puisne 
judges. This court sat at Bloemfontein.47 Procedural law was mainly based on the English 
model introduced at the Cape in 1827.48 Dutch was the only official language used in court. 49 
After the founding of the Zuid-AJrikaanse Repub/iek (ZAR) in 1858, a Constitution 
(Gromiwet) provided for the establishment of a rudimentary court system of a higher court of 
three landdrosten in civil and twelve jurors in criminal cases. As courts of first instance, 
courts of landdrosten were established in each district.50 In 1877, it was decided that the 
traditional court system be reformed. The highest court of the Republic was to be a High 
Court consisting of three judges. In addition, a circuit court was established, and the courts of 
landdrosten administered the law in the districtS.51 In 1864 and 1874, procedural laws were 
enacted where, again, the influence of the Cape procedural rules is evident.52 However, the 
42 See Spiller, District and Supreme Courts a/Natal, 2-7. 

43 See ss 20-38 Ordinance No 14 of 1845 and ss 25-60 Law No 10 of 1857. 

44 See Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 224 for further details. 

45 On the development in the Vrystaat see Hahlo and Kahn , Union , 226-8 and 240-247; Sachs, Justice in SA, 71-76; 

Oloefse, Orange Free Stale, 65. 

46 Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 241. 

47 Oelofse, Orange Free State, 66-73, Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 463-465; Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 242-244. 

48 Manier van Procederen in Crimineele Zaken 20 June 1856; Lagere Hoven - Manier van Procederen I November 1856 

and Rondgande Geregtshoven in Civiele Zaken - Manier van Procederen I March 1858. Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 462; Hahlo 

and Kahn, Union , 244. Ordinance No 6 of 1856, which regulated the Jaw of evidence, for instance, was a direct translation 

of the 1830 Cape enactment. 

49 Ordinance No 3 of 1854. 

50 See Art 127-131 Grondwet for more details. Included in Kotze, Locale Wellen ZAR, see also by Kotze SAU 36 (1919), 

130 et seqq. 

51 See ibid. and Art 29-32 Bijlage Grondwet (1877). 















1877 reforms came too late since Britain annexed the ZAR for four years.53 After 
independence in 1881, a High Court sat at Pretoria with full appellate jurisdiction. 
Johannesburg had to be content with a circuit court. 54 
After the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, the Boer Republics were relegated to the status of 
Crown colonies. In 1906-1907, however, the Orange River and Transvaal colonies were 
granted responsible government. Two newly created Supreme Courts obtained general 
appellate and review jurisdiction over the colonies.55 Johannesburg in the Transvaal was 
assigned a High Court. The courts of landdrosten were abolished once and for all and replaced 
by resident magistrates' courts. 
1 1 2 Institutional aspects 
J J 2 I Independence ofthe judiciary 
Under the rule of the VOC, judges were not independent of the other branches of the trias 
politica since the majority of judges also sat on the Council of Policy, the highest executive 
body of the settlement. Nor were they distinct from the legislature since the same Council 
performed legislative functions. 56 Until 1732, the Governor was Chairman of the Council of 
Policy and President of the Court of Justice. In 1732, the heeren seventien, the supreme 
directorate of the VOC, decided that the Governors of the buitencomptoiren (outposts) be 
excluded from participation in the administration of justice.57 Accordingly, in 1734, the 
secunde (Vice-Governor) nominally took over the chair of the Raad van Justisie as President 
53 The objective was to prove that the ZAR was in a position to administer the country properly and that foreign (British) 

intervention was thus unnecessary. See Kotze, SALJ 36 (1919), 135 for details. 

54 Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 235. 

55 Orange River Colony Ordinances No 4 and 7 of 1902 included in Lefebvre and Jackson, Statutes of the ORC. For more 

details see Hahlo and Kahn, Union , 238. 

56 Sachs, Justice in SA , 17; Devenish, Cape afGood Hope, 39; Davenport, South Africa, 18; Thompson, History, 41 . 

57 The heeren seventien was the highest administrative body of the VOc. The buitencomptoiren were all trade posts 

subordinate to Batavia (Jakarta, Indonesia), the capital of the Dutch East Indies. 
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of the Court. 58 Further, the flscaal, who was inter alia responsible as state prosecutor, also sat 
on the Bench as a judge. 59 
During the first British occupation the situation improved marginally. Even though Governor 
Earl Macartney was to take " ...especial care that in all Courts established within the settlement 
Justice be impartially administered ... ,,6o, he and the Lieutenant-Governor constituted the 
newly created local appeal court. Only the enlightened reforms of De Mist introduced 
separation of powers in the Cape. In terms of Art 66 of the Provisioneele Instructie, the 
onajhanglykheit of the High Court was well protected 61 and, according to Art 45 and 46, the 
Governor did not have the right to control the administration of justice.62 Nonetheless, after 
the second British occupation, the Governor returned as the President of the Appeal Court and 
theflscaal reassumed his seat on the Bench next to the Chief Justice.63 
These anomalies were resolved only by the Charters of Justice.64 From then on, the British 
colonial judiciary at the Cape, and later in Natal, became truly independent.65 It is worth 
noting that the Chief Justice of the Cape Colony was made ex officio President of the 
Legislative Council from 1854 to 1910, when the Cape was granted representative 
govemment.66 On the other hand, the dawn of English legal influence brought the principle of 
parliamentary supremacy first to the British colonies and, later, to the Republic of South 
Africa. As shown earlier, the historical origins of this constitutional principle lay in England 
S8 Visagie, Regspleging, 43; Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 200; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 429 . 

S9 Devenish, Cape o/Good Hope, 39 . 

60 According to Art 10 of the Instructions to the British Governor of 1797 quoted from Visagie, Regspleging, 92. 

6 1 Proclaimed on I March 1803. Article 66 states: "De Raad zal zich in dezeljs deliberatien, vonnissen 0/ besluiten, door 

geene andere Autoriteit hoegenaamd mogen laaten injluenceeren, maar als Rechterlyke Magt volkomen onafhanglyk zyn." 

62 Visagie, Regspleging, 103 . According to Van der Merwe, Die Kaap onder die Bataafte Republiek, 365 the Political 

Council of the Colony appeared to be unhappy with the far reaching provisions in favour ofjudiciai independence. 

63 Bird, The State o/the Cape o/Good Hope in 1822 as quoted by Botha, Public Prosecutor, 142 rightly observed: "What 

acute feelings must this create in the mind of the unhappy individual who, whilst trembling for his life, perceives the 

adversary at the ear of the judge." 

64 Apart from other things, issues were the membership of the Chief Justice in the Council of Advice, patronage over minor 

officers of court, language ability ofjurors. For details see Fine, Cape Supreme Court, 413-416. 

65 With regard to Natal see ss I -9 Ordinance No 14 of 1845 and sections 8-10 Law No 10 of 1857. 

66 The Legislative Council was a council of 15 members. With the Governor and the House of Assembly, it formed the 

Cape Parliament. The Legislative Council thus resembled the House of Lords and the President's office that of the Lord 
Chancellor. See at Girvin, Architects, 120 fn 141 for more details. 
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and this principle restricted the courts' right to test the legality of legislative measures. 67 In 
this important aspect, the South African judiciary from an early stage was subject to the 
authority ofParliament.68 
The early development of the judiciary in the two Boer republics shows that separation of 
powers was not observed. Landdrosten constantly performed both executive and judicial 
functions. Furthermore, in the ZAR, Art 165 of the Grondwet regulated initially that all courts 
prior to giving judgement, be it criminal or civil, had to enquire of the Executive Council 
whether the sentence should be reduced or even set aside. One might be tempted to think that 
these state organs acted as a court of equity. In reality, the early judges in the ZAR were mere 
puppets. In the Oranje Vrystaat, the situation improved only after the judiciary became 
formally independent with the establishment of the Supreme Court. Unlike the British 
colonies, the Vrystaat granted the judiciary, as an inherent feature of the Constitution, the 
right to review legislation. This right, however, was exercised only once.69 
In the ZAR, the judiciary's testing right was described some years later by President Kruger as 
a 'principle of the Devil' . These words were the final straw in South Africa's first 
constitutional crisis (1897-1899), which revealed the extent to which judicial independence 
existed in the ZAR. Kruger dismissed Chief Justice Kotze, who had refused to consent to the 
explicit abolition of the judiciary's testing right which had been legislated in 1897 after the 
High Court had declared some informal laws or besluiten invalid since their enactment 
collided with the Grondwet.7o 
1 1 2 2 Appointment and tenure 
In the early days of the Dutch Raad van Justitie, the appointment process lay de facto in the 
hands of the Governor, subject to the approval of the heeren seventien.71 During the first 
British occupation and after the second annexation until 1828, members of the court were 
67 See the text above at chapter VI I at fn II. 

68 Dugard, Human Rights, 14 and 16-18 and below at 1 2 2 I. 

69 Cassim and Solomon v The State (1892) CU 58. See particularly Thompson, 1954 BSALR, 51-57; Sachs, Justice in SA, 

74 and Oelofse, Orange Free State, 73. 

70 See Brown v Leyds NO 1897 OR 17 and Wet No 1 van 1897. For more details on the constitutional crisis in the final 

days of the ZAR see Tindall, Introductory Note to KOlZe's Memoirs, ix and xi-xliv; Dugard, Human Rights, 14 and 21-25; 

Kahn, SAU 75 (1958) 410 et seqq; Girvin, Architects, 127 with funher references. 

7 1 Only members of the Dutch Reformed Church were eligible. Lutherans or Catholics were excluded for many years. 
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appointed solely by the Governor and held office durante bene placito (at his pleasure only). 
At the time, this was markedly different from the situation in England after the Act of 
Settlement of 1701.72 It was again De Mist who came forward with strikingly modern 
proposals that in a sense anticipated appointment procedures introduced into South Africa 
under the present Constitution, some 193 years later. De Mist proposed that the president of 
the Raad van Justitie hold permanent office, and that three of the remaining six members of 
the court be appointed by the state government from a list of nominees submitted by the 
Colonial Office. The other three members were to be chosen from the most prominent and 
able colonists.73 
With the introduction of the First Charter of Justice in 1827, the five judges of the Cape 
Supreme Court and, later, of the Natal Supreme Court, were to be appointed by the Crown.74 
All judges now held office quamdiu se bene gesserint (on good behaviour).75 In the Oranje 
Vrystaat, judges were appointed by the President after consultation with the Executive 
Council. The appointment process in the ZAR appears to have been somewhat vague.76 From 
1902, judges in the former Boer republics were appointed by the Governor and later by the 
. C .1 77Governor-m- OunCl. 
1123 Threat ofremoval and disciplinary action 
Under the rule of the VOC, the fiscaal wielded enormous power as it was up to him to initiate 
disciplinary action against members of the judiciary.78 There appear to have been no precise 
rules as to disciplinary action, and constant rivalry and envy led to abuse. During the Batavian 
interlude, a procedure was introduced which was designed to ensure objectivity. According to 
Art 25 of De Mist's Provisioneele Instructie, any charge against an official was to be 
72 Visagie, Regsp/eging, 92; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 445. And see above at chapter VI I 22. 

73 De Wet, THR-HR 7 (1944), 28. 

74 Article 3 Charter of Justice; Botha, SAU 18 (1901),136. For Natal see ss 3 and 4 Ordinance No 14 of 1845 and s 10 

Law No 10 of 1857. 

75 Ibid; see also Art 5 First and Second Charter of Justice. 

76 See Art 117 Grondwet (1889) and Art 140 Grondwet (1896). Another interesting historical note surrounds the 

appointment of Kotze in 1877 by President Burger, who thought that this was within his sphere of action. However, the 

appointment was suspended by the Executive Council owing to procedural errors. With regard to the Oranje Vrystaat, see 

Art 5 and 7 Wet betrekkelijk de Hoogere Gerechtshoven in Wetboek van den Oranjevrijstaat, 21. 

77 See ss I and 6 Ordinance No 4 of 1902 for the Orange River Colony and ss 2 and 3 Proclamation No 14 of 1902 for the 

Colony of Transvaal in Statute Law ofthe Transvaal 1839-1910. 






prosecuted by the Public Prosecutor before the Raad van Justitie until the case was ready for 
judgement. The record was then sealed and sent for final decision to the motherland.79 
Later, under the Charters, the British Governor was empowered to suspend any judge on proof 
of misconduct, but only on advice of a majority of the members of the Executive Council. 80 
Further, he had to report any such case immediately to the monarch, who had the ultimate 
discretion as to whether to disallow or to confirm that suspension.8l This procedure also 
applied in Natal after 1845.82 It is interesting that a number of investigations concerning 
nineteenth century Cape83 and Natal84 judges were conducted. In the Vrystaat, the President 
was empowered to suspend judges. Permanent dismissal required a vote by the Volksraad 
after an inquiry into the matter at the request of the Executive Council.85 For decades, judges 
in the ZAR held office with no clear rules as to dismissal and disciplinary proceedings.86 After 
the Anglo-Boer War, judges could be dismissed by the Governor on alleged misbehaviour or 
incapacity after an address to both houses of Parliament. 
1 1 3 Professionalism and legal education of judges 
Unlike their brethren in the superior courts in the Netherlands, the judges of the early Raad 
van Justitie were laymen, completely untrained in substantive and procedural law.87 Until 
1739, the Raad van Justitie had access only to a small law library consisting of ten books.88 A 
compilation of local statutes was not available. Local statutes were promulgated only by 
79 Article 97 Provisioneele Instructie voor den Raad van Justitie aan de Kaap de Goede Hoop van 1804. 

80 Article 5 First and Second Charter of Justice. 

8! Article 6 First and Second Charter of Justice. 

82 Section 7 Ordinance 14 of 1845. 

83 Investigations into judges' conduct were made with regard to Sir John Wylde (1831), Andries Stockentrom (I 875) and 

James FitzPatrick (1878). For details see Fine, Cape Supreme Court, 530, 518 and 479. With respect to Wylde see also 

Girvin, Architects, 97 and SAL! 109 (1992), 655. With regard to FitzPatrick see Girvin, influence, 282-284. 

84 For a detailed account of the proceedings against judge Cloete see Spiller, District and Supreme Courts ofNatal, 23-26 ; 

Fine, Cape Supreme Court , 458. Judge Cloete was accused of having allowed private feelings to interfere with impartial 

administration ofjustice, particularly in the case of Meller v Buchanan . 

85 Article 7 Wet betrekkelijk de Hoogere Gerechtshoven. See also Hahlo and Kahn, Union , 243 . 

86 According to Wet No 3 van 1877 it was proposed that precise rules on the dismissal of judges be drafted . However, this 

statute was never passed . 

87 Wilson, History a/South A/rica, 221. 

88 Devenish, Cape ofGood Hope , 39. See further Botha, Law Library, 160. 
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public declamation at the Cape Town castle and on Sundays during church service.89 
Furthennore, it was not clear to the judges which other statutory enactments had validity at the 
Cape. For example, confusion surrounded the question of whether the Statutes of India were 
to be applied by the Raad. Only in 1715 was this uncertainty cleared, albeit in a substantially 
incorrect manner.90 Not surprisingly the first British Governor, Macartney, reported in 1797: 
"The supreme judges, however, are not civilians nor professional lawyers. The forms of the court 
are in other respects faulty and in some instances their decisions are supposed to have had a partial 
bias... ".91 
The standard of professionality and legal education of the judges at the Cape before the 
Charters of Justice was unimpressive, and judges were drawn from the ranks of various non­
legal professions or the civil service.92 Failure to give reasons for judgements, endless delays, 
and some degree of nepotism were endemic, and many judges were appointed simply to 
increase their emoluments. 93 Only from 1815 onwards were legally trained men increasingly 
appointed to the Bench. By 1827, three judges held a doctor's degree in law. 94 However, the 
Governor, as judge of the Appeal Court, was without any legal training.95 In civil cases he 
even sat without assessors. Sir Richard Plasket, Colonial Secretary from 1825, reported: "The 
Colony is at its lowest ebb ... [t]he Court ofJustice is perhaps the worst.,,96 
After the introduction of the Charters of Justice, the Cape judiciary was finally raised to the 
same standard as that of the judiciary in other Commonwealth legal systems. The Supreme 
Court was to consist of judges who had to be barristers in England, Ireland or Scotland of not 
less than three years standing.97 Appointments to the Bench were made mostly from the three 
United Kingdom Bars. After 1873, however, appointments were also made from the ranks of 
local advocates. It is worth noting that the legal training and background of the judges at the 
Cape in the nineteenth century had a significant influence on the shaping of what we today 
consider South African law. Not only by direct statutory enactment, as indicated above, but 
also by somewhat covert and indirect means, a considerable part of English law was received 
at the Cape. 
89 Sachs, Justice in SA, 18. 
90 See below at 4 2 2. 

91 Theal, Records ofthe Cape Colony, vol.lV 115 . 

92 Farlam, 1988 Consultus, 36. 
93 Johnstone, 1823 Commission, 13; Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 205 . 

94 Sir John Truter, W Bentink and J H Neethling. See Farlam, 1988 Consultus, 36-37. 

95 Ibid. at 36. 
96 Quoted from ibid. 
97 Article 3 First and Second Charter of Justice. 
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Until the 1870s, none of the Cape judges had been trained in Roman-Dutch law. Hence these 
judges had to apply rules of a legal system they did not really understand. Further, intellectual 
access to this body of law was difficult because the relevant legal works were written either in 
Latin or in Dutch. Judges naturally tended to prefer the language of the law in which they had 
been trained. Due to indifference or inability, judges frequently conducted a superficial 
analysis of the Roman-Dutch law on the point in question before them, before concluding that 
the English and Roman-Dutch law were essentially the same.98 Often this conclusion was 
totally incorrect. In most cases, it was English law that in consequence was applied by judges 
and therefore entered the law reports. The overall picture that emerges is a hazy one. 
Undoubtedly, judges at the Cape purported to apply Roman-Dutch law and some, for example 
Menzies, Cloete, Kotze and De Villiers, adhered more faithfully to Roman-Dutch law than 
others. However, Roman-Dutch law at the Cape increasingly acquired an English character as 
the judges superimposed layers ofEnglish common law.99 
Natal judges had even greater difficulties in applying Roman-Dutch law than their Cape 
brethren, with whom, with few exceptions, they did not compare in quality.lOO Since the 
majority of judges were not willing to make a serious effort to administer Roman-Dutch law, 
the Natal Bench inevitably proved the most receptive to English legal influence, at least until 
1910.101 Nor was the judiciary in the Vrystaat initially of a higher calibre. The early 
landdrosten could by no means be classified as jurists l02, and were laymen. 103 Professionalism 
came to the Oranje Vrystaat only in 1875 with the establishment of the Supreme Court. 
Judges were required to be qualified either as doctors of laws or as advocates of at least seven 
98 See the dictum by Van den Heever JA in Preller v Jordaan 1956 (I) SA 483 (A) 504 (A). 

99 Other mechanisms included the possibility of further appeal to the Privy Councilor frequent reference to English cases 

where English statutes were applied. Generally see Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 454-458; Zimmermann, Romisch-holfiindisches 

Recht in Siidafrika, 13-15; Girvin, Architects, 98, 110 and 138 and Influence, 223-225, 231 et seqq. 

100 Spiller, District and Supreme Courts of Natal, 83-8. Exceptions to that observance are most noteworthy Cloete J; 

Connor CJ and Dove Wilson CJ. See Spiller, District and Supreme Courts ofNatal, 31 and Girvin, Architects, 95 and 110­
113. 
101 Spiller, District and Supreme Courts ofNatal, 90. 
102 Again note the details at Scott, Transvaal, 91 
103 Hahlo, Union, 241. 
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l04 years standing. From then on, young jurists, trained for the most part at the Cape, 
dominated legal life in the Vrystaat. 105 
An equally sombre picture has been painted of the early judiciary in the ZAR. Judicial officers 
were mostly fanners and " .. .illiterate and simple folk, relying on their untrained but literate 
clerks.,,106 However, the appointment of Kotze as Chief Justice in 1877 proved a great success 
as he was a strong and erudite judge who strove actively to improve the standards of 
administration ofjustice. 107 By 1883, all judges, and not only the Chief Justice, were required 
to have graduated in law. 108 Notwithstanding this regulation, some appointments were clearly 
due to nepotism and favouritism. How different then the quality of the Transvaal Bench which 
was appointed by Lord Milner in 1906, consisting inter alia of James Rose Innes, William 
Solomon and John Wessels, all later to become Chief Justices of the Union of South Africa. 109 
Although this is perhaps an over-statement, the judges on the Benches of the two Boer 
republics tended to adhere more readily to the Roman-Dutch law than the judges in the British 
colonies. Accordingly, these judges deserve some credit for the retention of Roman-Dutch law 
and the formation of a mixed legal system in South Africa. One important reason for this 
tendency was the fact that the two Boer republics enacted legislation according to which 
'pure' Roman Dutch law or, more precisely, the law of Holland as it was prior to the British 
annexation, was to be the law of the republics. llo However, the courts did not necessarily 
consider themselves bound by these prescriptions as Kotze's judgement in Rooth v The State 
shows. I II Meanwhile, a number of decisions favouring the retention of Roman-Dutch law also 
104 Article 5 Wet betrekkelijk de Hoogere Gerechtshoven. 

105 The first President of the OVS, J H Brand, was a law professor from Cape Town and the second President F W Reitz 

was a Cape advocate before becoming first Chief lustice in 1874. The second Chief Justice was M de Villiers, the first 

South African to be professor of law at Leiden University and brother of the eminent Chief Justice of the Cape Colony Lord 

Henry de Villiers. For an interesting assessment see Sachs, Justice in SA, 71-75. 

106 Kotze, SALf 36 (1919), 134; Hahlo and Kahn, Union , 231. In 1859, it was noted in a testimonial that not one of the 

landdrosten had studied Roman-Dutch law. 

107 Kotze was referred to by the novelist Trollope, South Africa, 12 as the 'boy judge' since he was 28 when called to the 

Bench. See also Sachs, Justice in SA, 76 and Scott, Transvaal, 98. 

108 Art 2 ( c) Law No 3 of 1883. 

109 With regard to the earlier appointments in the ZAR see Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 235 . On the work of the first Transvaal 

Bench see particularly Sir James Rose Innes' own account in his Autobiography, 198-220. 

11 0 In the OVS and ZAR enacnnents served as a law of citation since some of the best known Roman-Dutch authors had to 

be used as binding authorities. See also Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 22 et seqq; Zimmermann, Romisch-hollandisches Recht in 

Sudafrika , 21 el seqq. 

III (1888) 2 SAR 259, 261-265. Also Preller v Schultz (1893) 10 eLf 81,88-90 and 175-176. Hahlo and Kahn , Union, 22 
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had a lasting effect on the nature of the development of South Africa's mixed legal system. 1l2 
By translating the works of Roman-Dutch legal authors into English, judges of this period 
helped to improve access to Roman-Dutch law.l13 The professionalism, legal education and 
scholarly knowledge of some of these judges clearly played a decisive role in the shaping of 
South African law. 
1 1 4 Conclusions 
Assessing the course of development until 1910 of the jUdiciary in the various territories 
which today fonn South Africa, the overall impression is one of steady improvement. At the 
end of this period, the administration of justice, due to strong English influences, was on a 
finn footing. Clear procedural laws guided litigation. Torture had been abolished. Trials were 
conducted in pUblic. Judges had to give reasons for their judgements, which were published in 
law reports. At least as regards judges, Bar and Side Bar, these institutions were increasingly 
staffed by legal professionals. In addition, the establislunent of the doctrine of stare decisis, 
the introduction of specific regulations for appointment, dismissal and tenure ofjudges and, of 
course, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy had far-reaching consequences for the 
institutional framework in which twentieth century South African judges later had to 
adjudicate. By 1910, judges had undoubtedly become the heart and head of the administration 
of justice in South Africa. Rightly therefore, one commentator described the judges of the 
nineteenth century as the architects of South Africa's mixed legal system. 114 
112 A good example is the response to the so-called doctrine of consideration. The Cape Supreme Court for years held that 
with regard to the validity of a contract the Roman-Dutch concept of iusta causa was equivalent to and replaced by the 
common law doctrine of consideration (Alexander v Perry (1874) 4 Buch 59; Tradesmen 's Benefit Society v Du Preez 
(1887) 5 SC 269; Mtembu v Webster (1904) 21 SC 323). In the end, however, the Appellate Division in 1919 (Conradie v 
Rossouw 1919 AD 279) accepted the view of the former High Court of Transvaal, which in 1904 (Rood v Wallach 1904 TS 
187) decided that the doctrine of consideration was alien to Roman-Dutch law. See Rose Innes, Autobiography, 209-210; 
Hutchison, Contract Formation, 166-171 . Zimmermann, Law o/Obligations, 556-559; Erasmus, Interaction, 151-152. 
113 To name just a few: Melius de Villiers' influential treatise on Voet and the actio iniuriarum. James Buchanan's 
translation of the first three books of Voet ' s Commentary. Sir John Kotze in 1885-6 translated S van Leeuwen's Rooms­
Hollands Regt. Sir Henry Juta translated J van der Linden's Regtsgeleerd, Praklicaal en Koopmans Handhoek. Sir James 
Rose Innes translated two titles ofVoet 's Commentary in 1879. Sir Andries Maasdorp published a translation of H Grotius ' 
In/eidinge in 1873. Sir John Wessels ' oevre inter alia included the first publication of a history of Roman-Dutch Law in 
1906. In his Autobiography Sir James Rose Innes confirmed his appreciation of Roman-Dutch law when he wrote (at 288) 
that he H •• • had always been a convinced believer in the Roman-Dutch law as a system." 




In respect of the topic of this thesis, one of the most important consequences of this broad 
acceptance of English influences is probably the general appreciation and perception of the 
jUdiciary as an almost infallible institution. In due course, any serious criticism of the South 
African judiciary came to be regarded as disrespectful, if not an affront to the dignity of the 
institution. This traditional view of South Africa's (superior) judiciary is still in effect today, 
albeit to a modified degree, and apparently made South African academics reluctant to analyse 
the topic in more detail. 
1 2 Developments after 1910 
1 2 1 The courts system 
Unlike a number of continental European legal systems, South Africa does not have a unifonn 
courts system. I 15 Different courts operate at various levels, staffed by personnel ranging from 
judges with years of practical experience and full legal training to lay assessors. Further, not 
all the courts fall exclusively under the ambit of the jUdiciary. While the judicial process is 
generally vested in the judiciary and its ordinary courts, a plethora of additional courts or 
tribunals exists outside the judiciary. I 16 
1 2 1 1 Superior courts 
(a) The Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court is a novelty in the South African legal system. 117 It is the highest 
South African court in all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the 
115 For a comparison with the Gennan court system see Werle, SA Courts: A Comparative Analysis, 37-56. Generally see 

Van Dijkhorst, Courts, 89-117; Hosten et ai, Introduction, 388-41 I; Du Plessis and Du Plessis, Introduction to Law. All, 

however, on the provisions of the Interim Constitution No 200 of 1993. 

116 Baxter, Administrative Law, 240 has described the bridging function of these tribunals between the judicial and the 

administrative process as: ••• (T]hey really complement, rather than substitute for, the ordinary courts of law."
u 
117 The introduction of the Constitutiona] Court into the legal system was not unanimously applauded . Some favoured 
simply the enlargement of the Appellate Division's jurisdiction. See for instance Hiemstra, 1992 Consultus, 119-120. On 
the work of the Technical and the Planning Committee see Du Plessis and Corder, Bill ofRights, 194-199. Claasen, THR­























Constitution.1J8 Above all, this includes the enforcement of the Bill of Rights 119, the power to 
review the constitutionality of executive and legislative acts120 and the determination of 
constitutional disputes between organs of state. 121 The Constitutional Court is not an integral 
part of any of the other superior courts of South Africa, particularly the Supreme Court of 
Appeal. Currently, there are eleven Constitutional Court judges: seven male, five female; 
seven White and four non-White. Its seat is at Johannesburg. 122 
(b) The Supreme Court ofAppeal 
According to ss 166 (b) and 168 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 
1996, the Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest court of appeal in South Africa except in 
constitutional matters. 123 It is devoid of any original jurisdiction. The court consists of a Chief 
Justice and 15 judges of appeal. 124 Of the present judges on the Bench, one is non-White. 125 
There are no females at the Supreme Court of Appeal at present. The court's seat is at 
Bloemfontein. 
Under the old dispensation, the Supreme Court of Appeal was the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of South Africa. It was formed in 1910 as the result of the political uniting 
into the Union of South Africa of the four British Colonies: the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, 
Orange River Colony and Transvaal. 126 In 1910, the establishment of a new structure of 
superior courts within the unified country was widely welcomed. 127 The scheme adopted was 
the creation of a uniform Supreme Court as superior court with different provincial and local 
divisions128, including an appellate division. When in 1950 the possibility of lodging appeals 
to the Privy Council was abolished, the Appellate Division became the highest court in the 
country. 
118 No 108 of 1996. 

119 Section 167 (3) (a) Constitution. 

120 Section 167 (4) (b) Constitution. 

121 Section 167 (4) (a) Constitution. 

122 Section 167 (I) Constitution. Data as of 28 May 1998. The kind assistance of the Department of Justice's Chief 

Directorate of Communications Services Mr. De Villiers Bosman is acknowledged here. 

123 Van Dijkborst, Courts , 92; Hosten et ai, introduction, 389; Du Plessis and Du Plessis, introduction to Law, 88. 

124 Section 168 (I) Constitution. 

125 Data as of 28 May 1998. See above at fn I~2. 

126 South Africa Act of 1909 (9 Edw VII ch.9), Preamble. See further Item 16 (3) (a) Schedule 6 of the Constitution. 

127 Corder, Judges at Work,20. 

128 The Eastern Districts, Griqualand West and Witwatersrand courts became local divisions of their respective provincial 

divisions. See Hahlo, Union, 249. 
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(c) The High Court a/South Africa 
The established structure of the four provincial and various local divisions of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa was subject to change after the end of apartheid.!29 First, the South 
West Africa Provincial Division ceased to be an integral part of the Supreme Court when 
South West Africa was granted independence in 1990. Then, the High Courts of the former 
so-called independent Homelands had to be re-integrated into the structure of the superior 
courts of South Africa.l30 Finally, under s 166 ( c) of the Constitution, the provincial divisions 
of the Supreme Court became divisions of the High Court of South Africa. However, item 16, 
schedule 6 of the Constitution, requires that the future structure of the High Court be in 
accordance with the newly created nine provinces. 
To date, no such rationalisation has taken place. Pending these changes, the High Court 
continues to consist of six provincial divisions!3! and three local divisions.132 For the time 
being, the former TBVC supreme courts 133 continue to function within the nine provinces, 
although apparently not as provincial or local divisions of the High Court of South Africa.134 
With regard to certain matters, the divisions of the High Court are courts of first instance. 
They also hear appeals and review applications from the lower courts. Any constitutional 
matter, except matters that are exclusively decided by the Constitutional Court, may also be 
heard. 135 At present, the High Court (in its narrow sense) consists of 131 judges, of which 14 
are non-white and 6 are female. If one adds the former TBVC supreme courts to this scheme 
the numbers rise to 149 judges, of which 22 are non-White and 6 are female. 136 In 
comparison, in 1988 the Supreme Court consisted of 140 White male judges; in 1978 of 86 
and in 1957 of 57 judges. 137 
129 See Van Dijkhorst, Courts, 94; Rosten at ai, introduction, 390. 
130 For details on courts which have been temporarily 'outside' South Africa see Rosten et ai, Introduction, 397-400. 
131 Cape of Good Rope, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal. 
132 South Eastern Cape, Durban and Coast as well as Witwatersrand. 
133 Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda Supreme Court. 
134 See Sithole v. Minister ofDefence 1995 (I) SA 205 (T) 214 (A)-(C). 
135 Section 169 (a) (i) Constitution. 
136 Data as of 28 May 1998. See fn 122 for full reference. 
137 Dugard, Human Rights, 115; Corder, Judicial Branch, 67. 
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It is necessary to keep in mind that superior court judges are not considered civil servants in 
the ordinary sense regardless of the fact that they adjudicate in the name of the state, and 
receive monthly salaries and pensions from the state. 
(d) Specialised superior courts 
There are a number of special courts that have been established to bring expertise to the 
adjudication process in complex legal areas such as tax, labour, and trade marks or copyright 
law. Some of these courts, for example the labour courts, are courts in the ordinary sense. 138 
Others, for example the income tax courts, are in fact tribunals which adjudicate in a highly 
fonnal (court-like) manner. These court tribunals are staffed by three members, the president 
generally being a judge. He or she is assisted by two lay members, who have significant 
knowledge in their respective fields. These court tribunals are the highest administrative 
courts in South Africa. At present, the following nine special courts have been established: a 
Maritime Court, water courts, patents courts, trade marks courts, copyright courts, 
expropriation and compensation courts, restrictive practices courts, a Land Claims Court, and 
income tax courts. Except perhaps for the latter, these court tribunals enjoy the same status as 
the superior courts oflaw. \39 
1 2 1 2 Inferior courts 
Prior to 1917, each province retained its own pre-Union magistrates' courts system. 
Thereafter, a unitary system of magistrates' courts in 300 magisterial districts was created. 140 
The magistrates courts are courts of first instance and have both criminal and civil 
jurisdiction, although not unlimited. Serious matters (civil and criminal) are confined to 
regional courts, which therefore have geographically extended jurisdiction. 141 This scheme 
will undergo some significant changes when the Magistrates' Courts Amendment Act of 1993 
138 For details see Du Toit et ai, Labour Relations Act. In terms of the Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995 these courts 
replaced the Industrial Court and the fonner Labour Appeal Court. As of 28 May 1998 ten judges sit on the Benches of the 
Labour court and the Labour Appeal Court, of which eight are white males and two are non-white males. For full reference 
as to the data see above at fn 122. 
139 Although the income tax courts are staffed by a judge and two lay assessors, their decisions do not have the force of 
binding precedents. See Baxter, Administrative Law, 244 fn 350; Govender, Acta Juridica 36 (1993), 76 and 79; Claasen, 
THR-HR 57 (1994), 436. 
140 Hosten et ai, Introduction, 403 . 
141 Ibid. at 403-406. 
322 
comes into operation. 142 A more pronounced distinction between the civil and criminal 
functions of the lower courts is envisaged, whereby magistrates' courts and regional courts 
will deal with criminal matters only. Following the same scheme, civil matters of minor 
importance will be dealt with by so-called civil courts for districts, and divisional civil courts 
will receive extended jurisdiction in civil matters. 143 In 1993, South Africa, excluding the 
TBVC territories, had 1 075 magistrates. Of these magistrates, 1 036 were White. 144 
Other inferior courts are the children' and the family courts. 145 These courts are administered 
by magistrates. In addition there operate the small claims courts and the short process courts. 
These courts are administered by so-called commissioners or adjudicators. 146 
Until 1993, magistrates, commissioners and adjudicators were part of the civil service or they 
were volunteers, appointed by the Minister of Justice. In any event, they continued to be 
subject to direction from above. There was no question of inferior judges being truly 
independent judicial officers. In this respect, their institutional position was considerably 
different from that of superior court judges. 147 We will return to this point later. 
1 2 1 3 Administrative tribunals 
Besides the more formalised court tribunals to which we have already referred above, there 
are a vast number of less formal tribunals that take an active part in the adjudication process, 
including over 20 appellate boards alone to which one can turn in order to have an 
administrative decision reconsidered. To mention just a few, there are licensing appeal boards, 
town and regional planning appeal boards, immigration appeal boards, the Publications 
Appeals Board, the Rent Control Board and the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. 148 
There are, further, numerous local administrative control boards of first instance; for example, 
142 No 120 of 1993 . 

143 Section 2 29B, 46A and 50A Pend lex Magistrates' Courts Act No 32 of 1944 after the Magistrates ' Courts Amendment 

Act No 120 of 1993. Included in Juta's Statutes ofSouth Africa, 2-49. 

144 Fernandez, AnalYSis and Critique, 117. 

145 See s 9 (1) (a) (v) Magistrates ' Courts Act No 32 of 1944; s 5 Child Care Act No 74 of 1983. 

146 See Hosten et ai, Introduction, 405-408; Van Dijkhorst, Courts , 108. 

147 Labuschagne 1993 De Jure , 360. A different opinion is shared by Wiechers, Administrative Law II, 97 fn5. 
148 Rabie, J979 De Jure, 146; Baxter, Administrative Law, 266; Govender, Acta Juridica 36 (1993), 82; partly outdated is 
Will , Machinery of Law, 284-320. 
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local road and air transportation boards, rent boards and liquor boards. 149 Registrars in certain 
branches of the public service also adjudicate. There are inter alia the Registrars of Trade 
Marks, Banks, Pension Funds, Patents, Deeds, Companies and Building Societies. 150 The 
number of administrative tribunals and the variety of procedural rules, staffing or appeal 
procedures is mind boggling. At present, there is talk of introducing an administrative appeal 
court in order to unravel the existing state of confusion. 151 
1214 Courts ofchiefs and headmen 
Finally, it is worth noting that a remnant of the heyday of apartheid continues to exist in the 
African divorce courts. 152 These courts can hear matrimonial disputes between Africans on the 
basis of customary law. All other commissioners' courts and appeal courts (on customary law 
matters) established under the Black Administration Act of 1927 were abolished in 1986. 
1 2 2 Institutional Aspects 
It is common knowledge that South Africa's judiciary found itself for most of this century in 
the maelstrom of apartheid politics. Taking this into account, a description of the role of South 
Africa's judiciary that aims beyond a mere presentation of structure should focus on the 
degree of independence from political interference enjoyed by the judiciary during this period. 
A suitable test might consist of two parts. The judiciary'S independence may be assessed 
149 Du Plessis and Du Plessis, Introduction to Law, 94; Baxter, Administrative Law, 265; Govender, Acta Juridica 36 
(1993),80-81; Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 141. 
150 Van Dijkhorst, Courts, 110; Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 278. 
151 Govender, Acta Juridica 36 (1993), 82 remarks, that the state of the tribunals in South Africa at present is not much 
different from the state of the English tribunals that lasted into the 1950s which were once described as follows: "Some 
tribunals sat in public, others sat in private. Some allowed unrestricted legal representation, others allowed none. Some 
followed legal rules of evidence, others disregarded them. One allowed full examination and cross-examination of witnesses, 
others allowed witnesses to be questioned only through the chairman. Some took evidence on oath, others did not. Some 
gave reasoned decisions, others did not." See also Baxter, Administrative Law, 267 et seqq. 
152 See s 71 Magistrates' Courts Amendment Act No 120 of 1993 and Special Courts for Blacks Abolition Act No 34 of 
1986. A structure of special black courts was introduced to South Afiica in 1927 by the Black Administration Act. Hence 
courts of chiefs and headmen were enabled to apply customary law in all civil and criminal disputes where the parties were 
black people, with the exception of certain serious offences as rape or murder. The divorce courts were created by s 10 
Black Administration Act (1927) Amendment Act No 9 of 1929. Generally see Hosten el ai, Introduction, 410; Van 




positively by questioning whether it enjoyed unrestricted jurisdiction and a right to judicial 
review. Negatively, one may ask by which devices and how effectively was the judiciary 
protected from external influences. 
1221 Power of judicial review and the ambit ofthejudiciary'sjurisdiction 
Section 2 of the South African Constitution states that the Constitution is the supreme law of 
the country. In addition, s 165 (1) and (2) of the Constitution state that all judicial authority is 
vested in the courts and that all courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution 
and the law. Hence, the courts' task is to uphold and to protect the Constitution. One of the 
most important means of fulfilling this task is judicial review. Section 172 (1) assigns to the 
courts the power to review the constitutionality of all legislative and executive acts. 153 
However, for most of this century it was Parliament that reigned supreme under the so-called 
Westminster System. 1S4 This traditional English concept was implanted in South Africa by 
virtue of the South Africa Act of 1909.155 The decisive characteristics of the Act were 
indivisibility, unlimitability and originality.lS6 The unlimitability of parliamentary 
sovereignty, in particular, denied the courts power of full judicial review. According to ss 35, 
137 and 152 of the South Africa Act, superseded by s 34 (2) of the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act of 1983, courts were not entitled to pronounce on the validity of any Act of 
Parliament. The only testing right was to declare invalid legislation that was enacted in non­
compliance with the prescribed procedure. IS7 Denial of the right to full judicial review placed 
the judiciary in a difficult position during the years of apartheid: it was mostly by means of 
153 Basson, inJerim Constitution, 13 and 143; Du Plessis and Corder, Bill ofRights, 109-116. 

154 Dicey, introduction, 70 defined this supremacy as follows: "[T]he principle of parliamentary sovereignty means neither 

more or less than this, namely that parliament has under the English constitution the right to make or unmake any law 

whatever, and further that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having the right to override or set aside 

the legislation of parliament." 

155 9 Edw VII Ch 9 (1909). 

156 Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 146. 

157 South Afiica Constitutional Act No 110 of 1983. See also s 18 (I) and (2). See in this regard Mpangele & Another v 

Botha & Others 1982 (3) SA 633 (N). Further details at Dugard, Human Rights, 14 and 25-36; Boulle et aI, Constitutional 





















legislative measures, invariably enacted in correct form and manner by an omnipotent, 
undemocratic and racist Parliament, that apartheid was entrenched and enforced. 158 
When, in the early 1950s, the Appellate Division declared invalid pieces of apartheid 
legislation that were intended to remove 'Cape Coloureds' from the common voters' roll, a 
constitutional crisis arose.1 59 Even though the goverrunent's first attempts misfired, in the 
final analysis they were successful. 160 By a 10 to 1 majority, the Appellate Division decided 
that the South Africa Act Amendment Act 9 of 1956 was valid since the Act had been passed 
in procedurally correct form. 161 South Africa's judiciary had shown the limits of its 
constitutional powers. 
In addition, Parliament increasingly excluded and limited the courts' inherent jurisdiction in 
certain matters. The extent this exclusion had reached by the 1990s is evident from the 
Abolition of Restrictions on the Jurisdiction of Courts Act 88 of 1996. After 1927, Parliament 
enacted 108 sections and subsections that restricted the courts' jurisdiction. Although not all 
restrictions were as drastic as the so-called ouster clauses in security legislationl62, it is clear 
how widely the inherent authority of South Africa's judiciary in all legal matters had been 
limited. 163 
158 Prior 1948, the scope of the courts testing right was raised in R v Ndobe 1930 AD 484 and Ndlawana v Hofmeyr No 
1937 AD 229. See Corder, Judges at Work, 152-155 as well as Boulle et ai, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 132­
135 . 

159 Apparently this was not the first constitutional crisis within the trias politica. The crises in the Vrystaot and particularly 

in the ZAR bear striking similarities to the 1950's crisis. In each instance, the crucial issue was the scope of the testing right 

of the judiciary. Generally see Forsyth, Danger for Their Talents, 61-74 with further references at 61 fn20; Kahn, 0 D 

Schreiner, 35-59; Boulle et ai, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 117-123 and 132-149. 

160 Separate Voters Act No 46 of 1951 rejected by the Appellate Division' s decision in Harris v Minister ofInterior 1952 

(2) SA 428 (A) and High Court of Parliament Act No 35 of 1952 declared invalid by the decision in Minister ofInterior v 

Harris 1952 (4) SA 769 (A). 

161 Collins v Minister ofInterior 1957 (I) SA 552 (A). According to the Appellate Division Quorum Act No 27 of 1955 an 

additional six judges of appeal had to be nominated . See also below at 1 2 2 2. 

162 See for example sec 58 Public Safety Act No 3 of 1955; Natives Act No 64 of 1956 or the infamous ss 28, 29 and 30 of 

the Internal Security Act No 74 of 1982. Further Staatspresident v United Democratic Front 1988 (4) SA 830 (A). See 

8asson, SAJOHR 3 (1987),28-43 for a discussion . 

163 Mathews, Freedom , 28-29; Andrew, South Africa, 296. 
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1222 Appointment to, removal from and tenure ofoffice 
Procedures with regard to appointment and removal of judges playa pivotal role in providing 
for a truly impartial and independent judiciary. 
Throughout legal history, the process of appointing judges has been a subject of intense 
controversy.164 Recent events in South Africa provide us with yet another illustration of this 
historical tendency. 165 According to s 100 of the South Africa Act of 1910 and, later, s 10 (1) 
(a) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959, judges were appointed by the head of state on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Justice. The lack of more detailed regulations put this 
sensitive process completely at the mercy of the executive. 166 This inevitably led to a number 
of critically received appointments to and promotions within the Bench. 167 
The events surrounding the enactment of the controversial Appellate Division Quorum Act 27 
of 1955 are further proof of the tendency of the executive to pack the Bench.168 Once the 
tendency was established, highly qualified but politically unsafe candidates for promotion 
169continued to be overlooked throughout the apartheid years. In 1983, the Hoexter 
Commission inter alia noted the following in regard to the appointment process: 
"There are indications in the evidence before the commission that...for elevation... individual merit 
has not always been the decisive factor. Judicial appointments sometimes betray an element of 
arbitrariness." 170 
164 Some colourful legal historic examples from the Common Law can be found in Gauntlett, 1990 Consultus, 23 . 
165 The intense public debate on the appointment of the present Chief Justice in 1996 has been described by a commentator 
as " ... one of the most divisive rows to hit the judiciary since the 1950s" (M Soggot in Mail & Guardian September 20-26, 
1996 at 4). Further see Mail & Guardian September 20 - 26, 1996 at 4-5 ; Cape Times October 4, 1996 at 8. 

166 Even though it might have been regarded as general practice to exercise any appointment in close connection with the 

respective Judge President or the Chief Justice, no single statute provided for this. See Kahn, 0 D Schreiner, 37-38. 
167 See particularly the comments with respect to common practice in appointing judges made by the Hon Mr Justice 
Didcott in his evidence before the Hoexter Commission. See Kahn, SAL.! 97 (1980), 661-662; Corder, Judges at Work, 23 
fn33 and 39. 
168 In terms of this Act, legislated at the climax of the constitutional crisis, it was required that eleven judges sat on a case 
where the validity of an Act of Parliament was in question . Since the Appellate Division at that time consisted of only five 
judges, six additional judges had to be appointed. It is indisputable that the appointments of some of the six were political 
appointments to secure the franchise question. For details see Forsyth, Danger to Their Talents , 14-25; Hahlo and Kahn, 
Union, 159; Corder, Supreme Court, 96-98 . 

169 Kahn, SAL.! 97 (1980), 661 -662 and 0 D Schreiner, 48 and 53 ; Gauntlett, 1990 Consultus , 23-24. 

170 Commission ofInquiry into the Structure and the Functioning ofthe Courts RP 78/83 Part A 59. 
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However, the commission's recommendation of an independent judicial appointment 
commission was not accepted. 171 On the contrary, the situation worsened when the executive 
decided in 1987 to 're-appoint' Rabie CJ as Acting Chief Justice for another two-year tenn 
following his retirement at the age of 70.172 It also promoted Natal Judge President Milne to 
the Appellate Division, apparently in order to stop him from assigning political suits to judges 
.. I f h 173cntlca 0 t e government. 
With regard to aspects of removal from office, s 101 of the South Africa Act of 1909 and later 
s 10 (7) of the Supreme Court Act of 1959 stated that a judge could be removed from office 
only by the Governor-General or the State President upon address of both Houses of 
Parliament during the same session, on the ground of misbehaviour or incapacity.174 Not a 
single South African judge has been removed from the Bench so far. Nonetheless, at the 
height of the constitutional crisis in the 1950s, the National Party considered legislation to 
remove all judges of appeal from office.175 
It is little wonder that the formal means of protection of judicial independence came under 
review after the end of the apartheid era. 176 New regulations have been introduced to secure 
the process of nomination, appointment and removal from undue influence. According to s 
174 (1) of the Constitution, any " ... appropriately qualified woman or man who is a fit and 
proper person may be appointed as a judicial officer". The President and the Deputy Judge 
President of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the State President after consulting the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC) and the leaders of the parties in the National Assembly. 177 
Other constitutional court judges are appointed by the State President from a list of candidates 
171 Ibid at 60. 
172 The retirement age is now regulated in ss 3 - 4 Judges' Pensions and Remuneration Act of 1989. 
173 According to Abel, Politics, 18 allegedly because the executive considered Rabie's potential successors as not 
sufficiently capable or politically loya\. See also Cameron, SAJOHR 3, 345; ICJ, Report, Ill. But see Editorial, 1989 
Consultus, 5. 

174 Amended by s 1 Act No 18 of 1985. See Labuschagne, 1993 De Jure, 361-362. 

175 For the whole see Forsyth, Danger for Their Talents, 36 with further references. 
176 See generally the contributions in Norton, Reshaping the Structures; Corder, Empowerment and Accountability further 
Corder's contribution with regard to the appointment of judges in Stellenbosch LR 2 (1992), 207-229; Gauntlett, 1990 








prepared by the JSc.178 The Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice are appointed by the 
State President solely, after consultation with the JSC. 179 All other judges of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa are appointed by the State President on the advice of the JSc. ISO Other 
judicial officers must be appointed in terms of an Act of Parliament which must ensure all 
necessary safeguards to protect the impartiality and independence of the officer. lSI Judges of 
the Constitutional Court hold office for a non-renewable term of 12 years. Like all other 
judges they have to retire at the age of70. ls2 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the JSC plays a crucial role in the nomination process. 
This advisory body is entirely new to South Africa. IS3 It was devised to take the selection 
process out of the hands of the executive and to create a body consisting of members of the 
legal as well as non-legal professions. According to s 178 (1) of the Constitution, the JSC 
consists at present of 10 legal and 15 non-legal members. ls4 The importance of the JSC is 
further evident from its role in the process of removal of a judge. The Constitution provides 
that the State President can remove a judge only if the JSC finds that the judge suffers from 
incapacity, is grossly incompetent or is guilty of misconduct, and the National Assembly calls 
for that judge to be removed by a resolution supported by at least two-thirds of its members. 185 
1223 Remuneration 
According to s 10 (1) (a) of the Supreme Court Act of 1959, judicial salaries are determined 
by the Judges' Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act of 1989 as amended and, as 




179 Section 174 (3) Constitution. 

180 Section 174 (6) Constitution. 

181 Section 174 (7) Constitution. 

182 Section 176 (I) and (2) Constitution; s 3 Judges' Pensions and Remuneration Act of 1989 as amended. 

183 For details on development towards the JSC see Corder, Empowerment and Accountability, 8-11 and Stellenbosch LR 2 

(1992), 207-230; Gauntlett, 1990 Consultus, 23-27; O'Regan, Enforcement, 3-6. A critical assessment of the JSC is 

provided for by R Calland 'Scrutinising the JSC's scrutineers' Cape Times October 4, 1996 at 8. 

184 The JSC's novel approach to the appointment process is also evident from the fact that it proposed to promote to the 
Bench not only senior members of the Bar but also senior magistrates as well as academics. At present there are three 
academics on the Constitutional Court (A Sachs, K O'Regan and Y Mokgoro). In 1995 Professor J Hlophe was appointed 
to the Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division of the High Court and in 1998 Professor D Davis was appointed to the same 
court. 
185 Section 177 (J) and (2) Constitution. 
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an additional safeguard, may not be reduced during the judge's tenn in office. 186 Furthennore, 
no judge may hold any other office or receive any emoluments or remuneration other than his 
or her salary. 187 
1 3 The role of South Africa's judiciary in the twentieth century 
An overview of the development of South Africa's judiciary would be incomplete if it did not 
address the questions that arise with regard to the role the judiciary played during the period of 
apartheid. 188 
From a sUbjective point of view it appears that, throughout the century, well-trained and 
experienced judges sat on the Benches of the South African superior courts. I89 Hence it would 
be quite inappropriate to discuss professionality and legal education of judges as in earlier 
chapters. The professional development of South Africa's judiciary rested on the 
improvements made at the end of the last century, and was boosted in the main by the creation 
of full-time law faculties at South Africa's universities, which finally put legal education on a 
finn footing. l90 Today, an LLB degree is obligatory for admission to the Bar and Side Bar. 191 
The structure of the Bar and its interaction with the Bench is important in this regard. 
Remarkably, the close relation between Bench and Bar has remained basically unaltered, even 
though litigation in a modern and industrialised state has changed considerably since the last 
century. The Bar remains a small and highly exclusive society with considerable institutional 
prestige, which provides its members with years of practical experience before they are 
eligible for an appointment to the Bench. 192 
186 Section 176 (3) Constitution and s 10 (I) (a) Supreme Court Act of 1959; ss 2 and 5 Judges' Remuneration and 

Conditions of Employment Act of 1989. 

187 Section II Supreme Court Act of 1959. 

188 The critical literature on the judiciary'S performance has grown constantly over the last 30 years. A recent and 

comprehensive overview on published works (not necessarily articles) is provided by Abel, Politics, 555. For a useful 

historical overview see Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases, 32-49. 

189 See for example Corder, Judicial Branch, 67-68. 

190 As successors to the University of the Good Hope which has been only an examining body. See the University Acts No 
12, 13, 14 of 1916. On the history of the University of Cape Town's law faculty see H Phillips, VCT, 1-13 and 66-70. At 
present there are 18 law schools operating in South Africa. 
191 Zimmermann, Juristenausbildung in Siidafrika, 986. 
192 Abel, Lawyers, 23 and 48 states in regard to the prestige of English barristers that their status • • is a composite ofU 
history, ascribed characteristics, functions, conventions of deference, the visibility of a few stars, and an exclusive 
< 
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A generally sound base of legal training and experience, however, was no guarantee of 
objective and equitable judgements: a university education at generally White law schools 193 
and, later, in lucrative private practice at the almost exclusively White Bar did not necessarily 
help to foster potential judges' understanding of the needs and realities of the majority of 
South Africa's citizens. 194 During the later years of apartheid, which saw South Africa's 
judiciary applying the fiercest laws - whether perforce or not is a moot point195 - judges came 
under intense suspicion as to the part they played in the machinery of apartheid. This came as 
a surprise to the judiciary, which was held in particularly high esteem by South Africa's White 
minority.196 Criticism was initially cautious since it easily led to serious consequences for the 
critics themselves. 197 Overall, an atmosphere prevailed which the late Professor B van 
Niekerk once described as follows: 
"" ... the functioning of the members of the judiciary in South Africa for all purposes takes place in a 
sort of intellectual vacuum, where their actions, their attitudes and failings (both as individuals and 
as a group) remain unscrutinised amidst the sycophantic praise customarily piled on them .. ,,198 
Over the years, the judiciary had been elevated to holy cow status and was surrounded by an 
'aura of infallibility,.199 As will be seen, the present debate on the question of judicial 
delictual liability has also been affected by this view. 
relationship with the Bench." This also applies to South African advocates. Corder, Judicial Branch, 68; Cameron et ai, 

1980 De Rebus 430 and Judicial Accountability, 184. 

193 Extension of University Education Act No 45 of 1959 abolished by the Universities Amendment Act No 83 of 1983. 

194 Cameron, SAJOHR 6 (1990), 255-256; Forsyth, SAJOHR 7 (1991), 4; Corder, Judicial Branch, 68 and Supreme Court, 

96 as well as SA Public Law 7 (1992), 181-183. 

195 See again above at I 22 1. See Hahlo and Maisels, Virginia Law Review 56 (1966), 12-14; Van den Vyver, Seven 

Lectures, 12-16; Van Blerk, 1992 Consultus, 137. More critical are Millner, Current Legal Problems 14 (1961),280 at 





196 Some describe South Africa's judges as equally eminent as English judges since the latter would consider only the South 

African judges as their equals. See Claasen, SAU 87 (1970), 25. 

197 Note the contempt of court prosecutions against the late Professor B van Niekerk in S v Van Niekerk 1970 (3) SA 655 

(T) and 1972 (3) SA 711 (A). Some authors (Sachs, Millner) appeared on a list of authors who in terms of sec 16 (6) (a) of 

the Internal Security Act No 74 of 1982 were not to be quoted. G Bindman was not readmitted to the Bar after he chaired 

the 1987 ICJ's inquiry. A Sachs was the victim of a bomb attack and R Suttner was jailed for several years. 

198 SAU 95 (1978), 592-593. 

199 Marcus, SAJOHR I (1985), 237; Cameron, SAJOHR 6 (I 990), 255 and Judicial Accountability, 185; Corder, Judges at 



















Although differences in terms of ideological (liberal, socialist, Marxist) or theoretical 
(instrumentalist, structuralist, realist) perspectives of the various critics are apparent, the 
essence is the same: the judgements of the courts, especially in regard to questions of race, 
internal security and hwnan rights, were generally an abandonment of basic liberal values and 
freedoms regardless of a strong English and Roman-Dutch tradition in that respect. The 
jUdiciary was described as executive- or establishment-minded.2oo Under strong positivistic 
influence, the courts confined themselves to a mere application of the legislation and 
abandoned an activist law-making position.201 It was argued that the judiciary as a 
predominantly White group of men saw their role rather as protectors of established values, of 
social stability and of the status quo than as proponents of true equality.202 
Not surprisingly, this acid criticism has evoked wrathful reactions from the judiciary, the 
executive, politicians and also from academics.203 The critics were inter alia said to have used 
inaccurate, selective and inconclusive statistical data.204 It was argued that needless damage 
was caused to the jUdiciary by unwarranted criticism since the critical literature tended 
towards oversimplification, generalisation, exaggeration, one-sidedness and distortion.205 
However, contrary to the opinion of some, it appears that most of the judiciary's critics seem 
to have borne in mind that simple generalisations were misplaced in this debate.206 It was 
acknowledged by the critics that, throughout the era of apartheid: there were judgements that 
200 ICJ, Erosion, iv; Hlophe, SAU 112 (1995),25; Sachs, Justice in SA, 258; Dugan!, Human Rights, 380. Con finned also 
by a number ofjudges, see Cameron, SAU99 (1982),40; Cowling, SAJOHR 3 (1987), 177-178. 
201 Corder, Judges at Work, 12,232; Millner, CLP 14 (1961), 300; Dugard, Human Rights, 368; Ellman, Time ofTrouble, 
232; Sachs, Justice in SA, 260. The various aspects of the positivistic debate, undoubtedly, have been condensed by 
Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases. For an interesting comparative analysis see Herdegen, Stellenbosch LR I (1990),336-346. 
202 Dugard, Human Rights, 380; Corder, Judicial Branch, 67 and 77; Motala, CILSA 24 (\991), 298, Dyzenhaus, Hard 
Cases, 49-5 I. For a valuable sununary of the developments in South Africa see De Vos, South African Judiciary, 43-67 and 
Forsyth, Time ofCrisis , 25-35. 
203 See Abel, Politics, 12-13; Van Blerk, Judge and be Judged and SALJ 99 (1982), 365 as well as 1992 Consultus, 135­
140; Steyn, THR-HR 30 (1967),101; Ogilvie Thompson, SALJ 89 (1972), 23; Rumpf[, SALJ91 (1974),529; Rabie, De 
Jure 16 (1983), 21; Coetsee, SAJOHR 4 (1988), 94. In a speech to the Association of Law Societies in 1988 then Minister 
of Justice Coetsee ascribed criticism at the judicial system to 'radical and activistic practitioners and academics' to whom 
the existence of ajudicia\ system with a good reputation was an 'obstacle'. See 1988 Annual Survey ofSA Law, 517. In the 
presence of increasingly sharp international criticism the Government in 1968 published a defensive report titled South 
Africa and the Rule ofLaw. 

204 Van Blerk, Judge and be Judged, 135-138; Corder, Judicial Branch, 76. 

205 Van Blerk, 1992 Consultus, 135. 
206 De Vos, South African Judiciary, 49. 
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stood up to the high expectations of fairness and justice207; there were judges not necessarily 
suspected of liberal tendencies, who gave fair and reasonable judgements208; that a human 
rights tradition had developed under the influence of some judges; that certain rules inherent 
in the community of the Bar have helped to sustain and to reinvigorate this tradition209; that 
liberal judgements which found loopholes in apartheid legislation were negated by following 
'blocking' legislation21O; that a judge was indeed in a dilemma in having sworn to apply the 
law but having to defy the dictates of his conscience when it came to the application of 
draconian security and unjust race laws211 ; and that the Appellate Division during the 
constitutional crisis of the 1950s took a firm stand against the measures of Parliament and the 
212government.
It is important to note that the debate has been predominantly an academic one. However, the 
vast majority of South Africans also took a critical view of judges. Despite averments to the 
contrary, the jUdiciary suffered a serious crisis of legitimacy.213 Moreover, the judiciary was 
totally unrepresentative of South Africa's population at large. In 1990, all judges were still 
White. The first non-White judge ever in South Africa's entire legal history accepted an 
appointment only in 1991.214 At that stage, there had been only one White female judge.2lS In 
1990, a mere 19 out of981 magistrates were non_White.216 This exclusively White magistracy 
was perceived as not independent and as biased in favour of the state.217 Such inroads into 
fundamental procedural liberties as restriction of the audi alteram partem rule or detention 
207 Corder, Judges at Work, 76; Motala, CILSA 24 (1991), 296. 

208 Sachs, Justice in SA, 144 and 257; Ellman, LSE 20 (1995),419; Dugard, Human Rights, 322-323; Millner, 1962 ILLQ, 

887; Ellman, Times a/Trouble, 230; see for example Nkwentsha v Minister 0/Law and Order 1988 (3) SA 99 (A). 
209 Ellman, Times o/Trouble, 205 et seqq. and 230; Sachs, Protecting Human Rights, 99. 
210 Corder, Judges at Work, 243; Sachs, Justice in SA, 147; Green, 1987 WLR, 341; Andrew, South A/rica, 293 . 

211 De Vos, South African Judiciary, 59 and Forsyth, Time o/Crisis, 26. 

212 Forsyth, Danger to Their Talents, 3 et seqq; Corder, Judges at Work, 239. 

213 Van Blerk, 1992 Consult us, 135-140. See, however, South Africa: HSRC, 1985 Report and South Africa: Hoexter 

Commission Report, 193. See also Editorial Note, 1991 Consultus, 3; D1amini, SAJOHR 4 (1988), 37; Corder, Stellenbosch 

LR 6 (1995), 204-207; Qwelane, Communities, 1-12; Motala, CILSA 24 (1991),297; Davis, SAJOHR 3 (1987), 229-233. 

For a mediatory opinion see Ellman, LSE 20 (1995), 407-479 who based his conclusions on a number of surveys performed 

in South Africa in 1981, 1990 and 1993. See also at 423. 

214 I Mohamed, the present Chief Justice. In 1987 H Mall was appointed acting judge. See 1991 Annual Survey, 665-666 

and 1986 Annual Survey, 560; Chaskalson, Reshaping, 14; Motala, CILSA 24 (1991), 297 fu86. 

215 Abel, Politics, 19. 

216 McQuoid-Mason, Trans/ormation, 106-108 and Fernandez, Analysis and Critique, 116. 
217 For instance, Durban magistrates had been subjected to video shows at the height of the perceived 'total onslaught' by 
the secret police. See Abel, Politics, 18; McQuoid-Mason, Trans/ormation, 105. For other examples see Qwelane, 
Communities, 7-9; ICI, Report, 109-115; Fernandez, Trans/ormation, 116. 
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without trial fostered this impression.218 A striking result of this legitimacy crisis was the 
establishment of so-called community courts during the state of emergency in African 
townships, which operated outside any political or judicial contro1.219 
Little wonder that during apartheid some critics questioned whether liberal judges should 
continue to lend legitimacy to South Africa's unjust legal system, and proposed that these 
judges should resign.22o After the end of the apartheid era, some critics argued that the post­
apartheid judiciary should not consist of apartheid's judges.221 To some it seemed doubtful 
whether a judiciary trained and appointed under the old regime should also rule in the new 
order. It was thought that White judges would continue to judge according to values 
inculcated by their social background and training.222 
Obviously, this view was not accepted. Instead, the jUdiciary was obliged to take a new oath 
of office.223 The main argument against dismissal was the fear of weakening the 
administration of justice at a stage when judicial experience was very much needed.224 
Furthermore, this drastic step would have implied that the entire judiciary, from then Chief 
Justice Corbett to the latest acting judge, had failed to fulfil their task as guardians of justice. 
As has been pointed out above, even the judiciary'S fiercest critics have rejected this 
conclusion as an oversimplification.225 
This, again, shows how difficult it is to assess objectively the performance of the judiciary 
during the years of apartheid. To an observer, the performance of South Africa's jUdiciary has 
a wave-like pattern. A critical assessment must reflect that the courts' record covers not only 
internal security or human rights issues, but also many other less controversial ones. It must, 
further, be pointed out that judges throughout the period since 1910 have successfully 
continued to shape South Africa's unique mixed legal system. Nevertheless, the area of 
218 For a detailed overview on the effects the emergency regulations see Mathews, Freedom, 192 et seqq. 

219 Sachs, Protecting Human Rights, 102; IC], Report, 117. 

220 A heated debate broke out subsequent to R Wacks' provocative thesis in his inaugural lecture in 1983. Wacks, SAL! 101 

(1984),268. Response by Dugard in SAL! 101 (1984), 286; Corder, Judicial Branch, 75. See also Green, 1987 WLR, 357­
36\. 

221 For the various proposals see Berat, 199 I TICL!, 204; Hlophe, SAL! 112 (1995), 22-24; Motala, ClLSA 24 (1991), 299­
304; Cowling, SAJOHR 3 (1987), 187-195; Forsyth, SAJOHR 7 (1991), 1-5 and 15-17 and 18 et seq. 

222 Motala, CILSA 24 (1991), 300-30 I and 303-304; Sachs, Protecting Human Rights, 95, Hlophe, SAL! 112 (1995), 24. 

m See s 241 (2A) (7) of the Interim Constitution and Erasmus, Superior Court Practice, Service 6, 1996, A2-136 et seq. 

224 Chaskalson, Res/wping, 13-15. 





human rights was where the judiciary's role as independent arbiter was most needed. At some 
stages, a somewhat liberal spirit seemed at hand; at many others, however, the conservative 
spirit carried the day.226 One tends to agree with John Dugard who said he found it easier to 
identify particular liberal judges than to classify a whole court as such.22? Certainly, a number 
of appointments by the executive were strongly executive-oriented, but not all were228, and 
there have been liberal judgements even by conservative judges. On the other hand, cases are 
legion where courts decided against civil liberties. Although the concept of parliamentary 
supremacy bound the hands of the judiciary, the judicial right to interpretation of the laws 
should have been, and was not, in numerous decisions, used in favour of disadvantaged 
members of society.229 
On balance, it is fair to state that under apartheid South Africa's judges struggled under strong 
positivistic influence to uphold the rule of law?30 To the degree that the state increased its 
pressure to retain a racial oligarchy, especially under the state of emergency, the judiciary's 
impotence and inability to protect individual rights against the state became alarmingly 
evident.231 The judiciary "...unwittingly aided the development of [a] socio-legal system 
which ignor[ed] many of the basic principles ofjustice in South Africa .... ".232 
2 THE SHAPING OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF DELICT AS A 
BACKGROUND TO JUDICIAL LIABILITY 
The civil liability of judges in South African law is regulated by case law as opposed to 
statutory law. Case law on judicial liability extends over a period of more than 115 years. This 
226 For a good summary of the courts' records and performance until 1985 see Corder, Supreme Court, 97-101. 

227 Dugard, Human Rights, 322-323. Although far from being comprehensive, names such as Innes, Centlivres, Schreiner, 

Corbett, Milne, Didcott or Goldstone come to mind. 

228 Ellman, Times a/Trouble, 227-229. 

229 " ... [C]riticism does not mean ... that there are no members of the judiciary who have made a positive contribution to the 

progressive development of the law - even with the constraints of apartheid. But these remain in a hopeless minority." 

Kamba, Future Role a/the Judiciary, 25. Furthermore Dyzenhaus, Hard Cases, 167-176, 213-217. 

230 Millner, CLP 14 (1961), 300; ICJ, Report, 109-115; Cameron, SAJOHR 6 (1990), 262. 

231 Declared for the second time in July 1985. For an assessment of the courts' activist record during this period see Corder, 

Supreme Court, 104-108; Basson, SAJOHR 3 (1987), 28. 

232 Corder, Judges at Work, 241. For an overview on the Appellate Division's record in security matters from 1950 to 1989 


























period coincides almost entirely with the emergence of a South African usus hodiernus that 
witnessed, originally, the increasing influence of English legal concepts and, later, the falling 
back on Roman-Dutch principles. It was particularly the law of delict which, in due course, 
became the focal point of the well known purist-pragmatist controversy?33 It is important to 
bear in mind that the development of judicial liability reflects, to some degree, the strong 
influences of English and Roman-Dutch legal concepts on the law of delict. 
The South African law of delict is based on three pillars which clearly are not of English 
origin: the actiones legis Aquiliae and iniuriarum, which are based on Roman and Roman­
Dutch law, and the action for pain and suffering which has, in part, Germanic rootS.234 The 
actio legis Aquiliae is aimed at recovery of damages for patrimonial loss. The actio 
iniuriarum is aimed at the compensation of sentimental loss. The action for pain and suffering 
comes somewhere in the middle. The actio legis Aquiliae and the actio iniuriarum were 
considerably modified in scope in Roman-Dutch law, and even more so in South African law. 
It has been shown elsewhere that the history of these actions was one of steady extension and 
generalisation.235 It needs to be seen whether this movement towards generalisation 
continues.236 New fields have been explored since the late nineteenth century, continuously 
broadening the scope of Aquilian liability from liability for culpable acts causing physical 
injury to persons or property to liability for any sort of conduct and harm.237 There have also 
233 The related developments have been the subject of numerous treatises, dissertations and articles. For the most recent 

approach, see Zimmermann and Visser, Southern Cross. Further Hosten et ai, Introduction, 352-375; Wille's Principles of 

South African Law, 27-30; Van Zyl, Regsgeskiedenis, 443-503; Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 17-50 and Legal System, 574-596; 

Spiller, Making ofthe Law ofDelict, 335-350; Beinart, Acta luridica 24 (1981), 7 et seqq; Schreiner, Contribution; Visser, 

Legal Historian, 2 et seqq. 

234 Zimmermann, Romisch-holldndisches Recht in Siidafrika, 138; Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 5. 

235 See above chapter IV 2 and chapter V 3. 

236 De Villiers CJ in Cape ofGood Hope Bank v Fischer (1886) 4 SC 368 at 376 stated with regard to Voet and Matthaeus: 

..... that in their time the Aquilian law had received an extension by analogy to a degree never permitted under the Roman 

law. The action ... was extended to every kind of loss sustained by a person in consequence of the wrongful acts of 
another. .." See also Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492 at 504. See also Visser's comments on the firm stand Van der Merwe 
and Olivier have taken in their textbook, see Visser, Legal Historian, 6. For the opposite view see Union Government v 
Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd 1956 (I) SA 577 (A); Lillicrap. Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington 
Bros (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 (I) SA 475 (A). Critical also is McKerron, Delict, 8. Further see Pauw, De Jure 8 (1975),25. 
m See Hutchison, Aquilian Liability II, 595. Examples in this respect are inter alia liability for pure economic loss, for 
negligent misstatements or for omissions. Under the action for pain and suffering reference has to be made to liability for 
emotional shock and. finally, to the adoption of quasi-delictual liability in the form of vicarious liability of employers for 
delicts of their employees. 
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been examples where the courts have pared the law of delict of elements considered obsolete, 
as in the case of the amende honorable238 or the obligation to surrender an offending animal 
under the actio de pauperie.239 
With regard to the category of quasi-delicts we can observe a similar tendency. The category 
of quasi-delicts, which has been considered the 'dogmatical home' of judicial liability until 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was not accepted in the modem South African law 
of delict. Liability on grounds of the actio de effusis vel deiectis as well as the actio de posito 
vel suspenso only very rarely commanded the attention of the South African COurtS.240 The 
liability of the nauta, caupo and stabularius has been absorbed by the concept of vicarious 
liabililf41; and the tendency of Roman-Dutch lawyers to exclude judicial liability from the 
group of quasi-delicts for all practical purposes continued in South African law. 
As we shall see, in modem South African law, judges are sued either under the actio legiS 
Aquiliae or under the actio iniuriarum. Consequently, South African jurists avoided the 
question of the difference between quasi-delictual and delictual liability, which for centuries 
had tormented so many of their predecessors. One may therefore agree with the statement by 
Professor Zimmermann concerning quasi-delictual liability in South African law, that - as in 
most other systems based on Roman law - ".. .its practical significance was limited. Liability 
as a rule was based upon fault, and as long as this remained the fundamental precept...it 
mattered little whether an action was classified as delictual or quasi-delictual.,,242 
238 Hare v White (1865) I Roscoe 246; Ward-Jackson v Cape Times Ltd 1910 WLD 257; Swart v Lion BOllle Store 1927 
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240 See Clair v Port Elizabeth Harbour Board; Kennedy v The Same 5 EDC 311; Marais v Eloff (1893) Hertzog 138; 
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On the other hand, South Africa's legal system would not be considered a mixed legal system 
if it were unmarked by common law influences. In this regard, reference is generally made to 
the British policy of gradualism in Anglicising the legal sphere, which began with the 
introduction of the First Charter of Justice at the Cape Colony in 1827.243 Two distinct 
features of this development may be identified. In the first place, as noted earlier, there were 
extensive legislative influences. Most of the statutes that were enacted were in virtually 
identical fonn to their English counterparts.244 Secondly, a considerable part of English law 
was received in South Africa not by direct statutory enactment but by somewhat covert and 
indirect means by judges who were trained almost exclusively in English law and had to apply 
rules of a legal system they did not really appreciate, or use legal authorities whose language 
they could hardly speak or read.24s Thus, the conducting of court proceedings in English from 
1825 onwards was met with relief.246 
All Roman-Dutch legal tenns had to be translated. In many cases, however, no preCIse 
equivalent was at hand and, thus, those legal tenns were used that appeared most likely to 
match. This, ultimately, led to another consequence: judges' use of English legal tenninology 
on a wide scale opened the door to extensive use of those English legal doctrines that, 
generally, were related to the relevant tenninology.247 Undoubtedly, the judges intended to 
apply Roman-Dutch law. Increasingly, however, Roman-Dutch law acquired an English 
character as the judges superimposed layers ofEnglish common law. 
It has been said that the basis of the South African law of delict was still Roman-Dutch, but its 
spirit and orientation had become increasingly English.248 However, the fonnation of the 
Union in 1910 and the growing national South African (Afrikaner) identity sooner or later also 
243 See above at 1 1 3. 
244 Generally Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 8-20; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 455-457; Devenish, Cape o/Good Hope, 56 refers to an 
osmosis which offered the greatest threat to Roman-Dutch law. See also above at I I and text at fn3 I et seqq and below at 2 
I and 2 2. 
245 See above at I I 3. 

246 See Ordinance No I of 1825 and No 27 of 1826. Further Dunoon, SAiJ 70 (\ 953), 90 et seqq. 

247 Other mechanisms included the possibility of further appeal to the Privy Councilor frequent reference to English cases 
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248 Boberg, SAU 83 (\ 966), 165. For a useful and detailed overview on the development of Aquilian liability during the 

nineteenth century see Van Aswegen, Aquilian Liability i, 559-593. With regard to the actio iniuriarum see again Boberg, 





led to the call for a South African legal identity. It is no exaggeration to say that racial purity 
which found its place on the political banners soon found its corollary in the quest for purity 
in South African law.249 At some of the new law faculties, the focus dramatically shifted from 
English to Roman-Dutch law. Lectures and textbooks dealt exclusively with principles of 
Roman-Dutch law, and in 1937 the Tydskrifvir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg was 
founded as an Afrikaans legal medium for the cultivation of Roman-Dutch law. 
In due course, this led to a confrontation with those who adhered to the status quo. Soon an 
academic war, a bellum juridicum, was declared, which raged between purists250 and 
pollutionists, i.e., between antiquarians and pragrnatists.251 However, it was not until the rise 
of a new generation of lawyers whose legal education and professional careers had already 
come under considerable purist influence that the courts themselves began to purge various 
fields of law of such English influences as were considered superfluous.252 This development 
reached its climax between 1950 and 1970, the first two decades after Afrikaner Nationalists 
came into power. This period saw the abolition of final appeal to the Privy Council in 1950 
and South Africa's leaving the Commonwealth in 1961. During this period, the relationship 
between the Appellate Division and the executive became increasingly hannonious. Legal 
purism undoubtedly had a strong political connotation. 
Today it may be said that a pragmatist approach prevails. South African legislation, and 
precedents are accorded prime authority. Beyond these, Roman-Dutch law is an authoritative 
source, whereas English law is a persuasive one. This rule, however, must always be seen in 
the specific context of the legal case in question.253 To a degree, at least in the law of delict, 
the purist-pragmatist controversy has helped to clarify and develop the law in new fields. Or 
249 Fagan, Historical Context, 61. 

250 Some prominent purists are I van Zijl Steyn, D Pont, J C De Wet, T Price, LC Steyn, FP van den Heever, WA Joubert, 
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as Professor Hutchison once aptly described it: "Fortunately... the war of words, unpleasant as 
it was, generated not only heat but also a great deal oflight.. .".254 
For a better background to the subject of the delictual liability of judges, attention should be 
paid, apart from these general remarks, to two issues: the emergence of the concept of 
wrongfulness under the actio legis Aquiliae and the problematic relation between malice and 
animus iniuriandi under the actio iniuriarum. The development ofjudicial liability in modem 
South African law to a large extent relates to the development of both concepts. To 
wrongfulness, because judicial liability nowadays is a question of wrongfulness and the 
application of policy considerations. To malice, because malice or improper motive, from the 
first days of its application to the liability of judicial officers, provided for considerable 
confusion and entanglement. 
2 1 The emergence of the concept of wrongfulness 
By the end of the nineteenth century, in the South African law of delict, as in Roman-Dutch 
law, wrongfulness or iniuria had not yet been identified as a distinct element for delictual 
liability apart from damage, causation and fault. 255 On the other hand, growing common law 
influences witnessed the acceptance by the courts of the so-called duty of care.256 The duty of 
care concept was regarded in English law as a necessary element in negligence, emerging 
from the courts' reluctance to grant liability for negligent conduct in every situation.257By the 
end of the first half of this century, the concept had established itself well in South African 
law. It operated on two distinct levels, which Millner described as follows: 
"At one level it is fact based, at another it is policy based. The fact-based duty of care fonns part of 
the inquiry whether the defendant's behaviour was negligent in the circumstances. The whole 
inquiry is governed by the foreseeability test. On the other hand, the policy-based .. . duty of care 
is ...basic to the development and growth of negligence and determines its scope, that is to say, the 
range of relationships and interests protected by it. Here it is a concept entirely divorced from 
foreseeability and governed by the policy of the law. ,,258 
254 Hutchison, Aquilian Liability 11,597. 
255 Van Aswegen, Aquilian Liability 1, 568-571. 
256 Price, SALJ 66 (1949), 174. 
257 Hutchison, Aquilian Liability II, 599. The doctrine was finnly established in Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBO 503. See 
Price, SALJ66 (1949), 179. 
258 Millner, Negligence, 230. My italics. 
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Nonetheless, in South Africa, criticism of the duty of care concept rose steadily over the years. 
In Perlman v Zoutendyk, one of the early cases in the field of pure economic loss, 
Watermeyer J for the first time expressed discomfort with the strong influence of English law 
in this field of the law of delict:259 
"Roman-Dutch law ... approaches a new problem in the continental rather than the English way, 
because in general all damage caused unjustifiably (iniuria) is actionable, whether caused 
intentionally (dolo) or by negligence (culpa)." 
The reactions to this decision were very much divided?60 Undoubtedly, the whole issue 
coincided increasingly with the general tendency in these mid-century decades to reconsider 
the influence and infiltration of English law in modem South African private law. Some took 
the view that fault (culpa) in the wide sense was sufficient to control boundless liability. In 
their eyes, iniuria was a rather primitive notion, and duty of care a confusing, ambiguous and 
tautologous concept - a useless repetition of the foreseeability test that already applied under 
the culpa requirement.261 
Others defended the duty of care. They argued that the critics were unaware of its 
implications, namely that it contained two distinct purposes, one of which (the policy-based 
level) bore some connotation of wrongfulness.262 However, in due course, the majority of 
writers came to consider the duty of care ambiguous. Rightly so, since the telescoping of the 
tests for iniuria and culpa created considerable confusion. 263 This dealt a severe blow to the 
concept of duty of care, from which it recovered only in modified form. 
While wrongfulness gained ground, it soon became evident that the criterion of wrongfulness 
had to be defined more accurately. The group of authors who rejected the duty of care concept 
in its entirety defined wrongfulness as the infringement of a legal SUbjective right (subjektiewe 
reg)?64 Four categories of such rights were identified.265 In the eyes of some writers, the 
259 1934 CPD 61 at 64. 
260 Hutchison, Aquilian Liability 11,616. 
261 Price, THR-HR 13 (1950), 261 and Acta Juridica 2 (1959), 127. 
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doctrine of subjective rights correctly shifted the focus from the defendant (could he foresee 
the consequences of his act?) to the plaintiff (what were the consequences for his interests?). 
The doctrine of subjective rights did not prevail, however, and those who favoured it were not 
as far as they thought from the position they had left behind, for right and duty are related 
concepts.266 After the smoke had settled, the courts adopted a mediatory approach. 
Although the courts by no means hastened to throw overboard the old duty of care concept,267 
important decisions were, sooner or later, based on a modified approach towards 
wrongfulness. A landmark decision, not only in the field of omissions, was the 1975 decision 
Minister van Polisie v Ewels.268 In Ewels, policy considerations led the Appellate Division to 
expand liability for omissions.269 Wrongfulness emerged as an important element whereby the 
courts weighed policy considerations against the threat of boundless expansion of liability. 
Ewels is also remarkable for the fact that Rumpff CJ made use of the so-caned concept of 
legal duty.27o In the words of Boberg, legal duty was a first cousin to the duty of care and had 
· bl " 271h d an unpecca e ancestry... .tea vantage"... o f 
In Ewels, thus a dualistic approach emerged: a prima facie wrongful act was considered an 
infringement of a legal right; on the other hand, in those areas of Aquilian liability, for 
instance omission or pure economic loss, where no prima facie infringement of a legal right 
existed since there is no general duty to prevent loss to another by a positive act, or a general 
duty to prevent pure economic loss, the existence of a legal duty is essential to determine 
right is infringed when the relationship between the holder of a right and the object of the right has been affected in a 
legally non permissible manner. See also Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 47. 
26<i Or as Boberg aptly stated " ... finding that [a] right existed implies that the defendant had a legal duty not to infringe it." 
Boberg, Delict, 32 . 
267 SAR & H v Marais 1950 (4) SA 619 (A); Herschel v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA 464 (A). Note, however, the dictum by Van 
den Heever JA who was the only one of the five judges to stress that in fact negligence was not the only requirement on 
which Aquilian liability was based but that iniuria ".. .remained throughout..." (at 487 D-E). For a critical discussion, see 
Mulligan, SAU 71 (1954), 321-323. Further see the dictum by Schreiner JA in Union Government v Ocean Accident and 
Guarantee Corporation Ltd 1956 (I) SA 577 (A) 585. 
268 1975 (3) SA 590 (A). Historically preceded by Steyn JA's minority judgement in Silva 's Fishing Corporation (Pty) Ltd 
v Maweza 1957 (2) SA 256 (A) and the decision in Regal v African Supers late (Pty) Ltd 1963 (I) SA 102 (A); Minister of 
Forestry v Quathlamba (Pty) Ltd 1973 (3) SA 69 (A). For a discussion of developments in the field of omissions, see 
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269 Note, however, that some authors hold that liability for omissions still does not generally exist. See Hutchison, Aquilian 
Liability II, 604-609. 
270 See Boberg, Delict, 231 . 
271 Ibid. at 37. 
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wrongfulness.272 This development culminated in Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van 
Afrika Bpk.273 Here, the element of wrongfulness was, once and for all, identified as a distinct 
element of Aquilian liability, not to be confused with fault. 
Although the original concept of duty of care was considered " .. .'n onding in ons gemene 
reg. .. ,,274, the concept of legal duty or regsp/ig was thought to be necessary to detennine the 
boundaries ofwrongfulness in specific cases.275 It follows that the breach of a legal duty or the 
infringement of a legal right are not distinct alternatives in the consideration of wrongfulness, 
but " ...alternative paths to the policy conclusion that the wrongfulness requirement compels, 
the one or the other seeming more comfortable in the circumstances.,,276 Wrongfulness, 
therefore, was identified as the key for the courts to prevent the spread of delictual liability 
beyond reasonable bounds. 
2 2 The emergence of the concept of malice 
A second aspect, now under the actio iniuriarum, that deserves attention is the relation 
between malice and animus iniuriandi and the emergence of a number of common law 
justification grounds in modem South African law. Few other topics have aroused more 
debate in the South African law of delict than the role of animus iniuriandi. To a degree, this 
debate also affected the development of judicial liability, and a considerable share of the 
confusion which prevailed for decades in this respect was owing to the English concept of 
malice. Once again the dissension that arose in regard to the law of delict during this century 
must be seen against the background of the conflict between purists and pollutionists. 
Ironically, something which has never been at issue under the actio legis Aquiliae, namely the 
exclusion of fault (or animus iniuriandi) as a requirement for liability, became the main issue 
here.277 
272 This is explained unequivocally by Neethling et ai, Law 0/Delict, 49. See also Wille's Principles o/South African Law, 
648; Hutchison, Aquilian Liability II, 634. 
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By the second half of the nineteenth century, South African courts increasingly relied on 
English defences like truth, fair comment and, particularly of course, privilege, to rationalise 
the ostensibly similar Roman-Dutch justification grounds, whose conceptual arrangement they 
had barely managed to grasp.278 As in so many other cases, the adoption of English legal 
terminology in this field resulted in an acceptance of the underlying common law doctrine 
ahnost in its entirety: South African justification grounds to no small degree became one with 
English common law principles and lost their typical Roman-Dutch connotations. 
Once the defendant's conduct had been justified by one of the existing defences, it was no 
longer considered prima facie unlawful. Hence, the common law justification grounds became 
directed against wrongfulness and, unlike the Roman-Dutch defences, no longer against fault 
or animus iniuriandi. This inevitably led to the introduction of a more objectively based 
approach to liability. When, finally, the South African courts began to treat these common law 
defences as numerus clausus, it became evident that the subjective concept of animus 
iniuriandi had become a " ... hollow fiction.,,279 
The prevailing tendency to replace the subjective elements in the law of defamation was 
boosted not only by the introduction of a numerus clausus of defences, but by the dubious 
equation of fault or animus iniuriandi with malice. In Roman-Dutch law, animus iniuriandi 
was accepted as the gist of an action for iniuria.280 However, as early as the middle of the 
nineteenth century, South African courts began to equate the typically English principle of 
malice with the Roman-Dutch principle of animus, precisely in the manner that has been 
outlined above.28I In doing so, the courts overlooked the fact that in English law malice 
played an entirely different role from that of animus iniuriandi in Roman-Dutch law.z82 
Malice was indicative always of an improper motive, but certainly not of fault. Therefore, 
malice was never as decisive in the determination of delictual liability as was fault in Roman­
Dutch law. In English law, malice was merely indicative of what was necessary to overcome 
fonner, wTOngfulness occasioned great pain; under the latter it was hardly worth dispute. In a sense, this ambiguity also 
indicates the underlying lack of principle in the English law of torts. 
278Boberg,SAU 83 (1966),158-165. 
279 McKerron, SAU 48 (1931). 172. 
280 See chapter V 3 fun 114-137 and 5 2 J. The phrase was coined by Schreiner JA in Basner v Trigger 1946 AD 83 at 94. 
Furthennore see Boberg. Defamation, 38; Boberg, SAU 83 (1966), 158-165; Burchell , Principles, 640-649. 
281 See above at I 1 3 fn 98-99. 
282 See text above at chapter V 3 before fn 13 7. 
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certain of the above mentioned defences. However, after animus iniuriandi was pushed aside 
by the courts, malice, at least as indicative of an improper motive, was the sole SUbjective 
concept that retained some relevance in the law of defamation, even though it was hardly 
comparable with animus iniuriandi, which above all depicts the will and never the motive 
behind the will. 283 
The turning point, however, came in 1960 when in Maisel v Van Naeren it was held that 
English legal principles had not ousted Roman-Dutch law.284 Animus iniuriandi was restored 
as an essential requirement for liability under the actio iniuriarum. A defendant was no longer 
bound by a numerus clausus of grounds of justification to rebut the prima facie presumption 
of wrongfulness or animus iniuriandi.285 The decision in Maisel was confirmed by a series of 
three decisions, which culminated in 1977 in SA UK v 0 'Malley.286 Today, the distinction 
between wrongfulness and fault is well established. As a consequence of this new approach 
malice lost its unfortunate influence and was downgraded to playa minor role as a means 
available to a plaintiff to rebut a number of defences. 
2 3 Conclusion 
In summary, it may be said that delictual liability in South Africa is based on a generalising 
rather than on a casuistic approach. It is a system based on principles. Therefore, its 
foundation is in civil law and it is rightly considered a law of delict rather than a law of 
delicts.287 Delictual liability entails compensation for harm wrongfully and culpably inflicted 
and consists of five distinct elements, namely an act, wrongfulness, fault, damage and 
causation, which must be present before delictual liability can arise.288 For the determination 
of wrongfulness, generally the boni mores or the legal convictions of the community serve as 
283 Ranchod, Foundations, 133-134 and 137-138. 
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the main criterion.289 Thus, wrongfulness is determined by balancing all those vanous 
constitutional, social, moral, economic or legal policy factors that are at stake in the particular 
case. 290 Generally, the test is objective. It applies ex post facto. However, as already indicated, 
in certain circumstances SUbjective factors (eg. malice) lying within the sphere of the 
defendant may also have relevance in regard to the determination of wrongfulness.291 With an 
eye on the dogmatical foundation of the concept the influence of subjective factors frequently 
is discussed under the doctrine of abuse of right. 
It is, furthermore, important to distinguish improper motive or malice from fault. With some 
exceptions, liability in delict will arise only if fault exists. Two forms of fault are identified: 
intention (dolus) and negligence (culpa). Fault, unlike wrongfulness (apart of course from the 
concept of the reasonable man that applies specifically to the determination of negligence) is a 
subjective concept. It refers to the reprehensible state of mind or conduct of someone. 
Improper motive is a different subjective concept, which entails a reprehensible purpose or 
objective behind the will of the defendant.292 
The defendant may rebut the presumption of wrongfulness by showing the applicability of a 
justification ground. Relatively late, in Wentzel v S.A. Yster en Staalbedryfsvereniging, for the 
first time a clear-cut distinction was drawn between defences against wrongfulness and 
defences against fault, which is in accordance with the two distinct elements of delictual 
liability?93 Hence, defence, necessity, provocation, consent to injury, statutory authority, 
official capacity and power of chastisement are accepted as traditional grounds of justification 
excluding wrongfulness under the actio legis Aquiliae, and truth, public benefit, privilege and 
fair comment are additional justification grounds under the actio iniuriarum.294 
289 Wille's Principles ofSouth African Law, 648; Boberg, Delict, 33. For a more diversified approach see Neethling et ai, 

Law ofDelict, 31-43. 

290 Boberg, Delict, 33; Wille 's Principles ofSouth African Law, 649. 

29 1 Most often instances that fall within the ambit of neighbour law or in relation to cases of pure economic loss or 

omissions. See for further references, Neethling et ai, Law of Delict, 37-38. Neethling rightly stresses the point that 

improper motive (often referred to as malice) may not be confused with intent. See also Boberg, Delict, 32 and 38-39. 

292 Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 38; McQuiod-Mason, Law ofPrivacy, 104. 

293 1967 (3) SA 91 (n. See further SA UK v 0 'Malley 1977 (3) SA 394 (A) and Boberg, Defamation, 48 et seq. 

294 See right below at 3 1 for more details. 
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JUDICIAL LIABILITY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF DELICT 
3 1 Introduction 
On the 27,28 and 29 October 1997, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) heard oral 
testimony on what it considered relevant activities of judicial officers, other public servants 
involved in the judicial process, legal practitioners and legal academics during the apartheid 
years from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date of 10 May 1994. Even though the judges refused to 
give oral evidence, a munber of judges responded positively to the invitations of the TRC in 
August 1997 and prepared written representations concerning the involvement of the judiciary. 
One year earlier, then Chief Justice Mr Justice M M Corbett responded to a presentation by Mr 
Krish Govender entitled Injustice under Apartheid Judiciary that suggested that judges who held 
office prior to April 1994 should be held accountable for their conduct. In dealing with Mr 
Govender's proposals, the fonner Chief Justice said: 
"1 am opposed to this suggestion [holding the judiciary accountable for their conduct during the 
apartheid era], basically for two reasons. In the first place it is not practically feasible. In order to 
determine whether Judge X had allowed justice to be subverted in some alleged manner in a particular 
case, the TRC would in effect have to retry the case: read the record of the proceedings (often very 
long) and determine ...whether or not Judge X came to the correct conclusion or not, and, if not, 
whether this was due to some improper factor or reason. The mind boggles at what all this would 
involve. The impracticality of it all is manifest. 
But there is a more important, a more fundamental, objection to this suggestion. This has to do with 
the principle ofjudicial independence ... In order to be true to his judicial oath and to administer justice 
to all persons alike "without fear, favour or prejudice" a judge must enjoy independence from the 
legislature, from the executive ... Various constitutional provisions underpin such independence: for 
example, the appointment ofjudges for life .. . ; a prohibition on the reduction of their salaries; security 
of temrre of office ... This does not mean that a judge is not accountable or above the law. He is 
accountable to a superior court of appeal; he performs his duties openly and in public ... and in the last 
resort there is impeachment. Outside these parameters, however, a judge may not be called upon to 
. d " 295account fior his or her JU gements.... 
On reading this statement, the question that immediately comes to mind is whether the Chief 
Justice's omission ofjudicial liability as another means of accountability was merely a lacuna on 
his part or whether his statement reflects the taboo status of judicial liability?96 In the words of 
the fonner Chief Justice in the first paragraph of the quote, 'the mind boggles' at what holding a 
judge accountable would involve. However, the requirements he refers to are precisely those that 
have to be met at present to hold a judge delictually liable in South African law: First, 
295 See SAU 115 (1997), 20. For a critical account of the TRC hearings see most recently Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges. 
296 A similar example is provided by the comments of Froneman ] in Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison, 
& another J994 (4) SA 592 (SE) at 598. 
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determination of a wrong judgement and secondly, determination of the relevant state of mind, 
that is improper motive. This notwithstanding, the former Chief Justice considered the 
'impracticality' of it all as manifest. 
These cotnments of the former Chief Justice fail to surprise. From discussions at various times 
with South African judges and legal academics, there emerges the widespread belief that to sue a 
judge in South Africa is, to say the least, impossible. In a sense, one is confronted here with what 
has been referred to above as the 'aura of infallibility' surrounding the South African jUdiciary. 
Surprisingly, this persists despite the clear regulation of the delictual liability ofjudicial officers 
in South African law. 
It is true that a number of models of judicial liability referred to in the general introduction to 
this thesis are not adopted by South African law.297 For example, direct liability of the state for 
its judges does not exist. In addition, since the judiciary is not subject to legislative or 
administrative control, the master and servant relationship required for vicarious liability cannot 
be established. In South African law, as in Roman law, in the Italian ius commune, in Roman­
Dutch law, and to some extent in English law, judicial liability is exclusively personal liability in 
delict. 
One reason for the amazement of South African judges when confronted with the idea ofjudicial 
liability might be that to date, the threat of delictual liability can hardly be said to have been put 
into effect. In fact, not a single superior court judge has been held delictually liable since 1652. 
However, this does not mean that there are no principles by which superior court judges could be 
held liable. Principles of judicial liability can be deduced from about a dozen reported cases 
which deal with the judicial liability of inferior court judges, from cases that deal with the 
judicial process as such and, of course, from the application of general principles of the law of 
delict. 
It should be noted that the rationales underlying judicial liability apply to superior and inferior 
court judges alike. To avoid ambiguity, reference will be made, generally, to liability ofjudicial 
officers, which includes liability of superior court judges. As we will see at a later stage, this 
principle needs to be qualified with regard to procedural aspects of liability of judicial officers. 
297 See De Villiers v Minister ofJustice 1916 TPD 463; Smith v Union Government 1933 AD 363; Swarts v Minister ofJustice 
1941 AD 181. 
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There, superior court judges enjoy a special privilege which is not shared by their brethren in the 
inferior courts. 
Depending on the nature of the infringement suffered, the injured party may institute an action 
under any of the main delictual actions, i.e., the actio legis Aquiliae, the actio iniuriarum or the 
action for pain and suffering. Consequently the generally accepted elements of liability must be 
met. Nonetheless, it might be useful to spell out these elements in more detail by paying specific 
attention to the requirements for judicial liability. 
ludicialliability requires conduct, on the part of the judicial officer which has caused damage or 
harm to another. This might be in the form of infringement ofpersonality rights, i.e., corpus (eg., 
order of sterilisation), lama (eg., defamation in court), fibertas (eg., deprivation of liberty) or 
dignitas (eg., humiliation in court). It might also cause patrimonial loss in consequence of an 
order or a judgement, i.e., by causing irreparable loss (eg., enforced warrant of execution) or 
additional costs of appeal or review. 
Furthermore, there must be fault. Generally the judicial officer must have acted deliberately, 
although it might well be asked whether or not negligent conduct should be actionable, too. 
The availability of justification grounds usually prevents the judicial conduct from being 
considered wTOngful. Nonetheless, the question that arises is when the judicial officer's 
protection will be lost. At this stage it is necessary to distinguish between cases of defamation or 
insult by an officer and those cases that depend on an order or a judgement. In the former, the 
conduct is wrongful and the justification ground (here generally referred to as qualified 
privilege) is forfeited when the judicial officer was actuated by an improper motive. In the latter, 
namely cases ofpatrimonial loss and deprivation of liberty, two conditions must exist before the 
protection of the justification ground (here referred to as official capacity) is lost: the 
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judgement/order must be wrong in law or fact; secondly, the judgement/order must be made 
with a particular state of mind not identical with fault (intention), i.e., improper motive.298 
Delictual liability ofjudicial officers in South African law, therefore, is, above all, a question of 
the availability of justification grounds. Two aspects in this respect call for specific comment. 
First, it is surprising that South African courts and legal academics have by and large omitted to 
deal with the important question of when a judgement is wrong in law or fact. A likely reason 
(among others299) for this lack of attention is that South African courts have rarely been called 
upon to decide such questions. There is only one recent case that deals in detail with judicial 
liability for wrongful imprisonment. 300 Meanwhile, there has not been a single decision ever on 
the question of liability for patrimonial loss in consequence of wrongful misjudgements by 
superior or inferior court judges. The considerable lack of terminological and substantial clarity 
in this area will be discussed in due course. Reaching clear definitions has two objectives: to 
provide a constitutionally acceptable definition of wrong judgements and to use this for a critical 
assessment of the present South African law ofjudicial liability. 
Secondly, notwithstanding the distinction between the two justification grounds of qualified 
privilege and official capacity, the tendency has been to include both justification grounds in one 
generic term: public office.301 It has been argued that in the case of judicial officers qualified 
privilege has the same requirements, scope and consequences as the justification of official 
capacity.302 For reasons that will be explained in due course, this thesis favours a mixed 
approach. 
298 Apart from the dubiousness of recoverability of economic loss generally, it is essential to note in this respect that to this 
day there has not been a single decision by South African courts on the specific liability of judges (of superior or inferior 
courts) under the actio legis Aquiliae for economic loss. Matthews v Young and The Cape alGood Hope Bank v Fischer 
dealt exclusively with the liability of so-called quasi-judicial bodies and provided for nothing except presumptions with 
regard to a legal classification of economic loss caused by judgements of ordinary courts. (See below at 3 3). Therefore, 
there has never been an exact terminological definition by the courts or in the literature of the legally acceptable 
categorisation of the wrongful causing of economic loss by a judicial decision. For the purposes of this thesis, and in 
analogy to the clearer field of wrongful imprisonment by judicial officers, such cases will be referred to as wrongful 
misjudgement. Wrongful misjudgement and wrongful imprisonment have one thing in common: the individual suffers from 
a wrong decision by a judicial officer. Consequently, while aspects of the underlying 'judicial mistake' are discussed, both 
instances will be included in the category of wrong judgement. 
299 See below at 3 5 I and 3 5 22 (a) . 
300 Moeketsi v Minister van Justisie en 'n Ander 1988 (4) SA 707 (T). 
lOI See for instance Midgley, Delict, 75. 
302 Ibid. at 82. 
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For practical reasons, in what follows, the development and the present law of judicial liability 
will be analysed by paying particular attention to those fields where South African courts have 
already been called upon to decide on questions ofjudicial liability. 
Therefore, infringements of personality rights or, more precisely, for defamation in court will be 
discussed first. It appears that the courts have given priority to this area. Distinguishing features 
ofjudicial liability for infringement of personal liberty and patrimonial loss are easier to depict 
against the background of liability for infringements ofJama. This is followed by an analysis of 
the law of civil liability of so-called quasi-judicial bodies and, thereafter, a critical assessment of 
the present law of judicial liability in the light of the new constitutional dispensation and a 
different interpretation of the historical Roman-Dutch authorities. 
32 Judicial liability for infringements of personality rights 
3 2 1 Liability for defamatory remarks made in the course of judicial proceedings 
32 1 1 Bosman v Bisset 
In 1881, for the first time, a South African court was called upon to determine the liability ofa 
judicial officer for defamation in court under the actio iniuriarum.303 Bosman v Bisset dealt with 
the allegation of defamatory remarks made by a magistrate against a prospective witness who 
appeared to have been drunk. On re-reading the case, it is illuminating to note that all but one of 
the authorities quoted by counsel were English cases.304 Advocate Upington, who appeared for 
the plaintiff, argued exclusively along the lines of the English doctrine of judicial privilege. In 
his eyes, the defence of privilege of judicial proceedings raised by the defendant could not be 
upheld since the magistrate had uttered his slanderous remarks without having jurisdiction. 
Therefore, he argued, Bisset had acted coram non judice and had lost the protection of privilege. 
It should be noted, however, that Upington was wrong not only in applying purely English 
doctrines to the case; it appears that he also confused the doctrine of immunity from suit with 
303 Bosman v Bisset (\881) 1 SC 319. 

304 For instance SCali v Stansfield ( \868) LR 3 Ex. 220 and Fray v Blackburn (1863) 3 B & S 576. See above chapter VI 3 2 I 


















absolute privilege. It has been shown earlier that in English law want ofjurisdiction was totally 
irrelevant to the question ofwhether absolute privilege applied or not.305 
De Villiers CJ firmly rejected counsel's argument. He was not prepared to even consider 
whether or not the magistrate had acted within the scope of his jurisdiction, since he rejected 
outright any application of the English concept of absolute privilege. Instead, he insisted on 
basing his approach on Roman-Dutch law, more particularly on Voet's comments on D 
47.10.2.306 This introduced into the discussion for the first time the concept of the bona fides of 
the judicial officer. De Villiers CJ interpreted Voet in the sense that liability did not arise as long 
as the judicial officer acted with the "...bonafide object of upholding the dignity of his office ...". 
This implied that where a party was exposed mala fide to hatred and disgrace " ...an action for 
injury will lie.,,307 On the basis of the facts of the matter before him, De Villiers CJ was 
convinced that Bisset had acted bonafide and consequently rejected Bosman's claim. 
It is ironical that De Villiers CJ's Roman-Dutch approach was not entirely dissimilar, in its 
ultimate effect, from the English concept of qualified privilege, something to which he himself 
drew attention: 
"Of all fOImS of privilege allowed by the English law to the free utterance of opinion, the privilege 
enjoyed by persons acting in a judicial capacity is the greatest. By our law also a similar privilege 
exists, although perhaps to a different degree. That there is a limit to the freedom ofcomment which 
Judges and Magistrates enjoyed under the Civil Law is clear from all the authorities.,,308 
Thus, notwithstanding the learned judge's noteworthy insistence - contrary to the trend at the 
time - on applying Roman-Dutch law rather than English law, his judgement actually laid down 
the foundation for the subsequent assimilation of the doctrine of qualified privilege into the 
South African law relating to judicial liability for defamation. De Villiers CJ managed to expel 
the ghost of the English doctrine ofjudicial liability through the front door and at the same time 
opened the back door to qualified privilege and its companion, malice or malafides. 
There is another interesting aspect to De Villiers CJ's judgement. In that it accepts the defence 
of qualified privilege but not absolute privilege, the judgement makes it abundantly clear that, as 
has been the case throughout its history, the scope of judicial liability is determined to a large 
extent by considerations of public policy: 
305 See above at chapter VI 423. 
306 See above at chapter V 5 2 I. 
307 Bosman v Bisset (1881) 1 SC 319 at 323-324. 
308 Ibid. at 323. My italics. 
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"It is the clear policy of our Jaw.. .to impose DO unnecessary fetters upon the freedom of Judges and 
Magistrates to comment upon all cases brought judicially before them, and upon the conduct of all 
persons concerned in those cases. ,,309 
3 2 1 2 Clark v Gadd 
Some 31 years were to elapse before the next significant case on judicial liability for defamation. 
In Clark v Gadd 310, the Eastern District Local Division was called upon to u t>- decide 
whether a magistrate was liable for damages for slander he was alleged to have uttered in court. 
In rejecting the action, Sheil J interpreted Bosman v Bisset as laying down that, in the absence of 
proof of malice or improper motive, a judicial officer enjoyed the protection of immunity from 
suit, in the form of the defence of qualified privilege. 
The judgement in Clark is noteworthy for a number of reasons. Firstly, because it clearly 
illustrates to what extent the influence of English law had grown since the decision in Bosman. 
Contrary to the approach of De Villiers CJ in the latter case, Sheil J made no attempt to discuss 
the relevant Roman-Dutch authorities, and showed far less hesitation in adopting and applying 
the doctrine of qualified privilege. Secondly, the judgement affords a typical example of the 
blending of Roman-Dutch and English legal concepts in the formative period of modern South 
African law. Sheil J referred to both malice and animus iniuriandi as ways of forfeiting qualified 
privilege, clearly considering the two concepts to be identical. 311 As pointed out earlier, this 
view was not an unusual one in the early part of this century. Finally, there being as yet no clear 
distinction drawn between unlawfulness and fault, the judgement does not specify what element 
of liability is defeated by the defence of qualified privilege. 
Subsequent cases dealing with the concept ofqualified privilege did not concern judicial officers 
but other persons involved in judicial proceedings: advocates, attorneys, witnesses and 
litigants.312 
309 Bosman v Bisset (1881) I SC 319 at 322. 
310 1910 EDL 278 at 282. 
311 Ibid, at 283. 
312 See inter alia Preston v Luy/ 191 J EDL 298; Briscoe v Benson 1914 TPD 598; Findlay v Knight 1935 AD 58; Gluckman v 
Schneider 1936 AD 151; Basner v Trigger 1946 AD 83 , On liability of advocates and attorneys see generally the work by 
Midgely, Lawyers ' ProfeSSional Liability, 
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3 2 1 3 May v Udwin 
In 1981, in the now leading case ofMay v Udwin, exactly 100 years after De Villiers CJ gave his 
landmark judgement in Bosman v Bisset, the Appellate Division was finally confronted with the 
question of judicial liability for defamation under the actio iniuriarum. The Court seized the 
opportunity to clarify the law by revamping it along the lines on which liability for defamation 
has been developed since the 1960s. 
The facts of the case are as follows: an attorney, one Udwin, sued a magistrate, May, for 
defamation under the actio iniuriarum.313 Allegedly, the magistrate, without giving reasons, had 
published the defamatory statements in a written judgement of a case where Udwin had 
appeared before him.314 In the Cape Provincial Division, Van Winsen J found for the plaintiff 
and awarded Udwin R1 000 damages for defamation. Van Winsen J held that three factors 
would be sufficient to rebut the qualified privilege of judicial officers: first, if the statement 
uttered were irrelevant to the proceedings. Secondly, if the judicial officer did not act reasonably 
in his use of words. Thirdly, if the judicial officer acted with malice.315 Van Winsen J was 
convinced that the magistrate had lost the protection of his judicial privilege since no reasonable 
grounds existed for him to publish the defamatory statements in the written judgement. The 
court came to the conclusion that May's conduct was attributable " ... not so much to 
maliciousness directed at the plaintiff personally but to an ill-considered and uncalled-for 
officiousness on his part assayed without a proper regard for all the relevant matter in issue 
before him.,,316 
On appeal, since nothing else was disputed, the Appellate Division was called upon merely to 
decide whether the magistrate had indeed lost the protection of his judicial privilege.317 As the 
following discussion shows, the Appellate Division's decision in May v Udwin brought light not 
only to the field ofjudicial liability, but also to the law with regard to the broader area of the role 
and exact scope of the justification ground of privilege and to the closely related question of the 
burden ofevidence. 
Jl3 Udwin v May 1978 (4) SA 967 (C). The judgement has been discussed in 1978 Annual Survey, 265-267. See also Burchell, 
Defence ofPrivilege, 173. 

3 14 Udwin v May 1978 (4) SA 967 (C) at 974 (H). 

315 Ibid. at 973 (D)-(E). 

3 16 Ibid. at 976 (A)-(B). 

31 7 Mayv Udwin 1981 (I ) SA (A) 1 at 10 (A)-(C)and 12(B). 
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The decision in May v Udwin must be viewed in the wake of the same court's decision in Suid­
Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie v 0 'Malley which sent shockwaves through the legal fraternity in 
the late seventies. When May was decided in September 1981, the 0 'Malley decision was only 
four years old. This decision, which in the words of one commentator, contributed to the 
orderliness of the law ofdefamation in the same way as "Hercules's tour de force in the Augean 
stables", once and for all established animus iniuriandi as an essential requirement of the actio 
iniuriarum.318 Animus was defined as subjective intention to defame with knowledge of 
unlawfulness. 
Joubert JA, who delivered the unanimous judgement of the court in May v Udwin, used the 
opportunity to make a crisp summary of the law of defamation as it stood after the decision in 
O'Malley. The publication of defamatory matter leads to two rebuttable presumptions of fact: 
first, that the defendant acted with animus iniuriandi, that is intentionally and with knowledge of 
unlawfulness; secondly, that the publication was unlawful. The onus (in the form of a burden of 
rebuttal, or weerleggingslas) is then on the defendant to rebut at least one of these presumptions. 
The defendant may rebut the former presumption by proving a defence directed against animus 
(so-called skulduitsluitingsgrond), and the latter presumption by proving a defence directed 
against unlawfulness (so-called regverdigingsgrond or justification ground). One of the possible 
justification grounds available to the defendant is that the defamatory statement was uttered on 
an occasion of qualified privilege. In this case, the publication is regarded " ...as being in the 
interest ofpublic policy, and, therefore, as being lawful.,,319 
Joubert JA then turned his attention to the aspect of judicial liability and, more specifically, to 
the question of justification grounds. In analysing Roman law as well as the Glossators and the 
Roman-Dutch authorities, he came to the conclusion that none of these authorities appeared to 
draw a distinction between defences directed against wrongfulness and fault (animus 
iniuriandi).32o This clearly was due to the general development in civil law, which for centuries 
had not distinguished systematically between wrongfulness and fault.321 As described earlier, 
this distinction emerged in South African law only towards the middle of our present century.322 
However, Joubert JA acknowledged that the presumption of animus in modem law had been 
318 Boberg, Defamation, 5 \. 

319 For the whole see May v Udwin 1981 (1) SA (A) 1 at 10 (D)-(G). 

320 Ibid. at 12-14. See also above at chapter IV 3 I and 4; chapter V 5. 

321 Zimmermann, Law of Obligations, 1006-1007, 1027-1028; Hutchison, Aquilian Liability 11, 597-600 with further 

references; Kerr, THR-HR 55 (1992), 533-542; Neethling et aI, Law ofDelict, 9-1 J. 

322 See above at 2 I. 
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used by Roman-Dutch authorities (and in fact the jurists of the Italian ius commune) to reduce a 
plaintiffs difficulty in proving intention behind the wrongdoer's statement or act. Where the 
plaintiff proved defamatory words, they were prima facie uttered animo iniuriandi.323 
The learned judge of appeal then analysed what a number of Roman-Dutch authorities had laid 
down with regard to defamation by judicial officers. Rightly, Joubert JA identified instances 
where judicial officers defamed a person while exercising the authority conferred upon them by 
virtue of their office as situations where the presumption of animus iniuriandi did not operate.324 
From the authorities it was clear, furthermore, that this in a sense privileged situation ended 
where a judicial officer abused his authority or exceeded the limits of his authority. 
However, his Lordship's quest for clarity on what exactly the Roman-Dutch authorities 
considered the limit ofjudicial privilege was not fulfilled. As shown earlier, the only criterion in 
Roman-Dutch law is that offered by Voet, i.e., the phrase ad concitandam invidiam atque 
infamiam.325 This criterion was interpreted by De Villiers CJ in Bosman to mean that a judicial 
officer acted " .. .in order to expose the party to hatred and disgrace ...".326 In May's case, Joubert 
JA interpreted Voet's criterion for abuse or excess ofjudicial authority as the (English) concept 
of malice, which has ever since lurked in the South African version of qualified privilege. 
Malice, thus, was reinstated as a way of forfeiting qualified privilege. Or, in the words of the 
learned Judge of Appeal: 
"It is important at this stage to ascertain what the state of mind of a judicial officer is required to be on 
putting Voet's criterion [Commentarius ad Pandectas 47.10.2] to practical use. The phrase ad 
concitandam invidiam atque infamiam clearly emphasises the object or purpose (oogmerk, doe£) of 
publishing the defamatory matter, viz. to expose the defamed person to odium, or ill-will, and 
disgrace. In the absence of any express reference to animus or dolus in the sense of intent (opset) it 
would seem that the judicial officer was required to have had a motive in mind which actuated his 
pUblication of the defamatory matter in abuse of his judicial authority or in excess of the limits 
thereof. In my opinion Voet's criterion must be accepted as being consistent with the position where a 
judicial officer, under the guise of performing his judicial functions, has been actuated by personal 
spite, ill-will, improper motive, unlcruful motive (ongeoorloofde oogmerk of motiej) or ulterior 
motive, that is to say, by malice, in his publication of the defamatory matter in order to expose the 
defamed person to odium, or ill-will, and disgrace. Malice has long been accepted by our courts as a 
tenn to designate what a plaintiff should prove in order to defeat the defence of qualified privilege.,,327 
323 See above at chapter IV 2 text at fnl24 e/ seqq. and 4; further see chapter V 5 1 and 52. 

324 May v Udwin 1981 (1) SA 1 (A) 16 (B) quoting Voet, Commenzarius, 47.10.2. 

325 See above at chapter V 5 2 1. 

326 Bosman v Bisset (1881) 1 SC 319 at 323. 

m May v Udwin 1981 (1) SA 1 (A) 18·19. 
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Undoubtedly, May v Udwin authoritatively laid down the principles applicable to the field of 
judicial liability for defamation.328 For three reasons May v Udwin is considered a landmark 
decision. 
Firstly, the concept of malice, which caused so much confusion within the actio iniuriarum, was 
reborn in this case and its importance conclusively affirmed. This, however, was made possible 
only by the preceding decisions of the Appellate Division, which reinforced animus iniuriandi as 
the gist of the action and distinguished between two kinds of defences, i.e., defences against 
wrongfulness and defences against fault. 329 Therefore, malice was understood as nothing other 
than motive and: (a) could not be founded any longer on intent or animus or dolus; and (b) could 
not be used as a defence excluding fault, since a defence to exclude fault must exclude either 
intention or knowledge of wrongfu~ess.33o Malice as a motive simply did not imply anything 
with regard to the lack of one of the two constituent requirements of fault. Consequently, the 
road was now wide open for malice to be used in present day South African law (exclusively) 
within the element ofwrongfulness in order to rebut a claim of qualified privilege.331 
Second, the court declared that malice was to be established from the facts of the case: the 
defamatory matter as such, the nature of the judicial function, the presence or absence of erunity 
between the parties and the circumstances relevant to the publication of the defamatory matter 
could all indicate malice.332 In order to avoid unnecessary fetters on judicial independence, 
public policy required that certain objective elements should not be treated as conclusive proof 
per se of malicious conduct of judicial officers. Consequently, the relevance of the defamatory 
matter to the proceedings and/or the presence of reasonable foundation for it, which previously 
(in Udwin's case) had been considered on a par with malice, in May v Udwin were held to be 
only " ...indicative of malice on the part of a judicial officer.,,333 The judgement in May's case, 
therefore, made it abundantly clear that the qualified privilege enjoyed by judicial officers in 
South African law is wider than the privilege available to other participants in the legal process 
328 Burchell, Defence ofPrivilege, 173 . 
329 See above at 2 2. 

330 Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 327. 

33 1 This is probably the right place to clarify that in fact the South African use of malice today is considerably different 

(more narrow) compared to the use of this concept in other common law legal systems, eg., England. Hence it is important 

to realise that Olowofoyeku in his work Suing Judges, 204 attributes a much wider meaning to malice. In fact, as will 

become apparent in due course Olowofoyeku's definition of malice is identical to dolus. See at 3523 (b) for more details. 

m May v Udwin 1981 (I ) SA 1 (A) 19 (B)-(D). 

333 Ibid. at 20 (D). 
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(parties, advocates, attorneys, witnesses) to whom the above-mentioned policy restrictions did 
not apply.334 
Third, until 1994 when the Appellate Division gave its much disputed judgement in the case 
Neethling v Du Preez, Neethling v Weekly Mail 335, May's case affinned the decision in 
O'Malley, in which the Appellate Division clarified the distinction between a full onus of proof 
on the defence and a mere evidential burden (weerleggingslas). In May, Joubert JA placed only 
an evidential burden on the judicial officer to establish that his conduct was justified.336 May 
chose to rebut the presumption of wrongfulness and adduced sufficient evidence for the defence 
ofqualified privilege.337 
On the basis of the present law, however, it must. be pointed out that this consequence of the 
decision in May does not hold any longer. In Neethling v Du Preez, Neethling v Weekly Mail, the 
Appellate Division decided that the full onus ofproof and not merely an evidential burden rested 
on a defendant in order to prove the defences of privileged occasion and of truth for the public 
benefit.338 
However, the Appellate Division's decision in May v Udwin is also subject to criticism. From 
what has been said above it is evident that Joubert JA drew his definitive conclusion in favour of 
malice from the absence of an express reference by Voet to animus or dolus. But, with all due 
respect, there exist other passages the learned Judge of Appeal did not quote, where Roman­
Dutch authorities considered certain (judicial) acts committed dolo malo (with animus 
iniuriandi) and not ad concitandam invidiam atque infamiam as instances where judicial officers 
were liable under the actio iniuriarum for exceeding their powers.339 These passages deal with 
intentional interrogation or torture. As shown earlier, Vander Keessel considered this under the 
rubric of instances where a judicial officer intentionally decreed and administered torture in a 
case that did not admit interrogation by torture, or if the judge was bribed and administered 
334 Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 325, fu 159, Law ofPersonality, 162 fu 196; Critically Burchell in Defence ofPrivilege, 181­
187, Law ofDefamation, 250-251; Midgley, Delict, 82. 

335 1994 (I) SA 708 (A)770. 

336 May v Udwin 1981 (I ) SA I (A) 10 (D). Also Borgin v De Vi/liers 1980 (3) SA 556 (A) 571 (E)-(G); Marais v Richard 
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torture, or where he did not observe the limits prescribed by law. All these instances were 
considered an abuse of power in the light of D 47.10.32. Hence these were instances where the 
judicial officer had exceeded his power and could be sued under the actio iniuriarum.34o 
It is true that these examples are not directly related to the point at issue, namely defamation. 
However, Joubert JA's criterion of malice, as derived from the authorities applied in May v 
Udwin, appears not to have been the sole answer to the general question of what was considered 
an excess or abuse of power by a judicial officer under the actio iniuriarum in Roman-Dutch 
law. 
This an appropriate point at which to report two alternatives to the concept of malice. It should 
be borne in mind, however, that both proposals were made prior to the decision in May v Udwin. 
The first proposal is that of MacMillan who adduced the view that qualified privilege is defeated 
by so-called actual intention or dolus directus.341 In MacMillan's view, the occasion ofprivilege 
is granted for a certain purpose. If it can be proved that the defendant acted with an objective 
contrary to this purpose, he or she would have abused the occasion and lost the privilege. Hence, 
the decisive issue was the defendant's purpose or objective. 
The point of divergence to the prevailing doctrine is the following: according to MacMillan, the 
defendant's (improper) purpose or objective is not synonymous with improper motive. The 
enquiry into purpose or objective is in fact a question of intention and not of motive. For actual 
intention or dolus directus to be present, a person must act with the aim and objective of 
committing an unlawful act. Hence, the question with regard to forfeit of qualified privilege was 
whether or not the defendant acted with intention, more precisely, with dolus directus. In 
analysing the proper meaning of malice in criminal law, MacMillan argues that in fact malice is 
synonymous with intention.342 In English law, ill will, improper motive or spite have only in 
exceptional cases been described as instances of so-called express malice. In ignorance of what 
the proper meaning of malice is in South Afiican law, the courts have mistakenly relied on the 
typical and superfluous concept of express malice as a determinant for the rebuttal of qualified 
privilege instead on intention, i.e., dolus directus. 
340 See above at chapter V 5 22 and 5 2 3. 

341 SALl92 (1975),144-164 . 
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MacMillan's view was not accepted, and May proved him wrong. 343 Not surprisingly, therefore, 
Boberg considered his view a mere flirtation with intention.344 Another view was advanced by 
Professor Carey Miller.345 To him, the (English) absolute privilege of judges for defamatory 
remarks was not an adequate solution since a 'blanket immunity' took no account " ...of the 
undesirable consequences of shielding judicial conduct or comment that does not warrant 
protection from the point of view of the public interest. ,,346 On the other hand, basing privilege 
merely upon improper motive or malice was a potential threat to judicial independence because 
it is all too easy to allege malice on the part ofa judicial officer. 
Although Carey Miller was of the opinion that it is very difficult for a plaintiff to prove malice 
sufficiently, it is undesirable that a judicial officer should be threatened with actions which allow 
too much room for subjective factors such as personality or demeanour that could be difficult to 
separate from issues of malice.347 Therefore, he suggested that the more objective criterion of 
reasonable relevance of the defamatory remarks in the matter before the court be used to 
determine rebuttal ofjudicial privilege. 348 
The liability of judges and magistrates for defamatory remarks made in the course of judicial 
proceedings may be summarised as follows:349 Judicial officers in South Africa, unlike those 
under common law legal systems in, for example, England or the USA, enjoy not absolute but a 
special kind ofqualified privilege. Consequently, a judicial officer can be held liable if a plaintiff 
proves on a balance of probabilities that the judge or the magistrate made the defamatory 
remarks with a malicious or an improper motive.35o 
343 Against him also Boberg, Defamation, 47 and 52-53; Burchell , Law of Defamation, 250 fu85; Van der Merwe and 
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3 2 2 Liability for wrongful imprisonment 
A South African judicial officer might also commit an actionable wrong by depriving someone 
of his or her liberty. The courts do not hesitate to stress libertas or physical liberty as a 
particularly important right: 
"... (T]he liberty of the individual is one of the fundamental rights of a man in a free society which 
should be jealously guarded at all times and there is a duty on our courts to preserve this right against 
infringement. ,,351 
Owing to English influences, two separate forms of infringement of physical liberty can 
generally be identified: wrongful imprisonment and malicious arrest. 352 Malicious arrest entails 
the improper use of the legal machinery in order to deprive someone of his or her physical 
liberty. In other words, the defendant makes use of the judge to effect the arrest by committing 
the third person to jail. Consequently, under this liability it is impossible for the judge himself to 
commit malicious arrest.353 Wrongful imprisonment, however, can be committed by a judicial 
officer. To succeed in an action for wrongful imprisonment a person must objectively (and 
directly) have been deprived of physical freedom by a judicial officer without justification. 
Under English influence, the courts have ignored iniuria as a requirement for wrongful 
imprisonment: neither fault nor negligence has to be established for liability.354 If the deprivation 
of personal liberty also caused patrimonial loss, the plaintiff may institute a further action under 
. I . A ./. 355the actlO eglS qw we. 
3 2 2 1 Cooper v The Government 
In 1906, for the first time, the Transvaal Supreme Court was called upon in Cooper v The 
Government to decide on a claim for damages for illegal imprisonment.356 The applicant had 
been sentenced by a magistrate to a fine of 40 shillings or one day's imprisonment without hard 
labour. When the fine was not paid, the accused was committed to prison under a warrant 
wrongfully made out for one day with hard labour. He was released the next day after he had had 
351 Thandani v Mimster ofLaw and Order 1991 (1) SA 702 (E) 707 quoted by Walter, Actio Iniun·arum , 155. 
352 Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 317. 
353 Ibid. at 318. 
354 Donono v Minister ofPrisons 1973 (4) SA 259 (C) 262; Shoba v Minister van Justisie 1982 (2) SA 554 (C) 559; Neethling 
et ai, Law ofDelict, 318 and Law ofPersonality, 129-130; Van der Walt, Delict, 63 ; Wille's Principles ofSouth African Law, 
700,704; Van der Merwe and Olivier, Onregmalige Daad, 550-555 . 
355 Shoba v Minister van Justisie 1982 (2) SA 554 (C) 559, 563-564; Mthimkhulu v Minister ofLaw and Order 1993 (3) SA 
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to break stones in a prison yard. Mason J, who delivered the judgement, rightly stressed the point 
that an action against the state for the wrongful act of a judicial officer will fail since judicial 
liability is exclusively personal liability of the officer concerned. The learned judge then 
embarked on an analysis of the chances of success of a personal action. 
This early decision again serves as a good example of the strength of English legal influence on 
the law ofjudicial liability at the beginning of this century. Mason J commenced his analysis of 
the authorities with the following statement, which in those days was almost obligatory: 
"The Roman-Dutch law with reference to the liability ofjudicial officers for errors in the performance 
of their functions appears to be substantially the same as that of England ... ".357 
And even though Mason J stressed immediately that this statement might have to be qualified 
with regard to " ...cases of wrongful acts done with a corrupt or malicious motive ...", this 
qualification is superfluous since, in the learned judge's view, the general rule with regard to 
judicial liability was clearly the following: 
": ..[N]o judicial officer is responsible for acts done by him in that capacity within the limits of 
jurisdiction which he possesses ... but when he does an act causing injury in respect of a matter wholly 
without his jurisdiction, he is liable in damages just as any other tort-feasor. ,,358 
It appears from the judgement that the court based its decision on an assessment of English and 
American case law. The trio of leading common law cases of those years - Scott v Stansfield 359, 
Anderson v Gorie 360 and Bradley v Fisher 361 - received attention, as did the famous case of 
Floyd v Barker 362 where Coke CJ laid the foundation of the English law of absolute immunity 
which remained essentially unchanged until Lord Denning's sweeping judgement in Sirros v 
Moore more than three centuries later.363 
The analysis of the Roman-Dutch authorities, meanwhile, was unsatisfactory and inconsistent, 
the sole reference being to Voet. It is interesting that Mason J quoted a passage from Voet's 
commentary which deals generally with the liability of magistrates under the actio legis 
Aquiliae.364 No reference was made to the passage where Voet discusses at length the liability of 
357 Ibid. at 439. 
35B Ibid. My italics. 
359 3 LR Ex 220. 
360 [1895] 1 QBD 668 (CA). 
361 80 US 335 (1872). 
362 (1607) 77 ER 1305. 
363 See again above at chapter VI 4 1 4 1. 
364 Commentarius, 9.2.15. 
362 
judicial officers.365 But where he referred to the Digest, Mason 1's reference was to the actio 
iniuriarum and not the actio legis Aquiliae. Hence, it becomes increasingly unclear from which 
type of action the judge derived clarity as to the position of the civil law with regard to judicial 
liability. It has been shown earlier that the position of Roman-Dutch law was not identical under 
the actio iniuriarum and the actio legis Aquiliae.366 
To return to the general rule as stated in Cooper v The Government: this rule was certainly not in 
accordance with Roman-Dutch law. In Roman and Roman-Dutch law, the question of want of 
jurisdiction and closely related aspects, namely the distinction between courts of record or not of 
record, have never played a role in the detennination of the liability of judicial officers. In view 
of its acceptance of the general rule, the court's reference to malicious acts on the part of a 
judicial officer was simply to pay lip service to Roman-Dutch law. Nonetheless, the brief 
indication of malice is evidence of the fact that the good faith criterion was superficially 
extended to other areas ofjudicial liability. 
3221 Tilonko v The Governor, a Judge and the Attorney-General of Natal 
Two years later, in the case of Tilonko v The Governor, a Judge and the Attorney-General of 
Natal, the Natal Supreme Court, well known for its tendency to adhere to English legal 
principles367, placed even more emphasis on English concepts.368 This case is remarkable for 
three reasons. Firstly, it contains not a single reference to Roman-Dutch law. Secondly, it 
introduces an interesting aspect of procedural law into the discussion, namely the concept of 
leave to sue. 369 Thirdly, it is the only reported case where a superior judge was sued for 
damages. 370 
The applicant sought to sue a judge of the Supreme Court of the Colony of Natal in respect ofa 
judgement in which the respondent had refused to release the applicant from prison since the 
court had no jurisdiction to order the release. This judgement had in effect been confinned on 
appeal to the Privy Council. Notwithstanding this lack of success, an application was made for 
365 Ibid. at 5.1.58. 

366 See above at chapter V 4 5 and 5 4. 
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leave to sue, amongst other officials, the judge. Remarkably, compensation for deprivation of 
liberty was sought neither under the actio iniuriarum nor the actio legis Aquiliae, but under the 
English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. 
With regard to the application for leave to sue, the court considered itself obliged to decide 
whether or not the applicant had made out a prima facie case. To commence with the final 
decision, the court did not grant leave to sue. There are probably very few other cases in which a 
court has dismissed an application with harsher words than in Tilonlw. Bale CJ, for instance, 
commenced his judgement with the not very encouraging remark that the application " .. .is...the 
most extraordinary one that has ever been made to this Court, and, probably, is in some 
particulars unique in the Courts of the Empire." Dove Wilson J considered "...the application 
under all circumstances [as] ridiculous." And Broome J topped these remarks with the words: "It 
seems to me nothing short of astonishing that such an application should seriously have been 
made to this Court." In comparison with the cases discussed so far, the court's reaction is a 
valuable example of how differently actions against superior and inferior court judges were 
perceived at the beginning of this century. Obviously, it was considered grossly inappropriate 
even to consider instituting an action against a Supreme Court judge. 
With regard to the merits of the application, the court held that there was no authority 
whatsoever in the law according to which a judge could be held liable for a mistake in a 
judgement. Again, on the strength of Anderson v Gorie 371, the court considered even malicious 
acts by a superior court judge (judge of a court of record) as not sufficient to make out a case of 
judicial liability. Since the court, furthermore, drew no distinction between superior and inferior 
courts in its judgement, it effectively held that all judicial officers were protected by absolute 
privilege and, thus, that no liability would ever exist. Bale CJ held that the sole remedy in a case 
of a " ...malicious or perverse judgement..." was to seek the dismissal of the judge. However, as 
we have shown earlier, this decision to dismiss a judge was never that of a court in those days 
but solely of the sovereign upon an address of both Houses of Parliament; cold comfort, 
indeed.372 
In Tilonko, it may be said that the influence of Roman-Dutch law on the question of judicial 
liability reached its lowest point. No reference was made, not even a perfunctory one, to Roman­
Dutch authorities. Nor was there any reference to those few cases where South African judges at 
371 [1895] I QBD 668 (CA). 





least held high the banner of difference from English law, namely qualified immunity. Reading 
the decision of the Natal court in Tilonko, an observer must have been convinced that English 
law ofjudicial liability held complete sway in South Africa. 
3 2 2 2 Penrice v Dickinson 
Credit must go to the judges on the Bench of the Appellate Division in 1945 for leading South 
African law back to an approach which is more in line with the old authorities. In Penrice v 
Dickinson 373, in an application for condonation of a delay in serving notice of an appeal, the 
applicant sought revision of a decision in the lower court where he had failed in an action for 
damages for wrongful deprivation of personal liberty sustained in consequence of two orders 
made by a magistrate. At the hearing of a charge of criminal defamation against the applicant, 
evidence was heard with regard to the mental condition of the applicant, who was diagnosed as 
suffering from a peculiar form of paranoia known as litigious paranoia. Upon the applicant's 
request for a postponement to produce evidence to the contrary, the magistrate hearing the case 
ordered the applicant to be removed straight to a mental institution for further observation on the 
basis of a medical report submitted by a doctor who had never seen the plaintiff. Hence a serious 
miscarriage ofjustice took place at the first hearing in that the applicant had not been allowed a 
proper opportunity to put his case and to lead medical evidence. The case was resumed two 
weeks later and it was decided by the same magistrate - again without hearing proper evidence 
for the applicant - to detain him as a Governor-General's patient in a mental institution. 
It appears from the Appellate Division's judgemene74, albeit not very clearly, that the 
performance of judicial functions by a magistrate was generally accepted by the judges as a 
sound defence against a claim for liability. Furthermore, the question of whether the respondent 
had acted in his judicial capacity when he made the two incorrect orders was not much at issue. 
Attention was given to determining the exact scope of liability ofjudicial officers, in other words 
what was required to rebut this defence of having acted in a judicial capacity. 
It is striking that Tindall JA relied here, some 36 years after the decision in Tilonko, exclusively 
on Roman-Dutch authorities to clarify the law in this respect. Now not a single reference was 
made to English case law. In analysing the position of Roman-Dutch law, Tindall JA drew on 
the passages where the Roman-Dutch authorities commented on the liability of the iudex, qui 
m 1945 AD 6. 









litem suamfecit. Not all the relevant Roman-Dutch authorities were quoted, but reference was at 
least made to Groenewegen's De Legibus Abrogatis, to Vinnius' Commentarius ad 
Institutionum, to Voet's Commentarius ad Pandectas and to Van Leeuwen's Rooms-Hollands 
Regt. Generally, cases of wrongful imprisonment, such as this one, involve an incorrect 
application of the law. In this respect they are significantly different from actions for defamation 
under the actio iniuriarum. This distinction is recognised by the Roman-Dutch authorities, and 
the historical sources provide enough clarity for us to appreciate their view. 
Rightly, therefore, the Appellate Division turned its attention to the interpretation of Inst 4.5.pr 
by the Roman-Dutch writers and, rightly, reference was made not to the more specialised 
qualified privilege in defamation but, more generally, to the defence of having perfonned 
judicial functions. Nevertheless, the court was convinced that substantially the sources did not 
indicate a different view. The learned Judge of Appeal came to the conclusion that the defence 
of performance of judicial function could be rebutted, and hence liability established, only by 
proof that the judicial officer had acted mala fide, without good faith, in making the incorrect 
decision.375 Since the applicant was not able to establish that the magistrate had acted mala fide 
when making the two orders in question, the court refused the application for condonation. 
In Penrice v Dickinson the Appellate Division thus affirmed the tendency to accept that judicial 
liability generally appeared to be determined by the criterion of good faith. Or, to put it 
differently, the question of a good or bad motive became relevant for the determination of the 
scope of judicial liability not only within the law of judicial defamation but also for other 
judicial wrongs such as, for example, wrongful imprisonment. This was apparent as early as 
1906 in Cooper v The Government, and was also accepted in 1922 in the Appellate Division's 
decision in Matthews v Young. The latter, however, did not concern wrongful imprisonment and 
will be discussed in more detail below.376 
3223 Moeketsi v Minister van lustisie en'n Ander 
Almost another half century passed before, in 1988, the Transvaal Provincial Division again had 
to decide on the question of liability of a judicial officer for wrongful imprisonment.377 Apart 
375 Penrice v Diclanson 1945 AD 6 at 14-16. 
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from the Appellate Division's decision in May v Udwin, the case of Moeketsi v Minister van 
Justisie en 'n Ander was the only other case in which a court was called upon to analyse the exact 
position ofjudicial liability within the law of delict subsequent to the authoritative ruling of the 
Appellate Division in the second half of this century on the relation between wrongfulness and 
fault. 378 The question here was whether or not to reaffirm the tendency that had emerged in 
Penrice v Dickinson towards extending the good faith criterion beyond the boundaries of 
defamation. The court repeated that, on authority of May v Udwin, improper motive was the 
decisive criterion in determining judicial liability for defamation. Consequently the question 
arose whether the same should apply to liability for wrongful imprisonment? 
In Moeketsi, a regional magistrate, without applying the principle of audi alteram partem, had 
ordered the arrest and removal of the plaintiff, a policeman, who when present in the court had 
apparently disturbed the court proceedings. The plaintiff sought damages in the amount of R15 
000 from the Minister of Justice and the magistrate for wrongful arrest and detention. After 
weighing the evidence, Van Zyl J came to the conclusion that the magistrate's action had been 
unreasonable (onredelik) and unjustified (ongeregverdig).379 However, anyone who believed 
that this statement by the learned Judge implied that the magistrate had acted wrongfully and 
was therefore liable for wrongful deprivation of liberty was to be disappointed. Van Zyl J went 
on to say: "Ofdit egter 'n onregmatige daad teenoor die eiser daarstel is 'n ander vraag .. .".380 
And, in fact, the learned judge, after having analysed extensively a number of Roman-Dutch 
authorities, concluded that merely unjustified and unreasonable conduct was not sufficient: 
"[l}n ons reg' said Van Zyl J "'n regsprekende beampte wat in sy judisiele hoedanigheid optree [is) 
slegs vir sy kwaadwillige ofbedrieglike optrede aanspreekiik.,,38I 
Van Zyl J went on to say that, generally, onredelikheid (unreasonableness) was based on 
negligence. However, in the case of a judicial officer, mere negligence was not sufficient for 
delictual liability. There had to be evidence of mala fides (malice or fraud) on the part of the 
officer before any liability could arise. Since the plaintiff was not able to show that the 
magistrate had acted mala fide Van Zyl J rejected the claim. Thus the good faith criterion was 
accepted and reaffirmed in Moeketsi as the essential criterion to rebut the privileged status of a 
judicial officer. 
378 See above at 2 I. 
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Like Tindall JA in Penrice, Van Zyl J relied exclusively on Roman-Dutch authorities to support 
his opinion. The learned Judge made reference to some of the most important authorities, 
namely Groenewegen, Voet, VanLeeuwen and Vander Keessel, as well as to the Appellate 
Division's decision in Penrice v Dickinson. Rightly, Van Zyl J rejected the approach taken by 
earlier judgements in Cooper v The Government, Tilonko v The Governor, a Judge and the 
Attorney-General ofNatal as not authoritative for the determination of the liability of judicial 
officers.382 The decision was well in accord with the principles of judicial liability that had 
emerged from May v Udwin some seven years earlier. Beyond that, it finalised the general 
direction that had emerged in Penrice some 43 years earlier. 
The decision in Moeketsi did not escape criticism from academic conunentators.383 It was not so 
much the outcome of the decision that was challenged as some details with regard to its 
reasoning. The most important aspect of the criticism appears to be that the conduct of the 
magistrate was incorrectly considered onredelik and ongeregverdig, in other words as 
onregmatig or wrongful. With regard to the present position of judicial liability, critical 
assessment of which will follow in due course, brief reference should be made to the pertinent 
opinion of Professor Neethling. In his view, a judicial act, regardless of how reprehensible or 
dubious, has to be considered lawful as long as the judicial act was committed bonafide.384 On 
the basis of the present position in law, Neethling convincingly argued that there was no other 
interpretation or in-between solution, as indicated by the court in Moeketsi. It was the logical 
consequence of the proper and sufficient establishment of the defence of official capacity. 
Apart from this, Professor Neethling criticised the court for diffusing the clarity of the law in 
reference to the terms skuld and skuldvorm of nalatigheid. Fault, including negligence, is 
generally irrelevant for the determination of wrongfulness. However, wrongfulness is the 
decisive criterion of liability since wrongful imprisonment is an example of so-called no fault 
liability. Therefore, the court's reference to negligence served only to confuse. 
In consequence of the decision in Moeketsi, the present position with regard to wrongful 
imprisonment appears to be as followS: 385 After a prima facie case of deprivation of liberty has 
been made out, a presumption of wrongfulness arises. A judicial officer may raise a defence to 
382 I bid. at (F). 
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rebut this presmnption. Usually he will rely on the defence of official capacity, which he has to 
prove on a balance of probabilities. It will then be presmned that he acted lawfully within the 
bounds of the justification ground. The onus is then on the plaintiff to establish that, in fact, the 
judicial officer acted unlawfully. The plaintiff may do that by proving that the judicial officer 
acted with a reprehensible or improper motive, i.e., that he was actuated by mala fides (malice or 
fraud). Therefore, according to the decision in Moeketsi, judicial liability for wrongful 
imprisonment is governed by the same principle as that governing judicial liability for 
defamation. 
3 3 Judicial liability for patrimonial loss due to a wrongful misjudgement 
Turning now to actions for patrimonial loss suffered, it may be asked whether this tendency in 
South African law to determine the liability of judicial officers by means of a qualified good 
faith criterion prevails also with regard to claims against judicial officers under the actio legis 
Aquiliae; in other words, whether good faith is not merely a trend, but has become the basis of a 
comprehensive dogma in modern South African law ofjudicial liability. 
3 3 1 The Cape of Good Hope Bank v Fischer 
In 1886, the Cape Supreme Court, under the auspices again of De Villiers CJ, was called upon to 
consider the question of the Aquilian action in The Cape o/Good Hope Bank v Fischer.386 The 
facts of the case were the following: a registrar of deeds had failed to register a properly 
executed mortgage bond and, consequently, the plaintiff suffered patrimonial loss due to the loss 
of preference. Comparing the conveyancing of land in the Netherlands (which was done by the 
local magistrates) to the situation at the Cape where, after the enactment of Ordinance No 39 of 
1828, only registrars were pennitted to perform this task, the learned Chief Justice stated, albeit 
without detailed reference to specific Roman-Dutch authorities: 
"I can find no authority for the contention that such a judge or magistrate would have been liable for 
any loss occasioned by mistakes made by him in good faith in the perfonnance of his duties.,,387 
386 (1886) 4 SC 368. 
387 Ibid. at 375 . 
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In contemporary parlance: liability in Roman-Dutch law for wrong judgements was only for 
conduct committed mala fide. Admittedly, De Villiers crs statement in Cape of Good Hope 
Bank is open to interpretation, namely that his Lordship may have considered modern judicial 
officers likewise to be covered by this (not very specific) kind of good faith immunity. This 
interpretation is supported by the following section, where one reads that the Chief Justice was 
not prepared to extend any of this judicial immunity to a Cape Colonial registrar ofdeeds, whose 
functions he considered to be mainly of an administrative nature.388 Be that as it may, one thing 
can safely be deduced from this case: we are faced again with an early (1886) appearance of the 
good faith criterion. 
3 3 2 Matthews v Young 
A subsequent instance where the actio legis Aquiliae had to be considered with respect to 
judicial liability was the well-known case of Matthews v Young. 389 Strictly speaking, the 
decision concerned the liability of members of a commission that acted merely in a quasi­
judicial capacity, and not a judicial body.39o Nonetheless, the underlying principles would seem 
to apply alike to courts in the strict sense. The plaintiff had lost his employment after he was 
expelled from his trade union. In the proceedings for his re-instatement, it became evident that 
the procedure followed at the enquiry, which had led to his expUlsion by the trade union, had 
been irregular. Even though the plaintiff was reinstated, his former employer did not give him 
back his job. Therefore, he sued the officials of the union who had sat on the union council for 
economic loss arising out of the unlawful expUlsion. The plaintiff won in first instance, but the 
decision was taken on appeal by the council members.391 
After De Villiers JA had decided that it was under the actio legis Aqui/iae and not under the 
actio iniuriarum that the respondent (the plaintiff in the action a quo) was claiming 
compensation, he decided that the respondent could not succeed on appeal. The appellants were 
held to have acted as a properly constituted tribunal under the rules of the union, in a quasi­
judicial capacity, and therefore, although the judgement was procedurally wrong, it was not 
wrongful, because it was given bona fide: the appellants had acted in the honest discharge of 
388 Ibid. at 375. 

389 1922 AD 492. 

390 For a detailed discussion of the judicial liability of quasi-judicial bodies see below at 3 4. 

391 For a classification of this case in a broader spectrum of delictual liability see Hutchison, Aquilian Liability 11,612. See also 





their duties.392 In modem terminology: the applicants had successfully raised the justification 
ground of official capacity and therefore the onus was on the respondent to prove that the 
members of the council were actuated by a reprehensible or improper motive. Since the 
respondent failed to do so, the appeal had to be upheld.393 
At the time when Matthews v Young was decided, no clear-cut distinction between wrongfulness 
and fault and the corresponding defences had emerged.394 From the most recent discussion of 
Matthews v Young by Professor Hutchison, titled "A glimpse of the modem approach,,395, it 
appears that Matthews was in fact one of the early cases that made it clear that wrongfulness was 
a separate requirement for delictual liability. 
De Villiers lA's reasoning that it was only a mala fide discharge of (quasi) judicial duties that 
would lead to forfeiture of a privileged status was based exclusively upon the authority of some 
Roman-Dutch authorities, namely Groenewegen's and Voet's comments on the quasi-delictual 
liability of the iudex, qui litem suam !ecit.396 However, the true spirit, now familiar to us, that 
guided De Villiers lA through his interpretation of the sources in Matthews appears in the 
following passage: 
" ... they [the members of the union's council] were acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and are, 
therefore, under our law, as also, I understand, under the English law, not liable for any damage 
provided they acted bonajide ..." .397 
A few sentences later, he referred once again, as was natural in those days, to the concept of 
malice.398 
Consequently we may conclude that, just as in the case of defamation and wrongful 
imprisonment so too here in the case of liability under the actio legis Aquiliae for economic loss 
suffered in consequence of a wrong judgement, malice or improper motive was adopted as an 
essential requirement for (quasi) judicial liability. 
392 Innes CJ and Kotze JA concurred. 
393 Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492 at 510. 
394 See again above at 2 1 for more details. 
395 Hutchison, Aquilian Liability 11, 6 J2. 
396 Tractatus, Inst4.5.pr and Commentarius, 5.1.58, respectively. 
397 1922 AD 492 at 509-5 JO. My italics. 
398 Ibid. 
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3 4 Liability of members of so-called quasi-judicial bodies 
In South African law, the principle of qualified immunity ofjudicial officers in delict is extended 
in a more or less identical manner beyond the ordinary courts. It applies also to all those persons 
or bodies that participate in the adjudication process in a non-curial capacity.399 
Because South Africa does not have true administrative courts, these non-curial bodies contain 
the plethora of tribunals adjudicating within the administrative sphere that have already been 
described above.4OO It should not be overlooked, however, that there are numerous examples 
where adjudication takes place outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts or administrative 
tribunals. There are, for instance, courts martial40I , ecclesiastical committees of inquiry402, as 
well as general councils of trade unions403 or employers' associations404, arbitrators405 or persons 
who are called upon to adjudicate in the govenunent of voluntary institutions or associations, 
which on a different basis (not necessarily public or administrative law) render decisions binding 
on those who are subject to the body in question. 
In analysing the expansion of this qualified judicial immunity to a sphere outside the ordinary 
courts, it again becomes evident that in South African law, as distinct from English law, 
questions of jurisdiction or to what court (superior court or court of record) the adjudicating 
officer belongs are absolutely irrelevant: it is exclusively the person who performs ajudicial act 
who, for reasons of policy, is protected from too wide a liability in delict. If, therefore, the 
performance of a judicial act is the decisive requirement in providing the performing officer or 
member of a body with qualified inununity, it becomes essential to determine whether or not the 
official or member of the body had indeed performed a judicial act and to distinguish this act 
from other acts which do not enjoy the same degree ofprotection. 
399 See Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492 at 508-509; Hoffman v Meyer 1956 (2) SA 752 (C) 756 (B); Wiechers, Administrative 

Law 1, 114. 

400 Above at I 2 I 3. Furthennore reference should be to Baxter, Administrative Law, 220-222; Wiechers, Administrative Law I, 

93-115 with a summary at 112-115. Partly outdated, however, is the overview provided by Will, Machinery ofLaw, 284-320 

401 Manning and Others v Council ofReview and Others 1989 (4) SA 866 (C); McKerron, Delict, 82; Van der Merwe and 

Olivier, Onregmatige Daad, 106-107 fu60. 

402 Lucas v Wilkinson 1926 NPD 10; Abrahamse v Phigeland 1932 CPD 196; Cohen v Committee of Harrismith Hebrew 

Congregation 1924 OPO 25. 

403 Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492 at 508-509. 

404 Tvl Coal Owners Association v Board ofControl 1921 TPO 44 7. 

405 Hoffman v Meyer 1956 (2) SA 752 (C). 
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One is confronted here with sheer confusion in terminology. The participation of non-curial 
organs in the adjudication process involves reference not only to judicial acts but inter alia to 
quasi- or semi-judicial bodies, to quasi- or semi-judicial acts and to non-administrative acts. 
Professor Baxter once summarised the persistent confusion as follows: The term 'j udicial', he 
says, 
"...often. ..has attached to it the adjectives 'semi-' or 'quasi' as a means of indicating some sort of 
difference between curial 'judicial' decisions and administrative 'judicial' decisions, or of indicating 
some sort of difference in quality, procedure, form or effect between 'quasi-judicial' and other 
administrative acts.'.406 
While the term quasi-judicial appears suitable to describe the category of non-curial 
administrative officers or members of bodies which participate in the process of adjudication, 
the term may not be used to pinpoint those acts that would fall under the ambit of qualified 
judicial inununity. Quasi-judicial acts or decisions are, in fact, not judicial acts but a peculiar 
kind of administrative act which came to be known as quasi-judicial in order make the 
distinction from so-called purely administrative acts.407 It is probably one of the most frequent 
mistakes in this field of law to assume that members of quasi-judicial bodies naturally also 
perform quasi-judicial acts. What is correct is that persons acting in a quasi-judicial capacity 
generally perform judicial acts. The distinction between judicial acts and quasi-judicial acts has 
important consequences for the liability for acts that cause either sentimental or economic loss. 
Administrative officers acting judicially in a quasi-judicial capacity or other members of quasi­
judicial bodies enjoy a qualified immunity from personal delictual liability.408 The 
misperformance of quasi-judicial or purely administrative acts by administrative officers, on the 
other hand, can result only in the liability ofthe state.409 
The coincidence ofpurely judicial, quasi-judicial administrative and purely administrative acts is 
particularly evident from the various functions magistrates perform. Besides the formal aspects 
406 Baxter, Administrative Law, 345-346. 
407 The meaning of quasi-judicial act is controversial. Some authors contend that the tenn quasi-judicial act should not be used 
at all. See Wiechers, Administrative Law /, 124; Baxter, Administrative Law, 345-346 and 576-577. Others adhere to the use of 
the tenn since it is firmly established, provided that clarity exists on the content of the concept. See Wiechers, Administrative 
Law /, 136. Generally see Baxter, 573-580 and Wiechers, Administrative Law I, 123-136 and THR-HR 29 (1966), 201; Street, 
SAU84 (1967), 385. 
408 Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492; Hoffman v Mrryer 1956 (2) SA 752 (C). 

409 The Cape of Good Hope Bank v Fischer (1886) 4 SC 368 at 375; Pullen, Bartman and Orr v Waja 1929 TPD 838; 

Kleinenberg v Clerk of Court Pietersburg 1904 TS 90. Further Baxter, Administrative Law, 346 fnn20 and 21, 632-634; 
Wiechers, Administrative Law I, 94, 104, 339-340 and his Administrative Law II, 92 and 97; Cilliers and D'OJiveira, State 
Liability, 256; Van der Westhuizen, Ldnderbericht Sudafrika, 632 and 650-651. 
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analysed above4lo, which undoubtedly incorporate the magistracy in the sphere of the jUdiciary 
rather than the executive, magistrates' duties still contain a considerable administrative element. 
As early as 1891, it was made clear that magistrates serve not only in a judicial capacity but in an 
administrative one as well: 
"Usually ... the term 'Magistrate' designates an official who is concerned, solely, with the 
administration of justice ... But I regret to say that such a definition of the term reflects but dimly and 
faintly the multitudinous character of a Magistrate's duties in this Colony. He is, indeed, a man of 
infinite capacity.'.411 
The relation between purely judicial acts by magistrates and delictual liability has been discussed 
at length in the previous chapters. Issuing licences, marrying couples, dealing with instances of 
infectious diseases, attending divisional council meetings and dealing with the assignment of 
agriCUltural credits or Land Bank loans are but some examples of the wide range of quasi­
judicial or purely administrative acts also performed by magistrates where infringements of 
rights could possibly take place. According to one source, up to 15% of a magistrate's time is 
regularly devoted to administrative work.412 
It is important, therefore, to distinguish between these various activities to determine whether or 
not officers or persons who do not perform judicial acts exclusively are personally liable for acts 
that infringe another's rights. It is not surprising that a number of proposals have been made by 
the courts and the legal literature regarding appropriate tests of whether or not an act may be 
considered judicia1.413 It falls outside the scope of this work to discuss these proposals at length. 
Therefore, only a brief overview will be presented. 
The so-called control test, namely whether the public official is under the control of a superior 
while making his decision414, is one criterion. If the state does not exercise any control, the 
official has performed neither a purely administrative nor a quasi-judicial act, but a judicial act. 
The state may not be held liable and, therefore, only personal delictual liability of the officer 
410 See above at 1 2 1 2 and 1 2 1 3. 
411 Reid v Gilson (1892) 13 NLR 323 at 325. 
412 Fernandez, AnalYSis and Critique, 121; Dicker, 1995 De Rebus, 637. 
413 See inter alia S v Carse 1967 2 SA 659 (C) 663-664; Matiwane v Estcourt Town Council 1967 3 SA 104 (H) 109 (D)-(E); 
Helderberg Butcheries (Pty) Ltd v Municipal Valuation Court Sommerset West 1977 (4) SA 99 (c); S v Chicaca 1980 (2) SA 
784 (n; S v Noka 1980 (4) SA 384 (0); Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 589 (A); Minister ofthe Interior v 
Harris 1952 (4) SA 769 (A). Furthennore Baxter, Administrative Law, 345-346 and 632-634; Wiechers, Administrative Law I, 
93-104 . 
414 De Villiers v Minister ofJustice 1916 TPD 463; Smith v Union Government 1933 AD 363 ; Swarts v Minister ofJustice 
1941 AD 181 ; Union Government v Thorne 1930 AD 47. 
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might be ofavail to the injured party. The weaknesses of this approach appear from the fact that, 
until 1993, magistrates were always subject to administrative control since they were considered 
public servants.415 Professor Marinus Wiechers has proposed in this respect that a magistrate's 
nonnal position be considered that of judicial officer and that qualified immunity be conferred 
on his administrative acts as well.416 Quite remarkably, he argues that superior court judges 
should also enjoy comprehensive and unrestricted qualified immunity even for acts that are 
really administrative, for example sequestration orders. 
Another test that has been applied is the so-called functional test. In Matthews v Young, De 
Villiers JA held that the general council of a trade union which had wrongfully ordered Young's 
exclusion from the union had 
"...purported to act under the rules of the society [the Union], and in doing so they were perfonning 
jUnctions analogous to those perfonned by ajudge, they were acting in a quasi-judicial capacity ...".417 
The crucial question here is in what function or sphere the magistrate, officer, councilor body in 
question acted.418 This test, it appears, was also applied by De Villiers CJ in the case of The 
Cape ofGood Hope Bank v Fischer, where the learned judge decided that a registrar of deeds' 
functions are mainly ministerial or administrative. Consequently, the judge denied the registrar 
the right to " ...shelter himself behind his judicial immunity when sued for a loss arising 
clearly...from a breach of his ministerial duties.'.419 More recently, however, in Knop v 
Johannesburg City Council, it was held that the nature of the official's function or capacity 
" ... cannot be elevated into propositions of law embodying self-contained criteria for determining 
liability".42o The nature of the function is but one of the aspects that need to be addressed. 
Other decisions saw the courts referring to the criteria of the much-criticised Donoughmore 
Report 421 in order to draw a proper distinction between judicial and quasi-judicial decisions.422 
This report was criticised for placing too much emphasis upon merely procedural differences.423 
415 Wiechers, Administrative Law J, 340. See also above at 1 2 1 2 and Dicker, 1995 De Rebus, 635. 
416 Wiechers, Administrative Law J, 340. 
417 1922 AD 492 at 509. My italics. 
418 Wiechers, Administrative Law J, 340. 
419 (1886) 4 SC 368 at 375. 
420 1995 (2) SA I (A) 24. 
421 See Baxter, Adminislralive Law, 345 for details. 
422 Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Administrator, Transvaal 1961 (3) SA 669 (T) 674; Bell v Van Rensburg NO 1971 (3) 
SA 693 (C). 
423 See Baxter, Administrative Law, 224 n229, 345-346 n 14 and Wiechers, Administrative Law I, 123-124 for details. 
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The approach of examining the procedures and the composition of the organ in question424 has 
not been considered decisive. That the members of the adjudicating organ are lawyers and the 
proceedings resemble those of the ordinary courts may serve as an indication that a judicial act 
was indeed performed. But, as said earlier, there are numerous examples of court-like tribunals 
where legally untrained assessors adjudicate, as well as parliamentary commissions of inquiry 
where superior court judges preside and where the commission is by no means considered a 
court. 
Drawing on De Smith, an English author, Professor Wiechers put forward four criteria or 
general tests:425 A judicial act contains a final and binding decision (res judicata). The regular 
duty of deciding a legal issue or a dispute between two parties (lis inter partes) is involved. The 
legal mode of operation or legal means used by the organ in question must be assessed. Finally, 
it may be asked whether the act in question imposes or finalises obligations or affects existing 
rights. With regard to administrative judicial acts, Professor Wiechers comes to the conclusion 
that it is not possible or desirable to use only one test to verify whether an act is judicial or 
not.426 It is submitted that this conclusion applies equally to non-administrative bodies. 
In Professor Wiechers' eyes, both substantive and formal tests ought to be applied. Thus it may 
be asked, with regard to substantive aspects, whether there is a legal dispute as regards 
privileges, freedoms, powers or duties. Furthermore, it ought to be examined whether or not 
legal norms are applied by ascertaining disputed facts and/or passing judgement. With regard to 
formal aspects, a rule-of-thumb test may be to enquire whether or not the organ in question has 
the qualities normally attributed to a judicial organ, such as independence, accessibility, trial 
procedure, training of its members, or what its status is. According to Wiechers, the decisive 
formal test is to determine the legal effect of the act. A judicial act, as distinct from 
administrative or quasi-judicial acts, is always final and binding on the parties. 
In the final analysis, the point is made by Professor Baxter that a judicial act and its attached 
qualified immunity should find only restricted application.427 The characterisation of an act as a 
judicial one is only proper if consideration is given to the policy considerations upon which this 
424 Wiechers, Administrative Law I, 94 . 

425 Ibid. at 95-99. 

426 Ibid. at 102-) 03. 

427 Baxter, Administrative Law, 633-634 . 
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immunity is based, namely that the official's independence and impartiality while adjudicating a 
dispute between two parties is paramount and begs complete protection. 
In summary, it is evident that, substantially, the scope of delictual liability of quasi-judicial (non­
curial) bodies is identical with that of members of ordinary courts (curial bodies). Whether a 
quasi-judicial body performs a judicial or merely a quasi-judicial or purely administrative act is 
problematic and can only be ascertained by properly applying both formal and substantive tests 
ofevaluation. 
3 5 Critical assessment of modern South African law of civil judicial liability 
3 5 1 Summary of the current law of civil judicial liability 
Judicial officers, including judges, magistrates, and administrative officers or other persons 
acting in a so-called quasi-judicial capacity, may be liable in delict only if they exceed the limits 
of the provisional protection that is conferred upon them in consequence of their performing 
judicial acts. Accordingly, the immunity these judicial officers enjoy in South Africa is only a 
qualified one, i.e., it is open to a plaintiff to rebut the defence raised by the judicial officer. Two 
distinct defences or justification grounds are available to judicial officers. In an action for 
damages for defamation, a judicial officer may raise the defence of qualified privilege. In an 
action for damages for wrongful imprisonment or wrongful misjudgement, a judicial officer may 
raise the defence of official capacity. South African law has now reached a point where both 
these justification grounds may be rebutted in practically the same way: the plaintiff on a balance 
of probabilities has to prove that the judicial officer exceeded his provisional protection or, in 
other words, that he abused his judicial office. The plaintiff may do so only by showing 
improper motive (malice or mala fides) on the part of the judicial officer. The result is evident: 
in modem South African law the good faith criterion, or improper motive, plays an essential role 
in determining the wrongfulness and liability ofa judicial officer. 
In a recent contribution to the historical development of South African Aquilian liability 
Professor Hutchison aptly referred to the concept of wrongfulness as a 'brake on liability,.428 
The concept of wrongfulness was intended as an additional element to apply policy 
428 Hutchison, Aquilian Liability II, 6 I 9. 
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considerations to cases where it appears necessary to restrict liability. The reason for this 
approach in South law still does not liability 

situation harm is caused culpably. Generally speaking, borderline situations where 

culpable conduct causing harm is still not actIonable can found in area of ""'5U5"'H' 
conduct. liability may certainly be to be among such borderline cases429 since most 
IJI:JVIJIIJ would agree that it is difficult to it with the need for judicial malepc~nalenc:;e 
that liability for negligent conduct in this situation, hence, is not always appropriate.430 
words ofLord Denning come to 
" ... [each judge should be able to] do his work in complete independence and free from fear. He 
should not have to tum the pages of his books with fingers, asking himself: 'IfI do 
shall I be liable in damages?,,>431 
Consequently, in a case uC1gement, it may that thatmade a 
judgement was objectively wrong - and that there was causation of loss (or, alternatively, 
deprivation of liberty) and even that was negligence on the part of the (through 
1l1l::><11J1J1l\.,a.UUll of law), but it does not follow that the judge will be held delictually liable 
under the actio Aquiliae or the actio iniuriarum. At this point policy considerations come 
into play and a the result which is that, improper motive on the 
of the judge can be established, conduct was not wrongful, that is overall lawful, and the 
judge is consequently not liable. 
this line of reasoning, which is perceived to be in accordance with the presently 
'At't'PrltPl1 approach South African law, is to Apart from the fact the 
position has hardly been spelt out as clearly as this the COurtS 432 , a number of issues are not 
analysed. The and case law rush over asoects. the 
definition ofwhich unexplained. Scant attention, instance, has been paid to 
what constitutes a wrong judgement. Further, uncritical of improper motive calls 
for particularly the constitutional developments also 
in light of the proper application of the Roman-Dutch authorities this field. Finally, it appears 
that the fault ofjudicial liability 
429 For instance inducement of breach of contract or numerous cases of causation economic loss. 

430 For details see below at chapter VI3 5 22 (c) (ii) 3523 (b). 

431 Sirros v Moore [197413 WLR 459 at 470. 





In the following section, these arguments will be pursued to provide a critical assessment of the 
modem South African approach towards civil judicial liability. 
352 The essential requirements of the eJement of wrongfulness 
Wrongfulness with regard to judicial liability exists only when two essential requirements are 
met: there must be a wrong judgement and the judge must have a particular state of mind when 
giving the judgement. 433 
3521 The requirement ofwrong judgement 
Judicial liability for wrongful imprisonment and wrongful misjudgement have one thing in 
common: in both instances the individual suffers from a wrong judgement made by a judicial 
officer. Exercising judgement is generally a difficult mental decision-making process and the 
judicial process must allow enough room for legal argument and balancing of interests. To adopt 
an image presented by Professor Rheinstein, referred to in the general introduction, judicial 
officers are not slot machines which can be fed with legal knowledge and, in turn, will spew out 
the correctjudgement.434 Not for nothing is Justitia's one symbolic tool the scale. 
Wrong judgement, therefore, is a relative term. Prima facie, the single effective determinant of 
what must be considered a wrong judgement is an objective one: a wrong judgement is at hand 
where something which is illegal is declared legal, or where something which is legal is declared 
illegal. In other words, to be wrong the judgement must be clearly contrary to a legal rule or 
norm that is established by the authoritative sources oflaw. It is evident that there hardly exists a 
more objective standard for the determination of whether or not a judicial officer's decision is 
wrong. However, it would be naive to assume that the legal sources relied upon are definitive 
and unequivocal. A statute or a precedent may allow more than one acceptable interpretation, 
and in controversial areas of law various conflicting opinions may be considered relevant, cogent 
433 See above at 3 3 I. 
434 In his inaugural lecture held in 1921 the Swiss Law Professor Fritzsche rightly observed : "Man stellt sich vor, dass er 
die auf jeden vorkommenden Fall passende Gesetzesschablone im Kopf habe, den betrefJenden Paragraphen aus dem 
Gedachlnis miisse hersagen konnen, und dass damit die Sache gelan sei. Eine naiv-falsche Vorslellung vom Wesen 



















or anruaole. In such cases it is sometimes practically impossible to verify objectively the 'law' 
the judicial in 
Apart from cases where the' decision is clearly law, the judgement is wrong 
it is subsequently properly overruled by a court. for example, a statute allows two 
and the the interpretation as the judgement 
while, on appeal, the the other interpretation: because of the hierarchy of 
the courts and the that court's becomes an source of 
the decision ofthe judge a quo, though excusable, may now be said to be wrong. 
A second aspect is ofgreat in cases ofambiguous legal sources. It must asked 
or not judicial officer made his accordance with the commonly accepted methods 
lllt(~rplretltIcm and in accordance with the legal of This approach 
emphasises the specific duties and obligations of judicial officers. Consequently, wrong 
also an unacceptable of judicial power.435 This focus on 
compliance with judicial duties, at least in cases of ambiguous legal sources, is consistent with 
the approach advocated by the great Hugo Grotius his Inleidinge Jol years ago: 
rnnITT"'-V to 
may incur in consequence. ,,436 
who decides to laws which it was his to know or an adjournment 
[he] may have acted in [is] liable for any damage which anyone 
Employing the of the man, respect of modern it mav be asked 
whether the reasonable judge who was true to his duty by applying the normal methods of 
interpretation discovery the law would come to an identical conclusion. IS an 
interesting consideration. However, it must noted considerations as to the reasonableness 
of the behaviour relate rather to the question fault or, more specifically, to the 
should not with of the 
wrongfulness.43 7 
435 Some of these wrongs have been accepted as of review. Section 24 Court Act of 1959 states: 
...proceedings of any inferior court may be brought under TCview the oLinterest in the cause, malice or 
corruption on the part of the presiding officer." 
436 Inleidinge (1926), 3.37.9. 
437 See below at 3 5 2 3 One decisive difference between the test 
143 for more details. 
and the test for negligence is that the 
former relates to the conduct of the wrnnannf'f while the test determines the legal blameworthiness of the 





However, even if a judgement is objectively wrong according to the above criteria it does not 
necessarily follow that the judgement is a wrongful one. 
3 5 2 2 	 The requirement of state ofmind: improper motive and the doctrine ofabuse of 
right 
(a) The established criterion: improper motive 
Practically all the emphasis in the case law analysed in the preceding chapter as well as in the 
academic literature since the latter half of the nineteenth century has been on the question of the 
state of mind of the judge. The requirement that judgements should be wrong has been 
overlooked or, at any rate, taken for granted. This might be due to failure to draw a clear line 
between wrongfulness and fault. It also suggests that judges and commentators thought that what 
constituted a wrong judgement was so obvious that it needed no further elaboration. 
Be that as it may, as the law now stands judicial liability (and wrongfulness) is established only 
where the judge was actuated by an improper motive. One may ask, however, whether the 
liability of judges should be made to depend on improper motive as opposed to some other 
subjective mental requirement. 
To understand its application to the question of judicial liability - and to appreciate the 
advantages of an alternative approach - the criterion of improper motive must be seen in its 
broader dogmatical context within the law, as well as in relation to the historical development 
which has already been traced. Two aspects must be examined: first, whether the motive 
criterion bears any relationship to the so-called doctrine of abuse of right438, which might be 
used to provide a satisfactory theoretical basis for it; and secondly, whether an application of the 
doctrine of abuse of right and the motive requirement are a suitable test ofwrongfulness. 
(b) The relationship ofthe motive requirement and the doctrine ofabuse ofright 
The doctrine of abuse of right applies principally in private and in administrative law.439 Its 
underlying premise is that the exercise of a right or a power may take place in a manner or 
circumstances that render such exercise wrongful. In such a case, a right holder exercises his or 
her rights in a legally reprehensible manner and, hence, abuses those rights. In practice, this is 
ascertained by investigating motive: an otherwise lawful act will be unlawful if done with an 
438 Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 104-1 10; Boberg, Delict, 206-210; Midgley, Delict, 68. 




















improper motive. Improper motive is generally defined more broadly than mere ill will, spite, 
ulterior motive or malice, which are, more specifically, the terms frequently used by the courts 
with respect to judicial liability. Such motive is present when a person acts with the sole motive 
of harming another without advancing a significant interest ofhis own (ad aemulationem, animo 
. . d·)440. h . th h h . ed 441VICinO nocen I , or WIt a motlve 0 er t an an aut ons one. 
Academics have advanced varying views on many details of this doctrine. However, all this 
'semantic quibbling', as Professor Boberg puts it, need not be elaborated on.442 Of relevance to 
our subj ect are those differences of opinion as to whether or not the doctrine of abuse of right 
enjoys general application in law. According to some, wrongfulness is always determined by the 
criterion of reasonableness, namely the objective reasonableness of the conduct in question. As 
improper motive is generally indicative of unreasonableness, the doctrine of abuse of right is 
inherently applicable.443 Others are of the opinion that this doctrine does not apply as a general 
rule throughout the law. It is argued that motive is restricted in its application to those few 
instances where competing interests or rights of equal merit clamour for equitable resolution.444 
Recourse to objective reasonableness is wmecessary where the law already balances the different 
interests or rights at stake and a decision is made within the categories into which the underlying 
aspects of reasonableness have crystallised.445 
To date the doctrine of abuse of right has been recognised by the courts as a determinant of 
wrongfulness in the areas of: the law of neighbours; defamation on a privileged occasion 
(relevant for judicial officers446) as well as in fair comment; malicious prosecution or wrongful 
440 Van der Merwe and Olivier, Onregmatige Daad, 64; Midgley, Delict, 51,68. 
441 Boberg, Delict, 208. 
442 Boberg, Delict, 206. 
443 In favour of the view that improper motive is capable of universal application, see Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 106-108. 
References are deduced from the field of the law of neighbours. However, the authors stress that: "The doctrine [of abuse of 
right] is not restricted to neighbours but enjoys general application in the law of delict." The authors then continue to observe 
inter alia: "The doctrine of abuse of rights entails the basic question whether or not the defendant acted wrongfully." And: 
" ... conduct with the exclusive aim of harming a neighbour (animus vicino nocendi) is, as a general rule, wrongful." See also 
Van der Merwe and Olivier, Onregmatige Daad, 68. With regard to case law see generally Rega/ v African Supers/ate (Pty) Ltd 
1963 (I) SA 102 (A) 107-108. Further Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 106 fn449. 
444 Boberg, Delict, 208. 
445 Boberg, Delict, 209: " ...categories of wrongfulness have been crystallised by the courts ... motive is relevant only in the few 
categories mentioned." Therefore " ...[t]he doctrine is... not of general application, though its application may be extended to new 

areas not yet covered by authority ... ". 

446 Bosman v Bisset (1881) SC 319; May v Udwin 1981 (I) SA I (A). 
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imprisomnent (relevant for judicial officers447) and, finally, in the attachment of property.448 
Even though decisions so far relate only to quasi-judicial bodies449, there are strong indications 
that the courts would also apply the doctrine of abuse of right to establishing the bounds of 
official authority for wrongful misjudgements. A number of academics definitely share this 
. 450VIew. 
Although improper motive is of great importance to the doctrine of abuse of right, generally it 
may not be considered the sole determinant of liability under the doctrine. The other determining 
factor is an objective enquiry into the pertinent interest of the perpetrator: the perpetrator's 
interest in exercising his rights (eg., the right of ownership, the right to make comments, the 
right to chastise a child, etc) is weighed against the interest of his opponent (eg., the neighbour, 
the child, etc). The extent of the perpetrator's interest is limited by the rights and interests of 
others. Consequently, improper motive alone is insufficient to convert lawful conduct into a 
wrongful act. 451 
From the case of May v Udwin, however, it appears that the additional objective requirement of 
absence of the perpetrator's interest is inapplicable with regard to liability ofjudicial officers. In 
May v Udwin, the Appellate Division made it abundantly clear that it considered those criteria 
other than malice used by the Cape Provincial Division (in Udwin v May) to determine the 
liability of judicial officers as generally irrelevant for the determination of liability under the 
actio iniuriarum. These additional criteria were 'irrelevance of the defamatory matter to the 
proceedings' and the 'absence of reasonable foundation for the statement' .452 It is evident that 
these criteria match the additional objective test of the absence of perpetrator's interest required 
under the doctrine of abuse of right.453 It is safe, therefore, to argue that according to the courts, 
447 Penrice v Dickinson 1945 AD 6; Moeketsi v Minister ofJustice 1988 (4) SA 707 (T). 
448 For an overview see Boberg, Delict, 206, 208; Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 106 fu449; Midgley, Delict, 68. 
449 The Cape ofGood Hope Bank v Fischer 4 SC (1886) 368; Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492; Lucas v Wilkinson 1926 NPD 
10; Abrahamse v Phigeland 1932 CPD 196; Cohen v Committee ofHarrismith Hebrew Congregation 1924 OPD 25; Tvl Coal 
Owners Association v Board ofControl 1921 TPD 447; Hoffman v Meyer 1956 (2) SA 752 (C). 
450 Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 99-100, 106 fu449 and THR-HR 52 (1989), 468; Midgley, Delict, 75. 
451 Generally Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) 1121; Neethling et ai, Law of Delict, 109 (d) and (c); Van der Merwe and 
Olivier, Onregmaage Daad, 68-69. From Boberg, Delict, 207 and 209 it cannot be deduced whether he approves this notion. 
452 See above at 3 2 1 3. 
m In May v Udwin 1981 (I) SA I (A) 20 (0) the court made it clear that these objective criteria are at most indicative of 
improper motive. The lack of significant interest, however, applies to the other parties to a case, for instance advocates, 
attorneys, witnesses or litigants. In addition see Burchell, Defence ofPrivilege , 178 and 181 et seqq. 
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at least with regard to judicial liability under the actio iniuriarum, improper motive alone is 
considered as determining the wrongfulness of a misjudgement 
Whatever view is correct with regard to the general or more specific application of the doctrine 
of abuse of right within the question of wrongfulness, the doctrine undoubtedly applies only 
where there is a conflict of interests between two competing rights of equal merit.454 Ultimately, 
all authors agree that the application of the doctrine of abuse of right entails the application of a 
value judgement. Professor Boberg calls this a " ...delicate balancing of the...rights of the 
aggrieved individual against the interests of society.'.455 Professor Neethling refers to "...a 
weighing-up of the benefits which the exercise of his right has for the defendant, against the 
prejudice suffered by the plaintiff .... " .456 Consequently, it would be superfluous to engage in the 
highly complex process of detennination of an abuse of right if it were evident that one party's 
rights or interests could be ignored or do not even exist - where, in other words, wrongfulness is 
determinable even without the application of a value judgement. Seen in this light, Boberg's 
solution of a somewhat restricted application of the doctrine of abuse of right is indeed the better 
one. 
With respect to judicial liability, therefore, the initial question must be whether or not a value 
judgement must be applied. It will be argued in what follows that, to a large extent, there is no 
point in maintaining that a conflict exists between the rights and interests of judicial officers 
(more broadly, of society) and the rights of the individual, as required for the application of a 
value judgement. Or, to put it differently, the doctrine of abuse of right and, consequently, the 
motive requirement should have only restricted application to the question ofjudicial liability. 
(c) The motive requirement's general suitability for the determination ofjudicial liability 
(i) The parties' rights at stake: arguments in favour ofthe motive requirement 
In order to assess whether there actually is a conflict of rights, it is necessary first to elaborate on 
what rights and interests of the judiciary and of the individual are at stake with regard to judicial 
liability. The rights of the injured party are generally easy to determine. Either the right of 
454 This appears from Boberg, Delict, 207 as well as from Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 106. 

455 Boberg, Delict, 207. 

456 Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 106. 
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personality, more precisely the right to fama, dignitas or libertas, or the right of property is at 
stake. The rights or interests of judicial officers are more difficult to define. These are 
institutional rights rather than personal rights. Hence, considerations of public policy are of 
significance for a proper determination of the conflict of rights. 
Little attention has as yet been paid to the aspect of public policy in the South African usus 
hodiernus ofjudicial liability. This appears to be the right place to make up for the deficiency. In 
this respect, however, it is necessary to distinguish between liability for defamation in court and 
liability for wrongful misjudgements and wrongful imprisonment. 
(a) Defamation in court 
With regard to judicial wrongdoing through defamation, it is thought by some that judicial 
officers should as a matter of policy be free from fear of the threat of liability by means of 
restricted liability in delict. Joubert JA in May v Udwin stated that: 
"Qualified privilege is founded on public policy. This is especially so with the qualified privilege of a 
judicial officer: Public interest in the due administration of justice requires that a judicial officer, in 
the exercise of his judicial functions, should be able to speak his mind freely without fear of incurring 
liability for damages for defamation.,,457 
Undoubtedly, the independence ofjudicial officers in their quest for truth appears to be a crucial 
factor. Openness in judicial proceedings is also of considerable importance, as appears from the 
remarks ofDe Villiers CJ in Bosman v Bisset: 
"It is the clear policy of our law ... to impose no unnecessary fetters upon the freedom of Judges and 
Magistrates to comment upon all cases brought judicially before them, and upon the conduct of all 
persons concerned in those cases.,,458 
It is in the interest of proper administration ofjustice that freedom of speech in court should be 
upheld to enable the courts to make the most objective decision possible. What is further 
envisaged is the furnishing of the judicial officer with sufficient authority to uphold the dignity 
of the court and to protect the proper administration of justice by the courts, in other words, to 
guarantee the functioning of the courts. No one could possibly argue that these considerations of 
public policy are not in the interests of society at large. It is accepted that the individual's right to 
fama in court should be and is subject to the restrictions indicated above. It is not the defamatory 
remark as such that is privileged, but the occasion and place where it is uttered by a judicial 
officer. 
457 1981 (I) SA J (A) 19 (H). 
458 I SC (1881) 319 at 323. 
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With regard to judicial wrongdoing through defamation, therefore, there exists a conflict 
between the rights and the interests of the judiciary (as well as society at large) and of the 
individual who has been defamed in court. Consequently, the doctrine of abuse of right is 
generally acceptable in order to determine the wrongfulness issue. In the light of the foregoing, 
to apply the value judgement to cases ofjudicial defamation in court means that the interests and 
rights of the judiciary prevail over those of the individual, unless the individual can prove 
improper motive on the part of the judge. The application of the motive requirement is thus 
called for in cases of defamation in court to achieve what I call an acceptable restriction of 
judicial liability. 
(fJ) Wrongful misjudgement and wrongful imprisonment 
Similar arguments are advanced by those who support the view that the doctrine of abuse of 
right and the motive requirement applies to other instances of judicial wrongdoing, namely 
wrongful imprisonment or wrongful misjudgement. Essentially, it is argued that in regard to the 
giving of wrong judgements there is a need for the same reasons of policy to weigh the interests 
and rights of the judiciary and society against those of the individual. Acting in a judicial 
capacity requires the judge to exercise his discretion as judiciously and impartially as possible. 
The threat of a possible delictual action might negatively influence the judge's decision in one 
way or another. 
A second argument - familiar in light of the historical development - is based on an application 
of the principle of res iudicata facit ius.459 There are sufficient ways of protecting a party from 
the consequences of a wrong judgement, namely review and appeal. Once a decision is final, 
however, it becomes res iudicata and assumes ultimate legal authority. Clearly, a delictual action 
would challenge and undermine this authority. To put it differently: how could an act which 
creates the law (final decision) cause a result which is against the law? The policy consideration 
upon which this principle is based is, of course, the achievement and protection of legal certainty 
and of peace: A point is reached where the interest of society in the effectiveness of 
administration ofjustice requires an end to litigation. 
4S9 Compare, for example, the dictum by Coke CJ in Floyd v Barker (1607) 77 ER 1305 at 1306-1307 where he stressed the 
fundamental importance of the finality ofjudicial judgements to the public interest. 
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Consequently, the prevailing oplmon argues that to restrict judges' delictual liability for 
wrongful misjudgement and wrongful imprisonment to cases of an abuse of right (wrong 
judgement given with an improper motive) ensures confidence in the independence of the 
judiciary and puts an end to fruitless litigation. 
These are indeed valuable and plausible arguments for restricting judicial liability. Whether they 
dictate that liability should be imposed only in the case of improper motive, however, is another 
matter. There are a number of arguments which can be raised against this view. The following 
arguments can be classified as practical, constitutional or historical, according to their nature: 
(U) Arguments against the motive requirement in cases ofwrong judgements 
(aJ The diffiCUlty ofleading sufficient evidence 
The first argument to be considered against the motive requirement is the difficulty of proof of 
improper motive on a balance of probabilities. In one of the most important decisions in recent 
years in the field of defamation, Hoexter JA observed that the question of allocating the onus of 
proof is a policy consideration that has a decisive primary impact on the general outcome of 
delictual actions.460 
It is submitted that the same applies to the question ofwhat has to be proved here. Owing to the 
extremely subjective nature of the concept, it is very difficult for an individual to prove 
malicious or improper motive on the part of a judicial officer.461 To recap: motive generally 
indicates the reason for conduct.462 It must not be confused with intent, which can be defined as 
wilful acts or omissions the wrongdoer knows to be wrongful. Motive is a subjective concept 
which refers to the reason, object, desire, or sense behind the enactment of will. Intention 
denotes the manifestation of the will rather than the wish or desire. From this it follows that 
improper motive is more restricted in its application than is intention. A person who 
intentionally kills someone does not necessarily act with an improper motive. For instance, 
intention but not malice is present in the killing of a terminally ill person to spare him or her 
further suffering.463 
460 Neethling v Du Preez; Neethling v The Weekly Mail 1994 1 SA 708 (A) 777 per Hoexter JA. Similar considerations by 
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461 Burchell, Defence ofPrivilege, 180. 

462 Generally to the following see Van der Walt, Delict, 60-65; Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 116-121; Van der Merwe and 
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In Esterhuizen v Administrator Tvl. Bekker J stated: 
"In my view, however, intent and motive are different concepts, and the fact that that the 
motive ... might be laudable does not negate the fact that the intention.. . might nevertheless be 
wrongful.'.464 
Consequently, it is argued that it is easier to prove the somewhat wider element of intention or 
dolus than the narrower element of improper motive. The plaintiff is freed from having to 
descend into the mire of inquiry into motive, spite or ill_wi11.465 The apparent difficulties a 
plaintiff has to face proving an improper motive on the part of the defendant, who, moreover, is 
not an ordinary defendant but a judicial officer, sometimes even a superior court judge, renders 
any theoretical balance of equity between the plaintiff and the defendant a hollow fiction. The 
fact that in May v Udwin the court made some concessions when it accepted that irrelevance of 
the matter or the absence of reasonable foundation was indicative of malice466, is a strong 
indication of the overwhelming difficulties a plaintiff faces in establishing improper motive.467 
In fact, it seems there is some point in arguing that South Africa's qualified protection from 
liability is in practice very close to the absolute protection enjoyed by English judges for 
centuries. In other words, for practical pUIposes, the question of the application of the motive 
requirement is very nearly congruent with the question of whether or not there should be judicial 
liability at all. 
A further argument may be adduced in this respect. Consider the American case of Stump v 
Sparlanan. The mother of a fifteen-year-old child presented a petition to a state court judge 
alleging that her allegedly retarded daughter had spent nights with men and that she should be 
sterilised to prevent 'unfortunate circumstances,.468 However, the girl's high school record, 
which the judge did not consult, indicated that in all probability she was not retarded.469 The 
judge did not file the petition with the court, gave no notice to the daughter, held no hearing and 
approved the petition immediately. Eight days later the girl was sterilised on the pretext that she 
was receiving an appendectomy. Only after she married did she realise that she had been 
sterilised two years earlier. No such case has taken place in South Africa thus far; and in many 
464 1957 (3) SA 710 (T) 722. 
465 Mac Millan, SAU92 (1975), 160. 
466 May v Udwin 1981 (1) SA 1 (A) 20 (D); Burchell, Law ofDefamation, 252. 
467 See in addition Neethling el ai, Law ofPersonality, \60-161, 162 til 198. 
468 435 US 349 (1978). For a discussion see Roth and Hagan, 1984 JFCJ, 5. 
469 Ibid. at 351 . 
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cases no doubt appeal and review proceedings do provide a remedy, and the principle of res 
judicata rightly puts an end to litigation. However, it is argued in the light of Stump that 
additional litigation sometimes is necessary for a victim of judicial wrongdoing. It is 
questionable then whether redress in cases of irreparable loss (by means of appeal or review) 
should hinge on the frequently overwhelming difficulty of proving improper motive on the part 
ofthe judicial officer. 
(f3) Constitutional arguments against the motive requirement 
Practical obstacles to lead evidence have consequences, particularly with regard to constitutional 
aspects. The approach, followed by the courts and the majority of the legal academics, to apply 
improper motive as the essential determinant of wrongfulness leads to an exceptionally 
problematic result: under certain circumstances judicial officers are granted the right to breach 
the law without having to fear any consequences. 
It is true that every justification ground renders prima facie unlawful conduct lawful at the 
outset.470 Seen from this point ofview, any (objectively) wrong judgement is a wrong judgement 
only in a technical and not in a delictual sense. Consequently a judge whose conduct is justified 
is not breaking the law: the judgement is wrong but not deliberately wrongful. 
Although the above is the generally accepted position of the law with regard to wrongfulness, it 
may be questioned whether this approach should be adopted in the case ofjudicial liability. The 
application of the motive requirement as the essential route to rebut the justification grounds of 
judicial officers and the near impossibility of a plaintiffs proving improper motive on the part of 
the judge has created a situation in South Africa where judicial officers may render wrong 
judgements without any real fear. The difficulty of leading sufficient evidence results in there 
being in practice no wrong judgements in a delictual sense, although de facto there may be some. 
It is worth questioning whether this discrepancy between reality and legality is acceptable, or 
whether it is not, rather, in the interests of the authority of the state and the credibility of the 
judiciary to remove this negative consequence of the application of the motive requirement by 
employing an alternative requirement. This question is of particular relevance in light of recent 
constitutional developments. 
470 Neethling et aI, Law a/Delict, 39 fn44. 
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It is trite but true that wrong judgements contravene not merely the rights and interests of an 
individual; they jeopardise the interests of society at large. This becomes abundantly clear if one 
takes into account that South Africa now is a constitutional state, a Rechtsstaat.471 In the modem 
constitutional state, the law is generally the most fundamental determinant of the proper 
functioning, even the survival, of the state. The state uses the law as the central means of 
upholding and maintaining internal order. Thus, all are bound by the authority of the law. This 
proposition applies to all the organs of the state alike, including the judiciary. 
The law has general application.472 It is submitted that the constitutional state risks its credibility 
and authority if it allows any officer of the state to act contrary to the law without subjecting him 
or her to same consequences as any other individual, namely liability (civil, criminal, or 
disciplinary). It is the special task of the judiciary to ensure that all individuals, juristic persons 
or organs of state act in confonnity with the rule of law.473 It is of exceptional importance to the 
constitutional state that the jUdiciary should itself act in accordance with the rule oflaw. 
Adjudication is a supreme governmental activity. As Steyn JA once said, " ... [T]he judicature 
is...an integral part of the State. It is the State acting through its judicial organs.'>474 Judges wield 
impressive power. The consequences of wrong judicial decisions for the individual's rights of 
personality, liberty, property and, until recently, even life, can be severe. The judiciary's right to 
immunity is a right that should be granted with the utmost circumspection. As Professor 
Labuschagne has stated: "Dit is 'n bekende historiese feit dat ongekontroleerde mag die 
voedingsbron van tirannie en onderdrukking is.'>475 Some years ago Edwin Cameron quoted 
Lord Devlin thus: 
"It is a great temptation to cast the judiciary as an elite which will bypass the traffic-laden ways of the 
democratic process. But it would only apparently be a bypass. In truth it would be a road that would 
never rejoin the highway but would lead inevitably ...to the totalitarian state.'.476 
In light of South Africa's immediate past, the new Constitution is aimed at prohibiting any such 
possibility of abuse due to uncontrolled use of power. It is an essential aspect of the rule of law 
that there should be means of redress available to the individual for wrongs committed by any 
471 Basson, Interim Constitution, xxvii; Beukes, 1997 Consultus, 129. 
472 Section 1 (c) together with ss 8 (1) and 7 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
473 Section 165 (2) together with s 8 (1) of the Constitution. 
474 Lekhari v Johannesburg City Council 1956 (1) SA 552 (A) 566 (C)-(D). 
475 At THR-HR 59 (1996), 479. 




organ of state. The obligation to act in conformity with the law has been made perfectly clear in 
the Constitution in s 165 (2): 
"The courts ... are subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and 
without fear, favour and prejudice." 
and in the judicial oath which all judicial officers must take: 
"I swear that as a judge...I will be faithful to the Republic of South Africa, will uphold and protect the 
Constitution and the human rights entrenched in it, and will administer justice to all persons alike 
without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the Constitution and the law.',477 
The Constitution, in s 37, provides for the only conceivable exception to this principle of 
observance of the law by an officer of the state, namely a state of emergency. But even here we 
read, in s 5: 
"No Act ofParliament that authorises a declaration of a state of emergency, and no legislation enacted 
or any other action taken in consequence of a declaration, may permit or authorise (a) indemnifying 
the state, or any person, in respect of any unlawful act...,,478 
The possibility of judges rendering wrong judgements without facing sanctions raises not only 
the question of the credibility of the judiciary. There arises also the question how to hold judges 
properly responsible. Another important aspect of the argument of rule of law is, therefore, the 
aspect of judicial accountability. From Juvenal's question "Who watches the watchmen?" it is 
clear that the judiciary as much as the executive and legislature requires control. Judicial 
obedience to the rule of law can be enforced, or rather controlled, only by accountability. Seen 
from this angle, judicial liability must be regarded as an alternative to other means of control. 
Institutionally, there are provisions in the Constitution and in national legislation with regard to 
selection, appointment and dismissal ofjudicial officers. Technically, there are means of appeal 
and review and, with regard to publicity, open court sessions as well as academic and public 
criticism.479 
It is only in recent years that the importance ofjudicial accountability has attracted the attention 
of the legal fraternity in South Africa.480 However, of those writers who have worked in this 
477 Schedule 2 item 6 (1) Constitution. 

478 My italics. 

479 Cameron, SAJOHR 6 (1990), 253, furthermore see above at 1 22. 

480 See inter alia Cameron, SAJOHR 6 (1990), 253 and Judicial Accountability, 181-199; Rautenbach and Malherbe, 
Constitutional Law, 234-236; Labuschagne, 1993 De Jure, 347 and THR-HR 59 (1996), 479; Corder, SA Public Law 7 (1992), 
181-193. Meanwhile the discussion on judicial accountability seems to have also reached the conscious minds of the superior 
court judges as appears from the words ofMr Justice I Mahomed at an address at the first orientation course for new judges held 





















field, only two acknowledge judicial liability as a specific means of accountability.481 This, it is 
submitted, is regrettable since delictual liability is a particularly useful and important aspect of 
judicial accountability. The uniqueness ofjudicial liability lies in that it is the sole control device 
within the power of the legal subject that suffered the wrong. Apart from appeal or review 
procedures, it may be described as a means by which the individual acts in the interests of 
society at large. Hence, with regard also to the need for judicial accountability, it seems that, to 
uphold the authority of the state and to protect the rule oflaw, the field in which judicial officers 
may adjudicate wrong judgements without fearing any delictual consequences should remain as 
restricted as possible. Or, at least, more restricted than appears to be the case on the basis of the 
present motive requirement. 
In this context, however, it should not be overlooked that the application of the motive 
requirement serves a legal-political purpose. The aim of restricting judicial liability by means of 
the sweeping motive requirement is to protect judicial officers from constant fear of delictual 
liability and thereby to ensure judicial independence.482 It must be recognised that the jUdiciary 
has a peculiar position within the state, its task beings to apply the laws impartially, fearlessly 
and without prejudice. In other words, the key to its success is independence. Judicial 
independence - from the parties in court, from the executive, from the legislature and from 
society at large - may without exaggeration be described as a cornerstone of the rule of law.483 
Acknowledging the need for judicial independence means that it is essential that judicial 
accountability is not mistaken for judicial subordination. The necessity of protecting the 
judiciary's independence and upholding its functionality, dignity and authority are important and 
complex issues, and one does not have to go back too many years in the South African context 
to appreciate the delicateness of the contention that judicial autonomy must be respected by 
other organs of state. As Edwin Cameron has remarked: 
481 Rautenbach and Malherbe, Constitutional Law, 236 and Labuschagne, THR-HR 59 (1996), 479 et seqq. For more traditional 
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"Constitutional structure as much as ethical propriety indicates that judges should be substantively and 
formally autonomous in relation not only to the other arms of government but to the competing 
interests in the public or private sector over whom they may be called to adjudicate.'.484 
A restriction ofjudicial liability in order to protect the independence of the jUdiciary is necessary 
mostly because ofjudicial officers' fear of reprisal. This fear may not be dismissed as a chimera. 
Consider the interests of an international oil giant which is sued by a handful of fishermen for 
damages due to an off-shore operation which devastated the base of their income. It is easy to 
see the danger that a judge presiding over the case with the knowledge that the losing enterprise 
might possibly institute a retaliatory action against him, could rule against the fishermen to 
escape this threat.485 Another example could lie in the case where a judicial officer is subject to 
wrong imputations in the public or in the press that he or she will adjudicate or has adjudicated 
wrongly. These examples, and there are many more, indicate that judicial independence is 
indeed an essential aspect of the proper functioning of the legal order. 
To summarise: From what has been said so far, it is obvious that the ambit of judicial liability 
must be determined by balancing three competing interests. In the first place, the independence 
of the judiciary and its freedom from undue influence must be protected from too wide a scope 
of judicial liability. Furthermore, it is necessary to prevent harassing or vexatious actions which 
would undermine the authority of the judiciary, as well as its efficiency. The second interest at 
hand is that of the individual, who must be given adequate means of protection from unlawful 
judicial conduct as well as a proper basis for compensation. 
It is obvious that striking a proper balance between these two interests is a very difficult task and 
is subject to differing priorities. Meanwhile, no one would claim that the principle of judicial 
independence exists exclusively for the sake of the courts or the judicial officers. Judicial 
independence is not supposed to be the personal privilege of judicial officers. On the contrary, it 
serves ultimately to ensure the freedom of the citizen vis-a-vis the state. The real reason for 
protecting judicial independence is that it serves the people, who should receive judgements only 
from independent judges. 
We come, thus, to the third interest: the public interest. It is important that the judiciary acts in 
conformity with the precepts of the Constitution, i.e., impartial administration of justice and 
prevention ofabuse ofpower. 
484 SAJOH R 6 (1990), 252. 
485 Cohen, CWLR 41 (1990), 270. 
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If, therefore, one is to understand judicial independence as essential for the efficient and just rul!e 
of the legal order, as a service to the law and not merely for the benefit of the judiciary, it 
becomes evident that the laudable protection of judicial independence has to be limited where a 
judicial officer himself does not serve the law but instead obstructs the legal order from within. 
Only the proper endeavour of following the normal process of adjudication should be protected. 
Thus, protecting judicial independence by means of the motive criterion does not take sufficient 
account of the fact that the Constitution in ss 2 and 165 (2) imposes a positive duty on the 
judiciary to act in conformity with the rule of law, whereby judges are obliged to adjudicate in a 
fair, just and correct manner. 
Taking into account these considerations, there is good cause to argue that the delicate question 
of judicial liability within the law of delict must be reinterpreted in the light of the newly 
introduced Constitution. The Bill of Rights, particularly, serves what is referred to as its dual 
role: at first, as part of an enquiry for determination whether or not the rules affecting the parties 
are (constitutionally) valid. Secondly, the provisions inshrined in the Bill of Rights are part of 
the wrongfulness enquiry, which determines the nature and extent of the rules. With respect to 
the influence of the Bill of Rights, Professor Burchell's statement stands also with respect to 
judicial liability, namely that judges and academics have to be able to resolve disputes where 
common-law rights, such as the judiciary's malice-based qualified privilege, confront 
constitutionally entrenched rights, namely the positive duty imposed on the organs of state, i.e., 
the judiciary, to act in conformity with the law.486 In the passage that follows, Professor Burchell 
predicts that the Constitutional Court: 
.. ... will obviously be more ready to draw inspiration from the Bill of Rights in claims for damages 
against governmental officials or bodies for the infringement of individual rights. It is clear, however, 
that the provisions of a Bill ofRights will only be directly relevant where there is some 'governmental 
connection' since a Bill of Rights is essentially designed to prevent or control governmental abuses of 
power." 487 
In my eyes, there is no reason to doubt the 'governmental connection' of the whole process of 
adjudication into which judicial officers are involved. 
(y) The historical argument against the motive requirement 
There remains the historical argument against the motive requirement. The application of the 
concept of improper motive to cases of wrongful misjudgements and wrongful imprisonment 
486 Taken from Burchell, Principles, 13. With regard to the impact of the Bill of Rights on the future law of delict see also 
Midgley, Delict, 18 and 52. 
487 Ibid. Furthermore see Midgley, Delict, 52 . 
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appears, with respect, to be ahistorical. With regard to the liability of judicial officers under the 
actio iniuriarum for defamation, however, it appears that South Afiican courts and academic 
writers are correct in holding that in Roman-Dutch law an improper motive was the decisive 
criterion in holding a judicial officer liable. It is true that the relevant Roman-Dutch authorities 
(Huber, Kersteman, Vander Keessel, Voet) do not give precise criteria by which to determine 
whether a judicial officer had abused his authority.488 There is certainly no indication of dolus 
within the relevant passages, and, indeed, De Villiers CJ (in 1881) and Joubert JA (in 1981) 
correctly held that in Voet's commentary the phrase ad concitandam invidiam atque infamiam 
emphasised improper motive rather than intention.489 
However, the same conclusion with respect to cases of liability ofjudicial officers for wrongful 
imprisonment or wrongful misjudgements is not as convincing.49o To base the use of the good 
faith criterion in this case exclusively on Roman-Dutch authorities is an interpretation which is 
not in accordance with the law as it was then. Moeketsi's case is probably the best and most 
recent illustration.491 In Moeketsi, the court interpreted the old authorities as having used the 
term dolus in the sense of motive and held that this applied also to modern South Afiican law: 
"Hierdie gemeenregtelike beginsels is in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg opgeneem ...".492 Van Zyl J 
translated the Latin term dolus as meaning bedrog or bedrieg/ike optrede.493 In English, bedrog 
means deceit, fraud. 494 
An essential part of the preceding chapters of detailed historical analysis was devoted to 
assessment of the extent to which judicial liability was determined by fault, particularly dolus. 
As early as Roman law, dolus had come to have a number of meanings. Two in particular 
crystallised as the most important with regard to judicial liability: Firstly, dolus in the more 
neutral sense of intention, opset, or, in German, Vorsatz, as opposed to mere culpa, that is 
negligence, nalatigheid or Fahrlassigkeit. Secondly, dolus as a requirement of the actio de dolo; 
here dolus bore the meaning of a particularly reprehensible state of mind, also described by 
488 At least with regard to liability for defamation. See above at 3 2 1 and chapter V 5 2 1. 

489 Bosman v Bisset (1881) SC 319 at 323; May v Udwin 1981 (1) SA 1 (A) 16 (H). 

490 Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492; Penrice v Dickinson 1945 AD 6; Moeketsi v Minister van Justisie 1988 (4) SA 707 (T). 

491 The critique applies to any of the other judgements as well . 

492 Moeketsi v Minister van Justisie 1988 (4) SA 707 (T) 713 (D). 

493 Ibid. at 711 (G) and 712 (A) and (D) with regard to Groenewegen, 712 (H) and (1) and 713 (8) with regard to Voet. 

494 Jura se Sakwoordeboek, 24. 
395 
calliditas,fallacia, machinatio, or circumvenio495 , that is by craftiness, artfulness, fraud, deceit, 
bedrog, or Arglist. 
Under Roman-Dutch law, however, lawyers no longer drew as clear a distinction between the 
two concepts of dolus. The lack of uniformity in the definition of the fault requirement in 
Roman-Dutch law is confusing496 although any uncertainty can be quickly resolved: Those 
authors who referred to dolus atque calliditas, bedrog or arglist accepted the actio de dolo as the 
appropriate action. Those who referred to dolus, dolus malus, opzet or boos opzet favoured the 
actio legis Aquiliae in holding a judge liable. Consequently, the former all argued that judicial 
liability was for dolo misjudgements only. In their turn, those authors who favoured the actio 
legis Aquiliae referred either to liability for dolus or dolus and culpa lata. The apparently 
ambiguous terminology, therefore, resulted from subsequent application of the two pertinent 
actions in the field ofjudicial liability in Roman Dutch law. 
In light of this historical development, it was certainly not incorrect of the court in Moeketsi to 
give the term dolus the meaning of bedrog or bedrieglike optrede, that is deceit or fraud. 
However, this might have been somewhat one-sided and too restrictive since Roman law, the 
Glossators and Commentators and, eventually, a number of Roman Dutch authorities employed 
not the actio de dolo but the actio legis Aquiliae to remedy judicial wrongdoing; and they 
consequently used the term dolus in a different sense. Meanwhile, it is submitted, with respect, 
that the court's interpretation wholly contradicts the historical sources in equating the (historical) 
meaning of bedrog or fraud with improper motive. This erroneous equation is evident from the 
decision in Moeketsi where it is stated: 
"Die gemeenregtelike posie word korrek weergegee in Penrice v Dickinson. .. en dit is duidelik dat in 
ons reg [is} 'n regsprekende beampte wat in .I}' judisiele hoedanigheid optree slegs vir .I}' 
kwaadwillige ofbedrieglike optrede aanspreeklik:.497 
And fwther: "Die gesag is duidelik dat daar mala fides, kwaadwilligheid of bedrieglike optrede 
aanwesig moet wees.'>498 
Undoubtedly this approach is in accordance with the decision of the Appellate Division in May v 
Udwin, as well as with the other more recent decisions in this field and the prevailing opinion in 
495 Compare the classic definition by Labeo at chapter Il 2 3 1 2. 
496 See above at chapter V 3 text at fu 115-139. 
497 Moeketsi v Minister van Justisie 1988 (4) SA 707 (T) 713 (G). 
498 Ibid. at 714 (C). 
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the legal literature. It is the final brick in the concept of qualified inununity and thus admirably 
provides an harmonious and unifolTI1 theory ofjudicial liability. 
However, the proposition of the court in Moeketsi, which followed the Appellate Division's 
judgements in Matthews and Penrice499 , that, according to the Roman-Dutch authorities, 
improper motive was decisive for liability for wrong judgements is simply not in accordance 
with what the sources indicate.soo Improper motive, as we understand it today, has never been 
considered decisive in the determination of dolus as a state of mind. It may have played some 
role in the Middle Ages, as Kuttner indicates cautiously at one point in his work Kanonistische 
Schuldlehre.so1 Kuttner suggests that the Christian fault doctrine may have been responsible for 
thisso2, but he too makes it clear that motive was only occasionally used to stress the 'gewollt­
emotionale Moment', the wilful and emotional element, the voluntas or intentio fallendi as the 
antithesis of the element of scientia, the consciousness of wrong. 
Strictly speaking, the decisive characteristic of intention remained the blending of consciousness 
and will, which is indicated by the telTI1 ex proposito.S03 Thus, it may be stated that dolus was 
never constituted by improper motive, and that the authorities never considered improper motive 
an alternative to dolus. Nor was dolus equated with improper motive even where use was made 
ofdolus within the actio de dolo. 
Authority for this conclusion may be found especially in the Roman-Dutch sources that relate 
directly to judicial liability for wrong judgements. The first authority the court quoted in 
Moeketsi was Groenewegen.S04 Groenewegen indicates that the liability of a judge depended on 
whether or not the judge acted with dolus and calliditas. If we recall that Groenewegen is one of 
the Roman-Dutch jurists who advanced the view that judges should be liable under the actio de 
dolo, his use of a meaning of dolus extended by calliditas is sufficiently explained. There is no 
indication whatsoever that motive was considered decisive by Groenewegen t~ determine the 
499 See above at 3 3 2 and 3 2 2 2, respectively. 

500 In his work Roman Private Law Van Zyl J himself indicates at no point that motive has played such a role in Roman Law. 

More precisely, at page 346 where he discusses the liability of the iUdex. qui litem suam fecit , reference is solely to partiality, 

negligence or ignorance as requirements of state of mind. 

501 At 41. 
502 Ibid. at 75 . 

503 Ibid. at 42. See also Joubert JA in May v Udwin 1981 (I) SA (1) 13 (H). 

504 Tractatus, Inst.4.5. 
397 
liability of a judicial officer even under the actio de dolo, or that calliditas had anything to do 
with motive. Calliditas was simply used as the description of particularly reprehensible conduct. 
Similarly, the other Roman-Dutch works the court referred to, namely Voet's Commentarius and 
Van Leeuwen's Rooms-Hollands Regt, do not indicate that malice or improper motive was 
relevant for the determination ofjudicial liability. 505 Vander Keessel' s Theses Selectae was not 
quoted verbatim by the court. In this work, as well as in his Praelectiones Juris Hodierni, Van 
der Keessel makes the point that either dolus or culpa lata suffices for liability.506 Huber as we 
know included references to dolus507 and, in addition, to culpa lata in his Eunomia Romana,508 
as well as to opzet, boos opzet, quaet opzet in his other works.509 Other Roman-Dutch writers 
not cited by the court, such as Vinnius51O, Christianaeus511 , Tulden512 and Matthaeus513 , also 
refer to dolus without any reference to a criterion of motive. The Nieuw Nederlands Advys-Boek 
includes a case where a presiding judge " ...met opzet, onbehoorlyk, en teegen aile Regten 
geconcludeert heeft.514 Kersteman in his Woorden-Boek refers to bedrog and to doleuselyk 
conduct ofajudge.515 
Taking into consideration other contemporary authorities of the ius commune, it appears that the 
Netherlands was not out of step in regard to the requirements for judicial liability. Heineccius516 
505 See at Voet, Commentarius, 5.1.58 and Van Leeuwen, Rooms-Hollands Regt, 4.33.10, respectively. See further 
Voet's Compendium Juris, 4.5 and Elementa Juris, 4.5 . With regard to Van Leeuwen, the court held that no answer 
was to be gleaned from this author since in this text Van Leeuwen u .. .maak. ..nie melding van bedrieglike optrede 
van die regter ...nie." This is not necessarily a correct interpretation of the passage in question. As has been indicated 
elsewhere (see above at chapter V 4 1 4) subsection 10 oUght to be read together with the following passage where 
Van Leeuwen proceeds to analyse the liability of members of the legal profession. There he makes the point that 
bedrog was sufficient basis for liability. Ifwe compare this passage with his statements in his other major work, it is 
evident why Van Leeuwen made use of the wider term bedrog. 
506 Theses Selectae, Th. 808; Praelectiones Iuris Hodierni, 3.37.9. 
507 Praelectiones Juris Civilis, 1.4.5.2. 

508 Eunomia Romania, 415.l. 

509 Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt, 2.3.3.3-6; Beginzelen der Regtkunde, 4.3.4. 

51 0 Ad Institutionum, 4.5.1.1 and 3. 

511 Decisiones Curiae Belgiae, 1.6.2 and 4.95 .1 and 4. 

512 Ad Institutionum, 4.5 .1. 

5lJ De Auctionibus, \.19.86. 

514 Advys 46.IV at 507. 

515 Hollandsch Rechlsgeleerl Woorden-Boek Amsterdam (1786) 'Rechters' . 

516 Recilationes, § 1113. 
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as well as StrykS17, HoppiusS18, SchuitzenS19 and BrunnemannS20 advocate judicial liability for 
dolus malus. So does Lauterbach, who refers to the judge who gives a wrongful judgement ex 
propos ito and dolo malo.S21 Leyser discusses the liability of the judge under the rubric De 
Syndicatu and refers his readers to, among others, the dolo acting judge or syndicatus.522 Strube 
explicitly mentions the judge who intentionally gives an unjust judgement: "Wenn der Richter 
vorsatzlich. .. ein ungerechtes Urtheilfallt, so wird er billig von dem in Anspruch genommen, der 
dadurch urn das seinige gebracht worden ist."S23 And Gluck once more makes the point that 
dolus may not always be understood in the sense of fraud (Betrug) as is the case with contractual 
obligations. With regard to delicts, it is more appropriate to refer to intention (Vorsatz) .S24 
The pandectists discuss the (general) relation between dolus and motive more exhaustively and 
Sintenis devotes eight pages to an elaborate and comprehensive discussion of the liability of the 
judge.52s Nowhere is motive referred to as a means of detennining judicial liability. On the 
contrary, Windscheid and Regelsberger make it abundantly clear that motive is wholly 
immaterial for the determination of dolus. s26 
Despite the argument that we are not tied to the past, the reliance of the courts in recent years on 
the historical sources for the detennination of the modern law of judicial liability for wrong • 
judgements makes it difficult to see how this liability can be based on an historically incorrect 
foundation. The underlying explanation for the negative decision in Moeketsi and in all 
preceding decisions is not easy to establish. That there was unconsidered quoting of previous 
decisions or uncritical or unreflective analysis of the old authorities is improbable, considering 
the knowledge and learning of the judges involved. What appears more reasonable is that the 
courts tried to reconcile the historical facts with the demands of their day. Earlier in this century, 
517 lustiniani lnstitutionum, 4.5. 

518 Commentatio, 4.5 at 803. It is noteworthy that he quotes following Roman-Dutch authorities: Groenewegen, Van 

Leeuwen, Christianaeus and Vinnius at 80S usus hodiernus. 

519 Synopsis lnstitutionum lmperialium, 4.5.1 

520 Commentarius, 50.13.3 . 

521 Collegium Theoretico-Practicum, SO.13.§ 2. 

522 Meditationes ad Pandectas, Spec. 680.2 and 4. It is interesting that he quotes extensively from Groenewegen and appears to 

approve the latter' s 'ability argument' . 

523 Rechtliche Bedenken, 646. 

524 Pandecten, 2.14.§ 293-29S.l.a. 

525 Civilrecht, vol.II § 125.3 . 

526 Pandeklenrecht, § 101.2 fn6; Regelsberger, Pandeklen, §§ 143.2 and 179.1. 
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it was probably the overwhelmingly strong influence of the concept of malice on the law of 
delict that influenced the reading of the old authorities. 
It should not be ignored that from the early days of Bosman, 116 years ago, South African courts 
were determined not to follow the English courts and to grant judicial officers absolute 
immunity. It was the influence of Roman-Dutch law that prevented full-scale adoption of 
English principles in this field. But even though, theoretically, absolute immunity did not hold 
sway, the courts showed no reluctance in interpreting the Roman-Dutch sources in such a way as 
to force them into the mould of qualified privilege. Qualified privilege, in turn, was determined 
by malice. Thus, once more, it was the unfortunate role of malice that made the courts look in 
the historical sources for absence of good faith in a judge's conduct, which was then seen as 
indicative of the desired criterion of malice. 
Relying rather superficially on only four statements by the old authorities, the courts in the 
earlier decisions failed to realise that dolus, even in the meaning of fraud or deceit, never implied 
improper motive in Roman-Dutch law. Wherever the earlier judges could grasp the smallest 
glimpse, idea or imprint of a good faith criterion in the Roman-Dutch sources, they took it as an 
indication of malice. A more detailed analysis would have clarified for them what the Roman­
Dutch jurists really had in mind when they referred to dolus or dolus malus. 
In Moeketsi, a totally different distinction might have prevailed. Perhaps it was the intention of 
the court to reconcile the law in cases of wrongful imprisonment with the law in relation to 
judicial defamation as stated by the Appellate Division in May v Udwin some seven years 
earlier. There, once and for all, malice was made the decisive criterion on which to base judicial 
liability for defamation under the actio iniuriarum. What the court in Moeketsi neglected to take 
notice of, however, was that in Roman-Dutch law the liability of judges for defamation was not 
settled in the same way as liability for wrong judgements. The preconditions were totally 
different. The lack of clear statements by the jurists with regard to judicial defamation is 
mirrored by the wealth of sources that deal with liability for wrong judgements. Whereas there is 
undoubtedly some indication of improper motive in the fonner, the authorities consulted make 




3 5 2 3 Alternatives to the motive requirement 
Taking into account the above arguments against the motive requirement, it appears that there is 
at least some reason for holding that improper motive and the doctrine of abuse of right should 
not be required for the detennination of judicial liability for wrongful misjudgements and 
wrongful imprisonment. But is there an acceptable alternative to the motive requirement? 
(a) Negligence 
On the basis of the Constitution, negligence could certainly be considered one alternative. In 
light of ss 2 and 165 (2) of the Constitution, judges are under a legal duty to act carefully and in 
accordance with the law. This could be interpreted as a strong indicator of wrongfulness or even 
more so the unconstitutionality of a negligent judgement. 
There is little doubt that a negligence-based requirement would give rise to a number of difficult 
albeit very interesting questions. To mention just a few: Firstly, although we can easily establish 
the legal duties a judge owes to the parties before him (ss 2 and 165 (2) of the Constitution), it is 
not easy to establish precisely the necessary objective standards of the reasonable judge, the 
bonus iudex so to speak: A judge would be liable if the reasonable judge in his position would 
have acted differently.527 What then are the relevant standards of professional Gudicial) 
competence? Certainly, the standards applicable to magistrates must differ from those applicable 
to judges of the various provincial divisions. With respect to the latter, however, one may ­
provocatively - question whether the judges of the High Court should be subject to the same 
standards as the judges at the Supreme Court of Appeal or the Constitutional Court. From what 
has been said earlier, it is also obvious that the reasonable judge test may not be confused with 
the test of wrong judgement. Although the standards applied to the test of wrong judgement are 
objective ones, this test does not relate to what the bonus iudex would or would not have done. It 
entails more the question of whether or not the judicial decision was a proper one, found on the 
basis of the law.528 
Secondly, policy considerations come into play. Aspects of policy make it necessary to weigh 
the arguments in favour of judicial accountability against those in favour of the protection of 
judicial independence and judicial dignity. The singularity of the concept of judicial liability 
527 Neethling et ai, Law of Delict, 122 and 129 (with respect to experts, i.e., dentists, surgeons, electricians. At least in 

theory judges could be included here). 

528 See again above at 352 I and Neethling el ai, Law ojDelicl, 143 . 
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makes it difficult to draw distinctions. Overall, the scale tips in favour of the protection of 
judicial independence. Although by denying liability for negligent misconduct there will remain 
a number of cases where an objectively wrong judgement will not lead to liability, this is the 
price society has to pay for an independent judiciary which has been identified as an equally 
important feature of the constitutional state. 
(b) Dolus 
Dolus might also be considered an acceptable alternative. Determining wrongfulness by dolus is, 
overall, less 'costly' than accepting improper motive as the decisive requirement.529 The 
arguments in favour of the application of dolus are based primarily on practical and historical 
considerations. The historical facts have been elaborated in great detail and need no further 
comment. From a practical point of view, dolus is easier for a plaintiff to prove than improper 
motive. This is particularly the case if extrinsic evidence on the state of mind of the judicial 
officer is permissible. 
It is questionable, however, what form of dolus should find preference. On the one hand, dolus 
eventualis could be considered the relevant state of mind. Accordingly, a judge would be liable 
even ifhe did not intend to give an incorrect judgement, but foresaw that his judgement might be 
incorrect and recklessly gave it anyway. On the other hand, one might insist on dolus directus. 
This would require that the judge actually desired a particular consequence of his conduct.530 As 
a matter of principle, dolus directus should be included in cases of judicial liability. It might be 
going too far, however, to hold a judge liable for dolus eventualis, since judges, faced in many 
cases with ambiguous sources, must ultimately make their decisions, even though they can 
foresee the possibility of their being overruled by a higher court. One might add to this the 
problems so-called activist judges would face.53 ! Liability for dolus eventualis must also be 
529 010wofoyeku, in his excellent work Suing Judges, 204 advances the view that in general the privilege judges enjoy in 
common law systems, particularly in England, ought to be qualified, not absolute. In his eyes a malice-based liability 
should apply in order to prevent vexatious and harassing actions against judges; in other words to protect judicial 
independence. What at first sight appears to underpin the position South African courts and academics have advanced for 
the past decades, is precisely in line with the approach favoured in this thesis. Olowofoyeku defines malice (as he uses it) 
"".as including a conscious purpose or intent to injure unlawfully." There is no doubt that Olowofoyeku's definition is 
identical with dolus as defined here earlier: a person acts with dolus where his will is directed at a result which he causes 
while conscious of the wrongfulness of his conduct. See inter alia Neethling et aI, Law ofDelict, 116; Boberg, Delict, 268; 
Van der Merwe and Olivier, Onregmatige Daad, 115; Wille's Principles ofLaw, 652. 
530 Neethling et aI, Law ofDelict, 117; Boberg, Delict, 37. 
531 The related problems have been indicated by Labuschagne, 1993 De Jure, 358-359. The problem is also apparent where 
questions of interpretation of statute law arise as well as aspects of precedent. Here briefly reference must be made to the 
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considered detrimental since it would prevent judicial creativity of the kind displayed for 
instance by Lord Denning in the well-known case of Candler v Crane, Christmas & CO. 532 
In this case, Lord Denning U attempted to extend the law even though he knew that he was 
'twisting' precedent to reach the conclusion that a negligent misstatement causing economic loss 
might be actionable in the tort of negligence. Even though academic opinion favoured an 
extension, the law blocked the way by binding precedent. Lord Denning U, contrary to his 
brethren on the Bench, creatively manipulated precedent to achieve the result he wanted. In a 
sense his judgement was wrong since the majority disagreed and there was no appeal (regardless 
of the fact that in 1964 in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd the House of Lords 
overruled the majority opinion in Candler and followed Lord Denning's U approach).533 It is 
arguable, however, whether or not Lord Denning U deliberately broke the law in Candler and 
thus gave a wrongful judgement (in the sense of the definition given above). Certainly, it would 
be a lot easier to ascertain that Lord Denning LJ had acted with dolus eventualis than to prove 
that he was actuated by dolus directus. From this it follows that liability for dolus eventualis 
would inhibit judicial creativity, one of the most fundamental assets of any common law system, 
including the (mixed) South African legal system. 
Finally, the difficulties noted by some academics with regard to dolus as a test for 
wrongfulness534 must be mentioned here. It is thought that using dolus as a test for wrongfulness 
leads to a confusion between wrongfulness and fault. However, as the law stands, it is now 
widely accepted that fault including dolus can be used as a determinant of wrongfulness.535 
That the application of dolus directus would provide for a considerably wider scope ofjudicial 
liability is evident from the following: A judge who sentences a young criminal, who has never 
been sentenced before and who is known to be a drug addict, to five years of irnprisorunent for 
shoplifting, undoubtedly imposes a sentence which is contra legem according to South African 
law. The judge wishes the young offender to participate in a highly successful method of 
treatment for addiction, which takes about five years. This laudable motive is the only motive for 
so-called moderate or radical theories of interpretation which advocate, albeit to a varying degree, the creative role played 

by the judiciary in the interpretation of statutes. This enormously wide field cannot be dealt with here. See for more detail 

Du Plessis, interpretation, 271-273. 

532 [1951] 2 KB 164 (CA). For details see Boberg, Delict, 60, 67, 86 and 88. 

533 [\964] AC 465 (HL). See Boberg, Delict, 83 for a discussion. 

534 Neethling el ai, Law a/Delict, 37. 

535 Boberg, Delict, 37 and also Neethling et ai, Law ofDelict, 38. 
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the misapplication of the law. Of course, the' could challenged on 
grounds, but from any other consideration, it is deliberately 
contra legem. present position of the however, the could not held liable 
for his misjudgement he was not actuated by imorooer motive. 
It is not necessary to create a fictitious example such as the above to demonstrate the 
disadvantages motive requirement. In Finance (Pty) v Kuhn, a magistrate 
536 Inrefused to follow the doctrine ofjudicial precedent by denying an costs to a Oartv.
an intentional doctrine simply U""'-'"U>;;;U 
precedents were wrong. In consequence, the P><U1UHl to appeal in to receive a 
correct judgement. J, as he was then, found "...difficult to that 
did not understand [the binding of the rl""n-i ... ...". The Judge 
came to conclusion the magistrate " ...defied the Court in deliberate dlsree:ard 
of the doctrine ofjudicial oreceden ,,537 And 
"The plaintiff has not asked for the defendant to be directed to pay the costs of the appeal. This was a 
proper attitude. The defendant bad to do with the mishandling of the case which has resulted 
in the appeaL The must therefore bear the expenses to which it has been put. 
The waste of money was caused solely by the He can count himself fortunate that the 
not seek an order against him oersonallv for the costs of the appeal." 
we are faced with an example a deliberate misapplication the law by a judicial 
officer the rights of an individual. In case, the costs of the appeal were 
undoubtedly an economic to the plaintiff. Although Didcott J went as far as to state 
the behaviour the case might possibly amount to mala fides, it was not 
possible in the existing state of the law to hold the magistrate liable the deliberate of 
the law occurred, without proof of such improper motive.538 Or in words: 
occurred only a technically judgement, not an wrongful misjudgement. 
And to make worse, it appears this judgement that Credex was not an 
~A."'I;.'.I:"'UVll. The in question followed same course a substantial of 
previous cases.539 
the above instances indicate that it would easier to prove dolus of a judicial officer, 
which would inevitably to an acceptable increase ofjudicial accountability. 
536 (3) SA 1977 482 
Ibid. at 485 (B). My italics. 
538 Ibid. at 485 (H). 
539 Ibid. at 483 (F). 
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3 5 3 The essential requirements of the element of fault 
By making the issue of wrongfulness depend on a particular form of fault, the law leaves little 
room for discussion of fault as a separate requirement. In every case where wrongfulness has 
been established, fault will be present. Suffice it to say that ajudicial officer may raise any of the 
accepted defences, most likely that of mistake (error) with regard to fact or the law, that exclude 
dolus and, hence, wrongfulness. If the judge can show that he was mistaken as to law or fact, as 
opposed to deliberately misapplying it, he will have shown he did not act dolo. 
As regards the question of the reasonable judge, which was raised earlier in the context of 
determining the wrongfulness issue, this aspect clearly belongs to the fault requirement. 
However, since a judge will not be liable if he acted negligently, there is no need to go into this 
question. 
4 PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL LIABllJTY 
4 1 The concept of leave to sue in modern South African law 
In addition to judicial immunity in substantive law at present, South African superior court 
judges also enjoy some procedural protection.540 According to s 25 (1) of the Supreme Court Act 
No 59 of 1959 and s 5 of the Constitutional Court Complementary Act No 13 of 1995, no 
process may be issued against a superior court judge except with the so-called consent of court. 
This procedural immunity applies in two instances, namely, where a summons or a subpoena is 
issued against a judge. No distinction is drawn here between the personal or judicial capacity of 
the judge.541 Generally, the concept is referred to as leave to sue. Judges of inferior courts, such 
as magistrates or members of quasi-judicial bodies do not enjoy this kind of procedural 
privilege. 
540 Boulle et ai, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 203 rightly observe that the concept of leave to sue: " .. . affords 
judges a different kind of immunity." 




to sue is almost unique. Except for Botswana and Namibia, 
542 It isno other """" ..+.-. at for a similar preliminary procedural 
evident to sue was "p"pn,pt1 by these bordering countnes as the general 
assimilation law. 
Until recently, to sue was hardly ever subject to criticism It was generally 
considered an means towards protecting South African judiciary vexatious, 
unmeritorious and actions that could undermine its di . 543gmty.ll1U;;1911Y 
Such ill-conceived it was argued, are mostly the result frustration 
at losing a case. it was held that " .. .it is not desirable that should 
be brought into court it is absolutely necessary.,,544 reputation of the 
judiciary is it is - once again - mainly public policy consloer that explain the 
protection. 
HlYWPVPT a cnncal observer will have some difficulty with concept of leave to sue. The first 
problem is it is the judiciary itself that decides or not to grant leave to sue. 
to sue does not to with s 34 of the Constitution 
of provides unrestricted access to the courts. it may be asked whether 
to sue is necessary. considering the already enjoy under the 
substantIve law. 
tle!ore concentrating on the feasibility and constitutionality concept of leave to sue 
lHUUIVUl South African law, an overview of development is needed. While a 
handful ofauthors have commented, briefly, on the situation, no one has ever 
to trace roots of this requirement.5 "!;) the concept of leave to sue 
IS a ll....UUl....... of the formation of system. 
542 So far as assessed. See s 12 Supreme Court Act of 1990 ''''''UV'~/' Order 4 rule 14 (Botswana). In Italy repealed procedural 
rules the consent of the Minister of Justice before an action for could be filed. See Olowofoyeku, 
211. 
543 v 0 'Brien-Quinn Botswanian Court cases 123/85 and llnrl"nortf'I1 Quoted from Othlhogile, LU 7 (1991), 
110; Superior Court Practice, Service 3, AI-76; Harms, Civil Procedure, 63; Boulle et ai, Constitutional and 
618; Herbstein and Van Winsen, Civil Practice,Administrative Law, 203-204; Nathan and Rules 
Herbstein and Diemont, Superior Court Practice, 43. 

544 Ex parte Aaron 1904 TS 487 at 489 per Rose Innes C1 

545 Riekert's contribution in THR-HR 41 (1978), 426-431 deals \vith the question whether leave to sue was 





4 2 Historical roots of the concept of leave to sue 
It is contended that the modern South African law of procedure is predominantly of English 
origin: According to Ellison Kahn, civil procedure in South Africa " ... owes its origins to and is 
essentially that of England.,,546 As described earlier, the first Charter ofJustice brought sweeping 
changes to the administration of justice at the Cape and, in due course, to the whole of what is 
today South Africa. However, Ellison Kahn's statement has to be modified in that South African 
procedural law, albeit strongly influenced by English rules and concepts, retained and developed 
its own peCUliarities. 
Four instances serve to illustrate this. First, as said above, no system of common law and equity 
courts was established at the Cape.547 This century-old dichotomy of jurisdiction in English law 
did not offer a sound alternative for the Cape legal system when it was decided, for political 
reasons, to retain Roman-Dutch law as the law of the colony.548 Then, unlike the situation in 
England at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Cape Colony never adopted the 
classifications of forms of actions, also known as writs. These writs were hopelessly entangled 
with questions of substantive English law and there was clearly no point in accepting this system 
of pleading at the Cape. In consequence South African pleading was to a large extent " ... spared 
the excessive technicality of common-law pleading...".549 Again, unlike their brethren in 
England, judges at the Cape were vested with far-reaching power to make rules.55o With this 
power, they had an effective and flexible tool to shape procedural law in accordance with local 
priorities and peCUliarities. We will see later that this rule-making power had some importance 
in the emergence of the concept of leave to sue in South African procedural law. Finally, a 
number of procedural features accepted in modern South African procedural law can be 
identified as of Roman-Dutch origin. Reference may be made to the concepts of provisional 
sentence (provisie van namptissement), spoliation order (mandament van spolie), security on 
546 Kahn, SAU 106 (1989), 613. 

547 See above at I I J. Erasmus, Interaction, 146 and SAU 108 (1991) I, 267 et seq; Art I First Charter of Justice. See also 

Hosten el ai, Introduction, 352; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal System, 575; Zimmennann, Romisch-holliindisches Recht in Sudafrika, 

II. 
548 Article 31 First Charter of Justice. See Theal, Records of the Cape Colony, volXXXII 255 et seq and Van der Merwe, 

Regsinsle/lings en Reg aan die Kaap, 266-268 and 276-281. 

549 Nevertheless this may not be understood in the sense that no interaction between procedural and substantive law took place. 

See Erasmus, Interaction, 151-161 for a discussion of these. Further by Erasmus, Slellenbosch LR I (1990),348 et seqq. 





oath (cautio iuratoria) and ascertainment litigation (interrogatioto 
in iure).551 
Like these the concept of to sue did not from common law 
However, as we shall see presently, its roots did not lie in .LWllla.WlJ procedural 
In fact, leave to sue !:lnnp!:lrc;: a concep t which, <1lUa.£.ll1t:;ly , 
552found its way into South 
English common did not recognise to sue as a preliminary or supplementary procedure 
required to sue Because of the protection 
of the substantive law, it was never to provide for this additional procedural ;:)a..tV~U<1lU. 
recent critical reassessment of the scope absolute protection of judges in England has 
considered South concept of to sue a alternative to the 
. E gl' hI 553IJU;:)HIUH In n IS aw. 
From discussion this subject, it may that Low Countries 
law abrogated. law, superior (but not 
could not to sued while in 554 There remains some uncertainty as to 
state law in post-classical law. In it was probably rare a judge to be 
contrast, however, Roman-Dutch of all kinds, including all 
judges, could be sued lUU,U;:), 555 Thus, law, like Lll~ll;:)ll 
law, did not contain a concept leave to sue. 
"~__II. Erasmus,lnleraction, 149. On the provisie van namptissement see Dolezalek, 

7ivilnr(}7p~w'pt:ht 95-96; Hosten et ai, Introduction, 354; Malan and De Beer, Provisional Sentence. 229-231. On the 

mandament van spolie see Dolezalek, 97-99; Mandament van to the historic 

development in South Africa see by the same author Possession, on the earlier development in the Low Countries see 

Kleyn, Possession in Roman-Dutch Law, 557-565. On the cautio iuratoria see v Minister 1987 (I) SA 1 (A) 

6-15 per Joubert JA. On the inlerrogatio in lure see Consideration, 22-68. 

552 See below at 4 2 I. 

S53 Olowofoveku Judges, 206-212. 
554 D 2.4.2. 




4 2 1 The introduction of the doctrine of leave to sue into South African law 
From the earliest South Afiican law has recognised the procedural privilege ofjudges. The 
Court Act 1959, as well as the Uniform Rules of Court Act 1965, have been 
identified as milestones in unifying distinct procedural rules set up by the various courts that 
formed the new Court of South 1910. The Uniform Rules the Sunreme 
Court repealed all previous of court made by legislation prior to Supreme 
Court Act of 1959.556 Consequently, s of the Court Act 1959 more _____ ~1_ 
s 5 Constitutional Court Complementary Act of 1995 became the successors ofthe various rules 
with regard to leave to sue of provincial divisions of Supreme Court and their pre-Union 
predecessors. 557 
obtaining leave to sue was inter alia included in rule (1) of the 
of Court, of the 19 of the Orange State Rules of as well 
as in rule 1 of the Natal Order XI.558 The rules of these three provincial divisions were framed in 
accordance former rule 9 of the of the Supreme Court of the Colony of of 
Good Hope559, which was promulgated in court on 1 January 1828 as valid law in 
Colony.560 Minor changes of the wording of rule 9 were introduced and promulgated in 1834 
and 1841 without essentially the The 
promulgation of the earliest Rules Court, which were drafted by one of the puisne judges of 
the newly created Supreme Court, William Westbrooke Burton (1784-1888)561, was preceded by 
556 Save for the rules referred to in the schedule to rule 71. 

m For reasons that are not clear. the Suoreme Court Act of I959 as originally promulgated, omitted of the judiciary 

similar to that provided in the provincial rules, but in terms of s 46 (l) Supreme Court Act, any rules of court 

remained in force until In 1963, s 4 of the Court Amendment Act No 85 introduced today's 

which was amended by s 3 Court Amendment Act No 41 of 1970 to which were not permitted 

to grant leave to sue a superior judge. 

558 With to the Natal rule see Titonko v The Governor (1908) NLR 70. 

559 The establishment of the Natal District Court resulted in the introduction of rule 10 promulgated in Ordinance No 32 of 

1846, the predecessor oforder XI rule I. See also Riekert, THR-HR 41 (1978), 427. 

56() The first collection of rules ofcourt ofthe Supreme Court was published by R J van de Sandt titled Rules, Orders, &c., 

Touching the Forms and Manner Proceediml in Civil and Criminal Cases, Before the Supreme, Circuit, & Mnai.frnlo 

Courts in the Good Hope Cape Town (1835). Later editions appeared in 1843 and 1864, Under the title Rules, 

Orders, &c., touching the Forms and Manner Proceedinf! in Civil and Cnminal Cases, the Suoerior and Inferior 

Courts ofthe Colony ofthe ofGood Hope Town (1886) the work was continued bv H Tennant. 

561 Erasmus, Interaction, 147. With to W W Burton see Girvin, Architects, 98-99 as well as Influence at 222-223; Fine, 





the issue of the First Charter of Justice Wlder letter patents on 24 August 1827. Rule 9 of the 
Cape Rules ofCourt stated the following: 
"All Civil Process of this Court may be sued out by anyone having matter of Complaint or Demand 
against another unsatisfied ...against any person whatsoever, without any leave for that pwpose 
obtained; excepting only the Governor, or Lieutenant-Governor, or other officers administering the 
Government of this Colony for the time being and His Majesty'sjudges a/the Supreme Caurt ...".S62 
As has been said, the First Charter of Justice vested judges with far-reaching powers to " ...frame, 
constitute and establish such rules, orders and regulations as to them shall seem meet...touching 
the forms and manner of proceedings to be observed .... ".563 
It has been argued that the initial Cape rule was rooted in the English constitutional doctrine of 
crown immunity, which fOWld expression in the maxim 'The king can do no wrong,.564 
Accordingly, the monarch could not be impeached in his own courts. This maxim was the 
fOWldation of restricted crown or state liability in English law, which was removed by legislation 
only after the 1880s.565 It has been suggested that this tendency to limit the liability of the crown 
led to the introduction and preservation of the concept of leave to sue in South African law in 
relation to the colonial governor and, in tum, to colonialjudges.566 
This argument on the origins of the rule cannot be supported. Firstly, it is doubtful whether the 
doctrine of crown inununity provides enough groWld for assuming that the concept of leave to 
sue, particularly with respect to the judiciary, derived from this source. English law has never 
identified judges as government or crown officials. Secondly, this interpretation fails to question 
whether other, non-English, influences could have had some impact on the emergence of the 
concept ofleave to sue in South African law. 
There is, in fact, strong evidence that leave to sue was not introduced by the British into South 
African law. A link with the state of law prior to the first Rules of Court can be fOWld in the 
evidence of then Chief Justice Sir John Truter given on 30 August 1825 to the 1823­
Commission of Inquiry led by J T Bigge and Major W M G Colebrooke.567 Truter crs evidence 
562 Van de Sandt, Rules, 3. My italics. 
563 Article 46 First Charter of Justice. See Erasmus, SAU 108 (1991) II, 476 el seqq. 
564 Rieken, THR-HR 41 (1978),427. 
565 Cilliers and D'Oliveira, State Liability, 219-224; Van der Westhuizen, Liinderbericht Siidafrika, 615-617. See also Rieken, 
THR-HR 4 J (1978), 428 fn 16 with reference to the Crown Liabilities Act of 1888 (Cape), Crown Suits Act of 1894 (Natal), 
Crown Liabilities Ordinances of 1903 for the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony. 
S66 Rieken, THR-HR 41 (1978), 428. 
567 See above at I J J. 
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shows neatly to what extent the commission inquired into various aspects of the administration 
of justice. Of particular interest is his evidence with regard to the law applied in the Colony, to 
questions of the hierarchy of the courts, their staffing and the training of the judges.568 Moreover, 
his statements indicate that English speaking Supreme Court judges were probably not the first 
judges in South Africa to be vested with a rule-making power, and that their Dutch predecessors 
already enjoyed this privilege.569 
The career of Truter CJ (who died in 184557°) is itself a colourful example of how some of the 
Dutch colonists adapted to the new government after the English took permanent possession of 
the Cape for the second time in 1806.571 Owing to his personal background, his legal training 
and judicial career, Sir John served in the late 1820s as a link between the previous and the new 
regime. His statements are a remarkable historical source on the state ofjustice at the Cape early 
in the nineteenth century. To the Commission's question as to whether certain individuals were 
protected from civil actions unless a so-called venia agendi572 had been obtained, Sir John 
responded: 
568 The evidence is included in Theal, Records ofthe Cape Colony, vo1.XXXIlI 261 et seqq. 
569 Question: "Do you conceive that the Court of Justice, as at present [1825] constituted, possesses any legislative functions?" 
Answer Truter CJ: "None whatever. It possesses however the power of framing rules for its own practice." Ibid. at 263. This 
notion could serve as an interesting supplement to the research Professor H J Erasmus has done with regard to the history of the 
rule-making power of the Supreme Court in South Africa Erasmus argues that courts in civil law countries do not have a rule­
making power. It is a peculiarity of common law systems. However, it is submitted here, with all due respect, that there might 
be a source other than exclusively common law influences for the implementation of the courts' rule-making power in the 
famous s 46 of the First Charter of Justice of 1827, i.e., Cape Dutch and thus a civil law influence. See for Erasmus's view SAU 
108 (1991) 11,476 et seqq. 
570 It might be of interest to know when passing by that Sir John Truter's epitaph is visible at the right front side of the Groote 
Kerk in Cape Town's Adderley Street. 
571 Sir John was born Johannes Andreas Triiter on II October 1763 at Cape Town. He was a third generation colonist. His father 
was a city councillor and served as burgher member on the Raad van Justisie. Truter studied at Leiden University from 1783 to 
1787, when he graduated doctor iuris. He retumed to the Cape in 1789 as a servant of the VOC and worked his way up the ranks. 
In 1789 he became Second Assistant to the Fiscal and in 1793, Secretary of the Court of Justice. During the Batavian interlude, 
he was appointed Secretary to the Government and was a close aide to the then Governor General J W Janssens. Janssens who on 
his return to Europe, after the Cape was annexed by the English forces, recommended Truter to the new rulers. In 1809, Truter 
was appointed Fiscal and, in 1812, Chief Justice, a post he held until the old Court of Justice ceased to exist in 1828. Again, 
Truter appears to have pleased the classe politique, namely Sir John Cradock and Lord Charles Somerset, the two governors of 
the Colony under whom he served. He was the first 'South African' ever to be knighted (in 1820). Undoubtedly, a remarkable 
career for a Dutch colonist. Truter died in 1845. For biographical details see Botha, SAU 18 (1901), 135-145; Van Warmelo, 
1978 De Rebus, 361-363 and Roberts, Bibliography, 379. 
572 Translation: to obtain permission to act; in our context, permission to sue. For the historical roots of this term see below 
text at fn593. 
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"By the Statutes of India this protection is accorded to the high officers of the Government, the 
members of the Court of Justice... in practice it has been extended here to the Landdrost and 
Heemraden of Districts. ,,5 73 
From his further comments it is clear that this application for venia agendi had to be made to the 
Court of Justice. The application was referred to a commissioner, who, in Truter's words, 
"...reports upon the nature of the action and also tries to adjust it...".574 The application, 
comprising the reasons which had given rise to the matter, had to bear an embossed revenue 
stamp and was formulated in terms of the deepest respect. 575 Venia agendi was required in 
actions against officials and judges whether in their official or their individual capacity. The 
privilege extended indefinitely after the expiration of the term of office.576 
However, some uncertainties remain. Firstly, it is not clear whether the commissioner was a 
judge to whom this task had been delegated or an inferior judicial officer. Secondly, it is 
uncertain whether venia agendi was granted as a matter of right or whether it was discretionary. 
Truter merely 'believed' that it was a matter of right.577 It is also unclear what he meant by 
adjusting the action.578 Was the commissioner supposed to mediate between the parties or was 
he merely empowered to decide on the correct grounds on which the party could sue? 
Be that as it may, Truter's comments clearly provide a link between the incorporation of this 
procedural privilege into the Cape Rules of Court and the earlier state of law. That William 
Burton and his fellows could have developed a new concept ofleave to sue in 1827 is too much 
of a coincidence to accept. Undoubtedly, Burton consulted the mass of information provided by 
573 Theal, Records ofthe Cape Colony, vol.XXXIII 268. 
574 Ibid. at 269. 
575 Botha, BriefGuide, 40. 
576 Theal, Records ofthe Cape Colony, vol.XXXIII 269. The spectacular case of tragic Estienne Barbier (1699-1739) provides a 
rare example ofvenia agendi being sought against colonial officials during the Dutch rule. Barbier was a frenchborn sergeant in 
the VOC's troops at Cape Town, who ended up sentenced to death and quartered on charges of treason. The court records of his 
final trial have been preserved in the National Archives. They show that Barbier, before escaping from prison and becoming a 
leader of a gang of rebellious settlers in the Hinterland, without success tried to lay a charge on grounds of denial of justice 
against the secretary of the Court of Justice at Cape Town at that time, P J Slootsboo. Barbier's disillusionment on realising that 
it was the secretary's own Court of Justice that had to grant venia agendi is obvious: "De gemelde Siosboom ...seid tegen mi}. 
dat ik bi} de gesaghhebber moest gaan om en permissie van hem te kreegen. en dar hy niet en !run sub; requeste schreeven, 
sonder de gesaghhebber zi}n permissie." c.J. No 344, 214, 216-217. I am indebted to Dr Nigel Penn of the History Department 
of the University of Cape Town for knowledge of Barbier's case. For further details see his article in Social Dynamics, 14 
(1988), 1. Barbier's thorny road to the scaffold inspired Andre Brink's novel entitled Inteendel Cape Town (1993), also 
available in English under the title On the Contrary Cape Town (1995). 
577 Theal, Records ofthe Cape Colony, vol.XXXlII 269 . 
578 Ibid. 
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the 1823 Commission, including Truter's evidence which was only two years old at that stage. 
Furthermore, considering the size of the legal conununity at the Cape in those days, it is beyond 
doubt that Burton and the other judges met Truter during the process of establishing the new 
Supreme Court at Cape Town. Finally, it may be assumed that Burton, in particular, was willing 
to consider Dutch legal concepts without prejudice. We know today that after his appointment to 
the Cape Bench early in 1827, he spent several months in the Netherlands, learning Dutch and 
making himself acquainted with Roman-Dutch law.579 
422 A Batavian-Cape-Dutch legal concept? 
Sir John Truter stated that the Statutes of India accorded, inter alia, procedural protection from 
civil actions to the judiciary. At an earlier stage of his evidence, he conunented on the 
introduction of the so-called Batavian Statutes under Dutch rule at the Cape.580 These Batavian 
Statutes are identical to the above-mentioned Statutes of India.58l From what we know today, 
Truter's conunents are in accordance with the historical facts. 582 
The Statutes of India were drafted in 1640 by an advocate from Amsterdam, Jan Matsuycker, 
who joined the VOC in 1636 and was assigned to Batavia. Matsuycker held a doctorate from the 
University of Leuwen (Southern Netherlands, today Belgium) and became an influential 
company servant. He served first as judge and later as president of the Batavian Raad van 
Justisie. In 1653, he became Governor-General at Batavia.583 The Statutes were a collection of 
various local Batavian placaaten which had been enacted since the early days of the Dutch 
settlement in Indonesia.584 They further comprised some regulations issued by the heeren 
seventien, as well as other general relevant placaaten of Dutch conunon law.585 In addition, 
579 See Fine, Cape Supreme Court, 454. 

580 Thea!, Records o/the Cape Colony, vol.XXX1Il265 et seq. 





582 See for more details Visagie, Regspleging, 32-36 and 65-68; De Wet, THR-HR 21 (1958), 93-95; La Bree, Rechterlijke 

Organisatie te Batavia, 63-68; Sirks, Legal History 14 (1993), 106-107; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 434-437; Hasten et ai, 

Introduction, 342; Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 15 and Legal System, 574. 

583 See La Bree, Rechterlijke Organisatie te Batavia, 64. Sirks, Legal History 14 (1993), 106. For biographical details see 





584 The wording of the original Statutes are included in Van der Chijs Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, 472 et seqq. 

585 Visagie, Regspleging, 33; Hahlo and Kahn, Union, 15; Stock, SAU 15 (1932), 330. 
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Matsuycker drafted a number of new regulations, among them a Maniere van Procedeeren voor 
de Collegien van Justitie tot Batavia (manual for the proceedings before the Courts of Justice at 
Batavia). The whole served as a basic code until 1766. What was not covered by the code was to 
be judged according to the law in the Netherlands. The Statutes were promulgated on 8 July 
1641 by Governor-General Antonio van Diemen and took effect from 1 January 1642. 
It must be noted, however, that the Governor-General at Batavia was hardly empowered to enact 
new laws. The famous Octrooi from 1602 made by the Estates-General, the supreme governing 
body of the Low Countries which chartered the VQC, never conferred legislative powers on the 
various bodies of the VOc. Thus, strictly speaking, the heeren seventien and the councils of the 
comptoirs were not entitled to pass any legislation.586 Nevertheless, D H van Zyl has argued that 
the lack of formal consent of the Estates-General was made up for by"... 'n stilswyende 
goedkeuring ... " since the Estates-General never objected to the local enactments at Batavia587 
This argument is confinned by a brief remark at the very end of the introductory chapter to the 
original Statutes 0 f India from 1641. The passage shows that the Batavian local authorities were 
well aware of the need to receive some kind of approval, either open or tacit, by the Estates­
General: 
"Ende alles by provisie [the Validity of the Statutes of India1 ende tot dat by d 'Heeren onse 
principalen met authorisatie ofte approbatie van de Ho. Mog. Heeren Staten Generael nader 
reglement op de regeringe van India geraempt ende overgesonden sal worden."S88 
Nevertheless, the validity of the Statutes was probably confirmed by customary use of the 
enactment in Batavia and the numerous buitencomptoiren.589 These Statutes of India were also 
applied at the Cape. Although formal adoption of the Statutes took place only in 1715, court 
records indicate that as early as 1656 reference was made to the Statutes of India in the Cape 
Court of Justice.590 In February 1715, the Political Council decided: " .. .dat voortaen omtrent de 
586 De Wet, THR-HR 21 (1958),94; Visagie, Regspleging, 33 et seq and 66 et seq; Van ZyJ, Geskiedenis, 433-437. Accordingly 
the recommendation of the heeren seven/ien from 4 March 1621 to administer the law primarily in accordance with the laws of 
the Province of Holland is also questionable. See Hosten et ai, Introduction, 341; Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 438. See also Rex v 
Harrison and Dryburgh 1922 AD 320 at 333. 
587 Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 435 . 
588 See Van der Chijs, Nederlandsc h-Indisch Plako.atboek, 473 . It is interesting to note that none of the relevant modem authors 
have referred to this detail. 
589 Sirks, Legal History 14 (1993), 108. 
590 Van Zyl, Geskiedenis, 437; Visagie, Regspleging, 65; Hosten et aI, Introduction , 342; Botha, Common and Statute Law, 42­
45 . 
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regts en gedingzaken, de Statuten van India zullen gevolgt werden. .. ".591 Only in peculiar local 
conditions were the Batavian regulations non applicable. 
Considering these general facts on the interaction of the Batavian Statutes and the law at the 
Cape, it remains to be asked whether Sir John was correct in stating that the Statutes of India 
contained a provision introducing the concept of leave to sue. From an anonymous hand-written 
copy of the Statutes of India at the Library of the Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division at 
Cape Town, it is evident that the Statutes indeed included such a concept. Under Art 36 of the 
chapter Van de Justitie, we find the following regulation together with the annotation Oude 
Statut (initial Statutes of India): 
"Dog t'Lands Oveheid de Leeden van den Raad van Justitie en Scheepenen, mitsg{ . .} aer de resp. 
OjJicieren van Justitie, zal niemand voor't Recht betrekken ten zij met special consent, gelyk ook 
niemand zyne Oudere nogte zyne geweezene Lyfherren ofte Vrouwen op 35 reaelen boeke." 
The section is followed by other regulations that have later dated annotations. For example, Art 
37 which regulates the requirement of obtaining venia agendi in order to sue a member of the 
clergy is dated 18 August 1729. The date ofArt 38 dealing with venia agendi of court officials is 
dated sometime in 1737. The fact that Art 36 must have been included under Matsuycker's 
initial version of the Statutes is not only evident from the annotation Dude Statut, but also by 
comparison of the Cape Town copy with the original text of the Batavian Statutes. Article 2 of 
the chapter Maniere van Procedeeren voor de Collegien van Justitie tot Batavia of the original 
Batavian Statutes states: 
"De Lantoverheyt, die van de Raede van Justitie ende den gerechte, mitsgaders oock de respective 
OjJicieren, en sal niemant voor recht betrecken, ten .ry met speciael consent, gelyck oock niemant 
.ryne ouders, nochte .ryne gewesene lyffheer ofte vrouwe, op 25 reaelen van achten."S92 
Since no sufficient reason for the application of the above-mentioned saving clause can be 
identified, it is fair to conclude that the concept of leave to sue was introduced to the Cape via 
the Batavian Statutes. It must have been Jan Matsuycker who, for whatever reason, included this 
procedural privilege in the original Statutes. 
In incorporating this privilege, Matsuycker appears to have been inspired by the Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law with regard to the so-called venia agendi. Although Roman-Dutch law did 
not provide for procedural privilege for magistrates, it took over the Roman concept of venia 
agendi. As we now know, venia agendi was necessary, for example, in cases when children 
59 1 Quoted at Visagie, Regspleging, 66; Botha, Common and Statute Law, 46. 
592 Included in Van der Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, 498. 
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intended to sue their parents or when a wife wished to sue her husband.593 Undoubtedly, 
Matsuycker must have had venia agendi in mind when he drafted Art 2 of the Batavian Maniere 
van Procedeeren. This is particularly apparent from the alternative formulation "...gelyck oock 
niemant syne ouders ...".; it is further apparent, from the fact that, similar to a child's not suing 
his ouders, a former slave was not permitted to sue his former master or mistress without 
consent: " ...nochte syne gewesene lyffheer ofte vrouwe ..." .594 The creative part of Matsuycker's 
approach was, first, that Batavian law, unlike Roman and Roman-Dutch law, covered 
administrative, judicial and religious authorities as well as martial authorities under the concept 
of venia agendi.595 Secondly, unlike their counterparts in Roman law, Batavian magistrates of 
any rank including judges enjoyed this procedural privilege. 
This extensive procedural privilege was intended to protect the status of various authorities 
within Dutch colonial society: former slave owners, parents and husbands; as well as high 
political officers and administrators, including the clergy and judges. The group of 
administrative, judicial and religious authorities was a particularly small and exclusive set of 
Dutch colonial notables within colonial society at large.596 The cream of colonial society at 
593 See above chapter II 4. And note Van der Linden, Institutes ofHolland, 3.1 .2.3: "If children conceive that they have any 
right of action against their parents, they must first apply to he court for leave to sue them; which leave is termed venia agendi." 
Further see Merula, Manier van Procederen, 4.24.12.2: "Alle Private Persoone11, tegens dewelke iemand eenige Actie heeft 
uitstaande, mogen .. in Rechte betogen worden." And 4.24.12.3: "Uitgenommen zommige, die men niet mag dagen, dan ...met 
Limiatie. In welker getal eerst verschynen des Anlegers of Klagers Ouders, Vader en Moeder... Deeze (als ook desze/fs 
Leenheer.. .) mag men in Recht nier roepen absque venia [Annotation [c] : venia agendi genoemt] zonder voorgaande Consent 
en permissie van den Juge ." The records of the National Archives provide for numerous examples of woman trying to obtain 
venia agendi for actions against their husbands. See for instance at CJ No. 2510, 84; CJ No. 2511 ,11; CJ No. 2515, 276; 
CJ No. 2522, 237: "Jacoba Bezuidenhout verzoekt veniam agendi om tegens haaren man Abraham Visser tot dissolutie van 
het huwelijks band te moegen procederen." 
594 Even though it appears that the Roman-Dutch writers had more in mind the ancient feudal relationship between 
Leenheer and his Vasal. See Merula, Manier van Procederen, 4.24.12.3 Annotation [b]. 
595 For us today a distant cry from the past. However, in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe the subordinate position of 
a wife to her spouse was common practice. J Voet can be cited as follows: "Among us she [the wife] is so far brought by 
marriage under a marital power enlarged to an almost boundless scope as to be constrained through such power by a chain as 
tight as or tighter than ties of paternal power by which sons of a family are bound ...". Furthermore see his Commentary at D 
2.4.10. 
596 For a telling description of colonial society at Batavia in the second half of the seventeenth century see Blusse, Strange 
Company, 73, 78 et seqq, 172 et seqq; Taylor, Social World ofBatavia, 14 et seqq. For an account of the personal relationships 
at the top of Batavian society and the nepotism in the middle of the eighteenth century see Sirks, Legal History 14 (1993), 109­
110. A description of the state of Dutch colonial society at the Cape is provided in Valentyn, Beschrywinge van de Kaap der 
Goede Hoope, 171-175. Also Schutte, Company and Colonists, at the Cape, 292-298. For a later period see Dooling, Law and 
Community. See also Botha, Social Life, 146-196. 
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Batavia has been described as new male VOC officials arriving from Europe and establishing 
themselves by marrying daughters or widows of those already established ther~. Transfer of 
office was predominantly within the widespread family units. This social elite was tremendously 
rich, partly due to profitable marriages, partly due to illicit trade profits.597 Little wonder that 
whoever entered this close-knit group was inclined to preserve and protect the profitable status 
quo. 
4 2 3 Conclusions 
The modern concept of leave to sue in s 25 of the Supreme Court Act of 1959 and s 5 of the 
Constitutional Court Amendment Act of 1995 is rooted in the mid-seventeenth century Batavian 
provision of venia agendi. However, this concept was not free from change over the centuries of 
its application. 
Variations already appear in the differences between the original Batavian Statute and the hand­
written copy in use at the Cape. Unlike their counterparts in Batavia, schepenen (landdrosten) 
were expressly protected by the regulations at the Cape. Furthermore, the Cape privilege applied 
indefinitely, and specific rules as to the procedure to petition for venia agendi existed. When the 
concept of leave was incorporated in rule 9 of the Cape Rules of Court, further changes took 
place. First, inferior judges no longer enjoyed this procedural privilege. Secondly, the concept 
applied only during the term of the judge's office. Thirdly, the privilege lost much of its social 
impetus as a protective shield for colonial notables: only the governor, his deputy and the 
members of the superior judiciary were to be included. Leave to sue came to be based on 
considerations of legal policy where it was considered an effective means to protect the dignity 
of judicial office from frivolous and vexatious actions. However, this was by no means a 
guarantee that post -1828 courts considered applications for leave to sue with much 
objectivity.598 Finally, under s 25 (l) of the Supreme Court Act of 1959, it was the judiciary 
which remained exclusively protected by leave to sue. The state president as successor to the 
governor was no longer included under s 25 of the Act.599 
597 Taylor, Social World ofBatavia, 14 and 78-79. 
598 As appears from the Natal case Titonka v The Governor (\908) NLR 70 at 73-74 where a full bench held that: "They [the 
Natal Rules of Court] certainly never contemplated taking proceedings against a judge of this court for acts which he has done 
as a judge." Further, it was held: " ... the application under all circumstances, is ridiculous." And: "It seems to me nothing short 
of astonishing that such an application should seriously have been made to this Court." 
599 For a discussion whether this was merely a casus omissus see Riekert, THR-HR 41 (1978), 430-431. 
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concept to sue origin in Batavian of 1642 and was not rooted in 
the constitutional doctrine crown immunity, as has been suggested. It selVes as an as 
yet example a concept which is of English nor Roman-Dutch, but of 
Batavian-Cape-Dutch In this sense, concept is unique not only in the procedural law 
South but in the legal as a whole. 
4 3 A future for leave to sue South law? 
In context of modem law, it is submitted that to sue as an additional procedural 
requirement to sue is not with s of the Constitution 1996. This VIew may 
draw .,....,i-T",.,....... from of but is good reason speaking out 
against retention of this out-dated concept. 
AccorGme to the ofs 25 of the Supreme Court 1959 and s 5 of the Constitutional 
Court Complementary Act leave to sue a judge must obtained court of 
would-be ;udee or of the Constitutional If the latter is to sued, 
consent must be Justice. 25 makes it further that no 
inferior court may an of summons or a against a Application 
leave to sue, in practice, is not by way of of motion, but is an informal application with 
to the . concemed.6OO a 1985 Botswanian case, Ngope v 0 'Brien Quinn, Trollip AJ 
held that a court must "...apprised the facts relating to the would-be plaintiff's alleged 
cause ofaction to enable it to decide whether or not to grant requested to sue.,,601 
writers have that an application will unless the can establish 
good cause. What amounts to good cause, depends on the circumstances each 
602case.
The question as to this does not deprive a Der50n who 
hands of a . from direct and immediate access to the courts redress, as been 
UCUUU.5'"' at 
l~F;l"l<:U~U in s 34 ofthe Constitution? Is leave to sue not a further and unnecessary on a 
would-be plaintiff? 
600 Civil Procedure. 63. 
601 Botswanian High Court cases 123/85 and 1186, unreported. 

602 Erasmus, Superior Courl Service 3, 1995, Al-76; Nathan and Rules ofCouri, 618. 
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The right of access to courts is contained in chapter 2 of the Constitution of 1996, the so-called 
Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights " ... enshrines and entrenches the fundamental human rights and 
freedoms of subjects of the state, which are protected against infringement.',603 According to s 
34: 
"Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application oflaw decided in a 
fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tnbunal or 
forum." 
The right of access to court, however, is not entirely free from limitation. Section 34 is no 
exception to limitation in terms of s 36, which contains a general limitation clause that applies to 
all constitutional rights, including the Bill ofRights.604 With regard to leave to sue, it might now 
be asked whether s 25 of the Supreme Court Act of 1959 and s 5 of the Constitutional Court 
Complementary Act of 1995 are laws ofgeneral application which limit s 34 of the Constitution 
in a reasonable and justifiable way. If the two provisions do not comply with the limitation test, 
they must be considered unconstitutional and void. In order to assess the constitutionality of the 
limitation of a constitutional right, s 36 refers to an additional five factors which supplement the 
initial two-tiered test of reasonableness andjustifiability.605 The following discussion is based on 
the scheme of this test. 
4 3 1 Law of general application 
According to s 36 (1) of the Constitution, a legal right may be limited only by a law of general 
application. A law in this sense includes legislation, common law and customary law.606 Section 
25 of the Supreme Court Act of 1959 and s 5 of the Constitutional Court Complementary Act of 
1995 are, therefore, laws ofgeneral application. 
603 Section 7 of the Constitution. See Basson, Interim Constitution, 13. 
604 The literature on the limitation clause is vast. For a detailed account (predominantly still with respect to the Interim 
Constitution) see Erasmus, Limitation, 629-654, Du Plessis and Corder, Bill of Rights, 122-128 and Basson, Interim 
Constitution, 50-54. A more recent contribution on the provisions of the final Constitution is provided by Woolman, 
SAJOHR 13 (1997), 102-134. While making use of publications dealing with the limitation clause of the Interim 
Constitution (s 33) it has to be realised that two essential aspects have been removed from the limitation clause of the final 
Constitution , i.e., the so-called 'necessary-requirement' and the passage that stated that no limitation 'shall negate the 
essential content of the right '. 
605 Rautenbach and MaJherbe, Constitutional Law, 311 and 313 . 
606 I bid. at 3 1 1 . 
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4 3 2 The nature of the right 
The first factor to be detennined is what right is protected by s 34 and how important s 34 is in 
an open and democratic society.607 
Under the closed and undemocratic system of the apartheid regime, free and unrestricted access 
to courts was often barred.608 Various fundamental rights of procedure were unprotected. To 
prevent once and for all any future abuse, s 34 of the Constitution protected the right to 
unrestricted access to the courts and provided for fair public hearings. Section 34 must be read in 
conjunction with s 8 (1) and s 35 (3) of the Constitution which guarantee equal protection of the 
law and the right to a fair trial. More precisely, this implies the following: 609 Section 34 obliges 
the government to establish a system of courts and tribunals as well as to provide for their 
continuous functioning.610 Free access to courts further guarantees rights in regard to the nature 
of court proceedings and the procedure to be followed, in other words a fair and public trial. This 
also applies to civil litigation, although there exists some uncertainty as to the precise scope of 
.gh 611thisn 1. 
Enshrinement of the right to a fair trial eliminated the infamous ouster clauses of the apartheid 
age which restricted the courts' jurisdiction in certain matters and, consequently, barred access to 
the COurtS.612 In Besserglik v Minister of Trade and Bernstein v Bester, it was argued by the 
applicants that access to the courts includes the right to have disputes determined by a court of 
law until final determination which, inter alia, would include a right of appeal.613 Although 
O'Regan J expressed some doubts about the correctness of this interpretation, it has not yet been 
expressly rejected.614 In Mohlomie v Minister of Defence, a time limit of six months for the 
607 Woolman, SAJOHR 13 (1997), 110. 
608 Generally the question of access to court can be seen in a broader context, i.e., access to justice. For details see 
Cappelletti, SAL] 109 (1992), 22. Further note Erasmus, 1996 Consultus, 105-107. 
609 See generally Rautenbach and Malherbe, Constitutional Law, 218; Rautenbach, Bill of Rights, 65-67 and 129; Basson, 
Interim Constitution, 32-33; Du Plessis and Corder, Bill ofRights, 163; Beukes, 1997 Consultus, 130; Loots, Access to Courts , 
Original Service, 1995, 8-1 ; Erasmus, Superior Court Practice, Service 6, 1996, A2-44-46. 

610 Known in German constitutional law as so-called Justizgewdhrungsanspruch. See Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (4) BCLR 

449 (cq, 1996 (2) SA 751 (cq para 51 . 

611 Rautenbach and Malherbe, Constitutional Law, 219-220. 

612 See above at I 22 I. Further see Basson, SAJOHR 3 (1987),28-43 . 

613 1996 (6) BCLR 745 (cq para 10; and 1996 (4) BCLR 449, 1996 (2) SA 75 I (cq para 102-106, respectively. 





institution of actions in tenns of s 113 (1) of the Defence Act of 1957 was considered 
inconsistent with the right of access to courts. 
Access to courts further includes the right to have justiciable disputes settled by an independent 
court. 1bis principle does not only protect the courts against outside interference. It also provides 
the individual with a claim vis-a-vis the courts in respect of independence and impartiality. 1bis 
includes inter alia the rule that a presiding officer has to recuse himself if there is suspicion that 
he is biased.615 It is important to note that free access to court is not necessarily restricted to 
courts in a narrow sense, but also applies to other independent and impartial bodies such as the 
various tribunals referred to above.616 
4 3 3 Importance of the purpose of the limitation 
Limiting provisions must also promote or protect a pennissible or lawful public interest.617 
For close to 170 years, leave to sue has received unanimous approval in the South African case 
law and jurisprudence. Arguments in favour of the concept have centred around two policy 
aspects: On the one hand, the purpose of leave to sue was to ensure that " ... because of the 
important, responsible and respected office of a Judge ... he should not be subjected to or harassed 
by trivial, vexatious, or unsubstantial civil lawsuits which have no chance of succeeding.'>618 On 
the other hand, leave to sue was said to be aimed against improper interruption of the courts' 
functioning, which could occur ifjudges had constantly to defend themselves in court actions.619 
Both arguments, the protectional and the functional, make reference to particular public 
interests, namely the integrity, dignity and efficient functioning of the judiciary. Undoubtedly 
these are important interests worthy ofpreservation in a democratic and open society.620 
615 S v Collier 1995 (8) BCLR 975 (CC). See also Rautenbach and Malherbe, Constitutional Law, 218-219. 

616 See above I 2 I 3 and recently Beukes, 1997 Consultus, 130-131. 

617 Woolman, SAJOHR 13 (1997), 110-111. 

618 Summarised per Trollip AJ in Ngobe v O'Brien-Quinn Botswanian High Court cases 123/85 and 1/86, unreported. 

Quoted from Othlhogile, LV 7 (1991), 110. Further Ex parte Aaron 1904 TS 487 at 489. See also Erasmus, Superior Court 

Practice, Service 3,1995, AI-76; Nathan and Barnett, Rules o/Court, 618; Harms, Civil Procedure, 63; Boulle et ai, 

Constitutional and Administrative Law, 203-204; Herbstein and Van Winsen, Civil Practice, 426; Herbstein and Diemont, 

Superior Court Practice, 43; Anders, SAU 27 (1910), 245 . 

619 Erasmus, Superior Court Practice, Service 4, 1995, A3-3. 

620 The merits of these purposes will be discussed below at 436 1 and 4362. 
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4 3 4 The nature and the extent of the limitation 
The next step must be to establish to what extent the interests protected by s 34 of the 
Constitution are affected by s 25 of the Supreme Court Act of 1959 and s 5 of the Constitutional 
Court Complementary Act of 1995. In other words, one has to: 
"...place the pwpose, effects and importance of the infringing legislation on one side of the scales and 
the nature and effect of the infringement...on the other. The more substantial the inroad into 
fundamental rights, the more persuasive the grounds for justification must be.,,621 
Leave to sue is a preliminary petition procedure which regulates access to court with respect to 
actions against a superior court judge. It has been argued that leave to sue is no different from 
any other rule requiring a litigant to proceed in court by one form of action or another. Therefore, 
leave to sue has been considered an adequate tool in the hands of the judiciary. It has been 
contended that criticism would elevate a mere procedural rule to the status of substantive law.622 
A more cautious approach, however, is advisable. Not every procedural rule is similar. Most 
procedural rules aim merely to regulate the functionality of court procedures.623 Some 
procedural rules, however, have serious consequences for the litigating parties. The different 
'leave to' regulations in South African procedural law, namely leave to appeal as well as leave to 
sue, are examples of the latter.624 In both cases, plaintiffs or prospective plaintiffs may have to 
face the hardship of denial of further or even initial legal steps before a court. Without having as 
yet assessed the admissibility of the regulations contained in s 25 of the Supreme Court Act of 
1959 and s 5 of the Constitutional Court Complementary Act of 1995, it is evident from an 
objective point of view that in both instances there are, inevitably, drastic consequences for the 
legal position of the parties. 
4 3 4 J The Constitutional Court's decision in Besserglik and its relevance to the concept 
ofleave to sue 
The constitutionality of the concept of leave to appeal in terms of s 20 (4) (b) of the Supreme 
Court Act of 1959 was in 1996 the subject of a Constitutional Court decision in Besserglik v 
Minister ofTrade, Industry and Tourism.625 The court rejected the argument that leave to appeal 
621 Sv Gwadiso 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC) para 18. Further Woolman, SAJOHR 13 (1997),110. 
622 Othlhogile, LV7 (1991),118. 
62J For instance, rules with regard to evidence, pleadings, court sittings, etc. 
624 The procedures with regard to leave to appeal are generally contained under ss 20 and 21 Supreme Court Act of 1959. 
625 1996 (6) BCLR 745 (CC). 
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and the required petition procedure infringed sections 22 and 8 (1) of the Interim Constitution of 
1993.626 With regard to s 22, it was held by the court that a screening procedure which excludes 
unmeritorious appeals cannot be considered a denial of a right to access to a court as long as the 
screening procedure enables a higher court to make an informed decision as to the prospects of 
627 success. 
This argument does not fully address the problems connected with s 25 of the Supreme Court 
Act of 1959 and s 5 of the Constitutional Court Complementary Act of 1995. Neither the 
Constitutional Court Complementary Act nor the Supreme Court Act provide for the safeguard 
of an additional petition procedure, there being no possibility whatsoever for a would-be plaintiff 
to have a denial of leave to sue reconsidered by a higher court. Hence, the central argument in 
Besserglik does not apply directly here. 
The same argument shows to what degree ss 25 and 5 limit the right of free access to courts 
since they deny a prospective plaintiff an elementary procedural right: the right to review.628 
This right would only be available to a party that succeeded in obtaining leave to sue. 
4 3 4 2 Procedure with respect to recusal and review 
Other aspects also show how severely s 34 of the Constitution is infringed by the two limitations 
presently under review. It is noteworthy that South African procedural law does not afford a 
similar far-reaching immunity to the judiciary with regard to either judicial recusal or judicial 
review. In the former instance, a litigant might institute procedures in order to have a judge 
recuse himself from a case when there is reasonable ground for suspicion of bias on the part of 
the judge, without an obligation to petition for leave firSt. 629 In addition, according to s 24 (1) (b) 
and (c) of the Supreme Court Act of 1959, the proceedings of any inferior court may be brought 
under review on the grounds of interest in the cause, bias, malice or corruption on the part of the 
judicial officer, as well as in cases of gross irregularity during the proceedings. 
626 Predecessors of s 34 and s 9 (1) of the Constitution of 1996. 

627 Besserglik v Minister ofTrade, Industry and Tourism 1996 (6) BCLR 745 (CC) para 9 and 10. 

628 De Vos, 1991 TSAR, 369. 

629 See Manning and Others v Council of Review and Others 1989 (4) SA 866 (CC); S v Malind; 1990 (1) SA 962 (A) 

affirming S v Radebe 1973 (J) SA 796 (A). Further note Boulle et ai, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 204; Van 






If one argues that leave to sue proceedings harm the integrity and dignity of the judicial office, it 
is submitted that the same applies to recusal and review proceedings. This is particularly evident 
from analysing the relation of review procedures and proceedings against a judge in delict for 
which leave to sue is necessary. From what has been said in the previous chapter, it is evident 
that at present a successful claim in delict against a judge requires proof of malice on the part of 
the judge. That these criteria are identical in review proceedings shows how closely related these 
proceedings are. Therefore, it is generally feasible that, at least in the cases of bias, malice or 
corruption, an action in delict could be considered concurrently with ordinary review procedures. 
In both instances, the accusation against the judge is identical in principle. However, it is only 
with regard to leave to sue that the protection argument is raised to justify a limitation of access 
to the courts. 
The weakness of the protection argument is further evident from a second aspect. Quite apart 
from instances of delictual claims against a judge, which are based on the judge's perfonnance 
in court, one can identify various other cases where leave to sue must be obtained. Reference 
might be made in this regard to the case ofajudge's spouse who wants to sue for divorce or the 
case of a judge who has failed to pay for a car he or she bought. It is submitted that in these cases 
the anticipated harm to the judiciary's integrity or dignity is not nearly as serious as in the case of 
recusal and review. The fact remains, however, that with regard to recusal or review an 
aggrieved party enjoys W1festricted access to court in order to have the consequences of ajudge's 
misconduct redressed. It is clear that South African law is not consistent in its approach to the 
various problems discussed. 
4 3 4 3 Legal uncertainty 
Another aspect ofconcern in dealing with the aspect of the nature and extent of the limitation, is 
the lack of clarity in the relevant sections.630 What exactly is considered sufficient ground for 
granting leave to sue? Secondary sources advise that " ...good cause would have to be shown in 
an application for leave to sue." And further: "What amounts to good cause depends upon the 
circumstances of each case.,,63I This is a hollow phrase. In an early case, Tilonko v The 
Governor, Bale CJ held that no leave to sue would be granted unless the court were satisfied that 
630 For the use of the term legal certainty/uncertainty see Beukes, 1997 Consultus, 131. 





a prima facie case had been made OUt.632 Section 25 of the Supreme Court Act of 1959 and s 5 
of the Constitutional Court Complementary Act of 1995 are completely silent on this important 
question. They do not even contain a reference to a prima facie case. No safe guidelines exist 
that would enable a would-be plaintiff to assess objectively what his chances are of obtaining 
leave to sue. 
Secondly, it is totally unclear from the wording, at least of the Supreme Court Act, who in the 
end grants leave to sue.633 From the Tilonko case it is evident that two of the three judges who 
constituted the court a quo also sat on the Bench of the second suit where the plaintiff tried to 
obtain leave to sue in respect of the first trial ,634 The wording of s 25 of the Supreme Court Act 
of 1959 does not exclude such a possibility. It only refers to the fact that: "...no swnmons ...shall 
in any civil action be issued ...except with the consent of that court ...".635 What this means is 
unclear. Is reference made to the court the judge belongs to? If so, who sits on this court? Will 
only the judge president or rather a full court of the division be involved? Or, will there be a 
judge president or will a full court of a second division or the Chief Justice or even the President 
of the Constitutional Court be called to grant leave to sue? Considering the weight of the 
fundamental right entrenched under s 34 of the Constitution, it is clear that this is an untenable 
situation. It promotes legal uncertainty of the first order. 
4 3 4 4 Other considerations 
Only superior court judges are protected by the preliminary procedural safeguard under 
discussion here. Even though South African judges might not enjoy the same reputation as they 
did 30 years ago, the judiciary is still in an elevated position. There remains a considerable 
reluctance to criticise, let alone to sue a member of the superior judiciary. Taking this into 
account, one may safely assert that the obligation to obtain preliminary leave to sue increases 
existing psychological inhibitions, a point which clearly relates to the question of access to court. 
632 (1908) NLR 70 at 73 
633 From s 5 Constitutional Court Complementary Act of 1995 it is evident that the President of the Constitutional Court grants 
leave to sue against an ordinary Constitutional Court judge. With regard to the President of the Constitutional Court the Chief 
Justice grants leave to sue. 
634 (1908) NLR 70 at 73-74. 
635 My italics. 
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A final criticism that must be made is that the present concept of leave to sue conveys to would­
be plaintiffs, and not only to them, the feeling that South Africa's superior judiciary resembles a 
distinct caste within society who, as soon as their own interests are at stake, withdraw into their 
snail-shells and protect themselves by a set of restrictive regulations. The superior judiciary at 
present enjoys not only considerable immunity from action in substantive law, which is 
technically very difficult to overcome, but shields itself by means of leave to sue. 
Add to this that - despite the validity in South African law of the maxim that no-one shall be 
judge in his own case (nema iudex in sua causa) - it is the judiciary itself which decides whether 
leave to sue will be granted against a brother or sister on the Bench. The lack of clarity on how 
the court granting leave to sue is constituted only intensifies these misgivings. Access to courts 
as entrenched under s 34 of the Constitution creates inter alia a platform for a constitutional 
guarantee concerning fair trial and the protection of fundamental procedural rights. It also 
provides the individual with a claim vis-a-vis the courts that the latter function independently 
and impartially.636 The proverb 'Dog does not eat dog' probably describes best why the essential 
procedural rule embodied in the above-mentioned maxim mentioned should also apply to leave 
to sue proceedings. 
4 3 5 The relation between the limitation and its purpose 
Having assessed the overall legitimacy of the purpose of the limitation of suing judges637 in s 25 
of the Supreme Court Act of 1959 as well as s 5 of the Constitutional Court Complementary Act 
of 1995 it must be determined whether the two provisions in reality promote the purpose of the 
limitation.638 
From a practical point of view, it may be said that the procedural privilege included in both 
sections presently under review does promote the purpose of the limitation, i.e., there have 
hardly been any actions against judges reported the past decades. 
636 Rautenbach, SA Bill ofRights, 66 . 
637 See above at 4 3 3. 
638 Woolman ,SAJOHR 13 (1997),110. 
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4 3 6 Less restrictive means to achieve that purpose 
Finally, the constitutionality of the two sections in question might be assessed by asking whether 
the purpose of the sections could not have been served equally effectively in their absence or by 
equally effective alternative measures. In other words, we have to strike a balance between two 
competing rights and interests.639 The existence of such alternatives would be strong indication 
that the two sections restricting direct access to court are indeed excessive. 
4361 Functioning ofthe courts 
Would unrestricted access to court in an action against a judge really prevent the courts from 
functioning properly? Examples from other legal systems such as those of Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium or even England show that actions against judges are highly exceptional, 
even though these countries do not have any procedural safeguard like South Africa's.640 In 
Canada, the majority of the annual 100 or so complaints against federal judges are concerned 
with the decision itself and not with complaints which could possibly give ground to an action in 
delict such as bias, or unbecoming conduct, or abuse of authority.641 None of these countries has 
considered the adoption of any kind of procedural immunity in order to shield the functionality 
of their courts. 
The most important argument against the functionality argument, meanwhile, can be found in 
South Africa itself where the Magistrates' Courts handle the vast majority of all court actions; in 
fact, by 1993 the figures reached over 95% of all criminal and civil matters. 642 The number of 
personal actions issued against magistrates is insignificant although the magistracy explicitly 
does not enjoy any kind of procedural immunity.643 Hence, it is unlikely that if leave to sue were 
639 With regard to the various aspects of balancing see ibid. at 113-119. 

640 As indicted earlier, there have been a number of actions in criminal law against former East-German judges and prosecutors. 

However, the vast majority of the cases lead to acquittal because most judges in former East-Germany did not violate 

fundamental principles of human rights. These verdicts of the Bundesgerichtshofhave been received very critically. See for an 

overview see Hillenkamp, 1996 JZ, 181-182; Spendel, 1995 JZ, 375 et seqq. With regard to Belgium see Storme, 1993 NJB, 

917 et seqq, by the same author Responsibility of the Judge, 402 et seqq; Kortmann, 1993 NJB, 920 et seqq. For the 

Netherlands see Winkel, Responsabilite de Juges. Recent cases in England are discussed above at chapter VI 4 I 4. 

641 See McQuoid-Mason, Transformation, 109-110. 

642 Fernandez, Analysis and Critique, 116; McQuoid-Mason, Transformation, 101 and 110; leJ. Report, 114. See further South 

Africa: Hoexter Commission 1983 Report, IV 2.2.1.2.1. 

643 No reported cases since 1977. 
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to be abolished as a requirement, South African judges would experience a flood of actions 
against them, with devastating consequences for the functioning of the superior courts. 
4 3 6 2 The judiciary's integrity and dignity 
It has also been argued that vexatious and hopelessly unfounded actions would harm the dignity 
and integrity of the jUdiciary. Therefore, the procedural immunity is necessary to filter out 
reasonable from unfounded actions. But would not a judiciary, which has nothing to fear from 
such actions and accordingly keeps the courts open for any conceivable action appear much 
more dignified in the eyes of the public when no claim succeeded even after say 100 actions? 
Would not those actions rebound on the quarrelsome litigants rather than on the judges? 
Furthermore, in light of the degree of the substantive protection judges enjoy at present there 
appears to be no need for further procedural safeguard. The limitations of s 25 of the Supreme 
Court Act of 1959 and s 5 of the Constitutional Court Complementary Act of 1995, therefore, 
seem superfluous and unduly burdensome. 
4 3 6 3 Less restrictive means 
If one adheres to the view that leave to sue is a necessary means of achieving the purposes of 
upholding the integrity, dignity and functioning of the courts, it is submitted that there exist other 
effective but less restrictive means of doing so. 
One alternative would be directed against one of the most crucial aspects of the present 
regulation, namely the fact that the judges themselves decide whether or not to grant leave to 
sue. One of the fundamental innovations in the structures ofjustice in the new democratic South 
Africa has been the introduction of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). Reference has 
already been made to the crucial role this body plays with regard to the appointment and removal 
of superior court judges. These are two essential modes ofjudicial accountability.644 It would be 
feasible to assign to a subcommittee of this truly independent and impartial semi-legal body the 
right to grant leave to sue against a judge.645 Technically, this body should not have any 
difficulty in dealing with the questions that arise from such a petition. This alternative would, 
644 See above at I 2 2 2. 

64~ Note the composition of the JSC according to s 178 of the Constitution. 
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fiuther, be in accordance with the creation of a balance between judicial independence and 
judicial accountability. It would free the jUdiciary from the odour of protecting their own. 
Even if one believed that the body granting leave to sue under the present regulation would be 
constituted in a different manner from that in the infamous Tilonko case646 and would act fairly 
and impartially, considerations of justice speak against the present regulation. Justice not only 
has to be done, it has also to be seen to be done.647 Therefore, the public needs to be assured that 
absolute impartiality prevails also where the judiciary itself is concerned. This assurance can 
only be provided by a body which is not part of the judiciary. The JSC meets all the necessary 
requirements. 
Finally, as the Constitutional Court pointed out in Besserglik, an essential requirement for 
assessing an infringement of s 34 of the Constitution is the question of whether or not a litigant 
has access to a higher court for review. Fairness of trial requires the additional and final 
possibility of an appeal against refusal of leave to sue - perhaps to a higher court or better to the 
full JSC. 
4 4 Conclusion 
Without doubt, the dignity and the integrity of the judges of the superior courts is of great 
importance to the proper and effective functioning of the judicial system in South Africa's new 
democratic society. These purposes require the protection of the legal order. Equally important 
to this aim is the support and protection of the functionality of the courts. Nonetheless, it is 
submitted that from the application of the general limitation test ofs 36 (1) of the Constitution of 
1996, it is evident that s 25 of the Supreme Court Act of 1959 and s 5 of the Constitutional 
Court Complementary Act of 1995 are not reasonable and justifiable limitations in an open and 
democratic society of the right of free access to the courts. The requirement of leave to sue, 
therefore, has to be considered an unconstitutional limitation of the fundamental right to 
unrestricted access to the courts which is entrenched under s 34 of the Constitution of 1996. 
The obligation imposed on an individual seeking redress for judicial misbehaviour to obtain 
leave to sue prior to institution of a claim is overkill: the rights and interests of the judiciary are 
most effectively protected by a proper application of the restricted scope of the substantive law 
646 See above at 3 2 2 I. 





of delictual liability. that, the of less or ('","flo",,,,,,,,,,,, 
as the inclusion the JSC into procedures also shows that s Supreme 
and s 5 Constitutional Complementary of 1995 are 
Act of 
The concept of leave to sue has historical roots in South system, 
show to what extent concept had Its ongIns m a non-enh o-ht.,.".,.rt and undemocratic 
colonial class It can historically explained. Today, 1"1",,,"'''''''' it is outdated. scant 
criticism that has raised this concept what fact is one leg of a privilege 
IS once agam evidence of the predominantly ~f'U"1"'M(' by lawyers and members 
ofsociety towards the South African judiciary.648 
In there has only one decision a court approached critically the concept of 
to sue. Botswaman case ofNgobe v 0 'Brien-Quinn is not authoritative in South law 
the court had to apply various provisions Botswanian law which no equivalent in 
South African law.649 It is worth noting, though, that on appeal a full held that 
Botswanian rule with regard to to sue, which had by the court a quo as 
being equivalent to s of the Supreme Court of 1959 (South Africa), constituted: " ... an 
oppressive and gratuitous interference with the right ofdirect access to the courts .... ". 650 
It is submitted same applles to South African law. The retention of the of 
to sue is not in accordance with concept ofjudicial accountability which is a part 
South Africa's open democratic society. It is inconsistent with s 34 of the Constitution of 
and therefore should have no place in future South African procedural law. 
648 References in Judges at Work, 232; Marcus, SAV \00 (1984), \60-171; 109-114. See above at 1 3. 
649 See Othlhogile, LV 7 (1991), 107; Redgment, 1987 De Rebus, 116. Botswana was made a British protectorate in 1885. 
the Proclamation of June 10, 1891 Roman-Dutch law was as the law of the protectorate. 
650 Per Maisels P. Quoted from Othlhogie, LV 7 (1991), 119. It is interesting to note that two of the which heard 
the appeal, Maisels P and Van Winsen .IvA, are South African Further, Van Winsen some SIX years earlier sat 
of the Caoe Provincial Division on the case Udwin v Mav which on was reversed bv the Appellate Division. Udwin v 
May is the only case ever in South Africa where officer was held delictually liable we have to remember that 





In view of the preceding analysis of the modem South African law of judicial liability, this 
appears to be the appropriate place to introduce a number of suggestions for reform. 
In cases ofjudicial liability for defamation or insult in court: the present law, as expounded by 
the Appellate Division in May v Udwin, should be retained. 
With regard to judicial liability for wrong judgements: the law should be modified so that 
dolus directus on the part of the judicial officer must be proved on a balance of probabilities 
by the plaintiff to rebut the judicial officer's justification ground. 
Leave to sue as incorporated in s 25 Constitutional Court Complementary Act of 1995 and 
s 25 Supreme Court Act of 1959 should be abolished. It ought to be possible to sue a judicial 
officer in any court like any other citizen in all actions, except actions for defamation or insult 
in court or wrong judgement. With regard to the latter, it must be ascertained whether: 
a.) In case of an alleged wrong judgement, the plaintiff has exhausted all possible legal actions 
against the judgement, i.e., appeal and/or review, without success. 
b.) Where appeal and/or review are unwarranted due to irreparable loss (eg., in the case of 
Stump v Sparkman) or in cases of defamation or insult in court, a petition to hear the case 
should be made to a subcommittee of the JSC, from which appeal would be to the 'full' JSc. 
In the first instance, jurisdiction to hear the matter is to the next higher court. In cases of 
actions against judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal the matter is heard by the 
Constitutional Court and vice versa. In the second instance, the subcommittee of the JSC is 
chaired by a judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal and an additional four members, another 
judge, a senior magistrate, an advocate or an attorney and one lay member. Appeals are heard 
by the 'full' JSC under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice. He sits with six members, i.e., 
another judge, a magistrate, an advocate, an attorney and two lay members not involved in the 
previous hearing. 
